[From Bruce Abbott (960909.1935 EST)]
Rick Marken (960909.1510) --
The problem, Dear Richard, is that those of Simon's ideas I had wished
to discuss here are in fact entirely consistent with those of WTP, even
though Simon may have arrived at them from a different direction. That
is the irony.
Well, it looks like WTP {Bill Powers (960909.1400 MDT)] may not see it that
way; irony upon irony;-)
You must have a private line to BP -- I haven't seen that one yet and it's
after 7 pm here. No matter, neither you nor Bill have any idea what those
ideas are, so neither of you are in a position to judge.
I don't want to surpress either Simon OR you. But I will certainly respond
to both of you because I want to help people who are learning PCT understand
why statements like Simon's, which might seem superficially consistent
with PCT, are not.
It might help if you first determined whether statements like Simon's are
consistent with PCT, THEN if they are not, criticize away. My annoyance
with you is that you didn't actually conduct a fair evaluation, but went on
assumption instead. In fact, you're _still_ in that mode.
When you accuse me of refusing to read what Simon "really said" or of trying
to keep people from reading books like those by Simon, you remind me of my
mother
Well, I'll take that as a compliment.
well after I received my Ph.D. in _cognitive psychology_
Holy smoke, no _wonder_ you have such a messed-up impression of psychology. (;->
Personally, I want people to read Simon -- and all other conventional
psychologists. I want them to evaluate Simon's understanding of behavior in
the context of their own understanding of PCT (as Francisco did). If Francisco
had relied on your estimate of the value of Simon's insights instead of
evaluating them on his own, he might have concluded that Simon actually did
have something worthwhile to say to control theorists.
But Rick, for the fourth time (I think), what Francisco cited has nothing to
do with the views I wished to discuss. Francisco wasn't evaluating the same
ideas of Simon's and therefore his conclusions, however valid, are not
relevant here.
However, I'm glad to hear that you want people to read Simon and anyone else
they might wish to pay attention to. You really had me worried there -- I
was half certain that a new Inquisition was about to be instituted right
here on CSGNET -- we me as the first target, of course!
So let's take a look at some of these insidious, anti-PCT ideas of Simon's I
wanted to present. Here's another couple of exerpts from _The sciences of
the artificial_. Simon has just made his somewhat different distinction
between the natural and artificial, in which "artificial" refers to
something adapted to serve a purpose.
So, too, we must be careful about equating "biological" with "natural." A
forest may be a phenomenon of nature; a farm certainly is not. The very
species upon which man depends for his food--his corn and his cattle-- are
artifacts of his ingenuity. A plowed field is no more a part of nature
than an asphalted street--and no less.
These examples set the terms for our problem, for those things we call
artifacts are not apart from nature. They have no dispensation to ignore
or violate natural law. At the same time they are adapted to man's goals
and purposes. They are what they are in order to satisfy his desire to
fly or to eat well. As a man's aims change, so too do his artifacts--
and vice versa, as well. [p. 3]
And a bit later:
In some contexts, we make a distinction between "artificial" and "synthetic."
For example, a gem made of glass colored to resemble sapphire would be called
artificial, while a man-made gem that was chemically indistinguishable from
saphire would be called synthetic. A similar distinction is often made
between "artificial" and "synthetic" rubber. Thus some artificial things
are imitations of things in nature; and the imitation may use either the
same basic materials as those in the natural object or quite different
materials.
As soon as we introduce "synthesis" as well as "artifice" we enter the
realm of engineering. For "synthetic" is often used in the broader sense
of "designed" or "composed." We speak of engineering as concerned with
"synthesis," while science is concerned with "analysis." Synthetic or
artificial objects--and more specifically, prospective artificial objects
having desired properties--are the central objective of engineering
activity and skill. The engineer is concerned with how things _ought_ to
be, that is, in order to _attain goals_, and to _function_. Hence, a
science of the artificial will be closely akin to a science of engineering--
but very different, as we shall see in my third chapter, from what goes
currently by the name of "engineering science." [Pp 4-5]
And again:
The Environment as Mold
Let us look a little more closely at the functional or purposeful aspects
of artificial things. Fulfillment of purpose or adaptation to a goal
involves a relation among three terms: the purpose or goal, the character
of the artifact, and the environment in which the artifact performs. When
we think of a clock, for example, in terms of purpose, we may use the child's
definition: "a clock is to tell time." When we focus our attention on the
clock itself, we may describe it in terms of arrangements of gears, and of
the application of the forces of springs or gravity operating on a weight or
pendulum.
But we may also consider clocks in relation to the environment in which
they are to be used. Sundials perform as clocks _in sunny climates_--
they are more useful in Phoenix than in Boston, and of no use at all during
the Arctic winter. Devising a clock that would tell time, on a rolling and
pitching ship, with sufficient accuracy to determine longitude was one of
the great adventures of eighteenth-century science and technology. To
perform in this difficult environment, the clock had to be endowed with
many delicate properties, some of them largely or totally irrelevant to the
performance of a landlubber's clock.
Natural science impinges on an artifact through two of the three terms of
the relation that characterizes it: the structure of the artifact itself
and the environment in which it performs. Whether a clock will in fact
tell time depends on its internal construction and where it is placed.
Whether a knife will cut depends on the material of its blade and the
hardness of the substance to which it is applied.
The Artifact as "Interface"
We can view the matter quite symmetrically. An artifact can be thought of
as a meeting point--an "interface" in today's terms--between an "inner"
environment, the substance and organization of the artifact itself, and
an "outer" environment, the surroundings in which it operates. If the
inner environment is appropriate to the outer environment, or vice versa,
the artifact will serve its intended purpose. Thus, if a clock is immune
to buffeting, it will serve as a ship's chronometer. (And conversely, if
it isn't, we may salvage it by mounting it on the mantel at home.)
Notice that this way of viewing artifacts applies equally well to many
things that are not man-made--to all things, in fact, that can be regarded
as "adapted" to some situation; and in particular, it applies to living
systems that have evolved through the forces of organic evolution. [Pp. 6-7]
I'll stop here to await your comments (Rick's or anyone elses').
Regards,
Bruce