# FW: What's perception got to do, got to do, with it?

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255>\
**Category:** CSG2016\
**Created:** [December 21, 2015, 7:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255 "2015-12-21T19:02:45Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [December 21, 2015, 7:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/1 "2015-12-21T19:02:45Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.21.12.39]

```
This is essentially the answer I was intending to write to Rick.

```

Anyone can imagine and simulate arbitrary perceptual functions, as  
in Rick’s spreadsheet, but unless the results of applying those  
functions is effective in controlling some perception,  
reorganization will soon modify or eliminate them. The perceptual  
functions that persist are the ones that prove useful. It’s not so  
much that the perception produced by the function is controllable,  
though that is often true, it is that controlling that function is  
useful, eventually in sustaining the intrinsic variables in states  
that allow life to continue, but more immediately in forming parts  
of other controllable perceptions. [Parenthetically, this was J. G.  
Taylor’s main insight, as expressed in “The Behavioral Basis of  
Perception”, Yale UP, 1962].  
Consider the mirage, as depicted in many a cartoon of a person  
crawling over a desert. The person perceives a lake. We, the  
omniscient outside observers, know there is no lake. But why does  
the person have a perceptual function that would allow him to see –  
not a shimmering patch AS a lake – but a lake?  
The reason is, I think, that lakes may have been useful perceptions  
in control of other perceptions such as slaking thirst, rowing a  
boat, appreciating beauty, and so forth. A perceived lake is a  
perceived lake, not a perceived combination of coherently transient  
patches of light and shade over a vertically limited extent, etc.  
etc. It’s just a lake. Is the lake a real lake? Who knows? But it’s  
a good perceptual function to have for the purpose of controlling  
one’s perceptions if every time one has that catenation of  
properties, one can slake thirst, row a boat, and appreciate the  
beauty.  
Someone flying over a “real” lake would see that lake just as would  
the person on the ground. The catenation of properties at the  
sensory level would not be the same, but the higher level properties  
of “boundedness” (is that in the environment?), wateriness, etc.  
would be the same. But not so for the lake that is a mirage. It is  
still a perceived lake, but that lake doesn’t stay put when the  
crawling man moves over the desert. He never gets to drink from it.  
We omniscient observers say it isn’t a real lake. That’s not a  
question of interpersonal agreement, but a statement that the  
perceptions that seem real come from functions that usually produce  
single valued (or vector) results that are useful in control or that  
are usefully controlled, even if sometimes those functions produce  
perceptions that don’t allow for such uses or that cannot themselves  
be controlled.  
The CEV and qi have the same status in this respect. Both, at the  
sensory level, are complexes of more than one variable, unless qi is  
specifically the physical input to a sensory unit such as a visual  
cone or an inner hair cell. Both are single valued results of  
applying the same function, but in computing qi, the inputs come  
only from the environment, whereas the CEV has no such limitation.  
It might also incorporate inputs from memory and imagination, or be  
produced entirely from imagination, as are probably most perceptions  
in dreams. Even then, the CEV is perceived AS being in the  
environment.  
I agree that the combination is likely to produce a taste. I cannot  
say that this taste would be “lemon” for someone who has never seen  
a lemon or been told that this taste is “lemon”. However, for  
someone who does _associate_ this taste with lemon, the perception  
of “lemon taste” would be as real as any other, and would be  
perceived as a property of a substance, even if there happened to be  
no substance, but only electrical stimulation of some neurons.  
Nobody else would be able to perceive that particular CEV, which, if  
there was a real substance, would be controllable by, say, adding  
sugar or tomato juice to the mix.  
That is indeed as it is perceived to be. Is it a mirage? I think  
not, because it can be used in controlling other perceptions, and  
moreover, to someone else who has a perceptual function that  
produces a perception of how “lemony” a taset might be, my addition  
of sugar or tomato juice will influence that person’s “lemoniness”  
perception. That kind of cross-personal influence is an argument for  
considering the taste to be in an environment accessible to both  
people. The taste of that drink could be a Collective Complex  
Environmental Variable (CCEV), controllable by a virtual controller  
composed of all the people who control their own perceptions of the  
taste by contributing ingredients to the mix. They won’t perceive  
the same taste, but they would all be controlling it as though there  
was a virtual controller with a controlled taste perception.  
That’s not the essence of my reply. My essential point is that a  
controlled variable is one that is compared with a reference value.  
The difference between those two values determines the influence  
that alters the controlled variable’s value so that it approaches  
the reference value. In the environment where qi is supposed to  
exist, no such reference value is supposed to exist. Therefore qi  
cannot be a controlled variable.  
I think this quibble is mistaken, both as regards qi and as regards  
the CEV. Imagine any function of N variables, but we take N=2 for  
easy visualisation, and call those variables x and y. For every  
possible x-y pair, the function produces a value z, which can be  
visualized as a height above the x-y plane. The function defines a  
surface of hills and valleys over the plane. The volume in which  
this surface exists is 3-dimensional, but the surface is only  
two-dimensional. Some other function would produce a different  
surface of hills and valleys in the same 3-dimensional volume. What  
the functions do is reduce by one the dimensionality of possible  
variation. Every point on the 2-D surface produces the same output  
from the function. When N is greater than 2, the function that  
produces a single value defines an analogous set of “hills and  
valleys” that form a hypersurface of N-1 dimensions.  
There’s no “complex unity”. There is only a complex set of  
possibilities that all produce the same result, the same pattern of  
hills and valleys. The job of the Test for the Controlled Variable  
is to try to find, from the infinite set of possible functions (an  
infinity greater than the infinity of real or complex numbers), some  
function that produces pretty much the same surface as the function  
that produces the controlled variable – the perception.  
Here I contradict you, to argue that intersubjective agreement is a  
perception that has no different status in “reality” from any other  
perception. To me, the test of “objectivity”, if that word is not  
intrinsically paradoxical, is the stability of the perceptual  
function as used in control, either of itself or as a component of  
other perceptions. Intersubjective agreement is indeed useful in  
controlling many perceptions, but can be tested in most cases of  
apparent agreement on a particular item by attempting to use that  
item in controlling some different perception. That two men crawling  
across the desert both agree that they see the same lake makes the  
lake no more real than if there were only one person crawling. Of  
course, there might “really” be an oasis in sight, and this reality  
could be tested when the two men found they could drink from it.  
Again “of course”, there might be no desert, and both might be  
hypnotized to perceive themselves in that situation. I don’t think  
that matters, because the perception each would have is that the  
lake was no mirage, but was a real lake. It would matter, however,  
if the hypnosis persisted to the extent that the subject died of  
thirst thinking that the water was real.  
Do you really believe that? Do you always assume that your  
perception of a dark patch on a cold sidewalk is wetness? That could  
be very dangerous in a Toronto winter. Or do you just assume that  
you veridically see a dark patch and not use that perception in  
controlling any other perception? (For the benefit of those living  
in more tropical climes, a dark patch on the sidewalk might, but  
probably does not, mean that the sidewalk is covered by ice, and a  
careless step might mean a dangerous, possibly fatal, fall). I don’t  
find it paralyzing to step carefully onto such a dark patch to see  
whether my foot slips before I put my full weight on it.  
It’s not mind games to try controlling something that depends on a  
perception that may not be veridical, as the desert crawlers  
discover when they die of thirst, or the walker on a possibly icy  
sidewalk finds when the tentative step determines that the wet patch  
is or is not ice.  
Martin

> **···**
>
> In response to [From Rick Marken  
> (2015.12.20.1830)] and
> 
> > [Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: There are two questions in play. The first question
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > is the ever-recurrent epistemological one: How real is our  
> > control? That devolves to: How real are our perceptions? I  
> > think successful control of a perception is our only warrent  
> > for attributing reality to it, that collective control  
> > strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that  
> > successful collective control implicitly includes and is  
> > based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables,  
> > and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing  
> > reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when  
> > replicated). Doing science is our best intellectual way of  
> > determining what is real.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: The variable q.i is an excellent instance of a
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > perceptual variable to which we are strongly warrent to  
> > attribute reality because we determine it by doing science.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: The second question is: Are q.i and the CEV
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > equivalent. q.i is a single variable perceived and measured  
> > by the observer; the CEV is by definition a complex of more  
> > than one variable.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: Rick (2015.12.20.1830) proposes that you and he are
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > in violent agreement, with a spreadsheet as means of  
> > verification. Below, I offer verbal evidence in support of  
> > this. You may not have seen this, which was posted during  
> > the time in which you weren’t reading CSG-net.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick Marken (2015.12.12.1245)
> 
> > > ```
> > > RM: I would say that the PCT stance on perception (or,
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > epistemology) is that the perceptions that we control are  
> > > constructions based on sensory data that is caused by an  
> > > external (environmental) reality that is approximated by  
> > > the models of physics and chemistry, and these  
> > > constructions are not arbitrary but have functional  
> > > significance in the sense that they allow us to control  
> > > the aspects of physical reality that we have to be able to  
> > > control in order to be able to survive. In other words, I  
> > > would say that the PCT stance is constructivist – realist  
> > > – functionalist.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: So Rick is a realist in regard to the models of
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > physics and chemistry. These models of course are  
> > perceptions. Realism here is a belief that doing science in  
> > the fields of physics and chemistry constructs perceptions  
> > that accord so well with reality (whatever that may be) that  
> > we are warrented to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat.  
> > That warrent is functional and provisional.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: On this basis, my point was about the character of
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > the “supposed-to-exist” CEV. My understanding is that  
> > intensity receptors perceive variables identified by physics  
> > and chemistry (in the example, sugar and acid) and generate  
> > perceptions. Input functions at the sensation level combine  
> > these intensity perceptions. In the example, they construct  
> > the unitary perception of the taste of lemon.
> 
> > ```
> > The term CEV suggests that, to the same extent that we
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > are warrented in supposing that the sugars and acids of  
> > lemon juice are really in the environment (warrented as  
> > variables identified by physics and chemistry), we are  
> > likewise warrented in supposing that lemon flavor is really  
> > in the environment.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: I may have a slightly different approach to your
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > disagreement with each other.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)
> 
> > > ```
> > > RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not  
> > > only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is  
> > > kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some  
> > > “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled.  
> > > The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function  
> > > of environmental variables, like the function of acid and  
> > > sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that  
> > > doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the  
> > > environment.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: I understand, yes, that you reply "No, no, the CEV is
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > not controlled, only the perception of it is controlled."  
> > This quarrel hinges on answers to question 1 above.
> 
> > ```
> > BN: My quibble here is with this definition of q.i as a
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > (singular) function of (plural) environmental variables. The  
> > making of them into a complex unity happens in the  
> > perceptual hierarchy. Fructose is perceived as sweet; citric  
> > acid is perceived as sour. Fructose and citric acid are  
> > commingled in a lemon. Intensity perceptions of sweet and  
> > sour are combined to construct the sensation of the taste of  
> > lemon juice. But at the interfaces between the taste sensors  
> > in the organism’s mouth and the physical environment outside  
> > those sensors there is a q.i for sugar and a q.i for acid,  
> > aggregated for populations of sensors. Each q.i is  
> > transformed by sensors into an intensity perception. At any  
> > higher level of the hierarchy we are no longer speaking of  
> > q.i, we are speaking of signals p that are constructed at  
> > the level below. The above formulation suggests that there  
> > is a single, unitary q.i = “a ratio of x sucrose to y citric  
> > acid” corresponding to the taste of lemon. From your term  
> > CEV a reader is liable to infer that there is, and likewise  
> > the same inference might be made from Rick’s definition of  
> > q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental  
> > variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: The variable q.i is an instrumental measurement that
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > can be observed by more than one person and replicated by  
> > anyone. Such instrumental measurements have a certain claim  
> > to be objective, the only claim of which I am aware, namely,  
> > intersubjective agreement.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > BN: Of course the measurement, the process of measuring,
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > the instruments of measurement themselves, cannot be  
> > demonstrated to be anything more than controlled  
> > perceptions. When we crank the epistemological implications  
> > of PCT up to the paradoxical sticking-place, intersubjective  
> > agreement appears to me to be our only route out of  
> > solipsism. Equally of course, as each of us in turn have  
> > acknowledged at one time or another, we assume that our  
> > perceptions are veridical, at least in some functional  
> > sense. Seriously not to do so would surely be paralyzing.
> 
> > ```
> > I doubt that anyone has carried that line of
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > epistemological doubt any farther than mind games.
> 
> > 
> 
> > /Bruce Nevin
> 
> >

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [December 23, 2015, 2:29am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/2 "2015-12-23T02:29:18Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.22.1830)]

[TCVModelwColor.xlsm](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/short-url/jBiFN1L5YQJq5Vggg9MTnd7X4Sa.xlsm) (38.9 KB)

[TCVModelwColor1.xlsm](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/short-url/hxllFio4xrqlg9OtOFkkWiW6BM3.xlsm) (38.2 KB)

