just passing it along

CSGnet Archive CSG2016
1

I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

2

I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra about the impossibility of free will has been going on for decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

···

On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, “bara0361@gmail.com” bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

[What Neuroscience Says about Free Will - Scientific American Blog Network](https://urldefense.p
roofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__blogs.scientificamerican.com_mind-2Dguest-2Dblog_what-2Dneuroscience-2Dsays-2Dabout-2Dfree-2Dwill_&d=CwMFaQ&c=8hUWFZcy2Z-Za5rBPlktOQ&r=-dJBNItYEMOLt6aj_KjGi2LMO_Q8QB-ZzxIZIF8DGyQ&m=lg07-RJwlWMxNqORkzIXp38b6X8TDSGMcdh-k3NmOR0&s=KNDptYZyROjTfAur3_qk81OyOWrJYpQ6cbPs0mt8pcI&e=)

Thanks,

*bara

3

[Martin Taylor 2016.05.02.09.48]

If you believe in Bill's hierachic perceptual control theory, you

cannot believe that “free will” exists, can you? To me, HPCT seems
to rule out that possibility completely, because the top-level
control units have fixed reference values, which means that their
outputs are completely determined by a stimulus-response linkage
that extends from the external environment back into the
environment.
PCT doesn’t have to be HPCT, however, so the question becomes more
complicated to address. You have to ask what you mean by “free will”
beyond its meaning as an impression each of us (I presume)
consciously has. Looked at from a physicist’s viewpoint, classical
physics as understood by Laplace led him to say that if we knew
exactly the state of the Universe at any moment, we would know it
for all time, and if classical physics held, he would be correct.
The problems arise from two points: chaos and quantum uncertainties,
both of which have to do with “knowing exactly”. In chaos theory, if
we knew exactly, Laplace would still have been right, because
chaotic systems diverge from infinitesimally different starting
points, not from one starting point.
The quantum issue is different. I believe our current understanding
of physics is inadequate to say whether Laplace’s position is
inherently wrong, and uncertainty is actually inherent in Nature, or
whether we don’t know how to look at Nature in a way that allows us
to tell. We do have two theories that explain experimental data in
exquisite detail, QED and Relativity, but so far we don’t know how
to reconcile them. However, even if a string-based multiverse turns
out to be an acceptable answer, such a solution doesn’t seem to bear
on whether our individual perceptions of having free will
corresponds to anything in the unknowable “real world”. Our theories
are always no more than structured perceptions that we control with
some level of precision.
Insofar as our individual structure currently exists, if we believe
in PCT at all, we currently have certain control units connected in
certain ways, whether we think of those units as large elements
working with “neural currents” or neuron-sized elements working with
waves of chemical concentration and electrical spikes. Those units
behave in certain ways, whether we now know those ways or not. If we
truly have “free will”, it must come from some system that operates
independently of these physical systems. Whether systems undetectable by physics exist and influence us is an
unanswerable question. Nobody guessed 50 or 100 years ago that there
could be “dark matter” that seems not to interact with “normal
matter” except through gravity, and that there is much more “dark”
than “normal” matter. Nobody can know whether we contain functioning
structures built of dark matter, or whether the larger Universe
does, and interacts with our normal matter through as yet
undiscovered fundamental forces. I think that even if such effects
exist, and turned out to be understandable by future physicists,
they would still leave “free will” dependent on some external system
that would remain even then unknown.
Returning to the here and now, my approach is to recognize that we
perceive “free will” much as we perceive any other abstraction such
as “generosity” or “beauty”. And like those, we are free(!) to see
if we can find anything in the “real world” to which it correspond
and on which we could act to change how much of it we have. What is
“really out there” we can never know. So we deal with what we
perceive and how that is influenced by what we do. In that sense,
how free our will is depends on the opportunities we have to
influence our other perceptions; a convict in a cell has much less
free will than does a billionaire with a private jet, several
yachts, and no particular job, because the convict has less choice
as to what he might do next, “as any fool can see.”
Anyway, as we used to say when I was little: “Them’s my thunks.”
Martin

···

On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren Mansell
wrote:

    I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra

about the impossibility of free will has been going on for
decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design
of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an
experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

    On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, "bara0361@gmail.com" <        >

wrote:

        I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and

sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One
of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might
think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

bara0361@gmail.com

4

Interesting posts, thank you! I think if I participated in this experiment, I would be left questioning my own memory, something I don’t need to do any more than I already do from time to time!

I am skeptical of basing too many conclusions on just one method, of course. I do feel (Warren) it would be interesting to see what other methods might reveal.

I wondered about the issue of lag time, whether that was significant or could be useful in any way to PCT. When there is a hiccup in the connection, is that important, does it have a larger effect on the hierarchy of behavior somewhere down the line. Or do we simply recognize the human body is not perfect, and chalk it up to the fact that we all sometimes have a “brain lapse?”

I once read about deja vu being explained in this way, as a sort of hiccup which caused us to feel as if we’d been there long before, when in fact we were just “remembering” something that had, in reality, only just happened.

Martin, your last paragraph wrapped things up neatly, at least for me. In my mind, the matter of free will vs. determinism is somewhere between a matter of opinion and one of life’s mysteries yet to be known (tho’ not really relevant to physical behavior). It seems to me that to use the argument against free will (for determinism) as a way to excuse someone from moral responsibility is, well, irresponsible.

Also, I put in a call to Northwestern, to see if they have a way to search Dad’s archives for any references to Dan Wegner and Thalia Wheatley, mentioned in this study. If they can search this way, I will also request any references to David Hawkins, from a different post here.

*bara

···

On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:29 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.05.02.09.48]

  On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren Mansell

wrote:

    I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra

about the impossibility of free will has been going on for
decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design
of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an
experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

If you believe in Bill's hierachic perceptual control theory, you

cannot believe that “free will” exists, can you? To me, HPCT seems
to rule out that possibility completely, because the top-level
control units have fixed reference values, which means that their
outputs are completely determined by a stimulus-response linkage
that extends from the external environment back into the
environment.

PCT doesn't have to be HPCT, however, so the question becomes more

complicated to address. You have to ask what you mean by “free will”
beyond its meaning as an impression each of us (I presume)
consciously has. Looked at from a physicist’s viewpoint, classical
physics as understood by Laplace led him to say that if we knew
exactly the state of the Universe at any moment, we would know it
for all time, and if classical physics held, he would be correct.
The problems arise from two points: chaos and quantum uncertainties,
both of which have to do with “knowing exactly”. In chaos theory, if
we knew exactly, Laplace would still have been right, because
chaotic systems diverge from infinitesimally different starting
points, not from one starting point.

The quantum issue is different. I believe our current understanding

of physics is inadequate to say whether Laplace’s position is
inherently wrong, and uncertainty is actually inherent in Nature, or
whether we don’t know how to look at Nature in a way that allows us
to tell. We do have two theories that explain experimental data in
exquisite detail, QED and Relativity, but so far we don’t know how
to reconcile them. However, even if a string-based multiverse turns
out to be an acceptable answer, such a solution doesn’t seem to bear
on whether our individual perceptions of having free will
corresponds to anything in the unknowable “real world”. Our theories
are always no more than structured perceptions that we control with
some level of precision.

Insofar as our individual structure currently exists, if we believe

in PCT at all, we currently have certain control units connected in
certain ways, whether we think of those units as large elements
working with “neural currents” or neuron-sized elements working with
waves of chemical concentration and electrical spikes. Those units
behave in certain ways, whether we now know those ways or not. If we
truly have “free will”, it must come from some system that operates
independently of these physical systems.

Whether systems undetectable by physics exist and influence us is an

unanswerable question. Nobody guessed 50 or 100 years ago that there
could be “dark matter” that seems not to interact with “normal
matter” except through gravity, and that there is much more “dark”
than “normal” matter. Nobody can know whether we contain functioning
structures built of dark matter, or whether the larger Universe
does, and interacts with our normal matter through as yet
undiscovered fundamental forces. I think that even if such effects
exist, and turned out to be understandable by future physicists,
they would still leave “free will” dependent on some external system
that would remain even then unknown.

Returning to the here and now, my approach is to recognize that we

perceive “free will” much as we perceive any other abstraction such
as “generosity” or “beauty”. And like those, we are free(!) to see
if we can find anything in the “real world” to which it correspond
and on which we could act to change how much of it we have. What is
“really out there” we can never know. So we deal with what we
perceive and how that is influenced by what we do. In that sense,
how free our will is depends on the opportunities we have to
influence our other perceptions; a convict in a cell has much less
free will than does a billionaire with a private jet, several
yachts, and no particular job, because the convict has less choice
as to what he might do next, “as any fool can see.”

Anyway, as we used to say when I was little: "Them's my thunks."



Martin

    On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, "bara0361@gmail.com" <bara0361@gmail.com        >

wrote:

        I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and

sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One
of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might
think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

5

I think you are overthinking it Martin. The standard assumption in psychology is not even to assume ‘will’, never mind ‘free will’. I consider the purposive nature of perceptual control through variable action to be the ‘will’ component sorted. The ‘free’ bit is less easy, but if free were to mean ‘unique’ or independent, then a PCT hierarchy would have it explained again because everyone’s hierarchy of purposes is unique. If free means ‘open-ended’ and not preprogrammed, then (trial

and error) reorganisation gives us the cherry on the top. What else is left to explain? I wouldn’t equate free will with consciousness, so what else is there to explain?..

Warren

···

On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren Mansell
wrote:

    I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra

about the impossibility of free will has been going on for
decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design
of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an
experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

    On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, "bara0361@gmail.com" <        >

wrote:

        I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and

sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One
of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might
think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

bara0361@gmail.com

6

[Martin Taylor 2015.05.02.15.26]

I have  no problem with your interpretation of "will", but I really

don’t understand your approach to “free”. To me, “free will” means
that I could, in principle, choose to do anything, without influence
you believe in Bill’s hierarchy, it makes very clear that the
outputs from the top level are determined by the current
environmental input, and the reorganization history determines how
that S-R process happens. There’s nothing “free” about it at all.
The possible questions arise only if you don’t believe in pure
HPCT. That’s where my comments were addressed.
I don’t believe I made any reference to consciousness in my previous
post, and apart from this one, I don’t do it now.
Martin

···

On 2016/05/2 3:13 PM, Warren Mansell
wrote:

    I think you are overthinking it Martin. The standard

assumption in psychology is not even to assume ‘will’, never
mind ‘free will’. I consider the purposive nature of perceptual
control through variable action to be the ‘will’ component
sorted. The ‘free’ bit is less easy, but if free were to mean
‘unique’ or independent, then a PCT hierarchy would have it
explained again because everyone’s hierarchy of purposes is
unique. If free means ‘open-ended’ and not preprogrammed, then
(trial

    and error) reorganisation gives us the cherry on the top.

What else is left to explain? I wouldn’t equate free will with
consciousness, so what else is there to explain?..

Warren

    On 2 May 2016, at 15:29, Martin Taylor <        >

wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.05.02.09.48]

      If you believe in Bill's hierachic perceptual control theory,

you cannot believe that “free will” exists, can you? To me,
HPCT seems to rule out that possibility completely, because
the top-level control units have fixed reference values, which
means that their outputs are completely determined by a
stimulus-response linkage that extends from the external
environment back into the environment.
PCT doesn’t have to be HPCT, however, so the question becomes
more complicated to address. You have to ask what you mean by
“free will” beyond its meaning as an impression each of us (I
presume) consciously has. Looked at from a physicist’s
viewpoint, classical physics as understood by Laplace led him
to say that if we knew exactly the state of the Universe at
any moment, we would know it for all time, and if classical
physics held, he would be correct. The problems arise from two
points: chaos and quantum uncertainties, both of which have to
do with “knowing exactly”. In chaos theory, if we knew
exactly, Laplace would still have been right, because chaotic
systems diverge from infinitesimally different starting
points, not from one starting point.
The quantum issue is different. I believe our current
understanding of physics is inadequate to say whether
Laplace’s position is inherently wrong, and uncertainty is
actually inherent in Nature, or whether we don’t know how to
look at Nature in a way that allows us to tell. We do have two
theories that explain experimental data in exquisite detail,
QED and Relativity, but so far we don’t know how to reconcile
them. However, even if a string-based multiverse turns out to
be an acceptable answer, such a solution doesn’t seem to bear
on whether our individual perceptions of having free will
corresponds to anything in the unknowable “real world”. Our
theories are always no more than structured perceptions that
we control with some level of precision.
Insofar as our individual structure currently exists, if we
believe in PCT at all, we currently have certain control units
connected in certain ways, whether we think of those units as
large elements working with “neural currents” or neuron-sized
elements working with waves of chemical concentration and
electrical spikes. Those units behave in certain ways, whether
we now know those ways or not. If we truly have “free will”,
it must come from some system that operates independently of
these physical systems. Whether systems undetectable by physics exist and influence us
is an unanswerable question. Nobody guessed 50 or 100 years
ago that there could be “dark matter” that seems not to
interact with “normal matter” except through gravity, and that
there is much more “dark” than “normal” matter. Nobody can
know whether we contain functioning structures built of dark
matter, or whether the larger Universe does, and interacts
with our normal matter through as yet undiscovered fundamental
forces. I think that even if such effects exist, and turned
out to be understandable by future physicists, they would
still leave “free will” dependent on some external system that
would remain even then unknown.
Returning to the here and now, my approach is to recognize
that we perceive “free will” much as we perceive any other
abstraction such as “generosity” or “beauty”. And like those,
we are free(!) to see if we can find anything in the “real
world” to which it correspond and on which we could act to
change how much of it we have. What is “really out there” we
can never know. So we deal with what we perceive and how that
is influenced by what we do. In that sense, how free our will
is depends on the opportunities we have to influence our other
perceptions; a convict in a cell has much less free will than
does a billionaire with a private jet, several yachts, and no
particular job, because the convict has less choice as to what
he might do next, “as any fool can see.”
Anyway, as we used to say when I was little: “Them’s my
thunks.”
Martin

mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net

        On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren

Mansell wrote:

          I lament when I read articles like this - the same

mantra about the impossibility of free will has been going
on for decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent
in the design of the experiment and in equating ‘will’
with conscious introspection. I guess if we thought
carefully there could be an experiment we could design to
show the primacy of free will…

          On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, "bara0361@gmail.com              "

<>
wrote:

              I do my best to spread the word about

PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other
articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered
what this group might think of it, whether it has
relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

bara0361@gmail.com

7

[From Fred Nickols (2016.05.02.1605 ET)]

I have a problem with part of what you say, Martin.

MT: To me, “free will” means that I could, in principle, choose to do anything, without influence from my history or from the rest of the Universe now.

It’s the “without influence” that bothers me. To me, ‘free will’ means simply that I am free to choose, to decide what to do in any situation. I am of course also free to ignore any “influences” but, for the most part, I will factor them into my choice or decision. On occasion, however, I will ignore, counter, off-set, negate, or run over those other factors. But that’s the exception rather than the rule.

