Holland's "Hidden Order"

I am in the midst of reading _Hidden Order_ by John H. Holland (1995, Helix
Books, ISBN 0-201-44230-2 (paperback)) and I'm extremely curious to hear it
discussed in detail among PCTheorists. On one hand I'm sure it will evoke
much wailing and rending of garments because the absence of PCT is in
several points a major problem. On the other hand, the importance of the
topic he deals with is indisputable from a PCT standpoint.

The subtitle is How Adaptation Builds Complexity. It explores the question
of what properties are general to all complex adaptive systems.

This looks to me like an especially important area for applying PCT. This
is a hot topic, and significant improvements on Holland's work is quite
likely to command attention. I think PCT can provide important advancement
of these ideas.

Tracy Bruce Harms
harms@hackvan.com

{From Bruce Gregory (970212.0945 EST)]

"T. B. Harms" <harms@HACKVAN.COM>

I am in the midst of reading _Hidden Order_ by John H. Holland (1995, Helix
Books, ISBN 0-201-44230-2 (paperback)) and I'm extremely curious to hear it
discussed in detail among PCTheorists. On one hand I'm sure it will evoke
much wailing and rending of garments because the absence of PCT is in
several points a major problem. On the other hand, the importance of the
topic he deals with is indisputable from a PCT standpoint.

The subtitle is How Adaptation Builds Complexity. It explores the question
of what properties are general to all complex adaptive systems.

This looks to me like an especially important area for applying PCT. This
is a hot topic, and significant improvements on Holland's work is quite
likely to command attention. I think PCT can provide important advancement
of these ideas.

Without doubt, since Holland provides no mechanism for purposive
behavior of any sort. But that's true of most theories, isn't
it?

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Abbott (970212.1255 EST)]

Tracy Harms (11 Feb 1997 18:34:26) --

I am in the midst of reading _Hidden Order_ by John H. Holland (1995, Helix
Books, ISBN 0-201-44230-2 (paperback)) and I'm extremely curious to hear it
discussed in detail among PCTheorists. On one hand I'm sure it will evoke
much wailing and rending of garments because the absence of PCT is in
several points a major problem. On the other hand, the importance of the
topic he deals with is indisputable from a PCT standpoint.

The subtitle is How Adaptation Builds Complexity. It explores the question
of what properties are general to all complex adaptive systems.

I'm sure Rick will be just as pleased with Holland as he is with Vroon
[Marken (970212.0930)]. In fact, I'm rather surprised we haven't heard from
him yet about this. Let the garment rending commence!

Regards,

Bruce

[From Peter Cariani (970212.1715 EST)]

{From Bruce Gregory (970212.0945 EST)]
"T. B. Harms" <harms@HACKVAN.COM>
> I am in the midst of reading _Hidden Order_ by John H. Holland (1995, Helix
> Books, ISBN 0-201-44230-2 (paperback)) and I'm extremely curious to hear it
> discussed in detail among PCTheorists. On one hand I'm sure it will evoke
> much wailing and rending of garments because the absence of PCT is in
> several points a major problem. On the other hand, the importance of the
> topic he deals with is indisputable from a PCT standpoint.
>
> The subtitle is How Adaptation Builds Complexity. It explores the question
> of what properties are general to all complex adaptive systems.
>
> This looks to me like an especially important area for applying PCT. This
> is a hot topic, and significant improvements on Holland's work is quite
> likely to command attention. I think PCT can provide important advancement
> of these ideas.

Without doubt, since Holland provides no mechanism for purposive
behavior of any sort. But that's true of most theories, isn't
it?

I haven't seen Holland's recent book, but I do know his earlier work,
and
I think it's unwarranted to say that he "provides no mechanism for
purposive

behavior of any sort." The genetic algorithm embodies "feedback to structure"

wherein those phenotypes that perform better (given some fitness
criteria,
which are effectively, goals and purposes) propagate their genotypes
into
the next generation. If we were to stretch this scheme to fit into the
PCT bed (in true Procrustian fashion), the population of organisms is
collectively
controlling for the "perception" of enhanced fitness among its members.

GA's come from an evolutionary metaphor rather than a
percept-action-percept one,
where selection and mutation/XO replace error-correcting gradient
descent,
so the mapping is uncomfortable and crude at best,
but on the other hand an adaptive system is an adaptive system,
and goals are goals.

Peter Cariani

[From Bruce Gregory (970213.0650 EST)]

Peter Cariani (970212.1715 EST)

I haven't seen Holland's recent book, but I do know his earlier work,
and
I think it's unwarranted to say that he "provides no mechanism for
purposive
> behavior of any sort." The genetic algorithm embodies "feedback to

structure"

wherein those phenotypes that perform better (given some fitness
criteria,
which are effectively, goals and purposes) propagate their genotypes
into
the next generation. If we were to stretch this scheme to fit into the
PCT bed (in true Procrustian fashion), the population of organisms is
collectively
controlling for the "perception" of enhanced fitness among its members.

I'm having trouble building this simulation. How exactly does the
population perceive enhanced fitness? What is its reference for
enhanced fitness? Where is this reference located? How is it set?
How does the population act to resist lowered fitness? What
determines the gain? How can I perform the Test?

By the way, I like PCT precisely because it _isn't_ a procrustean
bed. Too many of those around for my taste -- I'm not all that
comfortable with them :wink:

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Gregory (970213.0955 EST)]

Peter Cariani (970212.1715 EST)]

GA's come from an evolutionary metaphor rather than a
percept-action-percept one,
where selection and mutation/XO replace error-correcting gradient
descent,
so the mapping is uncomfortable and crude at best,
but on the other hand an adaptive system is an adaptive system,
and goals are goals.

I must confess that I have never really understood what role the
goals of individuals play in a mution selection model. It has
always seemed to be that such models assign what little purpose
they acknowledge to the environment -- the agent of selection --
rather than to the selectee which seems to be a victim rather
than an agent. It is useless to try to educate me because I have
read a great deal on the subject and still have been unable to
overcome this prejudice.

Bruce Gregory

Peter Cariani (970214.1115 EST)

[From Bruce Gregory (970213.0650 EST)]

Peter Cariani (970212.1715 EST)
> I haven't seen Holland's recent book, but I do know his earlier work,
> and
> I think it's unwarranted to say that he "provides no mechanism for
> purposive
> > behavior of any sort." The genetic algorithm embodies "feedback to
structure"
> wherein those phenotypes that perform better (given some fitness
> criteria,
> which are effectively, goals and purposes) propagate their genotypes
> into
> the next generation. If we were to stretch this scheme to fit into the
> PCT bed (in true Procrustian fashion), the population of organisms is
> collectively
> controlling for the "perception" of enhanced fitness among its members.

I'm having trouble building this simulation. How exactly does the
population perceive enhanced fitness? What is its reference for
enhanced fitness? Where is this reference located? How is it set?
How does the population act to resist lowered fitness? What
determines the gain? How can I perform the Test?

By the way, I like PCT precisely because it _isn't_ a procrustean
bed. Too many of those around for my taste -- I'm not all that
comfortable with them :wink:

Just step back a bit. I was just taking issue with the notion that
genetic algorithms (GAs) aren't "purposive",
that they aren't in some sense adaptive systems
that have goals built into their structure.
Yes, the mapping of GA's into the PCT framework would certainly be a
force-fit.

Let's think about GA's (and adaptive systems in general) in terms of
an optimization process. (I don't in general advocate this perspective
because it eliminates the material world and reduces perception to a
mathematical function, but it works for our purposes right here....).
I'll use the metaphor of exploring the properties of a mathematical
function (we can keep telling ourselves, "it's only a metaphor,
it's only a metaphor").

