Imitation [was Re: Cultural patterns]

CSGnet Archive CSG2003
1

[From 2003.04.01 22:44 EST)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0331.1734)

Bruce Nevin (2003.03.31 13:18 EST)

But that is not the whole story. We also set references by observing
others (hence my interest in a PCT account of imitation, repetition,
etc.)

I am not sure that at PCT account of imitation differs at all from a PCT
account of any other action. Higher level systems set the references of lower
level systems based on observation or memory.

The question is: How does observation of another's behavioral outputs result in setting one's own references such that one's own behavioral outputs are like them?

(a) On the face of it, this would seem to require that we set references for controlling our behavioral outputs. But a basic finding of PCT is that behavioral outputs are not controlled, they are means for controlling perceptual inputs. One possibility, directly contradicting this, is that we do control our perceptions of our behavioral outputs concurrently as we use them to control (with higher gain) other perceptual inputs.

(b) Another possibility is that <somehow> as we observe another's behavioral outputs we imagine what they are controlling by means of their observed behavioral outputs. This seems most reasonable for affect-laden gestures. An account might go something like this: You see a person smirk (smile, frown, shrug, slump). You imagine something in your experience that you control by means of smirking (etc.). You control that imagined perception by smirking. This goes beyond an account of imitation. Perhaps your smirking is also in imagination, and you attribute the imagined CV to the other person, imagining that this is what they are controlling. Certainly we do attribute affect to others and we are able to express like affect by similar gestures.

However, if control of affective gesture including facial expression is done with genetically inherited control systems (as seems likely, given its striking universality) then this account is not needed for the domain of expressive gesture. What about imitation of arbitrary configurations, transitions, or relations (clock hands at 4:00, moving to 4:15, that fish was this big), where is no particular evidence (that I know of) for innate systems?

[From Rick Marken (2003.03.31.1510)]

> Bruce Nevin (2003.03.31 13:18 EST)--
>
> Suppose perception of the pattern in the behavior of others (perhaps in
> terms of themes or features) sets references for the way many things are
> done (music, warfare, etc.), and out of the doing of those many things
> emerges an epiphenomenon which, being perceived, sets the references for
> controlling the pattern. I'll return to this loop at the end.

Sorry, sir, but as the PCT policeman it is my duty to cite you for a
minor PCT violation. Perceptions don't set references in PCT. If they
did, external events would exert far more control over behavior than
they actually do.

If systems set references based on memory but not on observation, it is considerably more difficult to understand how to model imitation.

How would you model two autonomous control systems such that one can imitate the other? It seems to me that this can only be done by the imitator perceiving the behavioral outputs of the other and setting internal references accordingly - either (a) references for perceptions of one's own outputs, or (b) references for control of other variables by means of outputs that mimic those of the other. What do you propose?

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 05:34 PM 3/31/2003, Bruce Gregory wrote:
At 03:11 PM 3/31/2003, Richard Marken wrote:

2

[From Fred Nickols (2003.04.02.0912 ET)] --

This was from Bruce Nevin according to my email system.

[From 2003.04.01 22:44 EST)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0331.1734)

Bruce Nevin (2003.03.31 13:18 EST)

But that is not the whole story. We also set references by observing
others (hence my interest in a PCT account of imitation, repetition,
etc.)

I am not sure that at PCT account of imitation differs at all from a PCT
account of any other action. Higher level systems set the references of lower
level systems based on observation or memory.

The question is: How does observation of another's behavioral outputs
result in setting one's own references such that one's own behavioral
outputs are like them?

I think this is a really important question.

(a) On the face of it, this would seem to require that we set references
for controlling our behavioral outputs. But a basic finding of PCT is that
behavioral outputs are not controlled, they are means for controlling
perceptual inputs. One possibility, directly contradicting this, is that we
do control our perceptions of our behavioral outputs concurrently as we use
them to control (with higher gain) other perceptual inputs.

If we can perceive our behavioral outputs, which we can, why couldn't we
act to control these? Wouldn't they be just another set of CVs? I also
don't see any conflict between the basics of PCT and the notion of
controlling behavioral outputs. Isn't it possible that for some actions,
the CV is not the behavioral output but for others the behavioral output is
the CV?

In taking a sip of coffee from my coffee cup, I grasp and move the cup to
my lip, however, the perception I am controlling, the CV, is the changing
relationship of the cup to my lip. I am not paying any special attention
to controlling the behavioral output required to make this happen. In
contrast, if I aim to put a smirk on my face, the perceptions I control are
those associated with sensations in muscles and skin of my face in relation
to reference signals created (at least on some occasions) by practicing in
front of a mirror or by simply making observations while in front of a
mirror at various times. I can, with the aid of a mirror, observe my
facial expressions and how they compare with those I see on the faces of
others.

