Goals and mechanisms

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1315 UT)]

In an effort to be more transparent, I will strive in the future to distinguish between goals and reference levels. It is perfectly possible to believe that humans have goals and act to achieve those goals without knowing a thing about PCT. If your question involves exactly how a goal can be achieved, PCT may well provide a valuable model. This is especially so if achieving the goal involves a motor activity, since most of the tests of PCT have involved this domain. For example, driving a car is well suited to a PCT analysis.

On the other hand, where the motor activity is confined to speaking, there are few tested PCT models that can be called upon. The recent exchanges between economists provide an example. When a Nobel Laureate in Economics makes a claim that appears to violate the principles described in a freshman economics text, it is reasonable to assume that his goal is to defend intellectual turf. In the process, he ignores data that other economists consider it essential to take into account. Can this situation be addressed using a verbal PCT model? Assuredly. But until there is a way to formalize the PCT story, it can be treated as a story, but not necessarily the best or only story. Social psychologists have conducted numerous studies of confirmation bias. The phenomenon does not obviously call for a PCT model, but should such a model become available that fits real data, it might lead to a wider interest in PCT on the part of cognitive psychologists.

Bruce

[From Fred Nickols (2010.15.0701 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1315 UT)]

In an effort to be more transparent, I will strive in the future to
distinguish between goals and reference levels. It is perfectly possible
to believe that humans have goals and act to achieve those goals without
knowing a thing about PCT. If your question involves exactly how a goal
can be achieved, PCT may well provide a valuable model. This is especially

so if achieving the goal involves a motor activity, since most of the

tests

of PCT have involved this domain. For example, driving a car is well

suited

to a PCT analysis.

Hmm. That's interesting. To me, there are all kinds of reference levels
for controlled variables at many, many levels of the hierarchy. Many, many
of these reference levels do not (and cannot involve conscious awareness).
By contrast, a goal is a reference level that is consciously (more or less)
established for some targeted variable. A salesperson walking into a
customer's office has reference levels that brought him or her there and
keep him or her upright while walking. The "goal" might be a sale of a
certain kind or amount or dollar value. The motor activities of walking and
talking (and perhaps showing and telling and demonstrating and persuading,
etc, etc,) have effects on variables of interest to the salesperson (and the
customer). For example, head nodding, objections raised (and countered),
and, in general, verbal and non-verbal behaviors on the part of both. How
does the salesperson achieve his/her goal? Well, the "experts" on sales
have argued that issue for a long time now (and I'm not sure that they're
any closer than when they started). But I am reasonably confident that the
goal of a sale is obtained as a consequence of influencing what is called
"the buying decision." Analyzing and figuring out how to influence the
buying decision is something I've done for a company or two. The "motor
activity" (i.e., "carrying the bag" as some call it) is the least of it.
Yet, PCT applies just as firmly to influencing the buying decision as it
does to walking in to the customer's premises. So, I'm also reasonably
confident that a PCT-based analysis applies to much, much more than "motor
activity."

Fred Nickols

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1515 UT)]

[From Fred Nickols (2010.15.0701 MST)]

Hmm. That’s interesting. To me, there are all kinds of reference levels
for controlled variables at many, many levels of the hierarchy. Many, many
of these reference levels do not (and cannot involve conscious awareness).
By contrast, a goal is a reference level that is consciously (more or less)
established for some targeted variable. A salesperson walking into a
customer’s office has reference levels that brought him or her there and
keep him or her upright while walking. The “goal” might be a sale of a
certain kind or amount or dollar value. The motor activities of walking and
talking (and perhaps showing and telling and demonstrating and persuading,
etc, etc,) have effects on variables of interest to the salesperson (and the
customer). For example, head nodding, objections raised (and countered),
and, in general, verbal and non-verbal behaviors on the part of both. How
does the salesperson achieve his/her goal? Well, the “experts” on sales
have argued that issue for a long time now (and I’m not sure that they’re
any closer than when they started). But I am reasonably confident that the
goal of a sale is obtained as a consequence of influencing what is called
“the buying decision.” Analyzing and figuring out how to influence the
buying decision is something I’ve done for a company or two. The “motor
activity” (i.e., “carrying the bag” as some call it) is the least of it.
Yet, PCT applies just as firmly to influencing the buying decision as it
does to walking in to the customer’s premises. So, I’m also reasonably
confident that a PCT-based analysis applies to much, much more than “motor
activity.”

I’m a bit puzzled because you are talking about motor activity when you describe the interaction between the salesperson and the customer. I presume the desired outcome of the buying decision is that the customer says, “yes.” Is the claim that the salesperson is controlling for the perception that the customer says “yes?” I guess one measure of this would be show that the salesperson does not stop talking until she hears the word “yes” spoken in the context of the sale. (Although I can imagine an S-R treatment of this explanation.)

Here’s what I think would be an example of a PCT-based study. We videoed an interaction between a salesperson and a customer. We conjectured that whenever the customer directed his gaze away from the salesperson the latter would move his hands in a way that captured the customers attention (albeit without conscious awareness) and directed it back to the salesperson’s eyes. We quantified the hand motions of the salesperson and the direction of the gaze of the customer. We then developed the following PCT model for the behavior of the salesperson. The model accounted for 95% of the variance in the data. We then videoed the same salesman interacting with other customers and found that our original model continued to account for more the 85% of the variance.

I would think that such a study would make a strong case that this particular salesman was controlling this particular perceptual variable. The case would be even stronger if the study included different salespersons who controlled different perceptual variables with a goal of capturing and retaining the customers attention.

What would not be impressive would be to say that a salesperson was controlling for the perception of making a sale or influencing the buying decision. This would add nothing to the observation that the salesperson’s goal was to make the sale.

Like Bill, I am interested in examples of the former kinds of study. I am not particularly interested in generalizations that simply demonstrate that goal-oriented behavior can be described in the language of PCT. I am prepared to stipulate that at the outset.

Bruce

···

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.15.0736 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1315 UT) --

In an effort to be more transparent, I will strive in the future to distinguish between goals and reference levels. It is perfectly possible to believe that humans have goals and act to achieve those goals without knowing a thing about PCT. If your question involves exactly how a goal can be achieved, PCT may well provide a valuable model. This is especially so if achieving the goal involves a motor activity, since most of the tests of PCT have involved this domain. For example, driving a car is well suited to a PCT analysis.

I'm glad you made this distinction clear. It goes a long way toward clarifying our difficulties in understanding each other. I'm going to keep this reply (relatively) short to give you a chance to get your oar in.