One can have different strategies for minimizing some error function.
Some will involve computing a gradient and following the gradient
downwards to a minimum. These approaches will work when you have
smooth (effectively continuous) surfaces with not many local minima.
On the other hand, if the surfaces that one is trying to navigate
are very "rugged" and they have many local minima, and maybe they
aren't very smooth at all -- they may be discrete -- and maybe
there's not a great deal of "spatial" order to them, maybe the
space is not even "metrical", it's a space of discrete, unordered
states. In these cases, a shotgun or Monte Carlo -like approach
might yield better results -- it's not efficient, but there's a
better chance that one doesn't get hung up in a local minimum.

In this optimization metaphor, the goal is the minimization of some
function, the reference signal (goal) is a zero error, the perceptual
signal is the value of the error function (which is the difference
between some function that one is constructing -- "model" -- and some
function that is given by observation). Actions are the adjustment
of model parameters (hopefully so that errors are reduced).

A GA uses a procedure that is more like the shotgun approach than
directed error-reduction. It would be as if in a PCT model, instead of
computing the error and making the correction by a deterministic rule,
the organism or device had 20 different responses that it could try out
(in parallel) and determine whether the error was reduced. Let's say
that we have a device and it has 20 parameters that determine how its
parts interact, and therefore how it will respond to a given
(perceived) situation. There would be a mechanism for generating
variation in the responses (mutation, cross-over) that nevertheless
retained combinations of parameter values that proved useful (linkage),
so the search is somewhat constrained, though far less so than by a
deterministic rule. To the degree that the search is constrained,
it is "efficient"; to the degree that it is less constrained,
it is potentially more "robust" and "creative", albeit with less
efficiency.
In the device there is some means of measuring how well each alternative
response achieves a certain goal ("fitness function"), and the
alternatives are ranked according to how well they do. Some
fraction of the best alternatives are chosen, and their genetic
specification
becomes the basis for the mutations & combinations that form the next
generation of alternative responses.

So the main differences, as I see them, between GAs and control systems
lie in the nature of the adaptive landscapes and the corresponding
parameter spaces:

GAs: discrete, possibly nonmetrical, ill-defined, badly behaved, many
local optima
PCT: continuous, metrical, relatively well-behaved with relatively few
local optima

The problems faced by GAs demand more shotgun-like approaches, whereas
the problems
faced by PCT systems demand a highly efficient, fast, reliable response.

In the GA, it's the whole system that's doing the adapting, the whole
population, fitness
functions and all. Over time, the selection-mutation process ensures
that the
alternatives in the population will, on the average, improve, and this
is what makes
them adaptive.

If it's easier to think in terms of individual devices,
think about an immune system whose task is
to recognize a foreign invader. The space of molecular shapes that it
needs to
search is horribly ill-defined, and not simply ranked in terms of simple
metrics.
Many different dimensions interact, so it's hard to decompose the space
into smaller
search problems (although some of this can be done for local "active
sites"). There's
no deterministic way of adjusting antibodies to achieve the function of
recognition,
but there is a way of assessing how well they are achieving recognition
(binding affinity).
Many alternative responses are tested in parallel (as many as there are
species of
antibodies), and how well each one does determines its probability of
being in the
next generation. For this kind of problem, a genetic approach isn't bad.
(My criticism
of genetic algorithms is that the problem domains that it is best suited
for are
these kinds of real world, ill-defined situations where real, physical
processes are
at work; GA's are usually applied, though, to formal domains that are
usually more
efficiently dealt with via other strategies. In other words, GA's, like
many other
adaptive paradigms, have been taken over by applied mathematicians for
use on formal
problems rather than used as design principles for building devices to
adaptively
interact with the real world. They've been reduced to just another
optimization process.)

I hope this helps....

Peter

[From Bruce Gregory (970216.0730 EST)]

Peter Cariani (970214.1115 EST)

I hope this helps....

Thanks Peter, it does help. I am trying to formulate
an intelligent question, not ignoring your response!

Bruce Gregory

[Martin Taylor 970217 16:25]

Bruce Gregory (970213.0955 EST)]

I must confess that I have never really understood what role the
goals of individuals play in a mution selection model.

None, so you probably have understood, after all.

It has
always seemed to be that such models assign what little purpose
they acknowledge to the environment -- the agent of selection --
rather than to the selectee which seems to be a victim rather
than an agent. It is useless to try to educate me because I have
read a great deal on the subject and still have been unable to
overcome this prejudice.