> **···**
>
> > Martin Taylor (2015.12.21.12.39)–
> > 
> > ```
> > In response to [From Rick Marken
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > (2015.12.20.1830)] and
> 
> > > [Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:
> 
> > >
> 
> > > ```
> > > BN: ... I
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > think successful control of a perception is our only warrent  
> > > for attributing reality to it, that collective control  
> > > strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that  
> > > successful collective control implicitly includes and is  
> > > based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables,  
> > > and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing  
> > > reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when  
> > > replicated)…
> 
> > ```
> > MT: This is essentially the answer I was intending to write to Rick.
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > Anyone can imagine and simulate arbitrary perceptual functions, as  
> > in Rick’s spreadsheet, but unless the results of applying those  
> > functions is effective in controlling some perception,  
> > reorganization will soon modify or eliminate them.
> 
> RM: Well, this isn’t quite what I was after as a comment on the spreadsheet. The perceptual functions in that sheet are, indeed, “arbitrary”, but only so as to make the point that what is called the controlled quantity and notated q.i is **the observer’s view** of the perception, p, that a controller is controlling.
> 
> RM: The spreadsheet is meant to demonstrate that the controlled quantity is not an entity in the environment; it is a variable aspect of the environment that is defined by the perceptual function. The observer doing the Test for the Controlled Variable (the Test) is trying to determine what this perceptual function is. The observer does this by testing hypotheses about the perceptual variable that the controller is controlling. These hypotheses are actually guesses about the nature of the perceptual function that produces the controlled perceptual variable. These hypotheses can be implemented using mathematical functions (as they are in the spreadsheet) or using one’s own perceptual systems (as they are in the example of “The Coin Game” on pp. 236-238 of B:CP, 2nd edition).
> 
> RM: **Regardless of how hypotheses about the perceptual function (and, hence, about the perception that is under control) are implemented, the resulting perception is the controlled quantity, q.i, seen from the perspective of the observer**. **If the Test shows q.i to be under control (it is protected from disturbances that should cause to vary) then we conclude that our perception of the controlled quantity, q.i, corresponds to the perceptual variable (the controlled variable) that the controller is actually controlling.** (Emphasis mine;-)
> 
> RM: So when our perception of q.i passes the Test – it is shown to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of the controlled variable) is equivalent to the perception,p the controller is controlling. This has led me to make some revisions of my spreadsheet demonstrating the TCV. These are mainly changes in notation and the data available to the user when doing the Test. The new spreadsheet is attached.
> 
> RM: Now all you see in the upper left is gray cells that can be used to change your hypothesis about the perceptual function that is producing the perception that the controller is controlling. That perceptual function is hidden so that you are now in the same position as an observer doing the Test for real. You (the observer) have reason to believe that the controller is controlling a perceptual variable that is a linear function of two environmental variables, x.1 and x.2. So you adjust the coefficients of x.1 and x.2 (under the constraint that the coefficient of x.2 must be \>0, otherwise the feedback effect of the output on the controlled quantity will be zero or positive).
> 
> RM: Each change of the coefficients changes q.i, your hypothesis about the perception that is under control. You test the accuracy of each hypothesis by seeing whether the controller protects the hypothetical controlled variable, q.i, from disturbance. The extent to which this happens is measured by the Stability value in the green cell. When the stability of q.i is up above .9 then q.i, as defined by the coefficients of the perceptual function, is being protected from disturbance and it can be concluded that q.i is very close to the perception, p, that is actually under control.
> 
> RM: Once you find a definition of q.i that has a high Stability value – i.e. your perception of the controlled variable, q.i, seems to correspond to the perception, p, that the controller is controlling – you can see how well you did (something you can’t do in the real Test) by hitting Ctrl u which unhides the actual perceptual function that defines p.
> 
> RM: So that’s it for now. Again, I’d really appreciate some comments (from anyone) on this spreadsheet. I know that methodology is not everyone’s cup of tea but I do think that understanding the Test can give you a better understanding of PCT even if you are not into PCT as a researcher.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> –  
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of [Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Controlling-2DPeople-2DParadoxical-2DNature-2DBeing_dp_1922117641_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fs-3Dbooks-26ie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1449541975-26sr-3D1-2D1&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=P_84Ho4Akb5qBtTsKc4zgzLZz5aN-I6VbiGh_fdxrQo&s=qw-rE7JRxs1kWVqe8RCJ7ESdhhMyVCY7_-k8-I322s4&e=).

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [December 24, 2015, 12:26am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/3 "2015-12-24T00:26:45Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2015.12.23.17.53]

> [Bruce Nevin (2015.12.22.18:30 ET)]

> 

> (Martin Taylor 2015.12.21.12.39) –

> 

> ```
> Mirage and black ice: the higher in the hierarchy, the
> 
> ```
> 
> farther from q.i, the more ambiguity, and the greater the need  
> for additional perceptual input. I don’t see that these bear  
> on the question of justifying a distinction between q.i and  
> CEV.

> 

> ```
> As we both have pointed out, a strict understanding of q.i
> 
> ```
> 
> would apply only to a single sensor. Or maybe to a set of  
> sensors of the same type (e.g. retinal cells sensitive to  
> green). Not awfully useful for PCT experiments.

```
That's certainly not how I have understood qi, either from Bill's

```

writings or from Rick’s. As I understand qi (Rick’s version) is is  
the scalar result of applying the perceptual input function to the  
sensory input variables. It is not in the environment, as I had  
though from the diagrams, but is another name for the perceptual  
variable. However, another observer who has access to those same  
sensory input variables could, in principle, produce a scalar  
variable whose value was equal to qi (p). I had thought that qi was  
supposed to be in the environment, but Rick’s message [From Rick  
Marken (2015.12.22.1830)] makes clear that it is not. It’s just  
another name for the perception.

> [From Rick Marken (2015.12.22.1830)]  
> MT: Anyone can imagine and simulate  
> arbitrary perceptual functions, as in Rick’s spreadsheet, but  
> unless the results of applying those functions is effective in  
> controlling some perception, reorganization will soon modify or  
> eliminate them.

> ```
> RM: Well, this isn't quite what I was after as a comment on
> 
> ```
> 
> the spreadsheet. The perceptual functions in that sheet are,  
> indeed, “arbitrary”, but only so as to make the point that what  
> is called the controlled quantity and notated q.i is \*\* the  
> observer’s view\*\* of the perception, p, that a controller  
> is controlling.

```
I agree with this, which I had not understood before. What I had

```

understood before is what you say next, which contradicts the above.

> 

> ```
> RM: The spreadsheet is meant to demonstrate that the
> 
> ```
> 
> controlled quantity is not an entity in the environment; it is a  
> variable aspect of the environment that is defined by the  
> perceptual function.

```
This I disagree with for a reason often stated. A controlled

```

quantity is a quantity that is compared with a reference value and  
is influenced by processes that depend on the resulting difference.  
There is no quantity in the environment that could serve as a  
reference value for a variable in the environment.

```
The CEV, in contrast, IS in the environment perceived by the

```

controller, though it may not be in any environment perceptible by  
another.

> ```
> The observer doing the Test for the Controlled Variable (the
> 
> ```
> 
> Test) is trying to determine what this perceptual function is.

```
This I do agree with.

```

> ```
> The observer does this by testing hypotheses about the
> 
> ```
> 
> perceptual variable that the controller is controlling. These  
> hypotheses are actually guesses about the nature of the  
> perceptual function that produces the controlled perceptual  
> variable. These hypotheses can be implemented using mathematical  
> functions (as they are in the spreadsheet) or using one’s own  
> perceptual systems (as they are in the example of “The Coin  
> Game” on pp. 236-238 of B:CP, 2nd edition).

> 

> RM: \*\* Regardless of how hypotheses about the perceptual  
> function (and, hence, about the perception that is under  
> control) are implemented, the resulting perception is the  
> controlled quantity, q.i, seen from the perspective of the  
> observer\*\*. \*\* If the Test shows q.i to be under control (it  
> is protected from disturbances that should cause to vary) then  
> we conclude that our perception of the controlled quantity,  
> q.i, corresponds to the perceptual variable (the controlled  
> variable) that the controller is actually controlling.\*\* (Emphasis  
> mine;-)

```
Well, you can emphasise it, but consider. If the actual perceptual

```

function is, say, x+y, then 2x+y or x^(3/2)+y and an infinite number  
of other functions will be shown to be “protected from disturbances  
that vary”. Not every member of that infinite set of functions can  
be the perceptual function. But I do now see that qi IS the  
experimenter’s perception of the controlled perceptual variable, and  
is not at all a variable in the environment. So we can say that if  
the experimenter finds a function that produces a variable that sees  
to be controlled, that function produces results that are correlated  
with the function that produces the controlled variable.

> 

> ```
> RM: So when our perception of q.i passes the Test -- it is shown
> 
> ```
> 
> to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of the  
> controlled variable) is equivalent to the perception,p the  
> controller is controlling.

```
More correctly, "when our perception of qi passes the Test -- it is

```

shown to be controlled-- then we can say that q.i (our perception of  
the controlled variable) is correlated with the perception, p the  
controller is controlling."

```
So qi is a perception in an experimenter of a perception controlled

```

by some external controller. I’m quite happy with that. All I want  
to be clear about is that _nothing_ in the environment is controlled  
unless there is also something in the environment that provides a  
reference value for it, and a mechanism whereby the difference  
affects the variable in question.

```
Now back to Bruce:

```

> ```
> these problems don't justify a distinction
> 
> ```
> 
> between q.i and CEV. What is relevant to a quantitative model is  
> q.i. What is the relevance of a CEV?

```
A CEV is someting percepvied by the controller (and the Analyst) to

```

be in the environment of the controller. Its relevance is that it  
can be disturbed by influences independent of the controller,  
resulting in perceptual effects. If the Analyst did not have a CEV  
to work with, (a) the loop would be incomplete, and (b) there would  
be no place for a scalar disturbance variable to be introduced into  
the loop. Now that we have determined that qi is a perception in an  
experimenter of the controlled perception, the result of applying a  
designed or evolved function to measurable variables, we can see  
that it has no relevance to the actual operation of the control loop  
under study. It is far from identical to the CEV, as I had imagined  
it might be before reading Rick’s message.

```
Martin

Martin

```

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [December 24, 2015, 7:21pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/4 "2015-12-24T19:21:34Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2015.12.24.1120)]

