How we got here

[From Bruce Abbott (990112.1140 EST)]

Bill Powers (990111.1600 MST)

How did we come to be arguing about whether "all beliefs are references?"

See below.

Bill Powers (990105.0903 MST)

I think it more likely that what we call a belief is a reference-perception
that specifies the "right" state for some variable perception which can be
in any state.

In fact, in all cases I can think of, when there is a deviation of the
perceived world from the state defined by a belief, it is the perception
that changes while the belief remains the same, implying that the belief is
the reference signal.

Rick Marken (990105.0750)

I think Bill's point about belief -- and I think it's a very
powerful point -- is that a belief functions like a goal for
our perceptual input that we ourselves set. When we believe in
something we have set a reference for the state of some perceptual
variable(s) and we will _act_ to bring this variable to the level
specified by the belief. Beliefs are _specifications_ for input;
they are not the inputs themselves. This is a powerful and useful
way to model beliefs because it points to _our own_ contribution
to the belief process; we set our own beliefs (references) and
thus determine the reference states for the corresponding perceptual
variables. The power of this point of view is lost (I think) when
we ignore beliefs as references and think of beliefs as the
reference states of perceptual variables.

Rick Marken (990105.1830)

Bill Powers (990105.1503)

I can't see why this simple idea [belief = reference perception]
causes such a problem. Is it that it's different from the
conventional concept of a belief?

I think it's just a very unfamiliar notion. I also think it can
seriously offend (disturb) one's sense of fairness and impartiality.
I know because this is how I felt when you first suggested the notion
to me during a visit here a couple years ago.
. . .
I thought you were wrong -- way wrong -- about beliefs being
references.

But I've changed my mind since then because I've seen beliefs
function as reference signals in myself and others. I've changed
my belief about belief;-) I think what we believe can become a
reference for perception and when it does we act accordingly (to
bring the perception to the reference state).

Rick Marken (990106.0750)

I think what we believe can become a reference for perception
and when it does we act accordingly (to bring the perception
to the reference state).

Martin Taylor (990106 1:20)

I don't think anyone with whom you have been arguing would dispute
that.

Great. Then why all the dispute? I think the novel (and important)
observation from a PCT perspective is that beliefs often _do_
function as references for perceptions. This was all Bill Powers
said in his original post on this subject; I think he said that
beliefs that are not just imagined perceptions are references for
perceptions. Beliefs that are just reference perceptions are not
really very interesting; if I believe that there is a pot of
gold at the end of the rainbow then big deal. This belief makes
no difference to anyone (including me) until it becomes a reference
perception and I start wasting my time and energy trying to find
that pot of gold.

The disputation is about a different assertion--that _all_ beliefs are
reference providers and only reference providers, and that _no_ belief
is a perception, imaginary or otherwise.

Then it was an unnecessary dispute since no one on the "beliefs are
references" side -- not Bill Powers, not me -- said that beliefs are
_only_ reference perceptions. But it seem to me there was (until now)
some rather strong dissent from the proposal that beliefs _can be_
(and often are) references. But I guess we now all agree on this;
beliefs can be -- and often are -- references specifications for
the state of perceptual variables.

Again, I think the idea that beliefs can be reference perceptions
is a very powerful notion.

Bill Powers (990106.0921 MST)

Thanks, Rick. That about wraps up the arguments for me. The word belief,
like so many words we trip over, is essentially undefined (like most
critical terms in psychology and philosophy), so it's pointless to argue
about what belief "really means." We can use it to refer to a number of
interesting situations, one of which is when we are _trying_ to keep a
belief true and modifying our behavior so as to keep it true (-seeming). In
that situation, the believed state of affairs seems to operate more like a
reference signal than a perception.

Rick Marken (990106.1010]

Martin Taylor (990106 11:11)

I'm glad that you, at least, agree that some beliefs are just
perceptions

Imagined perceptions. I just don't ever use the word "belief"
to refer to something I am perceiving. I do use it to refer to
an _interpretation_ of what I am perceiving (for example, when
I intrepret my perception of the behavior of some congressman
as being that of a "hypocritical asshole"; I say "I believe Henry
Hyde is a hypocritical asshole", for example). The interpretation
is an imagined perception; the "yes" vote for impeachment is
an actual perception; no belief involved.

Rick Marken (990107.0820)]

Since, as Bill Powers (990107.0000 MST) notes, imagination (according
to the PCT model) is driven by the reference signal, I would say
that even imagined perceptions are beliefs that are, ultimately,
reference perceptions.

Bruce Gregory (990107.0935 EDT)--

If you are at all like me, your beliefs differ considerably from
you see. Yet according to PCT, both are perceptions.

No, they are _not_ both perceptions. I think we are using the work
"belief" to refer to _reference signals_ (what you _want_ to perceive).

Bill Powers (990107.0000 MST)]

I can agree that some of the things we call beliefs are imagined
perceptions, if we're talking about imagining something rather than
perceiving it in the normal way. I don't agree that ALL the things we call
beliefs are imagined perceptions. And maybe none of them is.

Notice that in order to imagine a perception under the present model, one
must first set a reference level for it, specifying the desired degree of
that perception. The perception doesn't "just happen." In the imagination
mode, there is never any significant difference between perception and
reference signal, because no disturbances can affect the perception. So it
makes no difference whether we say that kind of belief is a reference
signal or a perceptual signal: they will be essentially identical in
magnitude.

However, when such a belief is subject to a reality test -- when the
perception comes from lower systems rather than imagination -- it is
possible that the perceptual signal will no longer match the reference
signal. I may believe I can lift the car, but when I try it, I do not
perceive the car being lifted. This, if I choose to pay attention, is the
evidence that says my belief is wrong.

But my perception is NOT wrong: it reports that the car is still on the
ground, even though my reference level for it is still "off the ground."
The perception now reports the actual state of affairs. In the period just
before the belief is changed, then, which signal represents the (mistaken)
belief? Is it the perceptual signal reporting the car on the ground, or the
reference signal specifying that it is off the ground? I claim it is the
latter.

Bill Powers (990107.1618 MST)

Bruce Gregory (990107.1415 EST)

So belief only applies when we are operating in imagination mode?

According to my usage of the term, that would make sense. When I say I
"believe" something, to me that means specifically that I don't "know" it
-- that is, I have either no evidence or insufficient evidence for it. If I
say I believe it is night-time in Australia right now, I mean that I have
no way to verify that -- it's reasonable, but there's no easy way to prove
it, and I'm speaking from expectations or logic, not knowledge.

As to "knowing," my usage is like Rick's. If I can see it, or direct
evidence of it, I say I know it. By that, I mean that its existence or
behavior seems independent of my belief or disbelief in it; it seems to be
a given of experience.

Rick Marken (990107.1830)

But all this has nothing to do with what belief _is_. I think
believing is something people do (even if they do it covertly,
in imagination). What do you think believing _is_?

Bill Powers (990109.0625 MST)

You are using "belief" in a way that is interchaneable with "deduction" or
"prediction" or "optimization." That is not my subjective meaning for that
term. To me, a belief is a perception, which we take to be a representation
of a reality even though we are creating it ourselves with no external
justification.

Rick Marken (990109.0930)

This is the way I spell belief, too. In the Piaget example,
the subject creates for herself a representation of reality
(an _imagined_ perception of more water being displaced by
the heavier or two cylinders) with no external justfication
(she has never tested to see whether this perception actually
occurs).

Bill Powers (990111.0708 MST)

All this gets so much simpler when you identify a belief as a reference
perception.

Bill Powers (990111.0708 MST)

Bruce Gregory (990110.1412 EST)

Since a reference level is not, in general, perceived, why do you call a
belief a reference perception? A belief is a reference level is it not? Of
course, it's your theory, so you can call it anything you like.

You're right, "reference perception" is a bad term. A reference signal is
not a perception, and can't give rise to one until its information is
transferred into a perceptual channel.

Rick Marken (990111.1100)

Bruce Abbott (990111.1315 EST)

My strongest objection to your [Bill Powers'] proposal is that
beliefs do not always seem to me to be defended; indeed I would
argue that most are not defended. We just accept certain
propositions as true until evidence proves otherwise, that is,
until we have reason to reevaluate them.

That was actually my position too when Bill and I first discussed
this a couple years ago. I objected to Bill's proposition about
beliefs because beliefs do not always seem to be defended.

So I don't know. I think certain beliefs obviously are defended
against disturbance, sometimes brutally (as in "holy wars"). So
the notion of belief as reference signal certainly seems to make
sense in terms of some kinds of behavior. Maybe all beliefs are
references (this makes sense in terms of the HPCT model)

Rick Marken (990111.1300)

Maybe belief becomes a reference for a controlled perception when
a control system moves from imagination to control mode.

Rick Marken (990111.1440)

I think these beliefs are similar; they are references for
perceptions that you might have; in one case the perception of
the sun coming up at 7:11 AM and in the other the perception
of the badness of killing another person. In both cases, what
you actually perceive may differ from what you believe you
will perceive. In that case, there will be an error and you
will presumably act to make what you perceive consistent with
your belief.

Bill Powers (990111.1600 MST)

How did we come to be arguing about whether "all beliefs are references?"

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (990112.0945)]

Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST)--

There is still the question of whether the belief, as an
evaluation of truth, is prescriptive (reference) or descriptive
(perception). When you say "I believe killing people is wrong,"
are you saying that killing people is wrong or that it should
be treated as wrong? That is, when you see a person killing
someone, do you perceive not-killing as the desired behavior
and killing as something perceived that is different from the
right behavior, or do you simply perceive the truth of a
statement, "killing is wrong?" Or what DO you experience when
this belief comes into view?

Now _that's_ an interesting question!

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (990112.1140 EST)

How did we come to be arguing about whether "all beliefs are references?"

See below.

Yes, very interesting. I started looking at cases where belief did seem to
act like a reference perception, and since I had no other examples at that
time, I took that as the basic definition. As the discussion went on, I
realized that sometimes a belief (as commonly used) might be the perception
of something actual or something remembered, or something proposed, rather
than the reference.

Now you are proposing that all beliefs are evaluations of propositions as
being true (for positive beliefs). Do you recognize any other usages of
this term that do NOT mean that? Are you recommending that we abandon all
such other usages and adopt yours for formal purposes? As I said in my last
post, I'm willing.

There is still the question of whether the belief, as an evaluation of
truth, is prescriptive (reference) or descriptive (perception). When you
say "I believe killing people is wrong," are you saying that killing people
is wrong or that it should be treated as wrong? That is, when you see a
person killing someone, do you perceive not-killing as the desired behavior
and killing as something perceived that is different from the right
behavior, or do you simply perceive the truth of a statement, "killing is
wrong?" Or what DO you experience when this belief comes into view?

Best,

Bill P.

Best,

Bill P.
'

[From Bruce Gregory (990112.1355 EST)]

Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST)

There is still the question of whether the belief, as an evaluation of
truth, is prescriptive (reference) or descriptive
(perception). When you
say "I believe killing people is wrong," are you saying that
killing people
is wrong or that it should be treated as wrong? That is, when
you see a
person killing someone, do you perceive not-killing as the
desired behavior
and killing as something perceived that is different from the right
behavior, or do you simply perceive the truth of a statement,
"killing is
wrong?" Or what DO you experience when this belief comes into view?

When most people say, "I believe killing people is wrong," they are
saying "I have the thought 'Killing people is wrong'". They also have
the thoughts "Killing people is justified if you are acting in self
defense"; "Killing people is justified if you are ordered to do so by a
superior officer"; "Killing people is justified if our country is at
war"; and "Killing people is justified if they have committed a heinous
crime." Which of these thoughts they have at any particular moment seems
to depend on the circumstances. A very small number of people say "I
believe killing people is wrong" and reject all qualifications. These
people no doubt mean something different by the utterance than do the
rest of us.

