[From Bruce Nevin (2003.05.18 22:10 EDT]
The “memory as RIF” thread is about some very specific
questions so I am responding to this as a branch of the “HPCT
lexicon” thread instead.
Marc Abrams (2003.05.13.1046)–
It might prove useful and helpful to this discussion
if we keep the model entities and processes separate from the phenomena
it produces.
I don’t understand what “the phenomena it produces” means, in
respect to memory and imagination.
As I understand your typographical conventions (in your 2003.05.04.0740),
any technical term signaled by capitalization should have an explicit
referent in the PCT model, in simulations, and in control diagrams. Any
capitalized term that does not have an explicit referent of this kind
must refer to something new that is proposed for inclusion in the model,
for which we must find a representation in control diagrams, and which we
must model and test in simulations.
Bill does a fine job of
defining three terms, in the B:CP glossary which would be useful to this
discussion.
They are: Memory, Remembering, and Imagining. To these you have added
Imagination and Rememberance. I question the additions below.
I think they should become
part of the HPCT lexicon and used as such. I will use the convention of
capitalizing lexicon terms in the same spirit they used to capitalize
nouns. They are;Memory; The storage and retrieval of the information
carried by perceptual signals. The physical apparatus of storage and
retrieval.
The second part is fine; I wonder about the first.
For technical usage Memory certainly refers to the physical apparatus. In
a control diagram in B:CP it is represented, e.g. in fig. 15.2 on p. 218,
by a box with two inputs and two outputs.
Inputs:
Storage, a copy of perceptual input from below.
Address Signal, error output(s) from above.
Outputs:
Reference Signal to the comparator below.
Retrieval, a copy of the Reference Signal going to perceptual
input.
This is refined with explicit switches in fig. 15.3 p. 221, where the
discussion sweeps immediately on to switching between control, passive
observation, automatic control, and imagination. (Interest in these
proposals distracted me until just recently from wondering how error
outputs get associated with memories, which is not explained by the
discussion of perceptual inputs being associated with memories.)
In the first part of the definition, “the information carried by
perceptual signals” is inspecific. It could simply say “the
storage and retrieval of perceptual signals”. In the model, what is
stored in a particular memory location is presumably an analog of the
value(s) of a perceptual signal. But “Memory” seems hardly
appropriate to refer to what is done with Memory. For storage in Memory
why not say “storage in Memory”, and for retrieval from Memory
why not say “retrieval from Memory”? “Memory” alone
shouldn’t be used also to refer to what Memory does or what is done with
Memory.
Note that I am using quotation marks for quotation. For ‘scare quotes’ I
use single quotes. (Single quotes are also for quotation within
quotations, of course, but we don’t have too many instances of that.)
Your ‘normative usage’ convention is an example of scare quotes, but
scare quotes can be used for more than that.
Imagining; Replay of stored
perceptual signals as present-time perceptual signals, in combinations
that did not ever occur before.
OK. An -ing word generally refers to a process. But it’s OK (and can be
very helpful) to use words that are defined elsewhere, so long as you
avoid circularity. An effect of this is that some terms are more basic
than others. Try this:
Imagining: the process of constructing a novel perception from signals
retrieved from Memory.
I don’t know of any referent for this definition (either form) in control
diagrams or simulations. The B:CP hypothesis of the Imagination Switch
mandates another definition as well, so that the two together might be as
follows:
Imagining: 1. Substituting the Reference Signal for the Perceptual Input
Signal by way of the Imagination Connection. 2. The process of
constructing a novel perception from signals retrieved from Memory.
Remembering; Replay of
stored perceptual signals as present-time perceptual signals, in
combinations that actually occurred at some time in the
past.
OK. I agree with your caveat at the end too, see below.
Now the two added terms.
Imagination; The results of
imagining
“Results” is ambiguous and vague. Do you mean “perceptions
resulting from Imagining”? There may also be consequences for
observable behavior (or lack thereof) and for learning (changes in gain,
changes in signal weights in input and output functions, changes in
connections, etc.) “Imagination” ordinarily refers to a faculty
or capacity, as in “has a vivid imagination”, “doesn’t
have much imagination”, etc. There has to be strong motivation to
justify setting up a technical term at variance from common usage and I
don’t see the justification here.
Remember; The results of
remembering.
I think you meant to type “rememberance”. That’s the term
that you use below. “Remember” is a verb, and in order to refer
to results you need a noun. “Rememberance” is an odd term,
similar to “souvenir” or “memento”. I have the same
qualms about “results” here as I voiced above under
Imagination. In both cases the distinction seems neither clear nor
necessary, as it must be to justify establishing technical vocabulary. I
see no referent for either in the model or in any simulations.
Can we agree on the use of
these words and definitions with respect to the HPCT model?If so, an interesting first question might be; How do
we know how much imagination is in any one rememberance, or how much
rememberance is in any one imagination?
Distinguishing between a memory and an imagined perception is not always
easy or obvious – for example, imagined perceptions may be stored in
memory and later recalled, etc. Memory is assumed to be veridical, and
imagination is commonly assumed not to be (pace the truths of the arts).
The usual way of distinguishing memory from imagination is
intersubjective agreement about “reality”.
To illustrate the comment above under the entry for Imagination: note
that here where I say “distinguishing between a memory and an
imagined perception”
I could instead say “distinguishing between memory and
imagination” but I could not say “distinguishing between a
memory and an imagination”. The first refers to a remembered
perception and an imagined perception; in the second, “a
memory” refers either to a remembered perception or to a mechanism
or faculty of memory, but “an imagination” can only refer to a
faculty of imagination.]
/Bruce
Nevin
···
At 02:14 PM 5/13/2003, Marc Abrams wrote: