# guilt

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916>\
**Category:** CSG2004\
**Created:** [September 3, 2004, 12:56am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916 "2004-09-03T00:56:19Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jason\_Gosnell](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/j/dbc845/32.png) [@Jason\_Gosnell](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Jason_Gosnell)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 12:56am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/1 "2004-09-03T00:56:19Z")

</div>

Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm studying  
guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the  
archives on guilt?

Thank you,

Jason Gosnell  
Bridgeway Center Inc.  
Ft. Walton Beach, FL  
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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 2:38am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/2 "2004-09-03T02:38:42Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]

Jason Gosnell wrote:

> Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm  
> studying  
> guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the  
> archives on guilt?

You can go to

[http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html](http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html)

and select "Search the Archives". I don't think there is much on  
"guilt" in the archives, though.

I think guilt is a feeling (emotion) associated with the error that  
results from a particular kind of internal conflict, one in which one  
system wants to experience a perception (X) that another system doesn't  
&nbsp;&nbsp;want others to know is wanted. A conflict exists because one system  
wants X and the other essentially doesn't. The physiological  
consequences of the error that results from this conflict combined with  
the cognitive interpretation of the cause of these consequences (the  
knowledge that I don't want others to know that I want X) is perceived  
as "guilt". See a description of the PCT model of emotion in Powers'  
\_Living Control Systems II\_ or, better, in the soon to be released,  
second edition of Powers' \_Behavior: The control of perception\_.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/d/58f4c7/32.png) [@David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/David_Goldstein1)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 9:56am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/3 "2004-09-03T09:56:01Z")

</div>

[From David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)]  
[Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]

Rick,

Please elaborate on your answer.

I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.

Thanks,  
David  
David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

> **···**
>
> ----- Original Message -----  
> From: "Rick Marken" \<marken@MINDREADINGS.COM\>  
> To: \<CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu\>  
> Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 10:38 PM  
> Subject: Re: guilt
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]
> > 
> > Jason Gosnell wrote:
> > 
> > \> Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm  
> > \> studying  
> > \> guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the  
> > \> archives on guilt?  
> > \>
> > 
> > You can go to
> > 
> > [http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html](http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html)
> > 
> > and select "Search the Archives". I don't think there is much on  
> > "guilt" in the archives, though.
> > 
> > I think guilt is a feeling (emotion) associated with the error that  
> > results from a particular kind of internal conflict, one in which one  
> > system wants to experience a perception (X) that another system doesn't  
> > &nbsp;&nbsp;want others to know is wanted. A conflict exists because one system  
> > wants X and the other essentially doesn't. The physiological  
> > consequences of the error that results from this conflict combined with  
> > the cognitive interpretation of the cause of these consequences (the  
> > knowledge that I don't want others to know that I want X) is perceived  
> > as "guilt". See a description of the PCT model of emotion in Powers'  
> > \_Living Control Systems II\_ or, better, in the soon to be released,  
> > second edition of Powers' \_Behavior: The control of perception\_.
> > 
> > Best
> > 
> > Rick  
> > ---  
> > Richard S. Marken  
> > marken@mindreadings.com  
> > Home 310 474-0313  
> > Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 12:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/4 "2004-09-03T12:02:31Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.0801)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)

What you are calling guilt others might call shame. I believe that  
guilt is normally associated with a situation in which one judges that,  
in retrospect, one's actions conflicted with one's beliefs.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 8:01pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/5 "2004-09-03T20:01:19Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)]

> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

> Please elaborate on your answer.
> 
> I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.

OK. I was trying to be succinct. Let me see if I can make the idea clearer.  
I don't want to take the time now to make diagrams but I will if I can't get  
this across verbally.

I think we feel guilt when we want to do something (or, possibly, have done  
something) that we also don't want to do (or have done), either because it  
violates our own ethics or because we think others would find our doing it  
to be objectionable. For example, I feel guilty about wanting to eat (and,  
possibly, about actually having eaten) an ice cream before dinner because I  
know it's wrong to ruin my appetite for the good food -- and also because  
Linda would be pissed;-). At the heart of this feeling of guilt, then, is  
error -- a discrepancy between what I want and what I get. There is an error  
if I eat (or ate) the ice cream (because I want to save my appetite) and  
there is an error if I don't (because I want to eat the ice cream).

PCT explains a conflict like this in terms of control systems trying to  
bring the same perceptual variable to two different reference states. In the  
example, the perceptual variable in conflict is ice cream. One control  
system wants the variable in the state "eaten" and the other wants it in the  
state "not eaten". What actually happens to the ice cream depends on the  
relative strength of each control system. If the systems are about equal in  
strength, there will be some error in both systems: you keep going to the  
freezer to get the ice cream but never get it because that would be wrong.  
But regardless of what happens, there will always be a good size error  
signal in one system or both. The error signal(s) leads to preparatory  
physiological reactions -- fluttery stomach, dry mouth, and so on -- that we  
experience (because the actions for which they are preparation never occur)  
as emotion. These same physiological reactions are associated with many  
different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably  
interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that one  
source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's  
wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I understand  
the PCT model of emotion.

Is this any clearer?

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken  
> MindReadings.com  
> Home: 310 474 0313  
> Cell: 310 729 1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 8:42pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/6 "2004-09-03T20:42:04Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1641)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)
> 
> These same physiological reactions are associated with many  
> different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably  
> interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that  
> one  
> source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's  
> wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I  
> understand  
> the PCT model of emotion.

Am I correct in concluding that the PCT model of emotions denies the  
existence of emotions in animals that lack sufficient cognitive  
apparatus to interpret their physiological responses? My dogs for  
example, are Cartesian automatons, as it were, as they cower when they  
hear loud thunder. They are experiencing no emotions, but presumably  
some form of conflict. Any ideas what it might be?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

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**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 9:00pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/7 "2004-09-03T21:00:17Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1400)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1641)]

> Am I correct in concluding that the PCT model of emotions denies the  
> existence of emotions in animals that lack sufficient cognitive  
> apparatus to interpret their physiological responses?

No. I think PCT would say that these animals probably experience the  
physiological aspects of emotion just as we do. They just don't make the  
cognitive distinctions that we make. So anger and fear, to the extent that  
they involve the same physiological reactions, would be experienced as the  
same emotion by a dog, but as different emotions by a human who was old  
enough to be able to make the cognitive distinction.

RSM

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken  
> MindReadings.com  
> Home: 310 474 0313  
> Cell: 310 729 1400

---

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**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 9:26pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/8 "2004-09-03T21:26:06Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1725)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1400)
> 
> No. I think PCT would say that these animals probably experience the  
> physiological aspects of emotion just as we do. They just don't make  
> the  
> cognitive distinctions that we make. So anger and fear, to the extent  
> that  
> they involve the same physiological reactions, would be experienced as  
> the  
> same emotion by a dog, but as different emotions by a human who was old  
> enough to be able to make the cognitive distinction.

That seems reasonable. How about my own reaction to very loud thunder?  
If I experience a physiological response, it must be due to conflict.  
If I run away, presumably I experience no conflict and no emotion. Is  
that correct?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 10:09pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/9 "2004-09-03T22:09:50Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1510)]

> Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1725)--

> How about my own reaction to very loud thunder? If I experience a  
> physiological response, it must be due to conflict.

No. According to PCT, it must be due to error that causes preparatory  
physiological reactions for actions that are not taken or that don't reduce  
the error (so that the physiological consequences of error persist).

> If I run away, presumably I experience no conflict and no emotion. Is  
> that correct?

I don't think there is any conflict involved in the thunderclap example. The  
thunder is just an insuperable disturbance to a controlled variable:  
perceived sound level.

RSM

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken  
> MindReadings.com  
> Home: 310 474 0313  
> Cell: 310 729 1400

---

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**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 10:20pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/10 "2004-09-03T22:20:15Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1819)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1510)
> 
> I don't think there is any conflict involved in the thunderclap  
> example. The  
> thunder is just an insuperable disturbance to a controlled variable:  
> perceived sound level.

O.K. No conflict, so I experience no emotion. What then do I experience  
that feels like fear?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 11:19pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/11 "2004-09-03T23:19:25Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)]

> Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1819)]

> O.K. No conflict, so I experience no emotion.

No. You do experience emotion. You just don't experience it (in the  
thunderclap example) as a result of conflict.

The ultimate physiological source of emotion (according to PCT, I believe)  
is failed control. When control fails there is error driving action  
(including the physiological preparation for action) that is not effectively  
reducing error. So there is continued physiological preparation (the feeling  
component of emotion) sans error reduction. Anything that results in failed  
control can, thus, be a cause of emotion. Among the things that can result  
in failed control are conflict, lack of skill or insuperable disturbance.

> What then do I experience that feels like fear?

I believe you experience the physiological response to error that results  
from the insuperable disturbance (thunderclap) to the controlled variable  
(sound level). Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this  
physiological reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap) is  
presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or "joy").

RSM

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken  
> MindReadings.com  
> Home: 310 474 0313  
> Cell: 310 729 1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2004, 11:32pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/12 "2004-09-03T23:32:08Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1931)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)
> 
> I believe you experience the physiological response to error that  
> results  
> from the insuperable disturbance (thunderclap) to the controlled  
> variable  
> (sound level). Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this  
> physiological reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap)  
> is  
> presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or  
> "joy").

I'm with you up to the last sentence. I don't think my dog is afraid of  
the sound of thunder (rather than experiencing joy at the sound of  
thunder) as a result of a cognitive interpretation on her part. Of  
course, I could be wrong.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 12:02am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/13 "2004-09-04T00:02:40Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1700)]

> Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1931)]
> 
> > Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)
> > 
> > Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this physiological  
> > reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap) is  
> > presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or  
> > "joy").
> 
> I'm with you up to the last sentence. I don't think my dog is afraid of  
> the sound of thunder (rather than experiencing joy at the sound of  
> thunder) as a result of a cognitive interpretation on her part.

Right. I imagine that your dog just experiences a perception of the  
physiological consequences of the error created by the huge disturbance to  
its controlled variable. It's the same perception that \_you\_ would call  
"fear" if you wanted to avoid hearing the thunderclap and "joy" if you were  
hoping to hear it. Dogs, I believe, experience emotions only as pure  
feelings. People experience emotions as cognitively interpreted feelings. So  
when the thunder claps, the dog gets perception X. That's it's emotion. You  
also get perception X but you also have a perception of what you want to do  
about the thunderclap that resulted in X. If you wanted to avoid (a) the  
thunderclap, then you perceive X + a as fear; if you wanted to hear (h) the  
thunderclap, then you perceive X + h as joy. I believe that, for the dog,  
the emotion is probably just X, regardless of what the dog wanted.

RSM

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken  
> MindReadings.com  
> Home: 310 474 0313  
> Cell: 310 729 1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/d/58f4c7/32.png) [@David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/David_Goldstein1)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 2:33am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/14 "2004-09-04T02:33:21Z")

</div>

[From David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)]  
[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]  
David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

Rick,  
I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.

I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an  
action which I believe is wrong.

What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really  
necessary?

David  
David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

> **···**
>
> ----- Original Message -----  
> From: "Richard Marken" \<marken@MINDREADINGS.COM\>  
> To: \<CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu\>  
> Sent: Friday, September 03, 2004 4:01 PM  
> Subject: Re: guilt
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)]
> > 
> > \> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)
> > 
> > \> Please elaborate on your answer.  
> > \>  
> > \> I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.
> > 
> > OK. I was trying to be succinct. Let me see if I can make the idea
> 
> clearer.
> 
> > I don't want to take the time now to make diagrams but I will if I can't
> 
> get
> 
> > this across verbally.
> > 
> > I think we feel guilt when we want to do something (or, possibly, have
> 
> done
> 
> > something) that we also don't want to do (or have done), either because it  
> > violates our own ethics or because we think others would find our doing it  
> > to be objectionable. For example, I feel guilty about wanting to eat
> 
> (and,
> 
> > possibly, about actually having eaten) an ice cream before dinner because
> 
> I
> 
> > know it's wrong to ruin my appetite for the good food -- and also because  
> > Linda would be pissed;-). At the heart of this feeling of guilt, then, is  
> > error -- a discrepancy between what I want and what I get. There is an
> 
> error
> 
> > if I eat (or ate) the ice cream (because I want to save my appetite) and  
> > there is an error if I don't (because I want to eat the ice cream).
> > 
> > PCT explains a conflict like this in terms of control systems trying to  
> > bring the same perceptual variable to two different reference states. In
> 
> the
> 
> > example, the perceptual variable in conflict is ice cream. One control  
> > system wants the variable in the state "eaten" and the other wants it in
> 
> the
> 
> > state "not eaten". What actually happens to the ice cream depends on the  
> > relative strength of each control system. If the systems are about equal
> 
> in
> 
> > strength, there will be some error in both systems: you keep going to the  
> > freezer to get the ice cream but never get it because that would be wrong.  
> > But regardless of what happens, there will always be a good size error  
> > signal in one system or both. The error signal(s) leads to preparatory  
> > physiological reactions -- fluttery stomach, dry mouth, and so on -- that
> 
> we
> 
> > experience (because the actions for which they are preparation never
> 
> occur)
> 
> > as emotion. These same physiological reactions are associated with many  
> > different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably  
> > interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that one  
> > source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's  
> > wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I
> 
> understand
> 
> > the PCT model of emotion.
> > 
> > Is this any clearer?
> > 
> > Best
> > 
> > Rick  
> > --  
> > Richard S. Marken  
> > MindReadings.com  
> > Home: 310 474 0313  
> > Cell: 310 729 1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 10:50am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/15 "2004-09-04T10:50:30Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.0650)]

> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)  
> [From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]  
> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)
> 
> Rick,  
> I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.
> 
> I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an  
> action which I believe is wrong.
> 
> What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really  
> necessary?

Far be it from me to speak for Rick, but one way to think of an action  
that you believe to be wrong is to say that you do not want to perceive  
anyone carrying out the action. When you perceive yourself as carrying  
out the action there is a necessary error and because you are the  
source of the action, a necessary conflict. Or so it seems to me.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 3:28pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/16 "2004-09-04T15:28:16Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.04.0830)]

> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)

> I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.
> 
> I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an  
> action which I believe is wrong.
> 
> What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really  
> necessary?

It just seemed to me that the phenomenon we call "guilt" is a conflict  
phenomenon; I feel guilty when I want X (for whatever higher level  
reason) and I don't want X (because I think it's wrong or because I  
know that others think it's wrong). So the explanation of this  
phenomenon was in terms of control systems providing conflicting  
references for the state of a perception, X.

So I would say that conflict between control systems is necessary to  
the explanation of guilt because guilt seems like a conflict phenomenon  
(like an internal tug of war).

If there is a way to explain guilt in PCT terms that does not involve  
conflict I'd sure like to hear it. I can't think of such a  
conflict-free explanation myself.

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

---

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**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 4:39pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/17 "2004-09-04T16:39:16Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1238)]

> Rick Marken (2004.09.04.0830)
> 
> If there is a way to explain guilt in PCT terms that does not involve  
> conflict I'd sure like to hear it. I can't think of such a  
> conflict-free explanation myself.

No problem. Guilt is a controlled perception. We perceive ourselves as  
guilty because we have a reference level for the perception of guilt.  
Something to do with original sin, I believe.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

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**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 4:40pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/18 "2004-09-04T16:40:32Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.11:03]

Back again for a week or so!

Reading through this thread on guilt, none of which I will quote,  
reminds me of a lot of other things relating to the control of one's  
perception of self, and to Layered Protocol Theory (LPT). Guilt is a  
perception, and it is a perception inexcapably tied to a social  
context.

According to LPT, the reason one communicates is that one can control  
some perception by means of the actions of another person. That means  
that O (the Originator, who we can call Oliver) counter-controls R  
(the Recipient, who we call Rachel) so that Rachel's actions become  
part of Oliver's external feedback loop for the control of his  
perception.

