[Martin Taylor 2018.02.20.13.12]
Allow me to compliment and complement Eetu's comment (pace [Rick
Marken 2018-02-20_09:52:49][Rick Marken 2018-02-20_09:52:49].
It is true that for a single isolated control loop, if the internal
component of the loop has a perfect model of the way the
environmental part works, and has sufficient computing resources,
then no external test could tell the difference between them. The
S-R version would have been trained with all possible applied
stimuli before the experiment, so that no matter what it perceived
at any moment in the rial, it would be able to produce the same
output as would the PCT control loop at that moment. The PCT loop,
on the other hand, would have needed no training at all, contains no
model of what “stimuli” it might encounter, nor what to output on
any occasion, other than to be provided with a leaky integrator as a
computing process to produce the output given the error.
The experimenter would, of course, have to be ignorant of the
different precursor training conditions for the two systems. But
given that ignorance, the experimenter would not know that the S-R
system had built an internal model that inverted the function
relating the output to the “stimulus”, whereas the control loop did
not need one.
Eetu pointed out how the introduction of the reference variable
differentiated between an S-R view and a control-loop view, since it
means that any well defined stimulus is followed by a statistically
varying response. The PCT researcher may recognize this possibility
and seek a second controlled variable. The S-R researcher has to
find a better way to describe the stimulus, adding a variable that
can be found in the environment rather than in the organism. Both
need something that was not in the original description of the
experiment, but the S-R researcher has the harder job.
A second, related version of this is the PCT mantra: "Many means to
the same end." With more than a single level of control, a
higher-level system can often (always?) control its perceptual value
by altering the balance between the lower-level control units that
support it, possibly using one means to the exclusion of another.
“Clever Hans” is an example from a long time ago, after which
experimenters in vision tried to make sure that no sounds
accompanied their changes of “stimulus”.
An anecdote that I have used before, to illustrate the problem. A
colleague of mine described his participation in a simple tracking
study when he had been a first-year undergraduate. The experimenter
asked him to keep the point of a stylus on a small conductive disk
set into a larger rotating disk like an old-fashioned gramophone
record. My colleague perceived this to be a study of intelligence,
and dismounted the large “gramophone record” disk so that he could
simply rest the stylus on the small conductive disk. He followed the
instructions he was given, but the experimenter (who could not see
the trial in progress) was first astonished by the perfection of his
“tracking” performance, and then angry that he “cheated”.
I think that an S-R psychologist would have a problem finding the
environmental variable that was the part of the “stimulus” that
caused my colleague’s output to differ so much from that of the
other subjects. PCT has no problem in finding a perceptual variable
that might have been controlled by my colleague so that it changed
reference values down the hierarchy to cause the output that removed
the large disk from its mounting rather than causing outputs that
continued to move the stylus as the large disk rotated (as the
experimenter intended).
I guess the fundamental answer is that you are correct that an S-R
system can always be invented that will mimic the externally
detectable results of any control system, however complex. But even
the most naive version of Ockham’s Razor: “the simplest theory
wins,” the Razor comes down very heavily in favour of hierarchic
control.
Martin
···
I understand that PCT explains how S-R psychology
works. But these two theories involve what is essentially the
same constitutive equation: response is proportional to
stimulus. In order to constitute a different theory, this
constitutive equation would need to be different. Would you
disagree?   Â
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 1:06 AM, Eetu
Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi
wrote:
[Eetu Pikkarainen
2018-02-20_08:45:11 UTC]
Â
Sorry, I am not
a psychologist so I hope that someone will correct
and complement my short answer.
S-R psychology
makes predictions about subject’s reactions based on
the current stimulus and previous knowledge. Usually
the success of these predictions are quite low.
PCT explains why
the correlation between stimulus and response must
be slow: there is always an important intervening
variable, namely the reference value, which
determines how the stimulus will affect the
response. So PCT research does not even try to
predict reactions from stimuluses. Instead it tries
to find out what perception the subject is
controlling (the Test for controlled variable). If
it can be found then it is possible to predict with
high accuracy how the subject responds by her output
(“reaction�) to the disturbances (“stimulus�)
against the perceived value of the controlled
variable.