> **···**
>
> > John Kirkland (2015.12.22)–
> 
> > JK: Reading about Rick’s description from fiddling about with colour mixing reminded me of a series of publications generated from an approach we designed (and others, internationally, continue to deploy) for probing into colour blending perceptions.
> 
> > JK: By way of background we started this line of enquiry many years ago when playing around with Benham discs. See [http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/col-Benham/index.html](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.michaelbach.de_ot_col-2DBenham_index.html&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=MtB0NGN5Jm7WYQr8EtezVWGY-v2MMBmsrBXwLVbUN5A&s=Q2TLpCN2oinQ_MXq5CxGpRK7Lt3JE8b5SaVzV3QhQcs&e=) My colleague (David Bimler, who’s become something of an expert in colour perception) wrote a little programme for creating these discs, that were then printed on white paper and stuck onto 45rpm vinyl records. We used a $5 stackable turntable so when the change lever was flicked a new one dropped onto the spinning turntable for viewing.
> 
> RM: Pertinent to nothing PCT, it turns out that I know the fellow who invented the stackable turntable. He was a good friend of the family; he just passed away this year. Bob Metzner was his name; a really nice, sweet, brilliant guy (got his degree from California Institute of Technology, where Feynman taught. I’m one degree of separation from him too; my aunt, the beatnik, used to go to parties where he played his bongos;-).
> 
> > JK: Briefly, the black/white flicker of a Benham disc tends to be reported as what’s known as “subjective colour” usually a pastel green, blue, red, brown, etc… OK, that’s by way of background to our question: What would colour deficient (aka colour-blind) people report?
> 
> RM: I believe the colors result from the differing temporal responses of the different types of cone cells.
> 
> > JK: First off we needed to design a simple procedure for assaying anybody’s colour vision…We selected evenly spaced hue/saturation and two values of value. Our initial studies were to do with validation.
> 
> > JK: Secondly, we assembled trilemmas (sets of three swatches) and arranged these as corners of a small implicit triangle, printed onto credit-card sized card.
> 
> > Thirdly, the task itself. A deck consists of 75 cards (we have two parallel decks). Working under controlled light conditions participants shuffled the deck and deal from the top. Their job was to report which triad is different from the remaining ones being careful not to focus on value but stick to differences in hue (with examples).
> 
> RM: I don’t quite understand this. Were they looking for a difference between one card and another or differences within a triad on a card?
> 
> > JK: Fourthly, and finally, what’s this to do with PCT?
> 
> RM: Everything living systems do has to do with PCT;-)
> 
> > JK: After all these years, and triggered by Rick’s recent report of his method, I wonder if we’d been unknowingly carrying out PCT research all along.
> 
> RM: It sounds like it to me. I’m not quite sure of exactly what the subjects were doing but it sounds like they were being asked to control for a “similarity” or “equality” relationship between color patches. The triads are a disturbance to this perception and the subject’s responses – saying which patch matches best or whatever – is the action that compensates for the disturbance. Based on the pattern of responses you are inferring what colors are and are not a disturbance to the relationship.
> 
> RM: The only thing I can think of that would make it “more” like PCT research would be to use a method of adjustment rather than a paired comparison procedure and do it with individual subjects (which you may have done so this suggestion may be irrelevant; but generally PCT research is based on looking at the result of testing “one-subject-at a time” rather than “averaging over subjects”).
> 
> > JK: OK Rick (anybody), here’s where I need some help. What we’ve got here is “visual lemonade”. But because the referents (swatches) are standardised it is possible to make some inferences about the underlying built-in mechanisms. That’s not the focus of my current PCT-related question. Instead, it is, “What is a PCT-related explanation of what we’ve been doing with this approach?” Diagrams welcomed too.
> 
> RM: I would have to know more details of the approach. But I think this is an important – but difficult – question to answer. Because it does seem like a lot of these psychophysical tasks are very much like tests to see what kinds of perceptual variables people control – or can control; they are kind of like the TCV. This will have to be something I include in my paper (or whatever it is I produce) on how to do PCT research. I’ll get on it as soon as I figure out what’s wrong with my spreadsheet demo. Both you (in private) and Martin (in a subsequent post in this thread, I think) have pointed out flaws in that TCV demo that I will have to figure out before I do any more pontificating about how to do PCT research;-)
> 
> Best regards
> 
> Rick
> 
> > 
> 
> > As an aside #1. We created lozengers too, and asked people to report what they saw in screen-presented patterns (like many 3-faced cubes). When colours blend it is reported as if a line appears, immediately highlighting the odd-one-out “different” trilemma member.
> 
> > Aside #2. David has been carrying out some reanalyses of others’ data and that team reported: a. pre-clinical indicators of Type II diabetes, and b. pre-clinical signs of heavy-metal poisoning (mercury in Brazil gold-fields).
> 
> > Not bad from messing around with Benham discs and asking a naive question.
> 
> > BTW, we never got around to conducting research aimed at answering the original question, what CVD people report when watching spinning black-and-white patterns.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Season’s greetings to one and all, from summer.
> 
> > 
> 
> > JohnK
> 
> > 
> 
> > .
> 
> –  
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of [Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Controlling-2DPeople-2DParadoxical-2DNature-2DBeing_dp_1922117641_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fs-3Dbooks-26ie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1449541975-26sr-3D1-2D1&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Di8aTyi52x-jTuut7q0kv0yCowzqFseFEZpifpoDF5M&s=cbzybK_Z-iqFCHuFFxl1d-jhqLKv7KydfUA_HBMFy3Y&e=).
> 
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruce Nevin [bnhpct@gmail.com](mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com) wrote:
> 
> > [Bruce Nevin (2015.12.21.08:40 ET)]:
> 
> > 
> 
> > Hi, Martin.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Martin Taylor 2015.12.19.12.39–
> 
> > > MMT: Rick usually asserts that the controlled quantity, qi, is objectively in the environment and can be directly influenced by an external observer. […]
> 
> > >
> 
> > > MMT: My position is quite the opposite. I say that we ONLY can control our perceptions. A perception is produced by some function whose input arguments may be composed entirely from sensory variables that are influenced by a supposed-to-exist environment […].
> 
> > >
> 
> > > MMT: When we talk, we omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat … and simply assert that there exists a real world through which our PCT model suggests our perceptions (real to us) are controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: Perhaps you can allow Rick (and me) the grace occasionally to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat as well?
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: There are two questions in play. The first question is the ever-recurrent epistemological one: How real is our control? That devolves to: How real are our perceptions? I think successful control of a perception is our only warrent for attributing reality to it, that collective control strengthens that warrent by intersubjective agreement, that successful collective control implicitly includes and is based upon corroborating (testing for) controlled variables, and that we have the strongest warrent for attributing reality to q.i as determined by the TCV (best when replicated). Doing science is our best intellectual way of determining what is real.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: The variable q.i is an excellent instance of a perceptual variable to which we are strongly warrent to attribute reality because we determine it by doing science.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: The second question is: Are q.i and the CEV equivalent. q.i is a single variable perceived and measured by the observer; the CEV is by definition a complex of more than one variable.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: Rick (2015.12.20.1830) proposes that you and he are in violent agreement, with a spreadsheet as means of verification. Below, I offer verbal evidence in support of this. You may not have seen this, which was posted during the time in which you weren’t reading CSG-net.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick Marken (2015.12.12.1245)
> 
> > > RM: I would say that the PCT stance on perception (or, epistemology) is that the perceptions that we control are constructions based on sensory data that is caused by an external (environmental) reality that is approximated by the models of physics and chemistry, and these constructions are not arbitrary but have functional significance in the sense that they allow us to control the aspects of physical reality that we have to be able to control in order to be able to survive. In other words, I would say that the PCT stance is constructivist – realist – functionalist.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: So Rick is a realist in regard to the models of physics and chemistry. These models of course are perceptions. Realism here is a belief that doing science in the fields of physics and chemistry constructs perceptions that accord so well with reality (whatever that may be) that we are warrented to omit the “supposed-to-exist” caveat. That warrent is functional and provisional.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: On this basis, my point was about the character of the “supposed-to-exist” CEV. My understanding is that intensity receptors perceive variables identified by physics and chemistry (in the example, sugar and acid) and generate perceptions. Input functions at the sensation level combine these intensity perceptions. In the example, they construct the unitary perception of the taste of lemon. The term CEV suggests that, to the same extent that we are warrented in supposing that the sugars and acids of lemon juice are really in the environment (warrented as variables identified by physics and chemistry), we are likewise warrented in supposing that lemon flavor is really in the environment.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: I may have a slightly different approach to your disagreement with each other.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick Marken (2015.12.06.1625)
> 
> > > RM: What you call the CEV is q.i, the controlled quantity. I prefer to stick with Powers’ terminology, not only because it’s Powers’ terminology but because CEV is kind of misleading; it implies that there is actually some “complex” variable in the environment that is controlled. The controlled quantity is actually an aspect or function of environmental variables, like the function of acid and sugar that is the perceived as the taste of lemonade, that doesn’t necessarily exist as a variable in the environment.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: I understand, yes, that you reply “No, no, the CEV is not controlled, only the perception of it is controlled.” This quarrel hinges on answers to question 1 above.
> 
> > BN: My quibble here is with this definition of q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental variables. The making of them into a complex unity happens in the perceptual hierarchy. Fructose is perceived as sweet; citric acid is perceived as sour. Fructose and citric acid are commingled in a lemon. Intensity perceptions of sweet and sour are combined to construct the sensation of the taste of lemon juice. But at the interfaces between the taste sensors in the organism’s mouth and the physical environment outside those sensors there is a q.i for sugar and a q.i for acid, aggregated for populations of sensors. Each q.i is transformed by sensors into an intensity perception. At any higher level of the hierarchy we are no longer speaking of q.i, we are speaking of signals p that are constructed at the level below. The above formulation suggests that there is a single, unitary q.i = “a ratio of x sucrose to y citric acid” corresponding to the taste of lemon. From your term CEV a reader is liable to infer that there is, and likewise the same inference might be made from Rick’s definition of q.i as a (singular) function of (plural) environmental variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: The variable q.i is an instrumental measurement that can be observed by more than one person and replicated by anyone. Such instrumental measurements have a certain claim to be objective, the only claim of which I am aware, namely, intersubjective agreement.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BN: Of course the measurement, the process of measuring, the instruments of measurement themselves, cannot be demonstrated to be anything more than controlled perceptions. When we crank the epistemological implications of PCT up to the paradoxical sticking-place, intersubjective agreement appears to me to be our only route out of solipsism. Equally of course, as each of us in turn have acknowledged at one time or another, we assume that our perceptions are veridical, at least in some functional sense. Seriously not to do so would surely be paralyzing. I doubt that anyone has carried that line of epistemological doubt any farther than mind games.
> 
> > 
> 
> > /Bruce Nevin
> 
> >

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [February 9, 2016, 6:51am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/5 "2016-02-09T06:51:03Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen vvalues in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III)Â can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.Â
> 
> So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Organism is controlling, not environment…
> 
> ```
> 
> If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.Â
> 
> And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> HB :Â I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There aare cases when this is not so.
> 
> BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled.  As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.Â
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> HB :
> 
> So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> Â
> 
> Boris
> 
> Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [February 9, 2016, 6:52am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/6 "2016-02-09T06:52:52Z")

</div>

Bruce,

you were speaking to Bill and Henry not to me. So could you please avoid :

BA : Please don’t confuse »traditional engineering control theory« with »modern engineering control theory.« Bill relied on traditional engineering control theory and its analytic techniques.

HB : You are again using conotation to »describe« my state. Am I confusing something ? Whatever you are refering that I could be confusing, it’s directed to Bill and Henry Yin. I just wrote their critics. So critics are theirs not mine.

If you’ll go back to our conversation about »The kid who doesn’t talk« you could easily see that my writings and understanding of PCT stays the same. And Bill didn’t object to my writings then. Even more. He was encouranging me to keep on converstaion with you in the way I did. So I don’t think that I deserve »lable« or »stigma« which you gave to me. I’m not chaging my statements daily or weekly as Rick is doing. Whatever he is doing I call confusion and by my oppinion he is »dragging« the whole CSGnet into a confussion.

So please be careful when you are accusing me of something, although I’d rather see if you don’t do it.

If you think that somebody is confusing something about »control theory«, you should turn to Bill’s literature and Henry Yin.

As I understood Henry Yin he was mostly generaally criticizing whether »control« is in environment or in organism. I don’t see what this has to do with »traditional engineering control theory« or »modern engineering control theory« ? Do they confuse »control inside« and control outside« ?

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 6:01 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.12:00 EST)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:25 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> Your theoretical explanation of Wieners »control theory« is bellow so I’ll not »copy-paste« it here. I’ll just try to look for differences in Bill’s and Wieners theories. If it is »the same«, why did Bill wrote his theory ?
> 
> BA : Boris, you can’t be a proponent of PCT and at the same time hold that we shouldn’t be equating machines and organisms. I’ll try to make clear why this is so.
> 
> BA : Now let’s examine what you take Bill to be saying about control systems.
> 
> HB : I think that Bill criticized Wiener and “engineering control theoryâ€?. So I think there are more problems in just “equatingâ€? theories …
> 
> \<
> 
> Bill P : For now the relevant aspect of Wiener’s diagram is the fact that it is drawn so that one may consider the _whole_ unit in terms of stimulus and respons, just as behaviorists have always done.
> 
> Bill P : Unspoken in Wiener’s diagram, by the way, are the reorganizing system’s intrinsic reference levels….
> 
> Where did you find these quoted sentences? Winer offered several diagrams; I have no idea which one Bill refers to here.
> 
> Bill P :
> 
> _ **Regarding the underpinnings of PCT:** _ There was no one in cybernetics/systems theory after Ashby’s book in 1953 (Design for a Brain) from whom I learned anything about control theory and its role in behavior. Wiener’s book of 1948, which I read in 1952 thanks to Kirk Sattley, got me started: the concept of feedback control, and the particular relations to behavior that he laid out, clicked in my mind as the obvious successor to all the psychological models I had ever heard of, including the one in which I then believed. Ashby’s book gave me an organized view of how one would start applying these principles on a grander scale—it was as much his organization as his ideas that turned me on./span\>
> 
> Bill P : Wiener and Ashby inspired me to go back to the sources of the ideas that they had adopted. When I did, I gradually came to realize that neither of them had learned very much about control systems.
> 
> Bill did not invent control theory; he took an existing body of knowledge from control system engineering and from it borrowed the negative feedback control system as the basic control model for PCT. As Bill noted above, his initial inspiration for doing this was provided by reading Winer’s book. Ashby provided the idea for the reorganizing system, including its »intrinsic variables« (which Ashby called »essential« variables).
> 
> HB : I’m sure you can find more Bill’s critics on Wieners model. what by my opinion tell us that thinking about “Control theory� wasn’t simply transferred to PCT.
> 
> HB: But I think that most comprehesible critics of engineering “control theory� was given by Henry Ying. His article is worth of reading as I think he is the only one whom I saw upgrading PCT till now. I think that he could be very helpful in conflicting understanding of PCT.
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> _4.2. Control of Input._ A control system always controls its input, not output [7]. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> According to mainstream engineering control theory, a control system controls its outputs, not its input. This is perhaps the most common fallacy today, both in engineering and in the life sciences [49, 55, 56]. This fallacy, an unfortunate legacy of cybernetics, is the result of imposing the perspective of the observer rather than using the perspective of the organism or controller. The mistake is to assume that what the engineer perceives and records, the “objective� effect of the system, is the output of the system.
> 
> The problem here is that »mainstream engineering control theory« uses the terms »input« and »output« differently than we do in PCT. When the control-system engineer speaks of »output«, he or she is referring to the variable that the system is controlling, whereas we use »output« to refer to the actions by means of which the control system acts to exert that control. When the control-system engineer speaks of »input« he or she is referring to the reference. Consequently, when Henry says that, »according to mainstream engineering control theory, a control system controls its outputs,not its input,« he is correct – but given the engineer’s definnitions of those terms, the statement is not a fallacy, it’s a correct description!
> 
> As Henry notes, the engineer’s problem is to design a system to be used by human beings. If you want a room to be a certain temperature, you change the reference setting on the thermostat (you input that setting) and if the system works properly, the result is that the room temperature is brought to the set temperature (the system produces or »outputs« the user’s desired room temperature). So using »input« to refer to the setting of the reference and »output« to refer to the system’s sensed value of the variable under control makes good sense.
> 
> The problem is **not** that mainstream engineering control theory has it wrong, the problem is that some folks who have endeavored to apply control theory to human and animal behavior have incorrectly understood the engineer’s term »output« to mean »behavior« or »actions« and »input« to mean »stimulus«.
> 
> The common assumption that output is controlled ignores the perspective of the organism that is doing the controlling. By imposing his own desire and perspective, the engineer ignores the autonomy of the negative feedback controller, for he is always trying to make the machine do what he wants. He can only accomplish this by adjusting the reference signal, as the user operates a thermostat by adjusting the temperature setting. Since this is the signal generated by the user, it is usually labeled as the input to the system. In a biological organism, however, the reference signal is always internal to the organism.
> 
> Again, it’s not the control engineer who is doing this. Those who attempt to apply control theory to living organisms while misunderstanding the engineer’s meaning of those terms are doing this.
> 
> Please don’t confuse »traditional engineering control theory« with »modern engineering control theory.« Bill relied on traditional engineering control theory and its analytic techniques. What he objected to was modern control theory, with its Kalman filters, feed-forward mechanisms, and a set of mathematical techniques that yield »optimal control« while making it just about impossible to understand how the resulting system accomplishes what it does.
> 
> Bruce A.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/abbott/32/2879_2.png) [@Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Abbott)\
**Post date:** [February 9, 2016, 1:45pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/7 "2016-02-09T13:45:19Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]

Hi Boris,

Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:

HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :

1. 

```
  It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.