What a peculiar thing to say. I'd hate to be in a position of saying
"it's useless to try to educate me" about something--that sounds too much
like being resigned to imminent death. And it doesn't sound much like
a prejudice, if it follows copious reading on the subject. It sounds more
as if your reading was done in some context that had some misapprehension
in it, a misapprehension that precluded your understanding what you were
reading. I don't suppose the follwing will help, but maybe....?

Another very peculiar thing to say:"the selectee seems to be a victim,"
could be involved in your misapprehension, could it?

What is "the selectee" other than a pattern that defines which individuals
come into being? In biological organisms the pattern is contained in the
genes, and one might also say in the immediate environment of the genes,
since how the genes are expressed depends on the environment. And what is
"selection" other than some function of how much of a pattern is reproduced
in other individuals that don't yet exist? Where's the victim? Where's the
"purpose?"

Where there _seems_ to be "purpose" is in hindsight. If the environment is
thus and so, and remains fairly constant over a time long compared to the
reproduction cycle of a pattern-type, then if the pattern-type varies at
some reproductions, there will be some new individuals who reproduce
themselves better than others. After a while, there will be more descendants
of some than of others. Are there "victims" among them? Surely not among
those who are alive. Are they then among those who were never born or
conceived? That's like saying that all the places an e-coli adaptor doesn't
visit have hurt feelings:-)

What you see after a long time is individuals who can survive and
reproduce in their particular environment. It looks as if evolution had
a "purpose" to make them fit the particular environment in which they now
find themselves--but only when you look backwards. (On "fitting", Gary Cziko
has put up the text of some of his chapters on his Web site--you can find
them through the CSG Web site, I think. One deals with "fit".).

The individuals have goals all right. Their goals are those that, when
satisfied, often leave the individuals in good condition, able to reproduce
and actually reproducing--if that were not the case, they would have no
direct descendants. We don't now see the descendants of individuals
that long ago had goals less fitted to their environment. The goals
of any individuals are part of the control systems of those individuals;
but there is (we assume) no grand control system that has a purpose to
make individuals of any particular pattern-type.

And the same goes for Genetic Algorithms executed in computers. Only, in
the computer, the ability of a pattern-type to reproduce depends on some
criterion supplied by a programmer, even when the environment of any
pattern-type-individual includes myriads of other individuals of the same
or different pattern-types. Genetic Algorithms for problem solving have
reproduction criteria that depend on approaches to the problem solution.
But there are still no victims, no "purpose" of the evolutionary process.
The programmer may have a purpose to produce a program that solves a
problem, but the reproducing elements have no such purpose, and neither does
the evolutionary process itself.

Maybe you can educate me about what it is you don't want to be educated
about, and I could perhaps provide a more germane response.

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (970218.1010 EST)]

Martin Taylor 970217 16:25

And the same goes for Genetic Algorithms executed in computers. Only, in
the computer, the ability of a pattern-type to reproduce depends on some
criterion supplied by a programmer, even when the environment of any
pattern-type-individual includes myriads of other individuals of the same
or different pattern-types. Genetic Algorithms for problem solving have
reproduction criteria that depend on approaches to the problem solution.
But there are still no victims, no "purpose" of the evolutionary process.
The programmer may have a purpose to produce a program that solves a
problem, but the reproducing elements have no such purpose, and neither does
the evolutionary process itself.

Fair enough. This bears on the point I raised with Peter -- PCT
systems have purposes in a way that Genetic Algorithms and
natural selection do not. My word "victims" was an attempt to
express the view that natural selection is purposeless. The
control manifest in GAs is the control exercised by the
progmmer, not the program. I don't think we disagree on
this.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (970219.0835 MST)]

Peter Cariani (970214.1115 EST)--

Just step back a bit. I was just taking issue with the notion that
genetic algorithms (GAs) aren't "purposive",
that they aren't in some sense adaptive systems
that have goals built into their structure.
Yes, the mapping of GA's into the PCT framework would certainly be a
force-fit.

I think we have to distinguish between random reorganization and _directed_
random reorganization. In the E. coli model, if you just make random changes
in direction _without looking at the result_, the moving dot will eventually
reach the target position, if you wait long enough (years?). But when you
time the random changes in direction according to the direction of travel,
the target is reached very rapidly, in a minute or two.

Evolution that depends only on random mutation could conceivably produce the
forms of life that we see, but the critical question is, "How fast?" If
changes in the "wrong direction" are just as likely as changes in the "right
direction," I doubt that 4 billion years would be long enough, by a handful
of orders of magnitude. But if propagation of a species in an unfavorable
direction were interrupted by mutation sooner than propagation in a
favorable direction, the whole process would be enormously more efficient.

The problem I've had with Genetic Algorithms that I've seen is that they
give credit for partial solutions to problems. We can say that a paramecium
that moves directly away from food particles is not very "fit", and that one
that moves only 45 degrees from the right direction is comparatively more
"fit" -- but both paramecia would starve to death. You really shouldn't
reward the second paramecium by letting it reproduce. Of course if you do,
you get _directed_ evolution, which as we know works extremely well. But it
doesn't fit the traditional model of natural selection.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Peter Cariani (970219.1535 EST)]

[From Bill Powers (970219.0835 MST)]

Peter Cariani (970214.1115 EST)--
>Just step back a bit. I was just taking issue with the notion that
>genetic algorithms (GAs) aren't "purposive",
>that they aren't in some sense adaptive systems
>that have goals built into their structure.
>Yes, the mapping of GA's into the PCT framework would certainly be a
>force-fit.

I think we have to distinguish between random reorganization and _directed_
random reorganization. In the E. coli model, if you just make random changes
in direction _without looking at the result_, the moving dot will eventually
reach the target position, if you wait long enough (years?). But when you
time the random changes in direction according to the direction of travel,
the target is reached very rapidly, in a minute or two.

I agree that one of the weakest points about GA's is their slow rate of
convergence (although I think that this can vary a great deal depending
upon
the number of genetic alternatives and the pattern language that
translates
the genetic pattern into behavior. Judicious choice of the pattern
language is
critical.) But even a dumb system that jiggles randomly around until it
finds
what it likes and then stays there is in some weak sense an adaptive
system.
It has a mechanism for finding preferred sitations, even if it's a slow
and inefficient one. Directed is better if there is clear direction to
be had
that leads to improvement.

Evolution that depends only on random mutation could conceivably produce the
forms of life that we see, but the critical question is, "How fast?" If
changes in the "wrong direction" are just as likely as changes in the "right
direction," I doubt that 4 billion years would be long enough, by a handful
of orders of magnitude. But if propagation of a species in an unfavorable
direction were interrupted by mutation sooner than propagation in a
favorable direction, the whole process would be enormously more efficient.

Both in biology and in GA's mutational processes are not purely random.
Since there
is gene linkage, duplication, and cross-over, there is structure to what
gets preserved
from generation to generation, it's a more constrained search,
particularly if
there is hierarchical structure to the genetic specification of the
organism.
There are also redundancies in the genome
that allow for more gradual modifications of function. I don't think
GA's
are a panacea by any means, but there are some problem contexts where
they
do make sense.

The problem I've had with Genetic Algorithms that I've seen is that they
give credit for partial solutions to problems. We can say that a paramecium
that moves directly away from food particles is not very "fit", and that one
that moves only 45 degrees from the right direction is comparatively more
"fit" -- but both paramecia would starve to death. You really shouldn't
reward the second paramecium by letting it reproduce. Of course if you do,
you get _directed_ evolution, which as we know works extremely well. But it
doesn't fit the traditional model of natural selection.

I don't know of GA's giving partial credit for partial solutions. There
are
better solutions and worse ones, but no partial ones (that I know of).
In all of
the GA's that I've seen both paramecia would get the same fitness
ranking since
neither reached the food. You can make fitness be inversely related to
the heading error, but then that's another task you're learning.

Peter