Counter-control, as discussed earlier this year, does not involve  
Rachel opposing a disturbance induced by Oliver. She does that, for  
sure, but her actions in doing so are perceived by Oliver, and  
Oliver's perceptions of Rachel's actions contribute to the perception  
Oliver originally intended to control.

Consider a specific example. Oliver wants the door shut, and Rachel  
is standing near the door. Oliver says "could you close the door,  
please", Rachel does so, and Oliver says "Thanks". Where's the  
counter-control in that sequence?

Here it is...

Oliver perceives Rachel as being, if not favourably disposed toward  
him, at least not actively hostile. He perceives that Rachel has the  
means to close the door (imagine if Rachel were holding a loaded tray  
of dishes, or was confined to a wheel chair and out of reach of the  
door; would Oliver, being well-disposed toward Rachel, make the same  
request?). Oliver therefore can reasonably suppose that his request  
would disturb a controlled perception held by Rachel, that Oliver is  
well-disposed toward her.

If Rachel failed to shut the door, Oliver might think less well of  
her, which would create error in her controlled perception of  
Oliver's feeling toward her. Shutting the door might lead Oliver to  
be well-disposed toward her, so she shuts the door. Oliver's  
controlled perception of the door state, with its reference level for  
seeing the door shut, is then brought to a state of no error.  
Counter-control has happened, on the part of both Oliver and Rachel.  
Oliver perceives the door shut, and Rachel perceives Oliver to  
increase his positive feelings toward her, if minimally. He said  
"Thanks".

What does Oliver's counter control depend on? It depends primarily on  
whether Rachel is in fact controlling for a perception that Oliver is  
well-disposed toward her. If she wanted to make Oliver hostile, she  
might say "Close it yourself", in response to his request. Oliver,  
therefore, should be controlling a perception that Rachel feels well  
disposed toward him. (I use "should be controlling" in a sense of  
engineering efficiency, not moral correctness; an effectively  
reorganized system would control what "should be controlled").

So, in this simple interaction, we find both parties needing to  
control a perception that the other feels well disposed toward him or  
her. Equivalently, Each has reorganized so as to act ordinarily in a  
way that does not bring them into conflict by either acting in direct  
opoosition to the other's control actions. If conflict is inevitable,  
then some other component of the perception of each other's  
disposition has also to be brought into play so that the perceptions  
each has of the other's disposition remains under control in a  
negative feedback loop (i.e. "The Bomb in the Machine" must not be  
allowed to explode \<[http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/DFS93/DFS93\_8.html](http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/DFS93/DFS93_8.html)\>).  
In the example of closing the door, Rachel might say "I'm sorry, I'm  
stuck right now, and can't close it for you" rather than "No, I  
won't".

Now we leave that example, and consider the perception of self. There  
are at least two perceptions of self (probably many, but two kinds).  
One is the perception one has of oneself "directly" through  
perceiving one's own actions in the environment, the other is what  
one perceives others to perceive of oneself. Both, presumably, are  
controllable, though, as Rabbie Burns said "Wud some Guid the giftie  
gie's, tae see ourselves as ithers see's" -- it's hard to be sure how  
others perceive us.

Hard as it may be, if we want to perceive others as perceiving us in  
a way that allows us to counter-control them effectively (as by  
having them close the door when we want it closed and they can do it  
easily), there are certain things that often work. One might allow  
others to counter-control us, by obliging their requests when it is  
convenient to do so, and one might try to act so as not to reduce  
their ability to control their own actions. Those kinds of statements  
correspond to reference levels for perceptions of "principles".

"Principles" also enter into one's own perception of self. One may  
have a reference for perceiving oneself as following certain  
principles, whether they be the ones above, or ones asserted by one's  
religion (which may conflict with the ones given as examples).  
Whatever they may be, those principles that enter into one's  
perception of self must form controlled perceptions, and the actions  
that control those perceptions become reference levels for all the  
overt actions observable by others.

(Slowly we are coming toward "guilt").

