[From Bjoern Simonsen(2000.12.06.1325 GMT+1)]
from Bill Powers (2000.12.04.0433 MST)
I'm beginning to get that impression, too, since everything I propose that
might distinguish reinforcement theory from reorganization (or any other)
theory seems to have something wrong with it. Of course that may be the
truth, but it's also possible, as Bruce Abbott tells us, that behaviorists
believe that reinforcement is simply the name for an observable aspect of
behavior, so they don't see any need for "testing" it. Do you "test" your
idea that the sky looks blue?.
I have followed the discussion "Grudging Acknowledgement". Here my basis
will be
"as Bruce Abbott tells us, that behaviorists
believe that reinforcement is simply the name for an observable aspect of
behavior, so they don't see any need for "testing" it."
As I have written earlier my first step to CSG was the essay "Behavior,
Purpose and Teleology" written by Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Bigelow.
In this essay they defined the behavioristic study of natural events.
My purpose writing this letter is to show my argumentation why we cant put
reinforcement theory and reorganization up against each other.
R.,W.and B wrote:
" Given any object, relatively abstracted from its surroundings for study,
the behavioristic approach consists in the examination of the output of the
object and the relations of this output to input. By output is meant any
change produced in the surroundings by the object. By input, conversely, is
meant any event external to the object that modifies this object in any
manner"
I'll put this in concrete terms saying that f(x) = ax1 + bx2 + ......
Where x1, x2, ..... are the external events (variables) and f(x) is the
object.
The behavioristic way to describe "the world"/reality is to tell how the
objects vary, varying
the external events.
An example in this site is:
Blowing smokes
[From Bruce Abbott (2000.11.28.2200 EST)]
As a possible counterweight to all my recent nonsense about reinforcement,
here's something I encountered in a textbook I'm using this semester in my
Learning class:
. . . DeGrandpre, Bickel, Hughes, and Higgens (1992) reviewed 17 studies
that manipulated the nicotine content of cigarettes, and they plotted
economic demand functions to show the effects of changing nicotine levels.
Their analysis showed that if smokers are given reduced-nicotine cigarettes
in place of their usual cigarettes, they smoke more cigarettes per day, and
thereby expose themselves to more cigarette smoke (and greater health
risks). Conversely, if smokers are given cigarettes with higher nicotine
level levels, they smoke fewer cigarettes per day.
[Mazur, 1998, pp. 228-229]
Here the group of the 17 students is the "Given any object, relatively
abstracted from its surroundings for study". De Grandpre et all. varied the
input "the external events that modified the object in any manner".
For the Behaviorists the main goal is the "examination of the output of the
object and the relation of this output to input" They have missing
information if they try to tell why the output happens. They can only tell
us the facts about input and output.
Therefore I think Bruce Nevin is correct when he writes
[From Bruce Nevin (2000.11.30 11:02 EDT)]
Many S-R studies cannot be analyzed in terms of control. Primarily, this is
because data on
individual performance is not available. Only statistical results are
reported.
R.,W.and B continues:
"The above statement of what is meant by the behavioristic method of study
omits the specific structure and the intrinsic organization of the object.
This omission is fundamental because on it is based the distinction between
the behavioristic and the alternative functional method of study. In
functional analysis, as opposed to a behavioristic approach the main goal is
the intrinsic organization of the entity studied, its structure and its
properties; the relations between the object and the surroundings are
relatively incidental."
I'll put this in concrete terms saying that f(y) = my1 + ny2 + ......
Where y1, y2, ..... are the description of internal structures and
properties and f(y) is the object.
The functional way to describe "the world"/reality is to tell how the
objects are structured and about their properties.
In PCT the "main goal is the intrinsic organization of the entity studied,
its structure and its properties; the relations between the object and the
surroundings are relatively incidental."
In PCT there may be disturbances. These are relations between the object and
the surroundings. But remember it is the perceptions of these disturbances
that work.
I'll go back to an earlier account [From Bill Powers(940917.0600 MDT)],
"The theory of control offers an explanation in terms of perceptual
signals, closed causal
loops, and mathematical properties of such systems. These entities, while
perfectly experience
able in the mind, are not experiences to be explained. We are saying IF
such an organization existed in the nervous system, THEN the experiences we
are trying to explain would follow. The theory proposes the existence of
entities in the world hidden from direct experience, perhaps not >all of
them hidden forever, but certainly hidden now."
I think we should cut out the competition between those who work with
reinforcement theory and ourselves who work with reorganization. It is two
different approaches which supplement each other.
Here I need some help (if there is help to get).
I have repeatedly tried to explain in a simple mathematical way that these
two approaches cannot be linked.
I assume that f(x) = ax1 + bx2 +...... and f(y) = my1 + ny2 +...... . Here
f(x) # f(y) and f(y) is also different from x1, x2, ..... Here are too many
unknown variables and I have too few equations. If I let a PCT-system be
disturbed by, for instance, ax1 I will have a problem to describe f(y),
because there is a reference in the picture.
I am inclined to say that people working with a behavioristic approach
cannot insist that people working with a functional approach are wrong and
vice versa. They are describing two non compatible worlds.
Let me digress from the issue. When people back in history tried to describe
the world they did it in two ways. Depending if their description was
behavioristic or functional, they described the world differently. Their
knowledge was gathered in different subjects. And basically some subjects
were deeply rooted in either the behavioristic or functional approach. I
think medicine, geology, chemistry etc. had a functional approach and
physics, psychology, sociology etc. had a behavioristic approach.
Later we got psychiatry, social medicine, geophysics etc. trying to mix the
two approaches. And I am not sure if they have succeeded. I have studied
geophysics myself and the mixing of physics and geology is successful.
However, I think a geophysicist is sometimes a physicist and other times a
geologist.
Back to the top.
I don't think the behaviorists have any need for "testing" their output. How
should they do it?
Do you "test" your idea that the sky looks blue?.
No but when I see a blue sky (seldom where I live) I put on sun glasses. It
is not because of the input or because of the disturbance. There may be a
special reference.
Bj�rn
···
Subject: RE: Experience, Reality and HPCT. Here he supports this writing: