[Erling Jorgensen (950628.1325CDT)]
(Bruce Nevin 950626 19:52 EST)
Erling: Your words here suggest that comparators for perceptions of a given
level of the hierarchy "live" in a universe composed of perceptions of the
next lower level.
This is a place to start more than an ending point for me. It helps
me keep in mind the matter of "point of view." Every perception is
just one of a multiplicity of perceptions and "vantage points." It's
actually quite a radical and "postmodern" reminder in that respect.
Not too many months ago I asked (Thu 950306 11:08:16 EST)
whether this so tidy and attractive "concentric perceptual universes"
conception was valid. I could not make it jibe with the heterarchical I/O
connections that a category level must have.
I remember the discussion and found it extremely useful. If Categories
are constructing determinations of "sameness," there's no real reason to
restrict their inputs to the (presumably) next lower level of Relationships.
The Hierarchical PCT model has always postulated copies of lower level
signals ascending to higher levels_ anyway, so the input connections
are there in the model.
Bill Powers responded (950307.1625 MST) with
some other indications of heterarchy with respect to relationship
perceptions
He won't like to hear this, but I confess that I often watch for Bill's
"imprimatur", to help shape my sense of "acceptable modifications" to
the theory. (It's not an authority thing so much as he's just so darned
persuasive!) I agree with you that limiting connections to immediately
adjacent levels has seemed excessively tidy. That's been more a
function of our need for analytical simplicity, while we try to figure
the thing out. But there is a genius, I believe, in trying to build
things out of the simplest components possible. There's a lot that
can be done with replicating a good design all over the place.
With regard to levels of a hierarchy / heterarchy, it is not at all clear
that the central nervous system "knows anything" about these levels.
We need not directly perceive the structures that give rise to our
emergent abilities to perceive. The exception might be the "reorgan-
ization system," which might perceive (local? global?) degree of
error as part of its intrinsic variables, and/or the state of certain
parameters; (this is all still speculative.)
You quote Bill:
What all this suggests is that any level of perception can be a function
of perceptions of _any lower level_.
It helps me to consider each level as a _transformation_ of the lower
level signals, i.e., as a different type of perception -- different in
kind not just degree. If multiple lower levels could contribute input
to a higher level, perhaps we should be specifying the levels in
question. For instance: Transitions [Level 4] among Sensations [Lev.2]
(e.g., watching colors fade in a sunset); Relationships [L6] between
Configurations [L3] (e.g., is the chord major or minor); Categories
[L7]of Events [L5] (e.g., "it's as easy as riding a bicycle"); Sequences
[L8] of Relationships [L6] and Categories [L7] (e.g., "i before e,
except after c").
Continuing the quote from Bill:
...a function
of perceptions of _any lower level_. Why not higher levels, too? Well,
I've tried that on, and all I can say is that I can't make sense of it.
Maybe someone else can.
Wouldn't perceptual input signals from a "higher" level lead to
oscillations and instability? I don't think it's just a product of
modeling via discrete computer systems, that higher level systems
must work on a _slower_ time scale. Bill's 1979 article ("A Cybernetic
Model for Research...) suggests that it's a requirement of an analogical
hierarchy as well. Even though everything is happening simultaneously,
each level has its own definition of "an instant," which is necessarily
longer for a higher level system.
George Simon ("Revisiting the notion of hierarchy." _Family Process_,
32:147-155, 1993) has a similar concept: "hierarchy is not conceived
as levels of status, power, or authority, but as levels of temporality."
(p.149) He quotes Elisabeth Fivaz-Depeursinge ("Documenting a
time-bound, circular view of hierarchies: A microanalysis of parent-
infant dyadic interaction." _Family Process_, 30:101-120, 1991),
who gives evidence for "the typical durations of a level's episodes
in relation to others. The longer a level's time constant, the higher
the level is placed in the hierarchy." (p.110)
Her study of play dialogue in parent-infant interactions may be a
way to start thinking about _contexts_ of meaning. Granted, she
is layering various "episodes," which may all be within the Sequence
level of HPCT. Still, I think she's on to something about how
situations are framed. I'll quote one of her paragraphs to give you
a sense of it.
"Episodes of reciprocal gaze (that is, both partners being visually
oriented toward each other) have been demonstrated to form a
frame in which briefer episodes (expressive displays) are nested.
These gaze episodes are themselves embedded within longer
episodes organized by the body configurations. At the earliest
stages of infancy, these longer episodes consist in holding, namely,
the posturing and supporting of the infant by the adult and the
proprioceptive and tonic participation of the infant in these
postures." (p.103)
In essence, time duration becomes an ordering principle for
embedding and contextualizing different episodes. That lines
up with a system requirement that we think we're finding in the
hierarchical control of perceptions, such that, higher levels have
a longer / slower time frame. This also interests me as a way
to conceptualize (and/or measure?) _shifts_ of communication
context, which could be useful in counseling research.
Fivaz-Depeursinge addresses this latter point as follows:
"By recontextualization we mean a _process of reordering
levels_ by which a subsystem within a hierarchy _switches_
levels; for instance, gaze interaction in relation to holding
interaction switches from content to context level. . . . At
some point in the dialogue sequence, a reversal of the time
constants of the holding and gaze episodes was observed;
the holding episodes switched from nesting the gaze episodes
to being nested within them." (p.107)
I don't think any of this refers to an actual switch within the
HPCT levels. But it does raise the difficult issue of what forms
the context for what, and can those contexts reverse. Maybe
the circular causality of the control loop(s) is a way out of the
dilemma, where a (higher) reference signal is the context for a
(lower) loop, and a (lower) perceptual input is the context
for a (higher) loop. More likely, it is switching / reversing the
means for accomplishing a yet higher goal.
In the article, Fivaz-Depeursinge gave the following example
of this switch in contexts: "When a daughter showed that
she no longer liked the sitting position, her father gave in
to her and held her standing in front of him, both looking
intently at each other. She alternately danced and paused,
in brief episodes nested within long episodes of reciprocal
gaze." (p.108)
I think there is some potential for PCT analysis of this kind
of study, even though it moves into a thorny area of interactive
(and/or coordinated) control by each person of their variables.
In any event, thanks for raising the opportunity for getting into
this. I think it's important to restate every so often the emerging
consensus about aspects of the theory, and I thought you
summarized well what is at stake with a notion of heterarchy.
All the best,
Erling