Imagination control, contrasts

CSGnet Archive CSG1993
1

[From Rick Marken (931007.1600)]

Martin Taylor (941007 14:50) --

Sure, but just where IS the closure of the feedback loop before the
word is spoken. Remember, it is spoken once and then is gone.

It occurs WHILE the word is spoken. Remember the Kelso, et al and
Abbs et al studies of compensation for disturbance to lip movement
WHILE a word is being uttered? This is what I'm thinking of; as the
person says "flunky" they are controlling (continuously, over time)
the progress of all the lower order perceptions that make up this
event (so nicely defined now by W. T. Powers).

The next occasion for the "same" word is in a different context.

And the word event is controlled (as it unfolds) within that new
context.

I'm saying that the closure is in imagination.

Why? The fact is that we continuously hear what we are continuously
articulating; the loop is closed IF what we articulate also depends
on what we hear (and there is tons of evidence that it does -- eg.
the delayed speech studies).

If there is error in the
imagined percept of the category of the spoken word, the appropriate
changes in output are done in the normal way.

Your introduction of this unnecessary imagination loop has created
on output generation (open loop) model. This is fine, but it will not
produce consistent results in variable contexts -- the very thing
you said my model (PCT) could not do (and which, in fact, it can).

The eventual output to
the real world cannot be controlled on the basis of error in the
perception of the effect of the word on the listener,

Output controlled?! So basically you don't believe that we can develop
a PCT model of conversational speech. Mazel tov. But I'd bet on
perceptual control (rather than imagination based output control)
any day. I think we could solve this problem if you built your
imagination-based output control model and show me how it produces
consistent results in varying contexts. Simple versions of the PCT
model already exist, of course, including some that control temporally
defined variables (like velocity).

Bruce Nevin (Thu 93107 14:35:14 EDT)--

The post that you dismissed was not about the test. As the
subject header and the opening paragraph stated, it was an analogy
between our conversation and the coin game. It was an
attempt to go up a level and look at our conversational process and the
current state of our evolving discussion from a perspective outside it,
by drawing an analogy to the communicative process used in the coin game.

Now if you're willing to go back and read what I said with this new
understanding, fine.

Maybe I'll try to go back over the posts but it seems unnecessary. The
communicative process in the coin game is precisely the same as that
in the pair test. In both cases, an exemplar is given, a distortion is
given and the subject says OK or NOT OK (or something like that).

Otherwise, I give up.

I'm pretty close myself. I just thought 1) the pair test was a good
example of "the test" and 2) it can be used to test your idea about
"contrasts". But things seem to get what seems to me to be too
complex too quickly

I said>

Is my description of controlling for contrast
correct? That is, does a person control for contrast by controlling
for a perception of a word as being categorically different than
all other words with which it might be mistaken?

You say:

I don't have a clear and simple answer to this.

Well, that makes it easy. No way to test it. This puts "contrasts"
in the same enviable position as "ESP" -- pretty easy to show it
exists; impossible to show that it doesn't.

Thanks

Rick

2

[Martin Taylor 931013 16:00]
(Rick Marken 931007.1600)

Sure, but just where IS the closure of the feedback loop before the
word is spoken. Remember, it is spoken once and then is gone.

It occurs WHILE the word is spoken. Remember the Kelso, et al and
Abbs et al studies of compensation for disturbance to lip movement
WHILE a word is being uttered? This is what I'm thinking of; as the
person says "flunky" they are controlling (continuously, over time)
the progress of all the lower order perceptions that make up this
event (so nicely defined now by W. T. Powers).

No problem here, except that I don't see how the on-line (real-world)
perceptual control that always happens at these levels can be used to
account for the different outputs of the "same" word when there are
different situational contexts. I used an example in which the word
"donkey" had been used before "flunky" in the conversation. This
tended to induce the talker to produce a "u" in "flunky" that was
more different than normal from the similar sound in "donkey." But if
I am right in my approach to interpersonal interaction, it wouldn't matter
if the word "donkey" had been used, if the talker perceived the listener
to have the concept of donkey central in attention. (Please don't criticize
the non-PCT terminology here. I use it because I think an everyday view
is what the talker would normally take). It is the talker's perception of
the likelihood that the listener would misperceive "flunky" as "donkey"
that matters, and that, I think, depends on the talker imagining his/her
own perception of the as yet unspoken word.

I'm saying that the closure is in imagination.

Why? The fact is that we continuously hear what we are continuously
articulating; the loop is closed IF what we articulate also depends
on what we hear (and there is tons of evidence that it does -- eg.
the delayed speech studies).

The closure of the perceptual control loop at levels near the actual
articulation is not in imagination. But there is a timing problem with
the dynamics of control at higher levels, if that control is through
the real world. The perception to be controlled is ultimately that
the listener acts in some manner or other. That is akin to a ballistic
control problem. In ballistic control, one shoots a bullet, and corrects
the aim for the NEXT shot according to the resulting error. But one is
much less likely to use a next shot if one has an accurate telescopic
sight. Likewise in using language, one can be misunderstood, as one can
determine from an unwanted perception of the listener's actions. It is
much better if one does not have to correct one's first linguistic aiming
point. That aiming point is constructed in imagination. The shooter of
the bullet controls the arm muscles on-line, but corrects the aiming error
off-line, between shots. So with the shooter of words.

If there is error in the
imagined percept of the category of the spoken word, the appropriate
changes in output are done in the normal way.

Your introduction of this unnecessary imagination loop has created
on output generation (open loop) model. This is fine, but it will not
produce consistent results in variable contexts -- the very thing
you said my model (PCT) could not do (and which, in fact, it can).

I didn't say it wouldn't. I asked you to show how it would, without
the arm-waving appeal to "All actions take place in an environment so
disturbed that only on-line control can account for accurate action."
In fact, lots of actions can, most of the time, produce "fire-and-forget"
accurate results that support the control of higher-level perceptions.
These are useful when the world is likely to provide substantially delayed
feedback.

The eventual output to
the real world cannot be controlled on the basis of error in the
perception of the effect of the word on the listener,

Output controlled?! So basically you don't believe that we can develop
a PCT model of conversational speech.

Slips of the tongue (or of the keyboard) can be revealing. I don't know
why I said that, but I suppose there's some residue of old-style thinking
lurking in my head. Of course I believe we can develop a PCT model of
conversational speech. I claim my Layered Protocol theory is such a model,
though in its earlier forms it isn't entirely one. I think it is, now.
It is based totally on the control by the talker of different levels of
perceptions of the listener. What wasn't there, and is needed for completeness,
is the kind of on-line perceptual control of articulation that you are
going on about.

Time is very important in considering dynamical systems like control systems,
especially when we are dealing with coupled control systems, as we are
when we deal with language-in-use (as opposed to language-as-artifact,
which is what Harrisian analysis deals with). The only effective
language-as-artifact is one that permits language-in-use to provide the
desired perceptual control at speeds that keep the talker alive. For
that, it is important that there not be too many misunderstandings in the
FIRST attempt to say something.

"Look out--there's a tiger."

"Sorry, was that 'Look' or 'Listen'"

"Jump"

"No, I don't think that was what you said."

"Goodbye, dear friend."

Goodbye, dear friend Rick. For now.

Martin