Let's get back to Oliver and Rachel. Oliver wants to perceive himself  
as a "good guy", meaning one who acts so as not to impede Rachel's  
ability to control. But there comes a time when in order to control  
some lower level perception (e.g. to have some ready cash), Oliver  
has an available action (take some of Rachel's cash) that does impede  
Rachel's control. Oliver might be able to get some of Rachel's cash  
by saying "Could you lend me some money" (using counter-control), or  
by stealing some, unknown to Rachel.

If Oliver uses counter-control to get cash from Rachel, he might  
slightly reduce Rachel's feeling of goodwill toward him -- less so if  
his request is customary and he has always repaid Rachel promptly,  
meaning he perceives Rachel to perceive him as trustworthy. But if  
Oliver steals the money and Rachel never finds out, then Rachel's  
feeling of goodwill toward Oliver will not be disturbed, and Oliver  
will not have induced error in his own perception of Rachel's feeling  
of goodwill toward him. So Oliver steals.

Oliver having stolen, however, introduces error in his perception of  
himself as a "good guy". He perceives that he has in fact reduced  
Rahel's ability to control (though he wouldn't put it that way unless  
he had studied PCT). It introduces error in his controlled perception  
of one of his principles. He has managed to create a difference  
between the way he sees himself and the way he perceives others as  
seeing him. Since the error is in his perception of his own  
principles, but not in his perception of how others perceive him as  
controlling his own principles, he feels "guilt". If, on the other  
hand, he had been brought up in Fagin's troop of young pickpockets,  
he might feel guilt if he failed to steal some of Rachel's cash, the  
principle in question being to perceive himself as acting in  
accordance with the Fagin-based social norms, which allow him to  
counter-control the members of Fagin's gang.

It is important that in either case (normal or Fagin-based), the  
feeling of guilt requires that the reference levels associated with  
the stealing action include a reference that Rachel not perceive  
Oliver as having acted against her own ability to control.

If it does not matter to Oliver whether Rachel knows, or if Oliver  
actively wants Rachel to know, there would ordinarily be no feeling  
of guilt associated with the theft. Only if Oliver had a principle  
that excluded the action of theft, and yet stole because some other  
controlled perception conflicted with the control of that "principle  
perception" would Oliver feel guilt.

The end result of this pseudo-analysis is that guilt is a concomitant  
of actions that increase error in a controlled perception of  
principle that contributes to the perception of self. Actions that  
increase error in any perception can occur, either in a poorly  
reorganized structure, or in a situation in which the control of some  
other perception leads to an internal conflict in which the control  
of the "principle" perception loses out. So one can develop a feeling  
of guilt either by not knowing how to act "properly" or through  
internal conflict.

Sorry for the length. It's all a bit complicated. I know I wound up  
agreeing with Rick that conflict is central to the question of guilt  
-- Sorry, Rick 😉  
but I thought that to go through the interpersonal and social loops  
according to LPT might help in other related analyses.

> **···**
>
> -------------------  
> I probably won't contribute much in the near future. There's another  
> meeting coming up next week, and I have a lot else that must be  
> attended to after the last month of pleasantly stressful activities.
> 
> Martin

---

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**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory7](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory7)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 5:05pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/19 "2004-09-04T17:05:04Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1304)]

> Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1238)
> 
> No problem. Guilt is a controlled perception. We perceive ourselves as  
> guilty because we have a reference level for the perception of guilt.  
> Something to do with original sin, I believe.

Perform the test. Notice that if you feel guilty about something, you  
often resist the efforts of another to persuade you that you should not  
feel guilty. In other words, you defend the perception of guilt against  
disturbances.

Bruce

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No  
Doubt: no awakening."

---

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2004, 6:20pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/guilt/13916/20 "2004-09-04T18:20:26Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1218 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1304)]

> Perform the test. Notice that if  
> you feel guilty about something, you
> 
> often resist the efforts of another to persuade you that you should  
> not
> 
> feel guilty. In other words, you defend the perception of guilt  
> against
> 
> disturbances.

Couldn’t it be that you’re defending your _reason_ for feeling  
guilty?

Best,

Bill P.

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