```

Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

1. 

```
  Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

```

No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.

1. 

```
  Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.

```

The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.

The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way. The whole **point\<** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

Bruce

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. Myy critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.
> 
> So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Organism is controlling, not environment
> 
> ```
> 
> If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.
> 
> And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> HB :
> 
> So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> Boris
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [June 24, 2016, 12:26pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/8 "2016-06-24T12:26:00Z")

</div>

Hi Bruce,

sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.

I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.

BA :

This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.

HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.

I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.

So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.

BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.

HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«

In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is **very different** from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) i **s as I have claimed** very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?

**The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW«** describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.

Medical dictionary ( Physiology)  
A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e…, the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.

In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?

So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.Â

HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.

In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.

So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.

Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is **nature**.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.

So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?

Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.

Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.

Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.Â

There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we. Â

Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :

HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.

BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.

HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.

BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved compoonents (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in thhe same way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.

HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.

Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).

Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.

Best,

Boris

![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]
> 
> Hi Boris,
> 
> Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:
> 
> HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »eendless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.
> 
> If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.
> 
> The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neuronss, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way.&nbbsp; The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.
> 
> So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Organism is controlling, not environment…
> 
> ```
> 
> If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.
> 
> And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulaation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> HB :
> 
> So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> Boris
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/abbott/32/2879_2.png) [@Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Abbott)\
**Post date:** [June 24, 2016, 1:49pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/9 "2016-06-24T13:49:17Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (2016.06.0950 EDT)]

![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Friday, June 24, 2016 8:26 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Hi Bruce,
> 
> sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.
> 
> I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.
> 
> Hi Boris,
> 
> I’m truely sorry, but as I just stated in my last reply to Rick, I really have spent too much time on CSGnet given that I have gotten behind on some important committments. (I’m currently facing a deadline for revising my research methods book, for one.) I do intend to get back to you with a reply, but I’m afraid it will probably be at least another month before I can devote the time to a careful consideration of your post.
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> BA :
> 
> This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.
> 
> I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.
> 
> So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.
> 
> BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«
> 
> In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is **very different** from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) i **s as I have claimed** very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?
> 
> **The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW«** describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.
> 
> Medical dictionary ( Physiology)  
> A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.
> 
> In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?
> 
> So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.
> 
> HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.
> 
> In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.
> 
> So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.
> 
> Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is **nature**.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.
> 
> So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?
> 
> Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.
> 
> Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.
> 
> Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.
> 
> There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.
> 
> Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :
> 
> HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.
> 
> BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologicallly evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they willl function in the same way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.
> 
> Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).
> 
> Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]
> 
> Hi Boris,
> 
> Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:
> 
> HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your cchoosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.
> 
> If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.
> 
> The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way.&nbspp; The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »enndless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.
> 
> So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Organism is controlling, not environment…
> 
> ```
> 
> If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.
> 
> And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> HB :
> 
> So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> Boris
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [June 24, 2016, 2:49pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/10 "2016-06-24T14:49:11Z")

</div>

Bruce,

I understand. Please take as much as time as it takes you to answer. Although I’m hoping that you wil come with »whole« answer. I’m also »caught in time«.

With all respect,

Boris

![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> **Sent:** Friday, June 24, 2016 3:49 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2016.06.0950 EDT)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Friday, June 24, 2016 8:26 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Hi Bruce,
> 
> sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.
> 
> I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.
> 
> Hi Boris,
> 
> I’m truely sorry, but as I just stated in my last reply to Rick, I really have spent too much time on CSGnet given that I have gotten behind on some important committments. (I’m currently facing a deadline for revising my research methods book, for one.) I do intend to get back to you with a reply, but I’m afraid it will probably be at least another month before I can devote the time to a careful consideration of your post.
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> BA :
> 
> This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.
> 
> I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.
> 
> So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.
> 
> BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«
> 
> In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is **very different** from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) i **s as I have claimed** very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?
> 
> **The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW«** describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.
> 
> Medical dictionary ( Physiology)  
> A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.
> 
> In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?
> 
> So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.
> 
> HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.
> 
> In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.
> 
> So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.
> 
> Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is **nature**.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.
> 
> So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?
> 
> Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.
> 
> Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.
> 
> Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.
> 
> There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.
> 
> Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :
> 
> HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.
> 
> BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolvedd components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will functionn in the same way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.
> 
> Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).
> 
> Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]
> 
> Hi Boris,
> 
> Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:
> 
> HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.
> 
> If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.
> 
> The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Bruce,
> 
> HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diagram from »endlless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> ```
> 
> Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.
> 
> So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> 1. 
> 
> ```
> Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> 
> ```
> 
> 2. 
> 
> ```
> Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> 
> ```
> 
> 3. 
> 
> ```
> Organism is controlling, not environment…
> 
> ```
> 
> /span\>
> 
> If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.
> 
> And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.
> 
> Henry Yin :
> 
> A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> HB :
> 
> So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> Boris
> 
> Bruce
> 
> * * *
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16
> 
> No virus found in this message.  
> Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bleach](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bleach/32/51_2.png) [@bleach](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bleach)\
**Post date:** [June 25, 2016, 10:34am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/11 "2016-06-25T10:34:45Z")

</div>

Boris, this is a very interesting discussion. Where I’m having a  
problem though is with your comments about 'zero reference.'Â No  
what I’m about to say may well be nothing more than me showing my  
ignorance of more current biological research…

```
In control theory we usually talk in a way to suggest that the

```

reference is a 'steady state signal.'Â Indeed it is likely that it  
usually is. However, most will think in terms of either a signal  
level or maybe the result of a calculation.

```
As I understood it, from many years ago, neuron outputs are

```

essentially 'pulses.'Â Thus a reference would be some ‘pulse rate’  
(I don’t believe that pulse width is an option with neurons).

```
As far as control theory is concerned there is nothing wrong with

```

the idea of a pulse rate comparator that generates some output pulse  
rate that is in some way proportional to the difference between the  
two inputs (reference and perceptual signal). There would, of  
course either need to be a another signal indicating the ‘polarity’  
of the error, or the comparator output with no error would be some  
steady state pulse rate that would then vary up or down depending  
upon the ‘polarity’ of an error.

```
Pulse width control is actually similar and normally the comparator

```

output is a steady state width that is again varied according to the  
magnitude and ‘polarity’ of any error.

```
I would not be surprised if it was discovered that all comparators

```

in the brain always have some non-zero reference signal present.  
Some of the lower level systems OTOH do appear to have zero value  
reference signals when the system is not actually active. However,  
these systems are unidirectional in their operation, such as muscle  
contraction or sensing temperature.

```
Does any of that relate to what you are talking about?

Best,
Bill

