[From Bill Powers (2003.03.26.1114 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.0326.1145)--
>PCT is a model of purposeful action. (It is the only working model.) It does
>not account for the emotional qualities associated with this action,
emotional >qualities that constitute the quality of life.
They're ganging up on me. Actually, I think I have made considerable
progress in accounting for emotional qualities which are _part_ of the
quality of life but by no means all of it. Considering the discussions on
CSGnet over the past decades, I really don't see how you can say the following:
> PCT deals with error in a system and attempts to reduce it, but does
not, as yet, >focus on the feelings of frustration and anger that can
accompany a failure to
>reduce error.
Are you aware of, and have you given serious consideration, to the theory
of emotion I proposed in Living Control Systems I ? This theory
specifically deals with such feelings, identifying them as composed partly
of somatic sensations and partly of congitive experiences or control
processes. Thus anger would be a set of physical feelings that go with
vasoconstriction, elevated blood pressure, increased respiration and heart
rate, and numerous other perceptions of somatic changes, plus the
cognitive/behavioral goal of attacking or acting in some energetic way
against the object of anger.
>As I recall, Bill feels that successful control does not "feel" like
>anything. In my view, successful control in challenging situations can
>feel like happiness or even elation.
"In challenging situations" implies more than successful control (like
standing upright successfullly, which at least for me has not produced a
feeling of happiness or elation for quite a long time). When there has been
a large effort to correct a large error, the diminution of both error and
effort may well cast a positive interpretation on the whole experience,
including the experience of decreasing somatic sensations left over from
the effort (the feeling of "relief").
I wonder whether the problem here could be that in my analysis of emotion,
I don't give emotion any special place in experience -- it's there, it
happens, we can understand it, but there's nothing magical or supernatural
about it, and nothing to give it any unusual degree of value in itself. A
person who interprets emotions as something of great value, like the
proverbial actress congratulating herself on her superior sensitivities,
might not appreciate a more matter-of-fact treatment of the subject like
mine, in which emotions per se have no existence separate from the normal
working of the hierarchy. It's not that I deny the existence of emotion or
its role in most behavior. It's just that having examined the experience of
emotion rather carefully, I can no longer think of it as the mysterious
thing it used to be for me, and apparently still is for most people.
It would help if those who seemingly reject my model of emotion would
undertake to offer their own, so I could at least get some notion of what
the alternative explanations are.
Best,
Bill P.