Perhaps it hasn't been clear that all control systems in HPCT, at any level, achieve goals by using motor systems, unless they're working in the imagination mode (perceiving the goal as if the matching perceptual signal has already been achieved). When I think about how nice it would be to be rich, I imagine being in my observatory opening the dome and uncovering my 36-inch Dobsonian , the latest product of Orion Telescopes -- no kidding, $55,000. That would be harder to do in the "live control" mode. Some parts of that experience are not under my control just now, like the $55,000.

This is the essence of the hierarchy of control: only level 1 actually operates muscles (or glands). The higher levels act by specifying, for lower systems, what perceptions they are to produce. The hierarchy, initially, was an attempt to lay out a series of links between thought and action. I say I have a goal of being a good person -- but what is a "good" person, and even knowing what that is, how do I reduce the difference between the way I am and the way I would like to be? The "how" question eventually takes us to the level of how much tension to generate in some set of muscles.

If you think about any goal that way, this same structure appears. You have a concept of what you hope or intend to experience. You also have a perception of the actual state of affairs, which is often different from what you want it to be. The difference is the basis for some kind of decision, choice, or implementation: how can I get there from here? I could, for example, become a stockbroker and get the telescope, or a philanthropist and become a good person. But I am not a stockbroker or a philanthropist, so I have to figure out (a) which one to become, and (b) how to become one. "How to become one" gets me into still more details: how does one go about becoming a stockbroker?

Eventually this gets to the lowest level, with my finger on the button of a telephone preparing to press it using certain muscles in order to enter a phone number in order to call Harvard University in order to ask to speak to the registrar's office in order to enroll in business school in order to get an MBA in order to apprentice with Merrill Lynch in order to become a stockbroker in order to afford the telescope. And maybe, while being a harmless amateur astronomer, in order to be a good person even if I am a stockbroker.

Obviously, the neural circuits involved in being a good person are going to be quite different from those involved in pressing the button on a telephone. But PCT is a proposal to the effect that they will ultimately be found to have the same structure: an input function, a comparator, an output function, and links to and from lower levels of organization in the nervous system.

Somehow, achieving the goal of being a good person has to be translated into specific motor actions which, if they are the right ones, will produce results that, many levels later and despite all sorts of unpredictable disturbances, produce a perception of being a good person. I think HPCT and control theory offer the first viable model of how an arrangement like that could possibly work -- even though we're still a long way from knowing the neurology of being a good person.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2010.01.15.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1315 UT)--

In an effort to be more transparent, I will strive in the future to distinguish between goals and
reference levels.

I don't see what that has to do with transparency.

It is perfectly possible to believe that humans have goals and act to achieve those goals without
knowing a thing about PCT.

Yes, definitely. But without PCT you wouldn't know what "achieving
goals" is (it's control of perception) or how it occurs (by negative
feedback closed-loop control).

If your question involves exactly how a goal can be achieved, PCT may well provide a valuable
model.

"May well" indeed! :wink:

This is especially so if achieving the goal involves a motor activity, since most of the tests of
PCT have involved this domain. For example, driving a car is well suited to a PCT analysis.

I think PCT also provides a valuable model for achieving goals in
imagination,a goal achievement process that involves no motor
activity.

On the other hand, where the motor activity is confined to speaking, there are few tested PCT
models that can be called upon.

Speaking involves motor activity, doesn't it? PCT has been applied to
several activities that involve speaking, actually. One I remember was
Robertson and Goldstein's study of how how words are resisted as
disturbances to self image. There are many studies also of how speech
is affected by auditory delay and spectral filtering. Speech is
clearly a control process.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1600 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.15.0736 MST)]

Obviously, the neural circuits involved in being a good person are going to be quite different from those involved in pressing the button on a telephone. But PCT is a proposal to the effect that they will ultimately be found to have the same structure: an input function, a comparator, an output function, and links to and from lower levels of organization in the nervous system.

Somehow, achieving the goal of being a good person has to be translated into specific motor actions which, if they are the right ones, will produce results that, many levels later and despite all sorts of unpredictable disturbances, produce a perception of being a good person. I think HPCT and control theory offer the first viable model of how an arrangement like that could possibly work -- even though we're still a long way from knowing the neurology of being a good person.

BG: I am comfortable with everything you say in this post. I have no problem with the assumption that all goal-oriented behavior can be modeled in terms of an input function, a comparator, an output function, and links to and from lower levels of organization in the nervous system. I am at the stage where I am still trying to identify the goals that are inputs to the comparator. Of late I have found numerous examples in economics, politics, and education where what I thought were the goals are clearly not (or control is extremely poor). For example, the stated goals in Afghanistan are unlikely to be achieved by the actions being taken (in General Petraeus's field-book insurrection of the type the U.S. says it wants to put down would require five times as many troops as Obama is prepared to commit.) So the goals are other than they appear to be or wishful thinking is firmly in the saddle. In education the goals are equally unrealistic. The problem is not that we trail other countries in science and mathematics scores. The problem is that we have no well-paying jobs for two-thirds of the population. (I continually remind my colleagues that half of all school children have an IQ of less than 100.) The "great leveling" that occurred in the years after WWII was more the result of strong unions than of superior education, although the latter was great for returning GIs.

Bruce

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1610 UT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.01.15.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1315 UT)--

In an effort to be more transparent, I will strive in the future to distinguish between goals and
reference levels.

I don't see what that has to do with transparency.

BG: Fair enough.

It is perfectly possible to believe that humans have goals and act to achieve those goals without
knowing a thing about PCT.

Yes, definitely. But without PCT you wouldn't know what "achieving
goals" is (it's control of perception) or how it occurs (by negative
feedback closed-loop control).

BG: Fair enough.

If your question involves exactly how a goal can be achieved, PCT may well provide a valuable
model.

"May well" indeed! :wink:

This is especially so if achieving the goal involves a motor activity, since most of the tests of
PCT have involved this domain. For example, driving a car is well suited to a PCT analysis.

I think PCT also provides a valuable model for achieving goals in
imagination,a goal achievement process that involves no motor
activity.

BG: I can imagine that I will win the lottery. Does this constitute a goal achievement process? It seems to me that we can imagine many things (a horse with six legs) that bear no relation to reality. The nice thing about imagination is that you do not have to imagine obstacles to achieving your goals.

On the other hand, where the motor activity is confined to speaking, there are few tested PCT
models that can be called upon.

Speaking involves motor activity, doesn't it? PCT has been applied to
several activities that involve speaking, actually. One I remember was
Robertson and Goldstein's study of how how words are resisted as
disturbances to self image. There are many studies also of how speech
is affected by auditory delay and spectral filtering. Speech is
clearly a control process.

I didn't doubt that. Speech is an action we take to achieve goals. Achieving goals requires us to overcome obstacles. What I had in mind was inferring the intentions of speakers from what they say. I'm glad to know there are studies involving what we hear.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (2010.01.15.0900)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.15.1610 UT)--

Rick Marken:
I think PCT also provides a valuable model for achieving goals in
imagination,a goal achievement process that involves no motor
activity.

