HPCT and Human Cognition

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)]

I'm budding in a bit on this conversation between Marc and Dick.

Marc Abrams (2003.05.06.2100) to Dick Robertson

The purpose of this dialogue is not about "being right"
( see my open letter to Bruce Gregory ). It's about how we each understand
the model.

I don't know what dialog you're talking about. But if it's a dialog about PCT then
it's seems to me that, if the goal of such a dialog is understanding the model,
then the dialog has to be about being right (regarding one's understanding of the
model). Why go through all the trouble of trying to learn PCT if the result will
be understand understanding that might be right or wrong.

Hey, maybe I'm wrong. Anyone validate here?

Ah. So you do care about whether your understanding is right or wrong.

Perceptions are "built" from
both sensory data and memory inputs going _up_ the hierarchy, as they are
going up they are continuously coming back down as error signals this is the
control process.

Perceptions are built only from lower level perceptions, the lowest level of
perceptions being sensory data -- perceptions of intensity caused by direct
stimulation of the sensory organs. Memory is not an input; it's a process of
switching reference signals directly into perceptual signals, so that you perceive
what you want to perceive. But the perceptions resulting from this memory process
are still perceptual signals. Higher level perceptions that are built from these
memory-produced perceptions are still built from perceptions. So I think it's best
to think of the hierarchical concept of perception in PCT in terms of higher level
perceptions being built from (or function of) lower level perceptions. Though you
are right that at any time many of these lower level perceptions are likely to
have the source in memory. How much of our perception is built from
memory-produced perceptions is an empirical question. My guess is relatively
little for normal people, quite a bit more for so-called schizophrenics.

The HPCT model ( i.e. our
"understanding" of Awareness, Memory, composition of the hierarchy, etc. )is
largely incomplete.

I think the PCT model of awareness and memory and the hierarchy is far more
complete than any other model I know of in the behavioral sciences. What is far
from complete are the empirical tests of these aspects of the model.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1230)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0507.1435)–
Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)

Memory is not an input; it’s a process of

switching reference signals directly into perceptual signals, so
that you perceive

what you want to perceive.

I must have a memory problem, since I often find myself unable to perceive

what I want to perceive. What is the PCT term for recalling a past
perception?

In my case, recalled perceptions are easily discriminated from
present

perceptions since they are nowhere near as “vivid.”

I’m not quite sure what you are asking but I’ll take this opportunity to
correct myself.
What I was describing in what you quote above is imagination, not memory.
Memory is the process of accessing previously experienced perceptions.
I don’t remember the details of the Bill’s memory access model but it is
described in B:CP, which I don’t have on hand. I think the proposal
was that the outputs of higher level systems access memories by pointing
to the the addresses of lower level references, which are played back as
perceptions in imagination mode. So I can remember what my beautiful wife
looks like (and see her in imagination) by (somehow) addressing the reference
for that lovely configuration and playing it back as an imagined perception.
The diagram is something like this:

Reference for configuration

v

—>| |-----

Reference Address output

Perception

v

of

[ | | | | | | ]   Reference addresses

Configuration |

     >
     v  Selected

reference

\ /

-------- Imagination Switch

I hope the spacing works out. I think this is it. I want to see
(in imagination) my wife (a configuration). The error in the configuration
control system becomes an address for the lower level references that would
ordinarily lead to my perceiving my wife. But I short circuit all the lower
level references by throwing the imagination switch (by what means this
“throwing” takes place is not specified in the model; it’s probably
the work of consciousness) so that the reference for all the lower level
perceptions (I just show one) that would become the perception of my wife
are played right back into the perceptual signal path and I see my wife
in imagination.

I think that whatever it is that throws the imagination switch is also
what flags whether the perception we are experiencing (in the example,
a configuration perception) is a real perception (what we would call “reality”)
or an imagined one. I think Bill said in B:CP that he didn’t know what
it was that threw the imagination switch. Which means that he didn’t know
how to model it at the time. That is definitely one potentially very
important missing element of the model. I think many forms of mental illness
are related to just that missing aspect of the model. That is, the illness
has to do with an inability to distinguish imagined from real perceptions.

Best regards

Rick

···

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Senior Behavioral Scientist

The RAND Corporation

PO Box 2138

1700 Main Street

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971

Fax: 310-451-7018

E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0507.1435)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)

Memory is not an input; it's a process of
switching reference signals directly into perceptual signals, so that you perceive
what you want to perceive.

I must have a memory problem, since I often find myself unable to perceive
what I want to perceive. What is the PCT term for recalling a past perception?
  In my case, recalled perceptions are easily discriminated from present
perceptions since they are nowhere near as "vivid."

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.06.1243 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)--

>it's seems to me that, if the goal of such a dialog is understanding the
model,
>then the dialog has to be about being right (regarding one's
understanding of the
>model).

The point of this truism is that if a person is trying too hard to prove he
is right, he will be unable to reconsider anything he happens to be wrong
about. So because of too much emphasis on convincing others that one is
right, one can lose the ability of self-criticism, and end up farther from
the truth instead of closer to it. You can win arguments by sheer
persistence, force of personality, and volume of speech, but winning an
argument doesn't mean you were right and the other guy was wrong. It just
means you beat the other guy down and he stopped arguing back. If that's
all you wanted, I suppose that's OK. But it's no way to discover truths.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1515)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.07.1443) --

>if the goal of such a dialog is understanding the model

Yes, the question becomes "according to whom"?

According to the people who know it best.

Again. I am not only interested in HPCT, but I am interested in some of the
things that are not part of the current model. For instance. What roles,
reorganization, memory, emotion, awareness, etc. have on the model.

Memory, emotion and awareness are phenomena. Their "role in the model" is that the
mechanisms of the model (such as reorganization) purport to explain these
phenomena. How well the model explains these phenomena is a matter for empirical
test, including observation of one's own subjective experience.

I say
this with the idea that we don't yet have enough info to say whether we can
be "right" or "wrong" about certain processes that include entities and
processes that are not included or described by the current model.

I don't understand this. I would say that we don't include entities and processes
in the model unless we need them to explain phenomena. The PCT model currently
contains entities and processes that explain phenomena like emotion and memory.
The rightness or wrongness of the model as an explanation of these processes can
now only be determined by empirical tests, including observation of one's own
subjective experience. My observations of my subjective experience suggest that
the model is right on about memory and awareness. But objective tests would be
nice.

>Memory is not an input; it's a process of
> switching reference signals directly into perceptual signals,

An inference.

No. It's a _description_ of how the model works. Unfortunately, it's a description
of only part of the model of memory, the imagination part. I hope I clarified this
in my post to Bruce G.

>So I think it's best to think of the hierarchical concept of perception in
> PCT in terms of higher level perceptions being built from (or function of)
>lower level perceptions.

Where do you see me saying something different then this. Please clarify.

When you say that higher level perception is partially made up of memory I think
it somewhat misrepresents the model. It makes it sound like higher level
perceptions are derived from lower level perceptions and something else called
"memory". I think it's clearer to say that higher level perceptions are always a
function of lower level perceptions, some of the latter possibly being produced
by memory.

> How much of our perception is built from
> memory-produced perceptions is an empirical question. My guess is
> relatively little for normal people, quite a bit more for so-called
schizophrenics.

Lets stick to the model.

I am.

It is more then an empirical question.

What more could it be. The question is the extent to which perceptions contain a
component derived from memory/imagination. That's an empirical question based on
the PCT model.

Your "guess" is meaningless to me.

That's unfortunate. I think it's an interesting guess with potentially useful
implications for psychiatry.

Not that it may not be valid. It certainly could be.
But I thought you were interested inshedding light on the model. As far as I
know "mental illness" is not part of the current model.

Mental illness is a _phenomenon_. You don't put phenomena into models; that's a
basic no-no of modeling. What I did was observe how the model could be used to
explain one aspect of the phenomenon of mental illness, hallucinations.

We established during our last conversation that we need to stick to
the model.

Actually, I though we established that you were talking about a phenomenon - the
experience of loss of control that one gets when in conflict -- when you were
talking about error correcting and reaching goals. I always stick to the model.
Maybe what needs clarification is the difference between a model and the phenomena
the model is designed to explain. This really should be step one in the study of
PCT. PCT is a set of mathematical equations that purport to explain phenomena
like feelings of emotion, remembrances of things past, reactions to e-mail,
communicating, controlling (and failing to control), etc.

>What is far from complete are the empirical tests of these aspects of the
model.

On predictions of the model.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1530)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.07.1611)
]
Its my turn ti bud in :-). I’ll
be short. 1) you describe one of the 3 “memory”
modes Bill has hypothesized. What of the other 2
What of them, indeed?
2) what kind of data do you have
to support your argument aboutt he one you do talk about.
Basically the same data Bill had when he invented the system: my own experience
of how I bring something into memory. I want to remember a face or a passage
in a poem and, often, after some time of mentally “searching” I am able
to produce the perception for myself in imagination.
Is there some alternative model of memory you wish to propose?

Best regards

Rick

···

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Senior Behavioral Scientist

The RAND Corporation

PO Box 2138

1700 Main Street

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971

Fax: 310-451-7018

E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

from [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.07.1443) ]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)]

I'm budding in a bit on this conversation between Marc and Dick.

Your not budding in ( I can't speak for Dick, but I love it ). Your input
is not only welcome it might be important. Thanks for the contribution.

I don't know what dialog you're talking about. But if it's a dialog about

PCT then

it's seems to me that,

Glad you brought this up. Actually I am talking about something more then
PCT. So is Dick as far as I can tell

if the goal of such a dialog is understanding the model,

Yes, the question becomes "according to whom"? I presume we will both use
Bill Powers as to that who, yes? To the extrent the model is defined, (that
is, there are technical words that describe specific entities and processes
of the _HPCT_ model). We are talking about processes that include HPCT, not
PCT, and further we are talking about some processes that are not currently
either defined in the model or currently part of the model. Any
clarification toward that end will be greatly appreciated.

then the dialog has to be about being right (regarding one's understanding

of the

model). Why go through all the trouble of trying to learn PCT if the

result will

be understand understanding that might be right or wrong.

Again. I am not only interested in HPCT, but I am interested in some of the
things that are not part of the current model. For instance. What roles,
reorganization, memory, emotion, awareness, etc. have on the model. I say
this with the idea that we don't yet have enough info to say whether we can
be "right" or "wrong" about certain processes that include entities and
processes that are not included or described by the current model.

> Hey, maybe I'm wrong. Anyone validate here?

Ah. So you do care about whether your understanding is right or wrong.

Of Course, but that is for _me_ to determine. Not you. You don't know ehough
about what I want to know to make that kind of judgement. You know a great
deal about _one_ part of what I want to know (PCT). Lets stick to what you
do know (PCT)and not to what you like to infer you know. Ok?

> Perceptions are "built" from
> both sensory data and memory inputs going _up_ the hierarchy, as they

are

> going up they are continuously coming back down as error signals this is

the

> control process.

Perceptions are built only from lower level perceptions, the lowest level

of

perceptions being sensory data -- perceptions of intensity caused by

direct

stimulation of the sensory organs.

No problem.

Memory is not an input; it's a process of
switching reference signals directly into perceptual signals,

An inference. I am going to be relentless on this point Rick. Where is your
data to support this statement? I disagree with this completely. If Bill
currently believes this to be true, I disagree with him as well. I am
currently in the middle of researching this very topic. I am not prepared to
present my data. I will shortly. For the time being this will be a point of
disagreement with regard to the HPCT model.

so that you perceive
what you want to perceive. But the perceptions resulting from this memory

process

are still perceptual signals. Higher level perceptions that are built from

these

memory-produced perceptions are still built from perceptions.

Ok. Nothing new or revealing here.

So I think it's best to think of the hierarchical concept of perception in

PCT in terms of higher level

perceptions being built from (or function of) lower level perceptions.

Where do you see me saying something different then this. Please clarify.

Though you
are right that at any time many of these lower level perceptions are

likely to

have the source in memory. How much of our perception is built from
memory-produced perceptions is an empirical question. My guess is

relatively

little for normal people, quite a bit more for so-called schizophrenics.

Lets stick to the model. It is more then an empirical question. Your "guess"
is meaningless to me. Not that it may not be valid. It certainly could be.
But I thought you were interested inshedding light on the model. As far as I
know "mental illness" is not part of the current model. It's part of your
inferences about the model. If you have the data I'm interested, if not. I'm
not. We established during our last conversation that we need to stick to
the model. I would like to adhere to that, unless you have some new data to
introduce.

I think the PCT model of awareness and memory and the hierarchy is far

more

complete than any other model I know of in the behavioral sciences.

ABSOLUTELY. It is the reason why I feel it is so important to "understand"
PCT/HPCT. I believe _ALL_ things originate from the PCT/HPCT model.

What is far
from complete are the empirical tests of these aspects of the model.

I respectfully disagree. Yes, we need empirical tests, But on what?

Marc

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.07.1611) ]

···

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1230)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0507.1435)–

Its my turn ti bud in :-). I’ll be short.

1) you describe one of the 3 "memory" modes Bill has hypothesized. What of the other 2
2) what kind of data do you have to support your argument aboutt he one you do talk about.

Marc

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0507.2115)]

Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1230)

What I was describing in what you quote above is imagination, not
memory. Memory is the process of accessing previously experienced
perceptions.

That addresses my questions.

I don't remember the details of the Bill's memory access
model but it is described in B:CP, which I don't have on hand. I think
the proposal was that the outputs of higher level systems access
memories by pointing to the the addresses of lower level references,
which are played back as perceptions in imagination mode.

I would be very surprised if memories were stored in a way that had
anything analogous to an address. I suspect they are accessed by a
pattern-matching processes.

I hope the spacing works out. I think this is it. I want to see (in
imagination) my wife (a configuration). The error in the configuration
control system becomes an address for the lower level references that
would ordinarily lead to my perceiving my wife. But I short circuit all
the lower level references by throwing the imagination switch (by what
means this "throwing" takes place is not specified in the model; it's
probably the work of consciousness) so that the reference for all the
lower level perceptions (I just show one) that would become the
perception of my wife are played right back into the perceptual signal
path and I see my wife in imagination.

