[From Chris Cherpas (951128.0945 PT)]
[re: > Rick Marken (951127.2000)]
RM:
Please post a reinforcement model that does not attribute to a reinforcer
an ability to strengthen that is completely independent of the state
of the organism.
cc:
How about the typical EAB approach? Reinforcement is not independent of the
state of the organism for at least two reasons:
1) The result of evolution makes some behaviors of some organisms
susceptible to a particular kind of event as reinforcing, others not;
2) An establishing operation, like food deprivation, modulates the
degree to which an organism's behavior is susceptible to reinforcement
at any given moment during the organism's life.
However, the overall reason is that the concept of reinforcement is
simply defined functionally. A class of behavior is called operant
because its instances reliably appear more when a certain kind of event
follows prior instances; fewer instances appear subsequently
when that type of event follows less often (or with lowered magnitude, etc.)
There's nothing magical going on here. In fact, reinforcement is usually
criticized because reinforcement is NOT defined independently of behavior
(i.e., the organism)! PCT wins no converts by erroneously characterizing
the concept of reinforcement.
[For example, I've read somewhere recently by a famous PCTer that
intermittent reinforcement presents a mystery to behaviorists,
because you get more responding in extinction after intermittent,
as opposed to continuous, reinforcement. Pseudo-problem. In fact the
famous PCTer's analysis is very close to the behaviorist's: there's
a greater change in the stimulus situation from CRF to EXT than from
intermittent to EXT schedules. There is no "paradox": pit intermittent
against continuous reinforcement in a choice situation; you'll see
which is "stronger."]
RM:
why are there no studies done by reinforcement theorists that can even be
construed as being about determining what organisms control?
cc:
The following broader treatment may interest you:
Killeen, Peter (1995). "Economics, Ecologics, and Mechanics: The dynamics
of responding under conditions of varying motivation," JEAB, _64_,
Number 5 (November), 405-431. (i.e., the current issue of JEAB)
RM:
In fact, reinforcement
theorists have a problem because they don't know WHAT control is; since they
don't know what control is, they don't have a theory of control (or purpose
or whatever they want to call it). It's not a definitional probleml it's a
FACTUAL problem (remember).
cc:
Reinforcement theorists know what control is, as defined by reinforcement
theory, not by control theory. That's still just a matter of definition.
In addition, they're not familiar with control theory, so they don't
know 1) the control theorist's definition of control and 2) the facts
of control which the control theorist studies, again, using the control
theorist's definition.
RM:
I would like to know how you would go about telling them that they are
not studying behavior properly. I would also like to know how you
would tell them that it's not their theories (such as they are) that are
wrong but, rather, their concept of the nature of behavior.
cc:
I assume that you would like to see greater numbers of people understanding
PCT and doing research from a PCT perspective. EABers, since their whole
field is "behavior" are keenly interested in their concept of the nature
of behavior (whole conferences and books are devoted to it). I think PCT's
best shot at getting EABers to take notice is to present a workshop at
ABA (Association for Behavior Analysis) called "Perceptual Control Theory
for Behavior Analysts." In the workshop, expain PCT and translate terms
across disciplines. Show data. You'll get interest.
Best regards,
cc