So I see “free will” somewhat differently than you do.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net]
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2016 3:33 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

[Martin Taylor 2015.05.02.15.26]

On 2016/05/2 3:13 PM, Warren Mansell wrote:

I think you are overthinking it Martin. The standard assumption in psychology is not even to assume ‘will’, never mind ‘free will’. I consider the purposive nature of perceptual control through variable action to be the ‘will’ component sorted. The ‘free’ bit is less easy, but if free were to mean ‘unique’ or independent, then a PCT hierarchy would have it explained again because everyone’s hierarchy of purposes is unique. If free means ‘open-ended’ and not preprogrammed, then (trial

and error) reorganisation gives us the cherry on the top. What else is left to explain? I wouldn’t equate free will with consciousness, so what else is there to explain?..

Warren

I have no problem with your interpretation of “will”, but I really don’t understand your approach to “free”. To me, “free will” means that I could, in principle, choose to do anything, without influence from my history or from the rest of the Universe now. As I said, if you believe in Bill’s hierarchy, it makes very clear that the outputs from the top level are determined by the current environmental input, and the reorganization history determines how that S-R process happens. There’s nothing “free” about it at all. The possible questions arise only if you don’t believe in pure HPCT. That’s where my comments were addressed.

I don’t believe I made any reference to consciousness in my previous post, and apart from this one, I don’t do it now.

Martin

On 2 May 2016, at 15:29, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.05.02.09.48]

On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren Mansell wrote:

I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra about the impossibility of free will has been going on for decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

If you believe in Bill’s hierachic perceptual control theory, you cannot believe that “free will” exists, can you? To me, HPCT seems to rule out that possibility completely, because the top-level control units have fixed reference values, which means that their outputs are completely determined by a stimulus-response linkage that extends from the external environment back into the environment.

PCT doesn’t have to be HPCT, however, so the question becomes more complicated to address. You have to ask what you mean by “free will” beyond its meaning as an impression each of us (I presume) consciously has. Looked at from a physicist’s viewpoint, classical physics as understood by Laplace led him to say that if we knew exactly the state of the Universe at any moment, we would know it for all time, and if classical physics held, he would be correct. The problems arise from two points: chaos and quantum uncertainties, both of which have to do with “knowing exactly”. In chaos theory, if we knew exactly, Laplace would still have been right, because chaotic systems diverge from infinitesimally different starting points, not from one starting point.

The quantum issue is different. I believe our current understanding of physics is inadequate to say whether Laplace’s position is inherently wrong, and uncertainty is actually inherent in Nature, or whether we don’t know how to look at Nature in a way that allows us to tell. We do have two theories that explain experimental data in exquisite detail, QED and Relativity, but so far we don’t know how to reconcile them. However, even if a string-based multiverse turns out to be an acceptable answer, such a solution doesn’t seem to bear on whether our individual perceptions of having free will corresponds to anything in the unknowable “real world”. Our theories are always no more than structured perceptions that we control with some level of precision.

Insofar as our individual structure currently exists, if we believe in PCT at all, we currently have certain control units connected in certain ways, whether we think of those units as large elements working with “neural currents” or neuron-sized elements working with waves of chemical concentration and electrical spikes. Those units behave in certain ways, whether we now know those ways or not. If we truly have “free will”, it must come from some system that operates independently of these physical systems.

Whether systems undetectable by physics exist and influence us is an unanswerable question. Nobody guessed 50 or 100 years ago that there could be “dark matter” that seems not to interact with “normal matter” except through gravity, and that there is much more “dark” than “normal” matter. Nobody can know whether we contain functioning structures built of dark matter, or whether the larger Universe does, and interacts with our normal matter through as yet undiscovered fundamental forces. I think that even if such effects exist, and turned out to be understandable by future physicists, they would still leave “free will” dependent on some external system that would remain even then unknown.

Returning to the here and now, my approach is to recognize that we perceive “free will” much as we perceive any other abstraction such as “generosity” or “beauty”. And like those, we are free(!) to see if we can find anything in the “real world” to which it correspond and on which we could act to change how much of it we have. What is “really out there” we can never know. So we deal with what we perceive and how that is influenced by what we do. In that sense, how free our will is depends on the opportunities we have to influence our other perceptions; a convict in a cell has much less free will than does a billionaire with a private jet, several yachts, and no particular job, because the convict has less choice as to what he might do next, “as any fool can see.”