BG: I can imagine that I will win the lottery. Does this constitute a goal achievement process?

You bet.

It seems to me that we can imagine many things (a horse with six legs) that bear no relation
to reality.

Yes. There were people who imagined that we would be greeted as
liberators when we invaded Iraq. There are people who imagine all
kinds of things. Control in imagination is easy. Comedy's hard (but
also a control process; it's all control).

The nice thing about imagination is that you do not have to imagine obstacles to achieving
your goals.

That's for sure. The disturbances we usually have to overcome in "real
world" control don't exist at all when we control imagination. If I
want to imagine lifting up my garage I just lift it, physical laws be
damned;-) Better yet, if I want to imagine rebuilding Haiti as a
tropical paradise for all citizens, I just make it happen in my mind;
no obstruction from right wingers;-)

Speech is an action we take to achieve goals.

It is also a goal in itself. The sounds we produce are controlled
inputs. People who are totally deaf have great difficulty producing
clear speech (they have to control other variables, like the shape and
feel of their vocal tact) because they can't control the sounds.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.18.1355 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.15.0736 MST)]

Somehow, achieving the goal of being a good person has to be translated into specific motor actions which, if they are the right ones, will produce results that, many levels later and despite all sorts of unpredictable disturbances, produce a perception of being a good person. I think HPCT and control theory offer the first viable model of how an arrangement like that could possibly work – even though we’re still a long way from knowing the neurology of being a good person.

Without disagreeing with you at all, let me make a few observations. First, we seem to have no special access to our own goals. Indeed research suggests that sometimes others know our goals better than we ourselves do. What HPCT provides is a powerful way to discover our goals. It does this because a fundamental principle of HPCT is that everything we do, we do in order to achieve a goal or to overcome obstacles to achieving a goal. Furthermore, it tells us that we can uncover our goals by looking at our behavior.

I am in the process of rethinking many of the lessons I learned over the past few years in the light of these fundamental principles. Many otherwise disconnected findings fall into place when I view them from this perspective. For example, emotions often tell us how well we are achieving our goals. This may not sound like a big deal to you, but believe me, for me it is. Thanks to you and Rick for sticking with me in this process.

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.18.0816 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.18.1355 UT) --

Without disagreeing with you at all, let me make a few observations. First, we seem to have no special access to our own goals. Indeed research suggests that sometimes others know our goals better than we ourselves do.

I can agree that we are unlikely to be aware of all the goals we have established in the past, particularly at the highest levels which often operate outside awareness and change only slowly. We have learned a bit about that in developing the practice of MOL.

However, the word "goal" doesn't just refer to the highest levels, in PCT. The essence of PCT is the goal-directed behavior in which actions are varied to make perceptions match goals at any level from putting a finger on a button of a telephone to studying for an exam or trying to be honest. HPCT is basically a structure of goals and subgoals. Practically everything we are conscious of doing involves goals, and we are quite aware of them. In fact we're so used to them, and so used to succeeding, that we just call it "doing," not goal-seeking. When someone comes across you in the kitchen and sees you holding a table-knife in one hand and a loaf of bread in the other, they might well ask "what are you doing?" even though they can see exactly what you're doing right then, which I just described. But you don't answer by telling them what you're doing; you describe the goal: "I'm making a peanut-butter and jelly sandwich" or "I'm putting these away or "I'm trying to remember if I shut the garage door" (meaning you don't remember but are trying to achieve the goal of remembering).

The idea that others can know our goals better than we do is, I think, more of a conceit than a fact. It probably comes from psychoanalysis, in which the therapist tells people what their real motives are and expects to be believed, or the medical model in which doctors discover what is wrong with you, inside where you can't see, and fix it for you. As far as psychological facts go, I think nobody can know your perceptions or the states you seek for them anywhere near as well as you can. That doesn't mean you are aware of them all, only that other people are in the wrong place to know even as much as you know about them. They have to guess; you don't. If you look long enough, you will see them. The other people, no matter how smart, have to wait for you to tell them what you found, if you think it's any of their business.

What HPCT provides is a powerful way to discover our goals. It does this because a fundamental principle of HPCT is that everything we do, we do in order to achieve a goal or to overcome obstacles to achieving a goal. Furthermore, it tells us that we can uncover our goals by looking at our behavior.

PCT does propose that those goals exist, and that's easy to verify within the volume of experience current in awareness. As you imply, it also provides good ways to deduce what another person's goals might be, at least approximately. However, it says that we can see our goals clearly not directly in behavior, which varies with every disturbance, but in the consistent ends that our variable behavior achieves. What we do, that others can see, is only sometimes important to us; most important is always what the doing is getting us.

I am in the process of rethinking many of the lessons I learned over the past few years in the light of these fundamental principles. Many otherwise disconnected findings fall into place when I view them from this perspective. For example, emotions often tell us how well we are achieving our goals. This may not sound like a big deal to you, but believe me, for me it is.

It's a big deal for me, too, because my whole theory of emotion is based on the idea that emotions are part of the process of acting (consciously or otherwise) to correct errors; When we feel emotions we know we must be experiencing errors, even if we're not aware at the moment of just what the errors are.

Another big deal for me is that you're using PCT to help yourself overcome problems. If PCT weren't helpful to other people, I wouldn't have much of an excuse for expecting others to try to understand it. That's the main thing I care about; whether other people understand it in the same ways I do is secondary.

Thanks to you and Rick for sticking with me in this process.

And thanks for weathering the storms and sticking with us.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1500 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.18.0816 MST)]

BP: The idea that others can know our goals better than we do is, I think, more of a conceit than a fact. It probably comes from psychoanalysis, in which the therapist tells people what their real motives are and expects to be believed, or the medical model in which doctors discover what is wrong with you, inside where you can't see, and fix it for you. As far as psychological facts go, I think nobody can know your perceptions or the states you seek for them anywhere near as well as you can. That doesn't mean you are aware of them all, only that other people are in the wrong place to know even as much as you know about them. They have to guess; you don't. If you look long enough, you will see them. The other people, no matter how smart, have to wait for you to tell them what you found, if you think it's any of their business.

BG: The data I was drawing on are discussed in Timothy Wilson's _Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious_. Wilson, needless to say, does not discuss the data in terms of control theory. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the data that seems to conflict with a PCT interpretation. While we certainly believe we know the reasons for our actions, it may be that we have no privileged access to them. I could say, "Because I am an empathetic person, I gave money to Doctors Without Borders." On the other hand, I could say, "Since I gave money to Doctors Without Borders, I must be an empathetic person." I don't think PCT favors one version over the other. The point is, I gave money to Doctors Without Borders. I controlled the perception of making a donation whatever story I happen to believe about the reasons for doing this.

BG: What HPCT provides is a powerful way to discover our goals. It does this because a fundamental principle of HPCT is that everything we do, we do in order to achieve a goal or to overcome obstacles to achieving a goal. Furthermore, it tells us that we can uncover our goals by looking at our behavior.

BP: PCT does propose that those goals exist, and that's easy to verify within the volume of experience current in awareness. As you imply, it also provides good ways to deduce what another person's goals might be, at least approximately. However, it says that we can see our goals clearly not directly in behavior, which varies with every disturbance, but in the consistent ends that our variable behavior achieves. What we do, that others can see, is only sometimes important to us; most important is always what the doing is getting us.

BG: Yes. My only point is that we do not always know why we have many of the goals we have. If Flip Wilson were around, Geraldine might say, "Reorganization made me do it!"

Bruce

Something I learned a long time ago about ends and means (goals and mechanisms) is that they are relative notions. An end is an end in relation to a means but a given end might be a means to a further end. (Yes, Virginia, there is a lot of conflict lurking in there.) In any case, consider several managers, all striving to improving the productivity of the operation for which they are responsible.

The immediate goal for all the managers is improved productivity of an operation. More distant goals might include:

- proving the efficacy of a given process improvement approach
- satisfying a requirement imposed by the boss
- establishing a reputation as a savvy manager
- reducing the costs of the operation
- contributing to improved profits via reduced costs
- proving one's own hypotheses about the causes of low productivity

On and on go the possibilities.

Obviously, there is a good fit between this view and a hierarchy of goals and mechanisms.

I don't recall ever spending a lot of time contemplating the network of goals-mechanisms that marked my own endeavors nor do I know of anyone else who has, which is not to say they don't, but I suspect much of what we do isn't always at the level of focused, conscious awareness. We just do what we do - and as has already been noted, our emotions are often the first clue that something is awry or perhaps on track. Exultation is probably a good indicator that some really important goal has been attained just as anger, frustration and dejection might be indicators of a goal in jeopardy or perhaps lost for the time being.

There are times when mapping out the network of variables that connect goals with mechanisms available for attaining them makes a lot of sense. The CEO of a company once set a goal of X percent net before income from investments and asked me to figure out how to achieve it. I immediately took apart the company's chart of accounts - I "mapped" the books so to speak - and identified the changes required to yield the net figure the CEO wanted (e.g., new revenues, cost reductions, etc). None of the changes were palatable and the goal went by the wayside.

Reality is sometimes rude.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols
Managing Partner
Distance Consulting, LLC
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

"Assistance at A Distance"

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.19.0929 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1500 UT) –

BG: I could say, “Because I
am an empathetic person, I gave money to Doctors Without Borders.”
On the other hand, I could say, “Since I gave money to Doctors
Without Borders, I must be an empathetic person.” I don’t think PCT
favors one version over the other. The point is, I gave money to Doctors
Without Borders. I controlled the perception of making a donation
whatever story I happen to believe about the reasons for doing
this.

BP: In the first place I don’t do trait psychology, so I wouldn’t agree
with either way of putting it, above. However, I can believe that a
person could want to be an emphathetic person if that person
believs that such traits exist, and other people could conclude that he
is or isn’t such a thing if they, too believed that such traits exist. So
an observer could say you are an emphathetic person when you don’t
perceive yourself that way, and vice versa. The observer could see that
you have a certain trait that you don’t see, but that doesn’t mean the
observer knows something about you that you don’t know. This is just a
matter of perception and imagination. It has nothing to do with how you
“really are.”
Given that people do believe in such things, I think we can expect
them to draw either conclusion you describe above. A person might think
“I want to be, or to be thought, emphathetic. What could I do to
create that appearance?” Whatever overt behavior is chosen as a
means of appearing (to oneself and others) emphathetic (“Miss
Arbuthnot, send a check for $10,000 to United Way”), it’s clear that
the goal is established first, and the means of achieving it
second.
On the other hand, a person might imagine himself in someone else’s
plight, and imagining how that would feel, try to help the other person
out of the plight, as a way of maintaining certain principles like the
Golden Rule.
Wolf Blitzer of CNN, observing this, might say to you with his typical
tact, “Tell our viewers how it feels to be such an extraordinarily
emphathetic person,” shoving the microphone in your face. This
interpretation of your act comes, of course, as a great surprise to you.
However, as you think about what “empathy” means, you might
realize that yes, you were feeling, in imagination, what you thought the
other person must be feeling, and that is what the word emphathy means,
so you must be an empathetic person. On the other hand, if your
principles are like those of some aid workers shown on CNN, you might
reject the characterization, saying as so many such workers do that you
were just doing your job. And meaning it, which is to say simply
decribing how you look to yourself.
The worst aspect of trait psychology is that people try behave as a
person with a certain trait would behave, but no matter how hard they
try, they know inside that they don’t really feel that way. Of course
they don’t: there is no such thing inside them and they just imagine
applying those terms to themselves. And they know they’re imagining,
which pretty much spoils everything. If you decide you really want very
much to be empathetic, you will go around with uncorrectable errors,
always trying to be more empathetic and of course not succeeding, which
according to PCT is why you keep trying so hard.

BG:My only point is that we do not always know why we have many of the
goals we have. If Flip Wilson were around, Geraldine might say,
“Reorganization made me do it!”
BP: True. However, MOL is designed specifically to help a person discover
what goals are operative that are not currently in awareness. I say
“not currently” because I have a strong hunch that such goals
must have been in awareness when they were first formed. This is probably
one reason why people in therapy always seem to be reminded of earlier
experiences, sometimes much earlier, even when the particular therapeutic
method being used doesn’t emphasize examining memories of the past. That
certainly happens in MOL which works strictly in present time. Good Old
Dianetics focused almost exclusively on the past, but we auditors
couldn’t help noticing that what mattered was not so much running through
the past incident again and again, as simply examining the conclusions
that were drawn and that are still important – and
reorganizing.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1820 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.19.0929 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1500 UT) –

BG: I could say, “Because I
am an empathetic person, I gave money to Doctors Without Borders.”
On the other hand, I could say, “Since I gave money to Doctors
Without Borders, I must be an empathetic person.” I don’t think PCT
favors one version over the other. The point is, I gave money to Doctors
Without Borders. I controlled the perception of making a donation
whatever story I happen to believe about the reasons for doing
this.