Bruce Gregory

[From Rick Marken (990112.1400)]

Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST)

when you see a person killing someone, do you perceive
not-killing as the desired behavior and killing as something
perceived that is different from the right behavior, or do
you simply perceive the truth of a statement, "killing is
wrong?" Or what DO you experience when this belief comes
into view?

Bruce Gregory (990112.1355 EST) --

When most people say, "I believe killing people is wrong," they are
saying "I have the thought 'Killing people is wrong'". They also have
the thoughts "Killing people is justified if you are acting in self
defense"... A very small number of people say "I believe killing
people is wrong" and reject all qualifications. These people no
doubt mean something different by the utterance than do the rest
of us.

These are certainly good points but they don't really answer
Bill's question which, I believe, can be phrased this way:
"Is the rightness or wrongness of a behavior (like killing)
an aspect of the _perception_ of that behavior or is it an
aspect of the _comparison_ of the perception of that behavior
to a reference specification, in the observer, of what that
perception _should be_?"

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Kenny Kitzke (990113.2230 EST)]

<Bill Powers (990112.1007 MST)>

In a post to Bruce Abbott, Bill Powers writes:

<There is still the question of whether the belief, as an evaluation of
truth, is prescriptive (reference) or descriptive (perception). When you
say "I believe killing people is wrong," are you saying that killing people
is wrong or that it should be treated as wrong? That is, when you see a
person killing someone, do you perceive not-killing as the desired behavior
and killing as something perceived that is different from the right
behavior, or do you simply perceive the truth of a statement, "killing is
wrong?" Or what DO you experience when this belief comes into view?>

Since it was I who made this statement (I assume you perceived incorrectly
but not immorally) and not Bruce, may I answer your questions?

When I say that, I mean I carry a moral belief at the principle level that
I am not to kill anyone.

My statement "I believe killing people is wrong," was not intended to
communicate anything beyond that belief. Is there an English problem here
or are you asking more questions for clarification so you can better
understand what I said I believed and how you would perceive my belief?

If I wanted to say killing people is wrong in a categorical sense, I could
have said that. All kinds of people kill other people because they *do
not* believe it is morally wrong for them: Nazis, Kamikazes, partial birth
abortion doctors, state and fedral correctional institutional personnel,
police, etc.

I understand this and have no reference for changing them to my view. That
might take coercion. :sunglasses: I may react with some low gain action to the
decisions others make or even try to personally stop such acts of behavior
at a much higher gain, but always short of intentionally killing anyone
myself.

If I wanted to say that killing people should be treated as wrong, I could
have said that and specified who should treat it that way. The answers
have already been written in a book by someone far wiser than I. You don't
need me to repeat something so obvious, do you? My statement was meant to
convey my reference belief for me. Do you want me to be upset because
others have different morality belief principles than I?

I do not perceive that I have any ability to dictate what other people's
moral beliefs or actions are or should be. And nothing in PCT will
determine the morality of my principles or of yours. Societies pass laws
to try to coerce others legal behavior to some reference they select for
individuals. But I think we PCTers all know that doesn't work very well
and why, don't we?

If a person has no principles, or different moral beliefs than I, they will
still have a reference at the principle level that will relate to their own
lower level systems and perceptual control. I think that moral beliefs are
internally generated principle reference perceptions and ours are all
different especially when based on different systems concepts.

Beliefs are very important for understanding how HPCT works. In B:CP, you
even list beliefs as generalizations at the Principle level. I believe
that moral beliefs are very common and uniquely human. If you want to use
PCT to describe human behavior, I would think some better definitions and
understanding would go a long way to getting acceptance.

If you want to say moral beliefs are not part of PCT, or we have no
technical definition or understanding about what beliefs are, you take the
chance of alienating any athiest who wants everyone to know that belief in
an Almighty God is unproven and foolish on scietific grounds. There would
be a whole segment of their behavior that we could not explain with PCT.

I believe PCT explains how we all behave all the time (no exceptions), with
or without moral beliefs. Of course, one can coerce another's actions but
can't set their behavior or their moral beliefs.

Man, I am tired. Have a busy day tomorrow. I'll hit the sack for now and
wait for some wisdom about beliefs.

Warm regards,

kenny