Anyway, as we used to say when I was little: “Them’s my thunks.”

Martin

On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, “bara0361@gmail.com” bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

8

[From
Fred Nickols (2016.05.02.1605 ET)]

        I

have a problem with part of what you say, Martin.

      MT:
      To me, "free will" means that I could, in principle,

choose to do anything, without influence from my history or
from the rest of the Universe now.

        It’s

the “without influence” that bothers me. To me, ‘free will’
means simply that I am free to choose, to decide what to do
in any situation. I am of course also free to ignore any
“influences” but, for the most part, I will factor them into
my choice or decision. On occasion, however, I will ignore,
counter, off-set, negate, or run over those other factors.
But that’s the exception rather than the rule.

        So

I see “free will” somewhat differently than you do.

        Fred

Nickols

···

From:
Martin Taylor [mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net]
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2016 3:33 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

        [Martin

Taylor 2015.05.02.15.26]

          On 2016/05/2 3:13 PM, Warren Mansell

wrote:

            I think you are overthinking it

Martin. The standard assumption in psychology is not
even to assume ‘will’, never mind ‘free will’. I
consider the purposive nature of perceptual control
through variable action to be the ‘will’ component
sorted. The ‘free’ bit is less easy, but if free were to
mean ‘unique’ or independent, then a PCT hierarchy would
have it explained again because everyone’s hierarchy of
purposes is unique. If free means ‘open-ended’ and not
preprogrammed, then (trial

            and error) reorganisation gives us

the cherry on the top. What else is left to explain? I
wouldn’t equate free will with consciousness, so what
else is there to explain?..

Warren

        I have  no problem with your

interpretation of “will”, but I really don’t understand your
approach to “free”. To me, “free will” means that I could,
in principle, choose to do anything, without influence from
my history or from the rest of the Universe now. As I said,
if you believe in Bill’s hierarchy, it makes very clear that
the outputs from the top level are determined by the current
environmental input, and the reorganization history
determines how that S-R process happens. There’s nothing
“free” about it at all. The possible questions arise only if
you don’t believe in pure HPCT. That’s where my comments
were addressed.

        I don't believe I made any reference to consciousness in my

previous post, and apart from this one, I don’t do it now.

        Martin

          On 2 May 2016, at 15:29, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net              >

wrote:

            [Martin

Taylor 2016.05.02.09.48]

              On 2016/05/2 2:07 AM, Warren

Mansell wrote:

                I lament when I read articles

like this - the same mantra about the impossibility
of free will has been going on for decades. It’s all
down to the assumptions inherent in the design of
the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there
could be an experiment we could design to show the
primacy of free will…

            If you believe in Bill's hierachic perceptual control

theory, you cannot believe that “free will” exists, can
you? To me, HPCT seems to rule out that possibility
completely, because the top-level control units have
fixed reference values, which means that their outputs
are completely determined by a stimulus-response linkage
that extends from the external environment back into the
environment.

            PCT doesn't have to be HPCT, however, so the question

becomes more complicated to address. You have to ask
what you mean by “free will” beyond its meaning as an
impression each of us (I presume) consciously has.
Looked at from a physicist’s viewpoint, classical
physics as understood by Laplace led him to say that if
we knew exactly the state of the Universe at any moment,
we would know it for all time, and if classical physics
held, he would be correct. The problems arise from two
points: chaos and quantum uncertainties, both of which
have to do with “knowing exactly”. In chaos theory, if
we knew exactly, Laplace would still have been right,
because chaotic systems diverge from infinitesimally
different starting points, not from one starting point.