BP: In the first place I don’t do trait psychology, so I wouldn’t agree
with either way of putting it, above. However, I can believe that a
person could want to be an emphathetic person if that person
believs that such traits exist, and other people could conclude that he
is or isn’t such a thing if they, too believed that such traits exist. So
an observer could say you are an emphathetic person when you don’t
perceive yourself that way, and vice versa. The observer could see that
you have a certain trait that you don’t see, but that doesn’t mean the
observer knows something about you that you don’t know. This is just a
matter of perception and imagination. It has nothing to do with how you
“really are.”

BG: Quite so, but it might allow the other person to predict how you would act in a new circumstance. In fact, there is evidence that those who know you well can sometimes do this better than you yourself can.

Given that people do believe in such things, I think we can expect
them to draw either conclusion you describe above. A person might think
“I want to be, or to be thought, emphathetic. What could I do to
create that appearance?” Whatever overt behavior is chosen as a
means of appearing (to oneself and others) emphathetic (“Miss
Arbuthnot, send a check for $10,000 to United Way”), it’s clear that
the goal is established first, and the means of achieving it
second.

BG: Quite so. But how is the goal established? Why this particular goal and not some other? I suggest that Miss Arbuthnot may be clueless. I also suggest that she will come up with a story to explain her magnanimity.

BP: On the other hand, a person might imagine himself in someone else’s
plight, and imagining how that would feel, try to help the other person
out of the plight, as a way of maintaining certain principles like the
Golden Rule.

BG: Again, the behavior is important. Imagining yourself in someone else’s plight is something you do. You do it because you have some goal. Why you have this goal is not necessarily accessible to you. But you will come up with a plausible story, I predict. As I grow older I find I have less interest in the stories and more interest in the goals. I’m afraid I tend to treat stories as rationalizations rather than reasons.

BP: Wolf Blitzer of CNN, observing this, might say to you with his typical
tact, “Tell our viewers how it feels to be such an extraordinarily
emphathetic person,” shoving the microphone in your face. This
interpretation of your act comes, of course, as a great surprise to you.
However, as you think about what “empathy” means, you might
realize that yes, you were feeling, in imagination, what you thought the
other person must be feeling, and that is what the word emphathy means,
so you must be an empathetic person. On the other hand, if your
principles are like those of some aid workers shown on CNN, you might
reject the characterization, saying as so many such workers do that you
were just doing your job. And meaning it, which is to say simply
decribing how you look to yourself.

BG: I agree that we all have our favorite stories when it comes to explaining our behavior. If not, we usually can come up with one on short notice,

BP: The worst aspect of trait psychology is that people try behave as a
person with a certain trait would behave, but no matter how hard they
try, they know inside that they don’t really feel that way. Of course
they don’t: there is no such thing inside them and they just imagine
applying those terms to themselves. And they know they’re imagining,
which pretty much spoils everything. If you decide you really want very
much to be empathetic, you will go around with uncorrectable errors,
always trying to be more empathetic and of course not succeeding, which
according to PCT is why you keep trying so hard.

BG: Actually, I hold no brief for trait psychology. As far as I can tell it simply involves the kind of stories we tell to explain the behavior of ourselves and others. I agree that persisting errors arise when these stories imply a behavior that conflicts with our existing behavior. As for how you feel, that seems often to follow from how you act. The twelve steppers appreciate this: fake it until you make it.


BG:My only point is that we do not always know why we have many of the
goals we have. If Flip Wilson were around, Geraldine might say,
“Reorganization made me do it!”
BP: True. However, MOL is designed specifically to help a person discover
what goals are operative that are not currently in awareness. I say
“not currently” because I have a strong hunch that such goals
must have been in awareness when they were first formed. This is probably
one reason why people in therapy always seem to be reminded of earlier
experiences, sometimes much earlier, even when the particular therapeutic
method being used doesn’t emphasize examining memories of the past. That
certainly happens in MOL which works strictly in present time. Good Old
Dianetics focused almost exclusively on the past, but we auditors
couldn’t help noticing that what mattered was not so much running through
the past incident again and again, as simply examining the conclusions
that were drawn and that are still important – and
reorganizing.

BG: Our fondness for explanations based in the past make sense when you realize that the only memories the brain has are of the past. Further, the brain understands the present only to the extent that it has features in common with the past. Or so it seems to me.

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.19.1235 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1820 UT) –

The observer could see that you
have a certain trait that you don’t see, but that doesn’t mean the
observer knows something about you that you don’t know. This is just a
matter of perception and imagination. It has nothing to do with how you
“really are.”

BG: Quite so, but it might allow the other person to predict how you
would act in a new circumstance. In fact, there is evidence that those
who know you well can sometimes do this better than you yourself
can.

I have my doubts about this. Don’t you find that when people pigeonhole
you, they develop stereotyped ideas about what you find interesting, what
opinions you have, what you like to eat, what you think is funny, and so
on? I find it very annoying when other people do this to me. I guess I’ll
have to try to find that book you cited to look for other meanings of
what you say. What sorts of evidence are you talking about?

What could I do to create that
appearance?" Whatever overt behavior is chosen as a means of
appearing (to oneself and others) emphathetic (“Miss Arbuthnot, send
a check for $10,000 to United Way”), it’s clear that the goal is
established first, and the means of achieving it
second.

BG: Quite so. But how is the goal established? Why this particular goal
and not some other? I suggest that Miss Arbuthnot may be clueless. I also
suggest that she will come up with a story to explain her
magnanimity.

Miss Arbuthnot is Mr. Empathy’s secretary.

BP: On the other hand, a person
might imagine himself in someone else’s plight, and imagining how that
would feel, try to help the other person out of the plight, as a way of
maintaining certain principles like the Golden Rule.

BG: Again, the behavior is important. Imagining yourself in someone
else’s plight is something you do.

BP: I would say it’s something you perceive. I don’t know what behavior
we use to cause an imagined perception to occur.

BG: You do it because you have
some goal. Why you have this goal is not necessarily accessible to
you.

BP: As I say, not at a given moment, perhaps. But if it’s really a goal
of yours, you can come to know what it is. And it helps to know that
goals are selected by higher-level systems as means to their ends. This
often makes it easier to become aware of what the higher-level goal
is.

BG: But you will come up with a
plausible story, I predict. As I grow older I find I have less interest
in the stories and more interest in the goals. I’m afraid I tend to treat
stories as rationalizations rather than reasons.

BP: Yes, although it’s hard to tell which is which unless they’re your
own stories you’re looking at. I think I’m pretty good at knowing which
of my ideas are stories and which have some basis. As to goals, I don’t
spend a lot of time looking for higher-order motivations, but when I do I
can generally find them. I’ve put in my couch-time, to be sure.