Do I have this right?

Fred Nickols
nickols@safe-t.net
www.nickols.us

···

At 05:34 PM 3/31/2003, Bruce Gregory wrote:

3

[From bruce Gregory 92003.0402.1001)]

Fred Nickols (2003.04.02.0912 ET)

In contrast, if I aim to put a smirk on my face, the perceptions I control are
those associated with sensations in muscles and skin of my face in relation
to reference signals created (at least on some occasions) by practicing in
front of a mirror or by simply making observations while in front of a
mirror at various times. I can, with the aid of a mirror, observe my
facial expressions and how they compare with those I see on the faces of
others.

Do you think this is the way Bush learned to smirk?

4

[From Bruce Nevin 2003.04.02 10:30 EST)]

[From Fred Nickols (2003.04.02.0912 ET)]

This was from Bruce Nevin according to my email system.

[From 2003.04.01 22:44
EST)]

Yes, that tag should have said

[From Bruce Nevin 2003.04.01 22:44 EST)]

– Sorry!

In taking a sip of coffee from my coffee cup,
I grasp and move the cup to

my lip, however, the perception I am controlling, the CV, is the
changing

relationship of the cup to my lip. I am not paying any special
attention

to controlling the behavioral output required to make this happen.

You could also simultaneously imitate the way another person in the
coffee shop is doing it - gingerly, blowing on it, sniffing the aroma; or
pinky lifted, hesitating on the way toward your mouth as you listen; or
grasping the body of the mug instead of the handle and gulping it down,
and so on. This is a more common situation for imitating, where you
imitate the manner of controlling some variable(s), so that there
is a second set of CVs, namely, your behavioral outputs by which you
control the first set of CVs.

In

contrast, if I aim to put a smirk on my face, the perceptions I control
are

those associated with sensations in muscles and skin of my face in
relation

to reference signals created (at least on some occasions) by practicing
in

front of a mirror or by simply making observations while in front of
a

mirror at various times. I can, with the aid of a mirror, observe
my

facial expressions and how they compare with those I see on the faces
of

others.

I know no one who has learned to produce their facial expressions by
practicing in a mirror. I have heard of people doing this, but when they
did they already were producing communicative facial expressions without
ever having paid attention to them in a mirror. But there are almost
certainly innate systems in place for facial expressions.

    /Bruce

Nevin

···

At 09:28 AM 4/2/2003, Fred Nickols wrote:

5

[From Fred Nickols (2003.04.02.1141 ET)] --

bruce Gregory 92003.0402.1001)]

Fred Nickols (2003.04.02.0912 ET)

In contrast, if I aim to put a smirk on my face, the perceptions I
control are
those associated with sensations in muscles and skin of my face in relation
to reference signals created (at least on some occasions) by practicing in
front of a mirror or by simply making observations while in front of a
mirror at various times. I can, with the aid of a mirror, observe my
facial expressions and how they compare with those I see on the faces of
others.

Do you think this is the way Bush learned to smirk?

Nope. When Bush "smirks" (smugly, I might add), I don't think he thinks
he's "smirking." I think he thinks (if he thinks about it at all) that
he's "smiling" (which, of course, he is, because a smirk is but one form of
a smile, a member of a set as it were).

Fred Nickols
nickols@safe-t.net
www.nickols.us

6

[From Fred Nickols (2004.04.02.1144 ET) --

Bruce Nevin 2003.04.02 10:30 EST)]

I know no one who has learned to produce their facial expressions by
practicing in a mirror. I have heard of people doing this, but when they
did they already were producing communicative facial expressions without
ever having paid attention to them in a mirror. But there are almost
certainly innate systems in place for facial expressions.

I was tempted to say that "Now you do" then thought better of it. What
made me draw back was your use of the word "produce." As I think about it,
I doubt I did learn to "produce" most of my facial expressions by
practicing them in front of a mirror. However, I am convinced that I
learned what they looked like to others by practicing them in front of a
mirror. Perhaps, then, it would be more accurate to say that I (even
though I am perhaps the only one out of several billion people who ever did
so) "fine-tuned" some of my facial expressions (which would involve
associating appearances with sensations and storing those sensations as
reference signals for later use in the event those appearances were to be
presented).

Would you like to see my very best "glare"?

Fred Nickols
nickols@safe-t.net
www.nickols.us