Perhaps the
example in Powers: Behavior: The Control of
Perception (2005) about the analysis of a typical
rat experiment in PCT terms could be lightening
about the difference, pages 238-243.
An extensive
description about PCT type of research in relation
to more typical psychological research is in Runkel,
P. (1990). Casting Nets and Testing Specimens: Two
Grand Methods of Psychology.
Â
Eetu
Â
From: PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN [mailto:pyeranos@ucla.edu ]
Sent: Tuesday, February 20, 2018 3:43 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: General
Â
That is a very strange
example. Â
I have read some PCT
literature. One remark is that PCT doesn’t
employ the same model as stimulus-response
psychology. How do the predictions of a
stimulus-response theory of behavior differ
from PCT predictions? Â
Â
On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at
11:01 AM, Bruce Nevin <bnhpct@gmail.com >
wrote:
[Bruce Nevin
2018-02-19_14:00:13 ET]
Â
PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIANÂ (Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 3:28
PM) –
Â
Philip, we do
model-based control without
calculating inverse kinematics. When
you walk through a familiar room in
the dark or with your eyes closed, the
model is made of perceptions restored
from memory and controlled in
imagination. Controlling in
imagination to avoid the chair that is
there  and the table that is
over
there  accompanies ordinary
perceptual control processes by which
you walk over to the light switch by
the door
there  and turn it on. In the
final stages of controlling a
perception of having light in the room
by means of flipping that switch no
amount of prediction is going to
guarantee that your fingers find the
switch reliably every time, but
repeated practice will sharpen the
precision of your memory, not to
mention your confidence in your
imagination.Â
Â
I will leave it to
others to refer you to the abundant
literature laying out predictions that
PCT makes that are different from
those of other theories. And I have no
choice but to leave it up to you to
read that literature.
Â
/Bruce
Â
On Sun, Feb 18,
2018 at 3:28 PM, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu >
wrote:
The purpose
of my question is to figure out
why PCT is to be developed as a
scientific discipline in its own
right.Â
What
predictions does PCT make that
are different from those of
other theories?   Â
Â

Virus-free.
www.avast.com
Â
On Sun,
Jan 28, 2018 at 9:56 AM,
Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com >
wrote:
[Rick
Marken
2018-01-28_09:55:50]
Â
On
Sat, Jan 27, 2018
at 9:36 PM, PHILIP
JERAIR YERANOSIAN
pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:
Â
PY:
If a system
uses inverse
kinematics to
calculate the
effects of its
output, is it
not ultimately
doing so in
order for its
actions to
produce a
desired effect
on its input?
Does it really
matter if a
system is
using a
simulated
model of the
environment to
predict its
input before
calculating
its output? Â
All
control
systems have
reference
values for
their inputs.
There is no
system that
only controls
its output. Â
All
control
systems are
doing
“perceptual�
control. Who
does not agree
with this
proposition?Â
RM: RM:
I think you are
asking whether
everyone agrees
that all control
systems (properly
designed closed-
loop negative
feedback systems)
even those that
include
model-based
calculations of
inverse
kinematics, are
doing perceptual
control. I can’t
speak for everyone
but I certainly
agree with that.
And I think it’s a
very good
observation.Â
Â
RM:
This fact about how
control systems work
is not particularly
important for
engineers who build
such systems to
understand since the
engineers know which
variables they want
their control
systems to control
and they develop
perceptual systems
(sensors) that
provide analogs of
these variables for
the system to
control. But it is
very important for
students of the
controlling done by
living systems to
understand since
figuring out what
perceptions these
systems are
controlling is
essential to
understanding their
behavior.Â
Â
Best
Â
Rick
Â
--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection
is achieved
not when you
have nothing
more to add,
but when you
have nothing
left to take
away.�
      Â
      Â
  --Antoine
de
Saint-Exupery
Â
Â
Â