BP earlier: Wolf Blitzer of CNN,
observing this, might say to you with his typical tact, “Tell our
viewers how it feels to be such an extraordinarily emphathetic
person,” shoving the microphone in your face. This interpretation of
your act comes, of course, as a great surprise to you. However, as you
think about what “empathy” means, you might realize that yes,
you were feeling, in imagination, what you thought the other person must
be feeling, and that is what the word emphathy means, so you must be an
empathetic person. On the other hand, if your principles are like those
of some aid workers shown on CNN, you might reject the characterization,
saying as so many such workers do that you were just doing your job. And
meaning it, which is to say simply decribing how you look to
yourself.

BG: I agree that we all have our favorite stories when it comes to
explaining our behavior. If not, we usually can come up with one on short
notice,

BP: This is a pretty cynical view, it seems to me – almost as if you’re
saying there’s no point in trying to “know thyself.” I know
that lots of people do have favorite stories to explain their behavior,
but aren’t they generally just ways of putting the blame elsewhere? And
aren’t they usually cast in cause-effect terms? “I have trouble
relating to other people because my parents abused me.”

BG: Actually, I hold no brief
for trait psychology. As far as I can tell it simply involves the kind of
stories we tell to explain the behavior of ourselves and others. I agree
that persisting errors arise when these stories imply a behavior that
conflicts with our existing behavior. As for how you feel, that seems
often to follow from how you act. The twelve steppers appreciate this:
fake it until you make it.

BP: That’s not quite the picture of emotion I have, so I wouldn’t expect
faking it to work. Something probably works, but I don’t think that’s
it.

BG:My only point is that we do
not always know why we have many of the goals we have. If Flip Wilson
were around, Geraldine might say, “Reorganization made me do
it!”

BP earlier: True. However, MOL
is designed specifically to help a person discover what goals are
operative that are not currently in awareness.

BG: Our fondness for
explanations based in the past make sense when you realize that the only
memories the brain has are of the past.

BP: That’s quite true, but the memories exist and are perceived only in
the present. It’s only the present form of the memory that matters, even
if it’s changed over the years, and what matters is what you think of it
now.

BG: Further, the brain
understands the present only to the extent that it has features in common
with the past. Or so it seems to me.

BP: Depends on what you mean by understanding. I think I understand many
things only in terms of present-time perceptions and reasoning. Having a
somewhat leaky memory anyway, I’ve had to rely on an ability to work out
things from scratch when required, rather than recalling what I remember
from the first time I understood them. And doesn’t your proposition run
into a snag when you ask how you understood the “features in
common” the first time you encountered them?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.20.12010 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.19.1235 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.19.1820 UT) –

BG: Quite so, but it might allow the other person to predict how you
would act in a new circumstance. In fact, there is evidence that those
who know you well can sometimes do this better than you yourself
can.

BP: I have my doubts about this. Don’t you find that when people pigeonhole
you, they develop stereotyped ideas about what you find interesting, what
opinions you have, what you like to eat, what you think is funny, and so
on? I find it very annoying when other people do this to me. I guess I’ll
have to try to find that book you cited to look for other meanings of
what you say. What sorts of evidence are you talking about?

BG: One form of evidence is the tendency to think we are above average in many respects. (As I recall something like 90% of university professors rate themselves as above average.) What percentage of drivers do think rate themselves as below average? Our friends tend to know better.

BG: Again, the behavior is important. Imagining yourself in someone
else’s plight is something you do.

BP: I would say it’s something you perceive. I don’t know what behavior
we use to cause an imagined perception to occur.

BG: Fair enough, but unless you are using a controlled substance (or sleeping) you generate these perceptions intentionally. It is in this sense that I say imagination is something you do.

BG: You do it because you have
some goal. Why you have this goal is not necessarily accessible to
you.

BP: As I say, not at a given moment, perhaps. But if it’s really a goal
of yours, you can come to know what it is. And it helps to know that
goals are selected by higher-level systems as means to their ends. This
often makes it easier to become aware of what the higher-level goal
is.

BG: I agree that we all have our favorite stories when it comes to
explaining our behavior. If not, we usually can come up with one on short
notice,

BP: This is a pretty cynical view, it seems to me – almost as if you’re
saying there’s no point in trying to “know thyself.” I know
that lots of people do have favorite stories to explain their behavior,
but aren’t they generally just ways of putting the blame elsewhere? And
aren’t they usually cast in cause-effect terms? “I have trouble
relating to other people because my parents abused me.”

BG: Needless to say, I don’t think of myself as cynical. What cynic does? I would characterize my mental state as cheerful resignation. As I use the word, any narrative is a story. Some are truer than others, but stories are still stories. Blaming people, including ones-self, is not very productive. Acting differently as a result of establishing a new goal is a more likely way to get you where you want to be. How do you know you have established a new goal? You observe yourself acting differently.

BG: Actually, I hold no brief
for trait psychology. As far as I can tell it simply involves the kind of
stories we tell to explain the behavior of ourselves and others. I agree
that persisting errors arise when these stories imply a behavior that
conflicts with our existing behavior. As for how you feel, that seems
often to follow from how you act. The twelve steppers appreciate this:
fake it until you make it.

BP: That’s not quite the picture of emotion I have, so I wouldn’t expect
faking it to work. Something probably works, but I don’t think that’s
it.

BG: You don’t fake the emotion. You carry out the action and soon you begin to feel the emotion. I suspect any man who has been married is familiar with the process.

BG:My only point is that we do
not always know why we have many of the goals we have. If Flip Wilson
were around, Geraldine might say, “Reorganization made me do
it!”

BP earlier: True. However, MOL
is designed specifically to help a person discover what goals are
operative that are not currently in awareness.

BG: Our fondness for
explanations based in the past make sense when you realize that the only
memories the brain has are of the past.

BP: That’s quite true, but the memories exist and are perceived only in
the present. It’s only the present form of the memory that matters, even
if it’s changed over the years, and what matters is what you think of it
now.

BG: I agree.

BG: Further, the brain
understands the present only to the extent that it has features in common
with the past. Or so it seems to me.

BP: Depends on what you mean by understanding. I think I understand many
things only in terms of present-time perceptions and reasoning. Having a
somewhat leaky memory anyway, I’ve had to rely on an ability to work out
things from scratch when required, rather than recalling what I remember
from the first time I understood them. And doesn’t your proposition run
into a snag when you ask how you understood the “features in
common” the first time you encountered them?

BG: When we are young everything is novel. In a sense, we understand nothing. But as we build up memories we become comfortable with the familiar. That is what I mean by understanding. You may be able to work things out from scratch, but I suspect that you call on familiar procedures to do so. What else could you call on?

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.20. 1725 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.20.12010 UT) --

BG: Fair enough, but unless you are using a controlled substance (or sleeping) you generate these perceptions intentionally. It is in this sense that I say imagination is something you do.

