imagination connection (<bleach>)

(Bruce Nevin 950706 11:04 EST) --

Bill Leach (950627.00:45 EST) Replying to Bruce Nevin (950626 19:52 EST):

Bill, are you claiming here that it is not possible to be conscious of
the lowest levels of perception?

Yes... and no. It is probably not possible to be conscious of the lowest
level perceptions without some inference. It is extremely hard (at least
for me anyway) to concentrate upon a sensation to the exclusion of any
"knowledge" about the sensation (such as where the source of the
sensation is located).
[...] the "wiring" appears to preclude the possibility of an
individual sensor signal reaching the brain without some combining taking
place first ....

This presumes attending to one perception to the exclusion of all others. I
don't think that being conscious of a given level of perception entails
this requirement of being conscious of just one signal on that level to the
exclusion of all other perceptions on any level. Anyway, it's not what I
had in mind.

even if an individual signal could proceed directly to the
brain to some point where conscious attention could be provided to just
that signal, there is still the problem of structure. That scalar
intensity signal would be located within a structure of such signals and
by inference through experience the location within the structure is
related to the physical location on the body for the initiating sensor.

In my experience, consciousness in some way "goes to" the perception,
rather than the perception being carried to "some point where conscious
attention could be provided to ... that signal" (homunculus?).

Indeed, in his accounts of how he came to propose the levels of perception,
Bill Powers has described being aware of perceptions of a number of types,
including I believe intensity.

An important form of Buddhist meditation practice, vipassana (that's the
Pali word, vipasyana in Sanskrit), involves persistent, systematic
attention to low level perceptions, learning to focus on them and not be
distracted by higher-level perceptions. One attends to one small area of
the body at a time, to the exclusion of other areas. In this practice, it
is quite a revelation just what and how much can be an object of attention
among the low-level perceptions in a small part of the body.

I have a suggestion regarding memory and imagination. You reported being
unable to remember and imagine certain kinds of sensory detail. The
suggestion is to practice attending to that sensory detail in some ongoing
experience of the physical environment, and then recalling that detail of
the experience. After some practice with this, the suggestion is to
practice imagining variations on remembered experience, in full sensory
detail. The reason I suggest this is that in my experience this is a
learnable (or enhanceable) skill, and I would like to know if your
experience confirms this. Certainly, the ability to recall and imagine
visually is an enhanceable skill; I used not to be able to do this at all.

A number of practices termed "creative visualization" and the like depend
upon imagining preferred outcomes in as much sensory detail as possible.
The claim usually is that this in some way magically creates the desired
outcome. We can see how this practice would provide very specific reference
values for a great many perceptions. When such perceptions arise from the
environment, preparation of this sort might enhance our ability to control
those perceptions, tending toward the preferred outcomes that were
visualized. Much of such control is likely to be unconscious, hence the
notion that it happens somehow magically. Isn't Maxwell Maltz's book
_Psycho-cybernetics_ something like this? (I have had a copy for years, but
have not got round to reading it. I recall Rick saying he liked it.)

        Bruce

<[Bill Leach 950707.18:16 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

(Bruce Nevin 950706 11:04 EST) --

What I am trying to say is that I do not believe that individual sensor
inputs are available "up in the hierarchy". Thus when we a "attending"
to a particular "low level" input we are doing so by using high level
functions and possibly trying to "strip" inferential information that
already exists in the signal with which we have "conscious awareness".

I suppose that my conception of "awareness" is that we probably do not
actually "switch levels". Any perceptual signal that we are consciously
aware of probably always is "viewed" from the same level and that the
"appearance" of shifting levels then is possibly caused by changes in the
amount of signal processing performed by lower levels (based upon the
reference signals proceeding down the chain).

Right, wrong or indifferent... I don't envision many "path way" changes
for neural signals short of reorganization activity. Except for the
operation of imagination I suspect that any given signal if it could be
traced would "run through" the same "hardware" no matter how you were
consciously trying to perceive the signal.

In my experience, consciousness in some way "goes to" the perception,
rather than the perception being carried to "some point where conscious
attention could be provided to ... that signal" (homunculus?).

Thus, it should be obvious that I don't agree with this from a physical
viewpoint. Functionally the same sort of "thing" would be accomplished
if the various levels more or less "pass" the signal without
modification. I hold this position with no more support or justification
than a general belief that there is no more "wiring" than the minimum
necessary to accomplish what is needed.

That is, there really is no need for the ability to "switch" levels with
the attendent extra neural switches, transmitters, pathways, summing
networks and the like. The "down side" is that one is then not really
examining the low level signal but rather the perception of the
perception of the perception of ... the perception of the low level
signal.

I don't believe that my view is inconsistant with either experience or
with Bill P.'s statements on the matter but of course he is free to speak
for himself.

imagination exercises

Yes, I think that you are right concerning the potential ability to learn
to imagine vividly. I don't know when I might be able to make a
consistent effort at what you suggest especially since I have considered
such an attempt several years ago and still have not done anything. Does
that mean that my reference is not very high? :slight_smile:

-bill

[Martin Taylor 950710 13:30]

Bill Leach 950707.18:16 to Bruce Nevin

Yes, I think that you are right concerning the potential ability to learn
to imagine vividly.

There an article in last week's (I think) Science about the effect of
imagination, suggesting strongly that an imagined visual experience has
much in common with the same vision based on environmental data. I don't
have it in front of me at the moment, but here's the gist. The authors
(whose names I forget) asked subjects to do a detection task of a particular
kind in which the detection of the target could be enhanced by presenting
related images beside where the target would be if it was presented at all.
The degree of enhancement depends on the distance between the target and
the side images, and can be negative at some distances (I think short).

They used three conditions: (1) with the side images, (2) without the side
images, and (3) without the side images, but with the subjects asked to
imagine (visualize) the side images. In condition 3, detection was
enhanced by about half the amount it would have been for the same
separation of target and real side images. In other words, the imagined
side images acted like real ones, at quite a low visual level. There
was no physical difference in the presentations in conditions 2 and 3.

If they are right, it looks as if the imagination connection may work
just as it has been supposed to do--providing perceptual signals
indistinguishable in kind from those derived from environmental data.

There's nothing I recall reading in the article about whether subjects
were selected for their ability to visualize vividly, but they may have
been. It would be interesting for Bill Leach, who claims he normally doesn't
visualize, to be a subject in that experiment.

Martin