```

 ![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

 ![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> On 06/24/2016 06:26 AM, Boris Hartman  
> wrote:
> 
> > ```
> > Hi
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > Bruce,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > sorry
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > see we have some troubles coming toghether with our  
> > oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on  
> > the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our  
> > agreement. I hope you will not mind.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BA :
> 
> > ```
> > This is not to say that biological control
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > system will have system diagrams that are identical to the  
> > simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock  
> > demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological  
> > control system, we need anatomical and physiological  
> > evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out,  
> > the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are  
> > still quite a long way from being able to do that to any  
> > significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level  
> > 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am  
> > currently working on implementing a more recent model that  
> > Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB :This is perfect beginning for possible
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live  
> > organism function in contrast to machines or models or  
> > whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I agree with you that diagrams and models are
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological  
> > Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way  
> > to “ determine the actual nature of a given  
> > biological control system, we need anatomical and  
> > physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are  
> > carried out�.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement  
> > about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to  
> > use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without  
> > using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to  
> > try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as  
> > »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the  
> > reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system  
> > will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the  
> > disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference  
> > value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had  
> > claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with  
> > model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning  
> > and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological  
> > facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value  
> > 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a  
> > change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed  
> > by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance  
> > with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any  
> > value, but the question is whether model or machine will  
> > correspond to »real world«
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > In
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0  
> > (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system  
> > signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the  
> > case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing  
> > happens). So this case is **very different** from the  
> > reference signals that are present. So the result reference  
> > 0 (zero)Â i **s as I have claimed** very special case.  
> > Using reference signal 0 ( zero)Â means that organism is not  
> > producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can  
> > be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more.  
> > Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which  
> > is not alive do any action ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > \*\* The  
> > »ALL-OR-NONE LAW«\*\*  
> > describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«.  
> > All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none  
> > response (1 or 0). The magnitude of  
> > the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is  
> > independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A  
> > bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to  
> > elicit a propagation of action potential.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Medical dictionary (
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > Physiology)  
> > A rule applied  
> > to the activation  
> > of individual muscle  
> > or nerve cells,  
> > where the response to stimuli  
> > (depolarisation) only  
> > occurs above  
> > a certain threshold,  
> > usually –55
> > 
> > ```
> > mV, after which a complete
> > action potential
> > occurs that
> > is maximum in intensity—i.e.,
> > 
> > the strength
> > of the nerve
> > impulse is not
> > dependent on,
> > or a function of,
> > the strength
> > of the stimulus.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > In
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from  
> > the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal  
> > 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol  
> > loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that  
> > is impossible. How can organism work without reference that  
> > are produced in organism ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams,  
> > models and simulators, because values don’t represent the  
> > »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams,  
> > models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with  
> > physiological facts are necesary.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block  
> > demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to  
> > real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work.  
> > But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a  
> > perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With  
> > machines there is no problem which value you use whether is  
> > 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is  
> > designed by humans and values which are uused can be any  
> > value human choose. The only condition I know is, that  
> > values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0  
> > (zero) is not.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > In
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only  
> > Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine  
> > or model is that human are born, they produce references and  
> > they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce  
> > references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they  
> > can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned  
> > and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences  
> > between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«,  
> > without checking whether anatomical and physiological  
> > »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded  
> > that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value.  
> > This is fundamnental mistake.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Many
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still  
> > beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines)  
> > is **nature**.And you also beleive that this is true,  
> > otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about  
> > plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in  
> > »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real«  
> > conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same  
> > conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0  
> > (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0  
> > (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv  
> > signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Reference
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in  
> > accordance with general principles of nervous system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Bill
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > didn’t suggested only » possible Level 1 system that operates the  
> > skeletal muscles in 1973�, b ut  
> > he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP,  
> > 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest  
> > part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external  
> > environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block  
> > diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live  
> > blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the  
> > »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT  
> > in critical position. The most important feature of  
> > hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not  
> > defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism  
> > and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form  
> > »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p.  
> > 191)Â is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear  
> > how »references« are produced.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Dag's
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on  
> > p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not  
> > go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which  
> > is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but  
> > I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found  
> > my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I  
> > can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top  
> > of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT  
> > organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it  
> > produces references as it should.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Bruce
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of  
> > »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have  
> > also some physiological knowledge and that is your  
> > advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole  
> > diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working  
> > properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences.  
> > I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions  
> > as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that  
> > we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and  
> > real organism works.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > There
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of  
> > how Living beings really work or as you said : it  
> > is a long way to �determine the actual nature of a given  
> > biological control system�. But  
> > we have to try, don’t we. Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Other
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from  
> > arguments I clarify above. So :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : Input is producing directly output. It seems like  
> > behavioristic approach.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : No,  
> > the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The  
> > input is transformed by the input function to a perception;  
> > this is compared to the reference value at the comparator,  
> > which takes the difference between reference and perception  
> > to create the error signal. The error signal drives the  
> > output, which affects the input via the feedback function.  
> > This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to  
> > reduce the error between the reference value and the  
> > perception.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : The output is the result of comparison between reference  
> > and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is  
> > the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had  
> > in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be  
> > produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic  
> > sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if  
> > organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : The beauty of control systems is that it  
> > doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made  
> > hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons,  
> > muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same  
> > way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and  
> > animal behavior can be understood as the output of  
> > biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of  
> > such systems just as we do any human-designed control  
> > system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be  
> > equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin.  
> > Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some  
> > main principles that are making them alike, because machines  
> > are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a  
> > lot of troubles.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Thinking
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > about the equality between machines and organisms brought  
> > you in the position where you already admitted that you made  
> > a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer  
> > environment by machines and control in Living beings (see  
> > our previous discussions).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Bruce
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I still think that we can come to possible agreement about  
> > real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram  
> > on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion.  
> > Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to  
> > »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are  
> > repeatedly misleaded by Rick.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:**  
> > Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com) ]  
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got  
> > to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Hi Boris,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Below you make several claims about the
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB:
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to  
> > your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a  
> > main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case  
> > in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your  
> > choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby  
> > would say)Â are :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal  
> > zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as  
> > stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare  
> > existance in organism as something »passing through«. I  
> > doubt that it could contribute to understanding how  
> > »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean  
> > that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear  
> > how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the  
> > reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system  
> > will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the  
> > disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference  
> > value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had  
> > claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if  
> > you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something  
> > when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to  
> > make clear distinction between model and real organism,  
> > becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real  
> > organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you  
> > something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also  
> > for »real organism«.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > If
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological  
> > evidences then you would notice that reference signal is  
> > simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism  
> > there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All  
> > or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not  
> > appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t.  
> > Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon  
> > trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it  
> > means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in  
> > physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so  
> > there is not neural activity. This is a big difference  
> > between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural  
> > signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals  
> > it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines  
> > are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they  
> > don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0,  
> > but in organism references are set by the nature. They can  
> > be set by other people.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > 1.      Input  
> > is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic  
> > approach.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > No,
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The  
> > input is transformed by the input function to a perception;  
> > this is compared to the reference value at the comparator,  
> > which takes the difference between reference and perception  
> > to create the error signal. The error signal drives the  
> > output, which affects the input via the feedback function.  
> > This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to  
> > reduce the error between the reference value and the  
> > perception.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > In
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input  
> > (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no  
> > comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b)  
> > there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no  
> > feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram  
> > of a stimulus-response system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > 2.      Almost  
> > at every possible value in the diagram you could make  
> > »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with  
> > »outside steady-state«, but that doesn’t mean that every  
> > »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > simple control system works, both statically and  
> > dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously  
> > varying disturbance value and observe that the system still  
> > acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference  
> > value.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > The beauty of control systems is that it
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made  
> > hardware or biologically evolved components (neurons,  
> > muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same  
> > way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and  
> > animal behavior can be understood as the output of  
> > biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of  
> > such systems just as we do any human-designed control  
> > system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > This is not to say that biological control
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > system will have system diagrams that are identical to the  
> > simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock  
> > demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological  
> > control system, we need anatomical and physiological  
> > evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out,  
> > the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are  
> > still quite a long way from being able to do that to any  
> > significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level  
> > 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am  
> > currently working on implementing a more recent model that  
> > Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bruce
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman   
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got  
> > to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman   
> > **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got  
> > to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bruce,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB : My opinion
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > is that there is no “subtractor� (o-d) in environment in the  
> > “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using  
> > this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s  
> > diagram as “add effects�, is something what is common in  
> > Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are  
> > “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : Boris, I **agree with you** : \*\*\* There is no  
> > »subtractor« in the environment\*\*\* . But I think  
> > you are getting confused between adding _variables_  
> > and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s  
> > »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level.  
> > But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > About
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your  
> > arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main  
> > problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in  
> > natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your  
> > choosen values in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby  
> > would say)Â are :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > 3.      It’s  
> > physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with  
> > outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable  
> > state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in  
> > organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it  
> > could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms  
> > function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not  
> > functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are  
> > »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> > 4.      Input  
> > is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic  
> > approach.
> 
> > 5.      Almost  
> > at every possible value in the diagram you could make  
> > »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with  
> > »outside steady-state«, but that doesn’t mean that every  
> > »picture« will represent how organism function.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Playing
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for  
> > understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing  
> > into extremes or if use other impossible values from  
> > organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a  
> > model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool«  
> > for representing how organism function in any case. So I  
> > think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using  
> > »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how  
> > references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question  
> > mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet  
> > and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there  
> > are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s  
> > stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and  
> > thus open the question how organism as »the whole works«  
> > and how references are formed.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the  
> > situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT  
> > organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double  
> > feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and  
> > »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as  
> > possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with  
> > »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I  
> > think in this way it will be finaly understood how  
> > »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on  
> > the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the  
> > »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole«  
> > picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with  
> > competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how  
> > can be usefull in understanding how organism »really«  
> > function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input  
> > quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction«  
> > going on in outer environment or control. In PCT  
> > »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as  
> > that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how  
> > nervous system function.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from  
> > Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in  
> > outer environment, human system receive only limited amount  
> > (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract  
> > system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual  
> > amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical  
> > variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is  
> > reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system«  
> > from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount  
> > of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the  
> > «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances +  
> > output) to »input function« no matter how values are  
> > distributed.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > The
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of  
> > possible states that diagram (LCS III)Â can offer or we can  
> > agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s  
> > diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > If
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree  
> > that all Bills »definitions« stay.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> > 1.      Observed  
> > behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is  
> > control empty
> 
> > 2.      Perceptual  
> > signal is controlled, but not from outside. It’s controlled  
> > inside organism.
> 
> > 3.      Organism  
> > is controlling, not environment…
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > If
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with  
> > Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are  
> > represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed  
> > »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of  
> > »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled  
> > variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined  
> > construct of »person in control« and observer.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > And
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I have one request Bruce.
> 
> > ```
> > If
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing  
> > me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me  
> > or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«.  
> > I could also say that you were confused by putting  
> > »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer  
> > environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to  
> > discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I  
> > think that this could lead to constructive and final  
> > answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal  
> > conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The  
> > first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and  
> > »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody  
> > ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in  
> > our history. And I think that Fred described the right  
> > reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no  
> > conotations of our personality.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I'd
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our  
> > conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your  
> > oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > :Â I think it’s better that we talk about different  
> > oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal  
> > partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an  
> > agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of  
> > us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more  
> > productive?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent  
> > the addition of two _ **variables** _ . In a negative  
> > feedback system, the **values** of those two variables  
> > will have opposite signs, in the steady state.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > We
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what  
> > you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral  
> > effects to environment or it’s not general event in  
> > environment. But we are seeking for general model of  
> > organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I  
> > understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really  
> > »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many  
> > cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing«  
> > the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with  
> > no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding  
> > effects of output, just disturbances entering »input  
> > function«.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that  
> > there are some »physical variables« from endless in the  
> > world arround us which are used for forming »abstract  
> > system« in our brains, some construction of limited  
> > perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all  
> > »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input  
> > fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in  
> > accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to  
> > be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > We
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but  
> > enough for more or less succesfull control of our  
> > »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s  
> > discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think  
> > that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances  
> > (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input  
> > function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled  
> > in comparator.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values**  
> > have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in  
> > a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and  
> > qo!
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of  
> > manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a  
> > screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > BA
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme  
> > right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The  
> > LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output  
> > Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of  
> > adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box  
> > labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > qi
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t  
> > see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you  
> > want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer  
> > environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : For better understanding I think that you could do more,  
> > for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput«  
> > and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general  
> > solution ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Maybe
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ?  
> > What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> > ```
> > This
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism  
> > (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is  
> > »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is  
> > insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not  
> > entering »input function« ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > I
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > think that general control loop always ends in just »input  
> > quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and  
> > later in comparator where it si controlled.  As Bill’s  
> > diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I think that in any case not only when »disturbances«  
> > represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the  
> > perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be  
> > controlled.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Henry
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > Yin :
> 
> > ```
> > A
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > control system always controls its input, not output. Only  
> > perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > HB
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > :
> 
> > ```
> > So
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > I think that control is happening in organism not outside.  
> > You can control what you perceive.
> 
> > ```
> > And
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking  
> > about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control  
> > happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT  
> > yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> > ```
> > But
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation«  
> > of reference signal which is still under »mark of  
> > interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ```
> > Do
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal  
> > control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT  
> > organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which  
> > original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bruce
> 
> > * * *
> 
> > ```
> > No
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > virus found in this message.  
> > Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> > Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release  
> > Date: 02/09/16
> 
> > No virus found in this message.
> > 
> > ```
> > Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)
> > Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > Date: 02/09/16
> 
> [mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.netmailto](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.netmailto):boris.hartman@masicom.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [June 27, 2016, 2:26pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/12 "2016-06-27T14:26:45Z")

</div>

Bill,

I’ll be honest. I think you are a good guy and in other circumstances it would be a privilege to talk to you. But in this situation I’m in quite »time-trouble«, and the matter you are talking about is quite too complex for debate. It is about how nervous system works. So I’m recommending you wormly the best expert for nervous system momentally in PCT. And this is Henry Yin. He can give you much more then I can. I have mostly phisiological knowledge which includes some knowledge about nervous system, but not so much as Henry Yin can offer.

So maybe in other conditions I’ll really enjoy talking to you (maybe in company with glass of wine) but in this moment it would take me to much time which I haven’t.

I’m really sorry. But I hope you’ll understand.

With all respect,

Boris

 ![image001137.png](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/20bf64848c8046ff2156da348fb593f87b0a48d8.png)

![image001104.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/ca4edb70579a88b9fff6e079e83b515ab27b3adb.jpeg)