I doubt that remembering your wife (who I conjecture is considerably
more than a configuration) is a control process. Again, I suspect it
involves pattern matching. I suspect the distinction between memory and
imagination is that the latter is a control process while the former is
not. For example, when you recall your wife, exactly what perception are
you controlling? If, on the other hand, you imagine her as part of a
trapeze act, it seems to me that you are controlling a perception based
on your uncontrolled memory of what a trapeze act looks like.

Purely conjectural, of course.

···

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.07.1930)]

Bill Powers (2003.05.06.1243 MDT)--

Rick Marken (2003.05.07.0910)--

> it's seems to me that, if the goal of such a dialog is understanding the
> model, then the dialog has to be about being right (regarding one's
> understanding of the model).

The point of this truism is that if a person is trying too hard to prove he
is right, he will be unable to reconsider anything he happens to be wrong
about. So because of too much emphasis on convincing others that one is
right, one can lose the ability of self-criticism, and end up farther from
the truth instead of closer to it. You can win arguments by sheer
persistence, force of personality, and volume of speech, but winning an
argument doesn't mean you were right and the other guy was wrong. It just
means you beat the other guy down and he stopped arguing back. If that's
all you wanted, I suppose that's OK. But it's no way to discover truths.

Did you just agree with me or not?

I think of the control model as being like algebra and that the dialog on the
net is similar to what goes on in an algebra class. The goal of the dialog in
an algebra class is for everyone to end up being able to solve algebra
problems. That's what I mean about being "right". I don't mean being right in
the sense of winning an argument but being right in the sense of having
learned a skill: solving algebra problems in this case. There is a right and
wrong way to do algebra. There is a right and a wrong way to do PCT.

The algebra teacher has the skill of solving algebra problems and is therefore
already right in the sense I was using the term. But the algebra teacher is
fallible and should always be open to criticism (including self-criticism). If
a good student catches a mistake the self-critical teacher will acknowledge it
and celebrate the student's skill, which was developed under the teacher's
tutelage. The teacher who has to be right no matter what will try to cover up
the mistake. This is certainly not a good way to be right.

I think some of us on the net know PCT the way an algebra teacher knows
algebra. I would say we have it right in the same sense that the algebra
teacher has algebra right. But, like the algebra teacher, we have to be
willing to listen to criticism from others and ourselves. We make mistakes
which our "students" often catch and the students have things to teach us,
too. But it's a complicated situation. Just because a student thinks the
teacher has made a mistake or that he or she has something to teach the
teacher, it's not necessarily so. I think the algebra teacher has to be able
to explain to the student that he or she is not right in these cases. If the
algebra student insists that given a+b=c+d, then a = b+c+d you can dialog
with the student to see why the student might think that's true but a some
point I think the teacher has to say that it's not _right_ and explain why.

Don't you think so?

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Bill Powers (2003.05.07.2026 MDT) --

Bruce Gregory (2003.0507.2115)--

I would be very surprised if memories were stored in a way that had
anything analogous to an address. I suspect they are accessed by a
pattern-matching processes.

Check out p. 211 ff in BCP. I discuss first the general principle of
addressing which enables some index to point to a storage location. Then I
introduce "associative" addressing, in which a recorded unit is accessed by
providing part of the information stored in it, upon which it delivers the
rest of it. This is a form of pattern-matching. Of course, if you already
have the complete pattern there is no need to match it to what is stored --
you already have what would be retrieved!

I think human memory uses both an indexical form of addressing and
associative addressing.

Best,

Bill P.

···

I hope the spacing works out. I think this is it. I want to see (in
imagination) my wife (a configuration). The error in the configuration
control system becomes an address for the lower level references that
would ordinarily lead to my perceiving my wife. But I short circuit all
the lower level references by throwing the imagination switch (by what
means this "throwing" takes place is not specified in the model; it's
probably the work of consciousness) so that the reference for all the
lower level perceptions (I just show one) that would become the
perception of my wife are played right back into the perceptual signal
path and I see my wife in imagination.

I doubt that remembering your wife (who I conjecture is considerably
more than a configuration) is a control process. Again, I suspect it
involves pattern matching. I suspect the distinction between memory and
imagination is that the latter is a control process while the former is
not. For example, when you recall your wife, exactly what perception are
you controlling? If, on the other hand, you imagine her as part of a
trapeze act, it seems to me that you are controlling a perception based
on your uncontrolled memory of what a trapeze act looks like.

Purely conjectural, of course.

--
Bruce Gregory lives with the poet and painter Gray Jacobik in the future
Canadian Province of New England.

www.joincanadanow.org