BP: OK, you are using the word "do" as I described the other day: what you "do" is actually a set of perceptions that you control toward a state called a "reference level" -- a goal.

I'm not sure how you are using the term "intentionally." In PCT, all goal-seeking is intentional, because an intention is a reference signal. With this understanding, even goals you are not aware of seeking are intentional. The real distinction being made here, I think, is between being aware and not being aware. How do you think about these things?

BG earlier: I agree that we all have our favorite stories when it comes to explaining our behavior. If not, we usually can come up with one on short notice,

BP earlier: This is a pretty cynical view, it seems to me -- almost as if you're saying there's no point in trying to "know thyself." ...

BG: Needless to say, I don't think of myself as cynical. What cynic does? I would characterize my mental state as cheerful resignation.

BP: For me, resignation is far from cheerful. What is it that you find in it to be cheerful about?

BG: As I use the word, any narrative is a story. Some are truer than others, but stories are still stories.

BP: Do you mean that they're just made-up fairy tales with one story being no more likely to be true than any other story? Or do you mean that they are hypotheses presented as narratives, subject to testing and falsification if they don't predict correctly?

Blaming people, including ones-self, is not very productive. Acting differently as a result of establishing a new goal is a more likely way to get you where you want to be. How do you know you have established a new goal? You observe yourself acting differently.

I'm having great difficulty figuring out when you are serious. But there is enough difference between what you say and what I would say that I have to ask further, at the risk of appearing naive. Are you saying you are always surprised to find yourself "doing" something -- that is, pursuing a goal? This sounds a lot like B. F. Skinner's way of treating the idea of purpose or intention. He said that if he found himself walking up to a mailbox and dropping a letter in it, he would say he evidently had the "purpose" (definitely in quotes) of mailing a letter, though clearly mailing the letter was simply a description of a consequence of his behavior. Skinner did not believe that any organism, including himself, could "initiate" a consequence; behavior was always a consequence of a prior event. Is that your view, too?

BP: That's not quite the picture of emotion I have, so I wouldn't expect faking it to work. Something probably works, but I don't think that's it.

BG: You don't fake the emotion. You carry out the action and soon you begin to feel the emotion. I suspect any man who has been married is familiar with the process.

That's very odd, I now realize, because it's precisely the PCT theory of emotion that I propose. First there is a change in a reference signal, generated by a higher system or altered by reorganization, or else a disturbance; any of these alters a perception. The resulting error signal produces a cascade of lower-order reference signals, which at some level split into a behavioral and a somatic branch. The somatic branch traverses the amygdala, the hypothalamus, and finally the pituitary and the autonomic nervous system, which adjust the state of the physiological systems as appropropriate to the changes in behavioral states being generated in the behavioral branch. The behavioral branch produces observable actions and changes in perceptions of external consequences caused by the actions. The changes in the physiological systems are detected by interoceptors and produce an upgoing tree of perceptions of intensities, sensations, and so on: feelings which, together with the perceptual signals where it all started, are experienced as an emotion.

That's the story I currently tell, and I believe there is as much evidence to support it as there is for any other story about emotion. I believe it fits the same observations that are used to justify other theories, and is at the same time far simpler.

So when does a story, in your view, become a scientific theory that is worth adopting? Is any story as worthless as any other story, as you seem to imply, or are you merely reminding us that all hypotheses need to be tested before being accepted?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.22.1150 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.20. 1725 MST)]

BP: I'm not sure how you are using the term "intentionally." In PCT, all goal-seeking is intentional, because an intention is a reference signal. With this understanding, even goals you are not aware of seeking are intentional. The real distinction being made here, I think, is between being aware and not being aware. How do you think about these things?

BG: I would never have thought of a reference level as an intention, but's fine. Since we cannot perceive reference signals, does that not imply that we cannot be aware of our intentions?

BP: I'm having great difficulty figuring out when you are serious. But there is enough difference between what you say and what I would say that I have to ask further, at the risk of appearing naive. Are you saying you are always surprised to find yourself "doing" something -- that is, pursuing a goal? This sounds a lot like B. F. Skinner's way of treating the idea of purpose or intention. He said that if he found himself walking up to a mailbox and dropping a letter in it, he would say he evidently had the "purpose" (definitely in quotes) of mailing a letter, though clearly mailing the letter was simply a description of a consequence of his behavior. Skinner did not believe that any organism, including himself, could "initiate" a consequence; behavior was always a consequence of a prior event. Is that your view, too?

BG: My wife has that problem, too. You may find it difficult to believe, but I thought I was simply stating orthodox HPCT! My behavior is the result of a changing reference level (intention) or I am countering a disturbance. No, I am not usually surprised by finding myself doing something, but I may be unaware of reasons that I am doing it. If pressed, I can always make up a story, but the establishment of a reference level is not something I can perceive. It is the work of a higher level control system or reorganization, neither of which I can perceive. I don't agree with Skinner who had no idea of control or how it works.

BP: That's the story I currently tell, and I believe there is as much evidence to support it as there is for any other story about emotion. I believe it fits the same observations that are used to justify other theories, and is at the same time far simpler.

BG: You'll get no argument from me.

So when does a story, in your view, become a scientific theory that is worth adopting? Is any story as worthless as any other story, as you seem to imply, or are you merely reminding us that all hypotheses need to be tested before being accepted?

BG: The hallmark of a scientific story is that it is consistent with all the other stories that we call facts. It is a story that we are prepared to give up when new facts are inconsistent with it. I never meant to imply that any story is worthless, but some stories are clearly worth more than others.

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.22.1013 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.22.1150 UT) --

BG: I would never have thought of a reference level as an intention, but's fine. Since we cannot perceive reference signals, does that not imply that we cannot be aware of our intentions?

BP: The imagination mode allows us to perceive reference signals instead of sending them to lower systems. The reference signals enter the perceptual function in place of the perceptual signals from the lower system. The effect is as if the lower system had received a reference signal and made its perception match it perfectly while sending a copy of the perceptual signal as usual to the higher system. Perception still occurs as a perceptual signal, but its source is the short-circuited signal normally sent as a reference signal for the lower systems. All this was my attempt to account for the phenomena of remembering and imagining.

If you didn't think of a reference signal as an intention, how did you account for intentions?

> BP earlier: I'm having great difficulty figuring out when you are serious. But there is enough difference between what you say and what I would say that I have to ask further, at the risk of appearing naive. Are you saying you are always surprised to find yourself "doing" something -- that is, pursuing a goal?

BG: No, I am not usually surprised by finding myself doing something, but I may be unaware of reasons that I am doing it.

BP: The reasons may explain why your intention is to accomplish some specific goal, but they are not the same as the intention itself, are they? Of course in HPCT the reasons are higher-level goals or reference signals, so they are intentions too, at a different level. If you're not surprised by finding yourself controlling some perception, the implication is that you knew beforehand that you were going to do that. This suggests the imagination scenario above.

BG: If pressed, I can always make up a story, but the establishment of a reference level is not something I can perceive.

BP: I think you can when your attention is on a higher level and you are imagining how you would accomplish the higher-level goal. When I plan a trip, I might imagine taking highway 285 as a way of getting to my destination. When I actually start the trip, my intention is to get onto 285, and remains in imagination, and awareness, until I actually reach 285, when the real perception of driving on it replaces the imagined picture. I trust and hope that I am not the only person on earth who does things that way.

BG: It is the work of a higher level control system or reorganization, neither of which I can perceive. I don't agree with Skinner who had no idea of control or how it works.

BP: You can perceive the higher level if you look for it. My best example of this is finding yourself standing in front of an open refrigerator and wondering why you're there (you've been thinking about something else). Then you realize you were on the way to getting some lunch, and proceed.

> BP: That's the story I currently tell, and I believe there is as much evidence to support it as there is for any other story about emotion. I believe it fits the same observations that are used to justify other theories, and is at the same time far simpler.

BG: You'll get no argument from me.

BP: Hmm. A nicely ambiguous statement. Like "I can't tell you how much your painting appeals to me," meaning "If I told you, you'd probably get mad."

>BP earlier: So when does a story, in your view, become a scientific theory that is worth adopting? Is any story as worthless as any other story, as you seem to imply, or are you merely reminding us that all hypotheses need to be tested before being accepted?

BG: The hallmark of a scientific story is that it is consistent with all the other stories that we call facts. It is a story that we are prepared to give up when new facts are inconsistent with it. I never meant to imply that any story is worthless, but some stories are clearly worth more than others.

BP: If everything we say is a story, then that dimension of description doesn't distinguish anything in particular. I suppose it just expresses a sort of irreducible minimum of skepticism about what anyone says about anything. Of course I'm in favor of skepticism, but at some point don't we have to put skepticism aside, settle for practical assumptions, and accept them for the time being? The "willing suspension of disbelief" that makes fiction, especially science-fiction, possible.

There are, however, some facts about which we can't be skeptical and can't disbelieve. If I am having an experience of a hippopotamus in the living room, it doesn't make any difference whether the hippopotamus is really there or I'm hallucinating it. Either way, I'm experiencing it. If I deny to myself that I'm experiencing it, the denial joins the hippopotamus as another item that is undoubtably being experienced. Our thoughts about things can be wrong, but the thoughts themselves are without doubt being thought.

This is how I approach the exploration of control phenomena in myself. If I'm imagining something I'm about to do, there is no way to deny that I'm imagining it. So the theory has to account for imagination. I'm always amused when a psychologist dismisses something a person reports as being imaginary, as if that immediately removed it from discussion. That's why you find so little in textbooks on the subject of how we imagine.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.01.23.0300 UT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.01.22.1013 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.01.22.1150 UT) –

BG: I would never have thought of a reference level as an intention, but’s fine. Since we cannot perceive reference signals, does that not imply that we cannot be aware of our intentions?

BP: The imagination mode allows us to perceive reference signals instead of sending them to lower systems. The reference signals enter the perceptual function in place of the perceptual signals from the lower system. The effect is as if the lower system had received a reference signal and made its perception match it perfectly while sending a copy of the perceptual signal as usual to the higher system. Perception still occurs as a perceptual signal, but its source is the short-circuited signal normally sent as a reference signal for the lower systems. All this was my attempt to account for the phenomena of remembering and imagining.

BG: My guess is that such a system would be difficult to model using a neural network. Which does not mean that it is wrong, just difficult to model. I have been thinking in terms of a network that inhibits output when it receives a certain input. I can’t think of any way to determine which model is superior or even whether they are different.

If you didn’t think of a reference signal as an intention, how did you account for intentions?

BG: I think of intentions as stories that accompany control sequences. “I think I’ll go down to the mail box and collect the mail,” is an intention. It is a story that accompanies the sequence of controlled perceptions. I don’t know why I had that thought, but it is consistent with my ensuing actions.

BG: If pressed, I can always make up a story, but the establishment of a reference level is not something I can perceive.

BP: I think you can when your attention is on a higher level and you are imagining how you would accomplish the higher-level goal. When I plan a trip, I might imagine taking highway 285 as a way of getting to my destination. When I actually start the trip, my intention is to get onto 285, and remains in imagination, and awareness, until I actually reach 285, when the real perception of driving on it replaces the imagined picture. I trust and hope that I am not the only person on earth who does things that way.

BG: I’m not sure that is the way I work. I rarely think about or pay any attention the next junction on a trip. When I see landmarks that I associate with the approaching junction my attention is engaged. I don’t recall imagining my exit from I95 and entrance onto I395, although I may be doing this without being aware that I am. When I am driving my attention is on what other cars are doing and not on my imagined goal. I am aware, in other words, of the disturbances that I am countering rather than goal I am pursuing.

BG: It is the work of a higher level control system or reorganization, neither of which I can perceive. I don’t agree with Skinner who had no idea of control or how it works.

BP: You can perceive the higher level if you look for it. My best example of this is finding yourself standing in front of an open refrigerator and wondering why you’re there (you’ve been thinking about something else). Then you realize you were on the way to getting some lunch, and proceed.

BG: You’ll get no argument from me.

BP: Hmm. A nicely ambiguous statement. Like “I can’t tell you how much your painting appeals to me,” meaning “If I told you, you’d probably get mad.”

BG: In this case it meant, “Your argument seems plausible, but I haven’t given the matter enough thought to render an informed opinion.”

BP: There are, however, some facts about which we can’t be skeptical and can’t disbelieve. If I am having an experience of a hippopotamus in the living room, it doesn’t make any difference whether the hippopotamus is really there or I’m hallucinating it. Either way, I’m experiencing it. If I deny to myself that I’m experiencing it, the denial joins the hippopotamus as another item that is undoubtably being experienced. Our thoughts about things can be wrong, but the thoughts themselves are without doubt being thought.

BG: Ah, yes. “I think, therefore I am.”

This is how I approach the exploration of control phenomena in myself. If I’m imagining something I’m about to do, there is no way to deny that I’m imagining it. So the theory has to account for imagination. I’m always amused when a psychologist dismisses something a person reports as being imaginary, as if that immediately removed it from discussion. That’s why you find so little in textbooks on the subject of how we imagine.

BG: I suspect that I lack imagination; or at least I don’t imagine a great deal. I think a lot, but in words, not images. Einstein said that he thought almost exclusively in images. Must have something to do with genius…

Bruce