 ![image00811.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/4571931b4d14b8a18aebf5b19977475e3d88794f.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bill Leach [[mailto:wrleach@cableone.net](mailto:wrleach@cableone.net)]  
> **Sent:** Saturday, June 25, 2016 12:35 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Boris, this is a very interesting discussion. Where I’m having a problem though is with your comments about ‘zero reference.’ No what I’m about to say may well be nothing more than me showing my ignorance of more current biological research…
> 
> In control theory we usually talk in a way to suggest that the reference is a ‘steady state signal.’ Indeed it is likely that it usually is. However, most will think in terms of either a signal level or maybe the result of a calculation.
> 
> As I understood it, from many years ago, neuron outputs are essentially ‘pulses.’ Thus a reference would be some ‘pulse rate’ (I don’t believe that pulse width is an option with neurons).
> 
> As far as control theory is concerned there is nothing wrong with the idea of a pulse rate comparator that generates some output pulse rate that is in some way proportional to the difference between the two inputs (reference and perceptual signal). There would, of course either need to be a another signal indicating the ‘polarity’ of the error, or the comparator output with no error would be some steady state pulse rate that would then vary up or down depending upon the ‘polarity’ of an error.
> 
> Pulse width control is actually similar and normally the comparator output is a steady state width that is again varied according to the magnitude and ‘polarity’ of any error.
> 
> I would not be surprised if it was discovered that all comparators in the brain always have some non-zero reference signal present. Some of the lower level systems OTOH do appear to have zero value reference signals when the system is not actually active. However, these systems are unidirectional in their operation, such as muscle contraction or sensing temperature.
> 
> Does any of that relate to what you are talking about?
> 
> Best,  
> Bill
> 
> On 06/24/2016 06:26 AM, Boris Hartman wrote:
> 
> > Hi Bruce,
> 
> > 
> 
> > sorry for delayed respons. As I said I have my reasons.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I see we have some troubles coming toghether with our oppinions. But I’m sure we can make it. So I’ll start on the end as I don’t see other possibility to seek for our agreement. I hope you will not mind.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA :
> 
> > This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB :This is perfect beginning for possible agreements. This is the bases how can we explore how live organism function in contrast to machines or models or whatever we imagine as the “true� about “Real� organisms.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I agree with you that diagrams and models are not so far, so to simulate the exact working of biological Control systems. I agree with you that there is a long way to “determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out�.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So if we start at the beggining of our »problem«. Disagreement about reference 0 (zero). My suggestion is that you try to use model »Live block diagram« in »real conditions« without using anatomical and physioloigical evidences. So we have to try to establish whether »Live diagram« could work as »real« organism or as you say »biological control system«.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : It seems that you are all the time »working« only with model, and I’m observing from view of organisms functioning and how much »LiveBlock diagram« correspond to physiological facts. From the point of model or »diagram« reference value 0 (zero) is just one of the values, which represent just a change of value. But we mustn’t forget that it was designed by human, and that human can realize ideas in accordance with »facts«. So it can give to the model or machine any value, but the question is whether model or machine will correspond to »real world«
> 
> > 
> 
> > In real organism (physiological aspect) reference value 0 (zero) means that there is no signal. In nervous system signlas are produced by the Law of »ALL-OR- NON LAW«. In the case of reference 0 (zero) there is no signal (nothing happens). So this case is **very different** from the reference signals that are present. So the result reference 0 (zero) i **s as I have claimed** very special case. Using reference signal 0 ( zero) means that organism is not producing reference signal. So as I have said before it can be indiicator that organism is not functioning any more. Most probably it can mean it is dead. How can organism which is not alive do any action ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > **The »ALL-OR-NONE LAW«** describes the relationship between »stimulus and respons«. All-or-nothing principle means all-or-none response (1 or 0). The magnitude of the action potential set up in any single nerve fiber is independent of the strength of the exciting stimulus. A bio-electrical stimulus below threshold strength fails to elicit a propagation of action potential.
> 
> > Medical dictionary ( Physiology)  
> > A rule applied to the activation of individual muscle or nerve cells, where the response to stimuli (depolarisation) only occurs above a certain threshold, usually –55 mV, after which a complete action potential occurs that is maximum in intensity—i.e., the strength of the nerve impulse is not dependent on, or a function of, the strength of the stimulus.
> 
> > 
> 
> > In short, nerv signal occurs or it don’t occur (depends from the trashold). In the case you presented as reference signal 0 (zero), nerv signal didn’t occur. You assumed that Contol loop in physiological sense is working without it. And that is impossible. How can organism work without reference that are produced in organism ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > So as I said before it’s very easy to »play« with diagrams, models and simulators, because values don’t represent the »real« process yet. But when we start applying »diagrams, models and so on« in »real circumstances«, plausibility with physiological facts are necesary.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : So the problem I see here is that you used PCT »Live Block demo« with basic assumption that it is perfect »match« to real organism. So that it shows exactly how organisms work. But we both know that »LiveBlock« diagram is not yet a perfect »match«. There is quite some things to be done. With machines there is no problem which value you use whether is 0 (zero) or any other value. But as I said before machine is designed by humans and values which are uused can be any value human choose. The only condition I know is, that values should work in »real« organism. And value reference 0 (zero) is not.
> 
> > 
> 
> > In the case of human nobody can’t design references. Only Nature can. So the main difference between human and machine or model is that human are born, they produce references and they die. Machines are not born, they don’t produce references and they don’t die. They can be damaged or they can stop working, they can be repared by humna or redisigned and so on. I hope I manage to present he main differences between human and machine and why they can’t be acquated.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So it seems to me, that relaying only on PCT »LiveBlock demo«, without checking whether anatomical and physiological »facts« are in accordance with BlockDiagram, you concluded that references at 0 (zero) are as good as any o6ther value. This is fundamnental mistake.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Many thinkers and Bill is included beleived and others still beleive that final arbiter for comparing models (machines) is **nature**.And you also beleive that this is true, otherwise I doubt that you would wrote the thoughts about plausability to anatomical and physioogical evidences.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So I beleive that, if you will try »Live block diagram« in »real« circumstances, simulating it’s working in »real« conditions, I’m sure that you will come to the same conclussions as I did. So if you’ll check reference 0 (zero) in real conditions, you will see that reference 0 (zero) in physiological sense means that there is no nerv signal . How can organism work without a reference signal ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Reference signal is ordinary nerv signal and it »behaves« in accordance with general principles of nervous system.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bill didn’t suggested only »possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973â€?, but he suggested also the whole »PCT organism« on p. 191 (BCP, 2005). If you will look carefully you will see that lowest part of the hierarchy is »connected« to the external environment, so I’ll assume that it represents »Live block diagram«. So references for the »outer« control loop (Live blosk diagram«) are formed in hierarchy. The problem is the »question mark« on the top of the hierarchy, which put PCT in critical position. The most important feature of hierarchy of control loops is not defined yet. It’s not defined yet clearly how references are formed in organism and it’s not defined how it comes to 11th level to form »references« for all other levels. The PCT organism (p. 191) is not working properly yet, because it’s not clear how »references« are produced.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Dag’s diagram presents »new« picture (bellow) of »PCT organims« on p. 191. The problem of references is still present. I’ll not go into details how me and Bill came to this picture, which is presented by Dag (you can see discussion on CSGnet), but I’ll just say that I continued working on my own and I found my solution of architecture of Bill’s diagram on p. 191. I can say that I managed to »erase question mark« at the top of the hierarchy as I think that in my version of whole PCT organism on p. 191 is approximatelly working properly so it produces references as it should.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bruce you are and you’ll be (at least for me) the best analyzer of »Live block diagram« (the same level as Martin). You have also some physiological knowledge and that is your advantage. So I think that you could make the same whole diagram of PCT organism on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) working properly with using anatomical and physiological evidences. I’m sure you’ll come approximatelly to the same conclussions as I did. So when you’ll make the whole diagram I think that we shall find the way to final agreement about how PCT and real organism works.
> 
> > 
> 
> > There are and there will be »black spots« in our understanding of how Living beings really work or as you said : it is a long way to â€?determine the actual nature of a given biological control systemâ€?. But we have to try, don’t we.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Other answers in our conversation mostly come out directly from arguments I clarify above. So :
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : The output is the result of comparison between reference and perceptual signal. And it’s not neccessary that it is the result of »outer control loop«, which you probably had in mind. In any case. With reference 0 (zero) output can be produced only by input speaking of course in behavioristic sense.But in physiological sense this will not happen if organism is not producing references so it’s not alive.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologiccally evolved components (neurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they wwill function in the same way. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I gave arguments above why machines and organisms can’t be equated. You can also read again arguments from Henry Yin. Humans and machines will never work the same. There are some main principles that are making them alike, because machines are made by human. But mixing them as the same can cause a lot of troubles.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Thinking about the equality between machines and organisms brought you in the position where you already admitted that you made a mistake when you tried to equate control in outer environment by machines and control in Living beings (see our previous discussions).
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bruce I still think that we can come to possible agreement about real nature of PCT. My proposal is that you »finish« diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) and then we can continue our discussion. Fully operational diagram will also help Rick to »reorganize« confussion in his head and others who are repeatedly misleaded by Rick.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Bruce Abbott [[mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com](mailto:bbabbott@frontier.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 2:45 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > [From Bruce Abbott (20160209.0845 EST)]
> 
> > 
> 
> > Hi Boris,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Below you make several claims about the screenshot I provided of the LiveBlock demo, as follows:
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB: About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen values in diaggram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : It’s physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism’s functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It’s not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : Do you have the LiveBlock demo? If so, try varying the reference level. I used zero in the example, but the system will generate a feedback that is nearly equal to the disturbance but of opposite sign no matter what reference value you use. Thus, this result is **not** , as you had claimed, a special case of using a zero reference value.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I still think that you used wrong example. The system if you mean »Liveblock« diagram will really generate something when references are ZERO, BUT ORGANISM WILL NOT. We have to make clear distinction between model and real organism, becaus emodel or LiveBlock diagrma has to fit to the »real organism« not vica verse. If diagrma is showing you something to be right it doesn’t mean that it is right also for »real organism«.
> 
> > 
> 
> > If you would match the »LiveBlock demo« with physiological evidences then you would notice that reference signal is simple neural signal. And for the neural signals in organism there is general rule in how they appear. It’s called »All or nothing«. So in organism neural signal appears or it not appear. It 1 or 0. Whether there is a signal or there isn’t. Whether the sum of incoming input signals exceed the axon trashhold or they don’t. So taking the reference as 0 it means that there is no referecne signal. That’s what in physiology means neural signal 0. There is no signal, so there is not neural activity. This is a big difference between macihne and »Live organism«. Organism produce neural signala and stay alive. If it don’t produce neural signals it’s most possible that it’s not alive any more. Machines are not born, they don’t produce reference signal and they don’t die. People can set any values for machines even 0, but in organism references are set by the nature. They can be set by other people.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 
> 
> > No, the output arises from the operation of a closed loop. The input is transformed by the input function to a perception; this is compared to the reference value at the comparator, which takes the difference between reference and perception to create the error signal. The error signal drives the output, which affects the input via the feedback function. This feedback acts to change the input in such a was as to reduce the error between the reference value and the perception.
> 
> > 
> 
> > In the behavioristic (S-R or open-loop) approach, the input (stimulus) drives the output (response), but there is (a) no comparison between a reference level and perception, and (b) there is no effect of the output on the input (i.e., no feedback). Clearly the LiveBlock diagram is not a diagram of a stimulus-response system.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 
> 
> > The LiveBlock demo correctly describes how a simple control system works, both statically and dynamically. You can have the demo produce a continuously varying disturbance value and observe that the system still acts to keep the perceptual signal close to the reference value.
> 
> > 
> 
> > The beauty of control systems is that it doesn’t matter what they are composed of – human-made hardware or biologically evolved components (nneurons, muscles, hormones, etc.) – they will function in the same wway. The whole **point** of PCT is that human and animal behavior can be understood as the output of biological control systems. We can analyze the operation of such systems just as we do any human-designed control system.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > This is not to say that biological control system will have system diagrams that are identical to the simple proportional controller illustrated in the LiveBlock demo. To determine the actual nature of a given biological control system, we need anatomical and physiological evidence showing where relevant functions are carried out, the nature of the signals, and where the signals go. We are still quite a long way from being able to do that to any significant degree. Bill Powers suggested a possible Level 1 system that operates the skeletal muscles in 1973 and I am currently working on implementing a more recent model that Bill was developing, that incorporates more recent evidence.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bruce
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Tuesday, February 09, 2016 1:51 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > [From Bruce Abbott (2015.12.20.1030 EST)]
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, December 20, 2015 1:21 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** RE: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bruce,
> 
> > HB : My opinion is that there is no “subtractorâ€? (o-d) in environment in the “input quantity«. At least I never saw anywhere Bill using this combination. But “adderâ€? (o+d) as it’s seen from Bill’s diagram as “add effectsâ€?, is something what is common in Bill’s theory, so effects of output and disturbances are “addedâ€? in environment. It’s clear in his diagram.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : Boris, I **agree with you** : _ **There is no »subtractor« in the environment** _. But I think you are getting confused between adding _variables_ and adding the _values_ of variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I’m glad that we agree about »subtractor«. That’s »closing« our mutual understanding of PCT to a higher level. But I would wait with accusatons who is confused.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > About diagram you showed, I assume it’s possible support to your arguments, I think it’s not a good example. So I see a main problem that by my oppinion you choosed very rare case in natural functioning of organisms…. My critics for your choosen valuues in diagram from »endless« possible (as Ashby would say) are :
> 
> > 
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > It's physiologicaly extreme example. Reference signal zero with outer »steady-state« is probably non existant as stable state in organism's functioning or of very rare existance in organism as something »passing through«. I doubt that it could contribute to understanding how »generaly« organisms function. Reference zero can also mean that organism is not functioning any more. It's not clear how efectors are »alive« if there is no »goal« in organism.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Input is producing directly output. It seems like behavioristic approach.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Almost at every possible value in the diagram you could make »endless« of such »a pictures« for different values with »outside steady-state«, but that doesn't mean that every »picture« will represent how organism function.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > Playing with »control loop« can be by my oppinion »dangerous« for understanidng how organisms work, if somebody is playing into extremes or if use other impossible values from organisms survival limits. »Live-block« diagram is just a model that can help to understand. it’s not almighty »tool« for representing how organism function in any case. So I think that members of CSGnet should be carefull about using »diagram« in any meaning.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I personaly think that it’s not clear yet in PCT how references in organism are formed, otherwise the »question mark« on 11th level would be removed. Nobody has done it yet and also in »new version« which was exposed by Dag, there are some changes made to »the whole diagaram«, but it’s stil not clear what »question mark« on 11th level means, and thus open the question how organism as »the whole works« and how references are formed.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So I think that PCT is in the »stalemate« position and in the situation that we don’t understand clearly how »PCT organism« function and what diagram with »the whole double feed-back control loop« on the bases of »reorganization« and »homeostatic« subsystem represent.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So my advice again is that CSGnet has to solve as soon as possible Dag’s »new diagram« where »confusion« with »reorganization« and »arrow to intrinsic variable« exists. I think in this way it will be finaly understood how »references« in organism are formed and »question mark« on the top of 11th level erased. My oppinion is that the »origin« of references can be understood only if the »whole« picture of PCT organism is understaood.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ![cid:image001.png@01D119FD.595FDCD0]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : And Bruce. I think that you could easily and with competence show how diagram (LCS III) realy works and how can be usefull in understanding how organism »really« function. By my oppinion effects are always added in »input quatity«. But that doesn’t mean there is any »subtraction« going on in outer environment or control. In PCT »subtracting« is done only in comparator inside organism, as that is aproximatelly **one of the main principles** how nervous system function.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I beleive that »input quantity« is something what comes from Ashby’s idea, who proposed that from endless variables in outer environment, human system receive only limited amount (depends from capabilites of receptor) and form »abstract system« in the brain, which is quite reduced »perceptual amount« in respect to »endless« amount of possible physical variables outside. In this way »picture of reality« is reduced, and finaly »constructed« into »abstract system« from »transformations« on receptors into nerv signals.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So I think that »input quantitty« represents the limited amount of physical variables in environment that finaly affect the «input function« as the sum of effects (disturbances + output) to »input function« no matter how values are distributed.
> 
> > 
> 
> > The question is whether we shall put here milion of pictures of possible states that diagram (LCS III) can offer or we can agree that effects in environment are always added as Bill’s diagram shows (LCS III). It’s quite imagined construct.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ![cid:image016.png@01D113B4.04DDF0B0]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > If we agree upon issues I mentioned then maybe we could agree that all Bills »definitions« stay.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So can we agree about the nature of control in PCT :
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Observed behavior is not control or controlled. Behavior (output) is control empty
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Perceptual signal is controlled, but not from outside. It's controlled inside organism.
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 1. 
> > 
> > ```
> > Organism is controlling, not environment…
> > 
> > ```
> 
> > 
> 
> > If we agree with this points, we can maybe agree also with Bill’s »defitnitions« of control elements, that are represented in diagram (LCS III) in which there is no fixed »controled variable«, just added effects in the form of »input quantity«. »Controlled quantity« or »controlled variable« in outer environment is by my oppinion imagined construct of »person in control« and observer.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > And I have one request Bruce.
> 
> > If it’s possible, please don’t use words which are describing me or my state. I feel like you are trying to disqualify me or that you are trying to show that I’m »confused person«. I could also say that you were confused by putting »subtractor« into outer environment and »control« from outer environment into perceptual signal. But I didn’t. I tried to discuss with you as an equal communication partner as I think that this could lead to constructive and final answers. So I’d be pleased if you avoid personal conotations. I will also try not to J
> 
> > 
> 
> > I felt the same way in conversation with Bruce Nevin. The first whom I saw using methods of »conotating« and »patronizing« others on this forum was Rick. So if anybody ask why my relation with Rick is as it is, the answer is in our history. And I think that Fred described the right reason why. So to avoid conflicts, I’d suggest no conotations of our personality.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I’d be glad if you conisder my offer, otherwise I think that our conversation couldl end in conflict. I respect you and your oppinion, so there is no need for this.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I think it’s better that we talk about different oppinions. So I’d rather see that you take me as an equal partner in conversation, with whom you can reach an agreement or maybe we can get even more knowledge, both of us. So we can learn from each other. Isn’t this more productive?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : The two plus signs entering qo in Bill’s diagram represent the addition of two _ **variables** _. In a negative feedback system, the **values** of those two variables will have opposite signs, in the steady state.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I suppose you meant **»two plus signs entering qi«.**
> 
> > 
> 
> > We already established in the case of »sunbathing« that what you are proposing is not always the case with behavioral effects to environment or it’s not general event in environment. But we are seeking for general model of organisms behavior, which will explain every behavior. I understand your abstracting as the case when behavior really »oppose« or »counteract« disturbances. But there are many cases when this is not so. So for example as in »sunbathing« the input quantity is »purely« contenting disturbances with no opposing effect of behavior (output). So no adding effects of output, just disturbances entering »input function«.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I think that »input quantity« resembles to Ashby’s idea that there are some »physical variables« from endless in the world arround us which are used for forming »abstract system« in our brains, some construction of limited perceptual transformations of »real world«. So not all »physical variables« are converted (transformed) in »input fucntion«, just those which can be possibly »transformed« in accordance to nature of »input function«. And these seems to be gathered in »input quantity«.
> 
> > 
> 
> > We perceive and control a little part of the » world«, but enough for more or less succesfull control of our »survival«. Sometimes lack of perceptions can cost as life.
> 
> > 
> 
> > I suppose this was described as »model of reality« in Bill’s discourse where he was »closing« to solipsism. So I think that »input quantity« forms any kind of »mixed« disturbances (I like this Kent’s term) that are content of »input function« and are later compared and selectivelly controlled in comparator.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : The **variables** are **added** , but because the **values** have _opposite_ signs, **adding** them results in a value for qi equal to the **difference** between d and qo!
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : This could be one of the cases… I feel this as trial of manipulation. There are cases when this is not so.
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : As proof, examine the figure below, which is taken from a screen shot of LiveBlock:
> 
> > 
> 
> > ![LiveBlock Negative Feedback.jpg]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > BA : I moved the Disturbance slider control to the extreme right to produce a steady disturbance value of 15.00. The LiveBlock control system responded by adjusting the Output Quantity to _ **minus** _ 14.85. The result of adding these two quantities to qi is shown in the box labeled »Input Quantity«: 0.15.
> 
> > 
> 
> > qi = 15.00 + (-14.85) = 15.00 – 14.85 = +0.15
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : The »proof« is arranged to your wanted values. And I don’t see what this has to do with »Behavior is control« ? Do you want to tell me, that there is »subtractor« in outer environment ??? You said it above it’s not.
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : For better understanding I think that you could do more, for example analyzing all other possible values of »ouput« and »disturbances« ? Maybe you can get some more general solution ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Maybe you could arrange it so that »Output quantity« is zero ? What does this mean for control in organism ?
> 
> > This will mean that »control« was moved to inside the organism (there is no »control quantity« outside).
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : Maybe you could include also the case where LCS is »protected from disturbances« where it seems that Rick is insinuating that disturbances are zero and that they are not entering »input function« ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > I think that general control loop always ends in just »input quantity« which is transformed into perceptual signal and later in comparator where it si controlled. As Bill’s diagram in LCS III is suggesting.
> 
> > 
> 
> > So I think that in any case not only when »disturbances« represent the only »content« of »input quantity«, the perceptual signal is not »controlled«, but is going to be controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Henry Yin :
> 
> > A control system always controls its input, not output. Only perceivable consequences of behavior can be controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > So I think that control is happening in organism not outside. You can control what you perceive.
> 
> > And this is what I think is many times neglected when speaking about »outer part of control loop«. Most important control happens in organism and that is what is not clear in PCT yet. And behavior is the result of this control
> 
> > But maybe the problem that this is not clear, can be »formation« of reference signal which is still under »mark of interogation) on 11.level…
> 
> > 
> 
> > Do you have any clue, how »the whole picture« of internal control in organism look like. Control inside the PCT organism is still very misterious (see Dug’s diagram which original version is on p. 191, B:CP).
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > Bruce
> 
> > * * *
> 
> > No virus found in this message.  
> > Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> > Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16
> 
> > No virus found in this message.  
> > Checked by AVG - [www.avg.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=vGvNTR4PCOGQsJkLNKQmCLr3kcMcsGW8vlFPFzph8AQ&s=HK783-67kKN4o1N_UwFDdRDrjNmND1VqMz7A3cvYLOs&e=)  
> > Version: 2016.0.7357 / Virus Database: 4522/11588 - Release Date: 02/09/16

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 8, 2015, 12:16pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/13 "2015-11-08T12:16:16Z")

</div>

Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.

Best,

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.
> 
> RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.
> 
> HB :
> 
> RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.
> 
> RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.
> 
> RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.
> 
> RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.
> 
> RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.
> 
> RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.
> 
> RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).
> 
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 8, 2015, 12:27pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/14 "2015-11-08T12:27:06Z")

</div>

And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output).  I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).

Best,

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.
> 
> RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> Best,
> 
> Boris
> 
> then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.
> 
> HB :
> 
> RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.
> 
> RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.
> 
> RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.
> 
> RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.
> 
> RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.
> 
> RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.
> 
> RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).
> 
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [November 8, 2015, 5:39pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/15 "2015-11-08T17:39:44Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]

> **···**
>
> On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).
> 
> RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> > **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> > **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > 
> 
> > I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> > **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > 
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> > Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> > Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).  
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 15, 2015, 7:19am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/16 "2015-11-15T07:19:12Z")

</div>

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of thee glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…

/p\>

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Bill P.:

When we ….»explain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behhaving system«…. we **construct**  an objective model aas if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Best,

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]
> 
> On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).
> 
> RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> > **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> > **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> > **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> > RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.
> 
> > RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> > Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.
> 
> > RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> > RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.
> 
> > RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.
> 
> > RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.
> 
> > RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.
> 
> > RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> > RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> > Best
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> > Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).
> 
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [November 15, 2015, 11:30pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/17 "2015-11-15T23:30:00Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2015.11.15.1530)]

> **···**
>
> > 
> 
> > RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.
> 
> On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:19 PM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.
> 
> RM: How can you say it doesn’t change anything else besides perception when you just said that we act _on the world_. In PCT we act on the world to influence (change) those aspects of the world that we perceive and control. PCT is not solipsism. It’s a theory (a belief, for those of you in the belief thread) that, like any theory, accounts for observable phenomena.Â
> 
> > HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.
> 
> RM: Yes, the output function is a carefully defined theoretical concept. However, what you see and informally call a person’s “output”, such as moving their arm, is actually a controlled result of other means (variations in muscle tensions in this case). That is, what you see as a person’s “output” is the (possibly varying) reference state of a controlled variable.
> 
> Â
> 
> > Â Bill P.
> 
> > The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.
> 
> RM: Of course, that is a definition of the output function. It’s not a definition of output or, more importantly, what we see as (and informally refer to as) a person’s “output”.Â
> 
> Â
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB: I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.
> 
> RM: I don’t understand what physiological evidences would have to do with it. Bill developed PCT to explain the controlling that he saw people (and other organisms) do; that is, he developed PCT to explain observable behavior; behavior that is occurring out there in the world. He went to some length to make sure (and to show) that the theory was consistent with physiological evidences.Â
> 
> Â
> 
> > HB: it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it.
> 
> RM: All we know is our perception. That IS our reality. PCT is aimed at explaining one aspect of that reality: the behavior of living organisms. Before you can explain the reality of behavior you have to know what it is that you are explaining. Conventional psychologists see behavior as “caused output”; Powers saw it as variables maintained in reference states, protected from disturbance; that is, he saw behavior as control. PCT was developed to explain that reality.Â
> 
> Â
> 
> > HB: So behavior involve no control.
> 
> RM: If that were true there would be no need for control theory to explain it.
> 
> Â
> 
> > HB: If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside.
> 
> RM: You do it by being in a closed negative feedback relationship with those perceptions. Check out the diagram of a control system model or, better yet, build a model yourself and you’ll see how it works.Â
> 
> > HB:Â HBIt’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article.
> 
> RM: I already have and it’s quite different from yours. The main problem with yours is that it is solipsistic and, thus, completely outside the realm of science. There are many other problems with your understanding of PCT but solipsism is really the show stopper for me. It makes what you say about PCT completely uninteresting because there is just no where to go with it, scientifically. So I probably won’t respond to your posts very much (unless by some miracle you join the reality-based community) unless I see some other egregious misconception of yours about PCT.
> 
> BestÂ
> 
> Rick
> 
> Â
> 
> > 
> 
> >  The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > When we ….»explaain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we **construct**  an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > 
> 
> > Â
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> > Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).Â
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> –  
> Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=zwuNxMCW-SQxS2PeZ8AI4v8pwICpq2BTMc5Q1O9aRMw&s=YGxPjtapFXZsO4TiGuuGBJnDSL_IEgQKDNFjMTw6PwM&e=)  
> Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=zwuNxMCW-SQxS2PeZ8AI4v8pwICpq2BTMc5Q1O9aRMw&s=-RHy9pSMTwuw-U6V6EoBCXXBbBRLslWgOhpDjwQuxeM&e=).  
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [November 16, 2015, 7:07pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/18 "2015-11-16T19:07:11Z")

</div>

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]

Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –

BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.

BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.

BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception. We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the  best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an _effective_ way to reality.Â

BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.Â

> **···**
>
> On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the gllass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…/p\>
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.
> 
> > If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.
> 
> > The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > When we ….»explain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we **connstruct**  an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]
> 
> > Â
> 
> > On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BestÂ
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> > > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > > **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> > > **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> > > **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > > **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> > > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > > **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> > > **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> > > Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB :
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0Â _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Â RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > BestÂ
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Rick
> 
> > > –
> 
> > > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> > > Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).Â
> 
> > > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> > 
> 
> > Â
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> > Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).Â
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [November 22, 2015, 1:59am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/19 "2015-11-22T01:59:00Z")

</div>

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.21.2055 ET)]

Boris, yes, I agree that our control of perceptual input appears to have effects on the environment. The appearance is such that our control of the perception appears to be our control of that which is perceived. I cannot join you in denying that it is in fact control of that which is perceived, because I don’t know whether it is or not. I have no way of knowing. Maybe you do.

HB: Well Bruce my positive opinion about you is rising rapidly, Â …

Reports indicate that I have my ups and downs. Seems to depend a lot on whose perceptions are reported. 😉

HB: … despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet.Â

I did? That’s a surprise to me! It wasn’t something that I perceived. At least not consciously.

> **···**
>
> On Sat, Nov 21, 2015 at 7:31 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Bruce Nevin [[mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com](mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Monday, November 16, 2015 8:07 PM  
> > **To:** CSG  
> > **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > I agree. Any person has it’s own imagination of presenting the world outside to him. So for somebody »we can control something in environment« and by others oppinion we can’t. We can just » **affect** environment«, as Bill propossed. I think that »affecting« environment has more physiological support than oppinion about »controlling environment«.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB:
> 
> > I agree. I never siad that there is no environment outside and Bill did neither. It could be maybe misunderstanding. We all assume that there is environment out there. The difference is whether we beleive that we are »controlling environment outside« or it is just affected by the inside control though means of control (support to control).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > In either way we assume that there is environment out there. I think that Bill was right to assume that there are only **effects** of output percived in environment. So the difference is only whether those »effects to environment« are controlled or not. Perceptions of physiological researches are on Bill’s side.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I agree. J. Yes, we **control disturbed perception** not environmental variables. Environmental variables are just **affected** by output thus disturibng (changing) our perceptions which are later controlled. I really don’t know anymore what we are arguing about J.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BN : We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the  best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an _effective_ way to reality.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I agree. Well Bruce my positive oppinon about you is rising rapidly, despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet. But it’s better than Rick, who wanted to »delete« me. I think we are about to come to agreement, but anyway i’ll try to vanish after that.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > The difference between Bill and you is only in that Bill justifiably beleived that also aspects of environment that the perception correspond to are **»affected«** not »controled« by output. It looks like a little word »game«. But it’s not. It’s supported with strong physiological evidences that Bill provided with his theory. I think that’s why we can find »effects« not »control« in Bill’s diagram. He could have easily put in diagram »controlled efects«. But he didn’t. Isn’t it that a good reason that we ask ourselves WHY ?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > /Bruce
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the percepttion of the glass change from »on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It mmeans that we produce actions that alter the world of perception…\>
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.
> 
> > If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.
> 
> > The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P.:
> 
> > When we ….»explain behavior in terms of somee physical model of a behaving system«…. we **construct** \> an objective model as if our own perceptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]
> 
> > Â
> 
> > On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> > BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output)  that does not involve control.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BestÂ
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> > > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > > **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> > > **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> > > **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > > **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> > > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > > **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> > > **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> > > Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Best,
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Boris
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > HB :
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0Â _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.Â
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Â RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > BestÂ
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > Rick
> 
> > > –
> 
> > > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> > > Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).Â
> 
> > > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> > 
> 
> > Â
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> > Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).Â
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> > Â

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 21, 2015, 12:31pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255/20 "2015-11-21T12:31:34Z")

</div>

[Bruce Nevin (2015.11.16.14:06)]

Boris Hartman (Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM) –

BH: it’s obvious (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

BN: Boris, it’s not that we can’t control anything in the environment, it’s that we can’t know that we have done so except by means of perceptions that we are controlling.

HB :

I agree. Any person has it’s own imagination of presenting the world outside to him. So for somebody »we can control something in environment« and by others oppinion we can’t. We can just » **affect** environment«, as Bill propossed. I think that »affecting« environment has more physiological support than oppinion about »controlling environment«.

BN: We assume that those perceptions correspond to reality because we have to in order to live, and because of how our perceptions corroborate one another.

HB:

I agree. I never siad that there is no environment outside and Bill did neither. It could be maybe misunderstanding. We all assume that there is environment out there. The difference is whether we beleive that we are »controlling environment outside« or it is just affected by the inside control though means of control (support to control).

In either way we assume that there is environment out there. I think that Bill was right to assume that there are only **effects** of output percived in environment. So the difference is only whether those »effects to environment« are controlled or not. Perceptions of physiological researches are on Bill’s side.

BN: Bill postulates that we have no access to or information about reality other than our perceptions. No one has been able to show an alternative, so we accept that as fact. We do perceive an environment, such that we take our perceptions to be the reality. Various phenomena (perceptual appearances) attest that our perceptions have some kind of workable correspondence with reality. There are perceptions we cannot control (e.g. sunrise in the west followed by apparent movement of the sun eastward across the sky) except perhaps by extraordinary measures (e.g. traveling extremely fast toward the west). There are unpredictable disturbances, some of which we can resist so as to control the disturbed perception.

HB : I agree. J. Yes, we **control disturbed perception** not environmental variables. Environmental variables are just **affected** by output thus disturibng (changing) our perceptions which are later controlled. I really don’t know anymore what we are arguing about J.Â

BN : We control many perceptions by means of environmental feedback paths that we maintain collectively with others (e.g. when I complained about the pavement of a town street encroaching on the corner of my property, using a survey map that the town had created for another purpose, the town altered the road). Collaboration and other forms of agreement affirm intersubjective agreement, which is the best approach we have to achieving objectivity about reality. The careful and systematic procedures of the sciences (which themselves are collectively maintained environmental feedback paths) collaboratively establish approximations to objective descriptions of reality within a community of scientists. Engineers employ findings of science as though they were facts about reality and build devices which many people employ as environmental feedback paths for controlling a great diversity of perceptions, from flying in airplanes and crossing long bridges to watching video images and performing laser surgery on a brain. Many of these things and more are mutually consistent within high-level perceptions such as theories, cosmologies, worldviews (however we prefer to name them). All of these things and more strongly attest that our perceptions correspond in an _effective_ way to reality.

HB : I agree. Well Bruce my positive oppinon about you is rising rapidly, despite the »fact« that you wanted to »kick« me out of CSGnet. But it’s better than Rick, who wanted to »delete« me. I think we are about to come to agreement, but anyway i’ll try to vanish after that.Â

BN: For these reasons, and more, when we control a perception we believe, justifiably, that we also control aspects of the environment that the perception corresponds to.

HB :

The difference between Bill and you is only in that Bill justifiably beleived that also aspects of environment that the perception correspond to are **»affected«** not »controled« by output. It looks like a little word »game«. But it’s not. It’s supported with strong physiological evidences that Bill provided with his theory. I think that’s why we can find »effects« not »control« in Bill’s diagram. He could have easily put in diagram »controlled efects«. But he didn’t. Isn’t it that a good reason that we ask ourselves WHY ?

Boris

> /Bruce

The simple examples are of course Bill’s. It’s showing that no behavior (output) involve control :

Bill P.:

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when we make the perception of the glass change from »»on the table« to »near the mouth« - we have no direct knowledge of what we are doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth…It means that we produce actions that aalter the world of perception…

HB : As I understand it, it means that we act on the world to change perception of the position of the glass. Effects of »physical output actions« or »observed behavior« are just changing the perceptual world inside us. It doesn’t control anything.

Bill P.

If the driver had to execute any of the behaviors in Table 1 blindly, with no visual, auditory, kinestethic, or other sensory information to tell him the current status of the variable, it would be impossible for him to vary his actions so as to oppose unexpected disturbances. In Fact, we would find through continuing experiment that the only reliable consequences of the driver’s actions are those the driver can sense. This is a crucial hint about how this sort of phenomena is created.

HB : By my oppinion in both examples Bill showed that output function is producing just EFFECTS to outer environment. We can remember again Barb’s words that her Dad carefully choosed words. So I think that Bill’s »definiton« of »output finction« is carefully choosen.

Bill P.

The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system.

HB : I think that using »definitons« will help us to make agreement of different oppinions. Something has to be reference.

So I’m interested Rick whether YOU AGREE WITH BILL’S DEFITNION OR NOT ? Please only yes or no. But you can explain if you don’t agree, why you don’t agree.

I think that Bill would emphasize that »output function« is producing »controlled effects« to outer environment if he would have physiological evidences. But he obviously didn’t have them so output is just affecting outer environment.

it’s obiously (at least to me) that we are not aware of what we are doing to »reality«, until we perceive it. So behavior involve no control. If you don’t know what you are doing to reality and you are aware only of what you perceive, how can you control something outside. That’s why I think there is no »CV« outside generic diagram which is clearly presenting that »ACTIONS ARE CONVERTED INTO EFFECT ON INPUT QUANTITY«, not »actions are control« as we can find it in yours, Warren’s and Tim’s article.

It’s occuring to me what is bodering you, but you will have to find your own answer in Bill’s books (speccially B:CP) or maybe in Henry Yin article. Whatever Bill is saying in the examples above, has deep physiological meaning.

The main question is how nervous system controls, so that we have so different »view of reality« or that we perceive the same »reality« in so different ways.

Bill P.:

When we ….»eexplain behavior in terms of some physical model of a behaving system«…. we **construct** an objective model as if our own perceeptions were exactly the world as it exists, including physics, chemistry, physiology, and neurology.

Best,

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bruce Nevin [[mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com](mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com)]  
> **Sent:** Monday, November 16, 2015 8:07 PM  
> **To:** CSG  
> **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 2:19 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 6:40 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** Re: FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> [From Rick Marken (2015.11.08.0940)]
> 
> On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Boris Hartman [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net) wrote:
> 
> BH: And sorry i made one mistake more. I wrote that »references« are not invorlved in »behaior« (output). I wanted to wrote that »Control« is not involved in »behavior« (output).
> 
> RM: OK,so how about an example of a behavior (output) that does not involve control.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:16 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Subject:** FW: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > Sorry for a mistake in my previous post. I wanted to answer it in whole, but there are again so many »nebouluses« so I stopped. Consider text in your message as irrelevant.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Boris Hartman [[mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)]  
> > **Sent:** Sunday, November 08, 2015 1:14 PM  
> > **To:** ‘csgnet@lists.illinois.edu’  
> > **Subject:** RE: What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > I don’t have time to read your »thought constructs«, but I will say only that »references« are not involved in »behavior« (output). »Behavior« output just affect outer environemnt. So there is no »Control in outer environment«. Anyway you also noticed that »behavior« is not always »Control« of something in outer environment. So whatever you are doing is not general.
> 
> > 
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : How can anything be »objectivelly« determined through someones perception. Is this again one of yours »thought construct« ? So are you saying that you can »see« reality directly ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken [[mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)]  
> > **Sent:** Friday, November 06, 2015 7:34 PM  
> > **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> > **Cc:** Richard Marken  
> > **Subject:** What’s perception got to do, got to do, with it?
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2015.11.06.1030)]
> 
> > RM: Now that all of us (well, almost all of us) are on board with the idea that behavior is control, the next step is to see what perception has to do with it.
> 
> > RM: Once you realize, as Bill did, that what organisms do – their behavior – is control,
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : He realized also that »Behavior is not Control«. And I think that he made unecessary »wording mistake« which make confussion. But you can explain to me once again what you mean by »Behavior is Control« ?
> 
> > Are you talking about »Obervable behavior as Control« ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > Best,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > 
> 
> > then you know that the only way to explain their behavior is using control theory; and that the main thing to be explained about behavior as control is the existence of reference states for controlled variables (see p. 176, LCS I, para 2 and 3 in particular).
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : And where can you find that reference states in outer environment ? I suppose that you meant »controlled variable« as something what exists in outer environment ?
> 
> > 
> 
> > 
> 
> > That is, control theory has to explain the facts associated with each Behavior in Table 1, p. 172 of LCS I (and in the “Behavior is Control”. spreadsheet): the fact that what we see as Behavior involves bringing Controlled Variables to and maintaining them in Reference states using Means that precisely counter normal Disturbances to those Variables.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB :
> 
> > RM: The situation is similar to trying to understand the behavior of a thermostat. Say you have observed (correctly) that the Behavior of the thermostat is control (which it is, of course): there is a Controlled Variable (room temperature) that is being kept in a constant Reference state (say, 68 degrees F) using Means (turning a heater on and off) that precisely counter normal Disturbances (such as variations in outdoor temperature). Control theory tells you that this behavior can be explained by assuming that the thermostat is controlling a perception of room temperature relative to an internal reference for that perception, the difference between reference and perception driving the heater output. And it turns out that this is exactly how the thermostat works; it controls the temperature as perceived in terms of the size of a bimetallic strip (the perceptual signal in the thermostat) which is compared to a reference, that is a contact inside the thermostat, and the difference between reference and perception (the error, measured by whether or not the bimetallic strip touches the contact) turns the heater on or off.
> 
> > RM:Of course, the big difference between the control organization that explains the controlling done by the thermostat and that which explains the controlling done by living organisms is in who sets the reference for the controlled variable. In the thermostat the reference is set from outside the system by the user of the system; in living organisms the reference is set by the system itself. This obvious difference between artificial and living control systems was not understood when control theory was first applied to the behavior of living systems because behavior was thought of as an output produced in response to input stimulation. Powers was able to apply control theory correctly, by having the reference signal set inside the behaving system itself, precisely because he understood that behavior is control.
> 
> > RM: So perception is part of the _theory_ (control theory) that accounts for the _fact_ of control. Perception doesn’t play a big role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of artifactual control systems, like the thermostat, because engineers know what variables they want these systems to control so they construct perceptual systems, like a bimetallic strip, that produce perceptions that vary in proportion to variations in those variables. But perception plays a central role when control theory is used to understand the behavior of living control systems because we don’t know what variables the system has been “built” to control and we can only understand what a system is doing (that is, we can only understand its controlling) when we know what variable it is controlling. And we know from control theory that the variables a control system controls are defined by its perceptual functions.
> 
> > RM: The importance of the fact that it is a perception rather than an objective state of the world that is controlled was brought home to me recently as I was analyzing some data for a study that was done by Warren Mansell and his students. I was asked to build a PCT model of the behavior in a video of the rubber band demo. The data, which were derived from screen captures of the video, were temporal variations in the position of the knot and S’s and E’s ends of the rubber bands. The goal was to build a PCT model that mimicked S’s behavior: controlling the position of the knot, keeping it over the dot while compensating for the disturbances produced by the movements of E’s end of the rubber bands.
> 
> > RM: I was able to build a simple control model that fit the data quite well (correlation between model and actual movements of S’s end of the rubber band was .98, RMS deviation was 5.1 pixels out of a possible 70). But in order to get this fit I had to set the model’s reference for the distance between knot and dot (the presumed controlled variable) to a value that was much greater than 0. This implied that S was not following instructions, which was to keep the knot over the dot. These instructions suggest that S’s reference for the distance between knot and dot should have been set to 0.
> 
> > RM: And then it hit me. S was indeed keeping the distance between knot and dot at 0, but S was keeping this distance at 0 _from S’s perspective_. S was looking at the knot from the side so there was parallax in S’s view of the knot – a displacement of the image of the knot/dot distance relative to what this distance would be when viewed from directly above (as it was in the video). The model was “picking up” this displacement by requiring a non-zero reference specification in order to get a good fit. But it was actually S’s perception of the knot/dot distance that was displaced, not S’s reference.
> 
> > RM: So the modeling led me to realize that the variable controlled by S was not the “objective” distance between knot and dot, as measured from the video, but, rather, the distance between the dot and a parallax displaced image of the knot as seen from the S’s perspective. When I changed the model so it was controlling this “parallax” perception of the knot/dot relationship, the reference could be set to 0 and the model fit the data exactly as well as it had when it was controlling the “objective” knot/dot distance relative to a “displaced” reference value.
> 
> > RM: The lesson here is that behavior can be _objectively_ determined to be a control process without saying anything about it _theoretically_ being perception that is controlled.
> 
> > 
> 
> > You can objectively determine that S is controlling the knot/dot distance in the rubber band demo, for example, by observing that this distance varies far less than it would be expected to as a result of E’s disturbances (movements of E’s end of the rubber bands) and that this is due to S’s compensating actions (movements of S’s end of the rubber bands). But you can’t tell precisely what variable S is controlling unless you know that S is controlling a perception, rather than the objective state of affairs as seen by you, the observer. This is where PCT comes in. Using the PCT model (as I did in modeling the behavior of S and E in the rubber band demo) you can get beyond knowing _that_ a person is controlling to knowing precisely _what_ they are controlling.
> 
> > RM: Of course, the perceptual variable a person is controlling is going to be related to the “objective” variable that you can see being controlled – as was the case with the rubber band demo model, where the perceptual variable controlled was just the parallax displaced objective variable – but in order to have a science of purposeful behavior – control – you have to have precise definitions of the variables the system control in order to develop correct models of how the system works. PCT gives you this precision.
> 
> > Best
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=YRNG8hyXwwt3oAdhfBgnak-00nscJOHgIsjlDAqt5RE&e=)  
> > Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=G22GrI03s1-fmDgJsg_29_jvTVSBejt9dPB2qVdCdNY&s=jjgYukopqbyv4jThQQ5hUzBiivfp426AEEiE95Bit2k&e=).
> 
> > Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> [www.mindreadings.com](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.mindreadings.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=aiW7jiGJkoJnTECflkpQ3G8aJRPznmQMXDyAu80XZ_0&e=)  
> Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_Doing-2DResearch-2DPurpose-2DExperimental-2DPsychology_dp_0944337554_ref-3Dsr-5F1-5F1-3Fie-3DUTF8-26qid-3D1407342866-26sr-3D8-2D1-26keywords-3Ddoing-2Bresearch-2Bon-2Bpurpose&d=BQMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=Wzf6OV8HL2BMMzveI1mkkXX-lc69CttyRNK9425lN2k&s=nKD4SCsNGsxCRcevDt5WSfxPMQNyuLPUGjg7BMbYY5A&e=).
> 
> Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Next page](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/fw-whats-perception-got-to-do-got-to-do-with-it/4255.md?page=2)