            The quantum issue is different. I believe our current

understanding of physics is inadequate to say whether
Laplace’s position is inherently wrong, and uncertainty
is actually inherent in Nature, or whether we don’t know
how to look at Nature in a way that allows us to tell.
We do have two theories that explain experimental data
in exquisite detail, QED and Relativity, but so far we
don’t know how to reconcile them. However, even if a
string-based multiverse turns out to be an acceptable
answer, such a solution doesn’t seem to bear on whether
our individual perceptions of having free will
corresponds to anything in the unknowable “real world”.
Our theories are always no more than structured
perceptions that we control with some level of
precision.

            Insofar as our individual structure currently exists, if

we believe in PCT at all, we currently have certain
control units connected in certain ways, whether we
think of those units as large elements working with
“neural currents” or neuron-sized elements working with
waves of chemical concentration and electrical spikes.
Those units behave in certain ways, whether we now know
those ways or not. If we truly have “free will”, it must
come from some system that operates independently of
these physical systems.

            Whether systems undetectable by physics exist and

influence us is an unanswerable question. Nobody guessed
50 or 100 years ago that there could be “dark matter”
that seems not to interact with “normal matter” except
through gravity, and that there is much more “dark” than
“normal” matter. Nobody can know whether we contain
functioning structures built of dark matter, or whether
the larger Universe does, and interacts with our normal
matter through as yet undiscovered fundamental forces. I
think that even if such effects exist, and turned out to
be understandable by future physicists, they would still
leave “free will” dependent on some external system that
would remain even then unknown.

            Returning to the here and now, my approach is to

recognize that we perceive “free will” much as we
perceive any other abstraction such as “generosity” or
“beauty”. And like those, we are free(!) to see if we
can find anything in the “real world” to which it
correspond and on which we could act to change how much
of it we have. What is “really out there” we can never
know. So we deal with what we perceive and how that is
influenced by what we do. In that sense, how free our
will is depends on the opportunities we have to
influence our other perceptions; a convict in a cell has
much less free will than does a billionaire with a
private jet, several yachts, and no particular job,
because the convict has less choice as to what he might
do next, “as any fool can see.”

            Anyway, as we used to say when I was little: "Them's my

thunks."

            Martin

              On 2 May 2016, at 00:58, "bara0361@gmail.com                  "

<bara0361@gmail.com >
wrote:

                  I do my best to spread the word

about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends
about other articles. One of them shared this
one, and wondered what this group might think of
it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Thanks,

*bara

9

[From Rick Marken (2016.05.03.1420)]

···

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: Thanks for this Barb. I see there’s already been some discussion about this. I’ll just say that this little blog illustrates rather clearly the problem that I see with all discussions of consciousness: the conflation of consciousness with intentionality. I make this point in a very brief section of the “Illusion of No Control” chapter in “Doing Research on Purpose” (p. 130). I even refer to the Wegner & Wheatley paper that is referenced in the blog. I think there is no way to have a coherent discussion of consciousness (or free-will, for that matter) without a good model of intentionality – that is, without PCT. Otherwise things get very confused, as they are in this piece. But this piece will be a good start a writing a paper I’m that I am trying to write on consciousness. So, again, thanks for posting this!

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

10

I’m glad that it might be a useful catalyst, at least. I understood the experiment, but I found the article a little confusing in that they seemed to be trying to address a number of issues at once, instead of taking it one step (level) at a time.

By the way, I’m just on the last chapter of “Controlling People; The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.” I found it an enjoyable way to refresh what I knew, and a concise way to clarify terms and ideas that I either didn’t know or wasn’t quite grasping within PCT and MOL. As a layperson, I think it is a great handrail on the grand staircase to understanding this very complex theory and its applications. I will recommend it (again) to some folks who have expressed interest.

Thank you,

*barb

···

On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 3:21 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2016.05.03.1420)]

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: Thanks for this Barb. I see there’s already been some discussion about this. I’ll just say that this little blog illustrates rather clearly the problem that I see with all discussions of consciousness: the conflation of consciousness with intentionality. I make this point in a very brief section of the “Illusion of No Control” chapter in “Doing Research on Purpose” (p. 130). I even refer to the Wegner & Wheatley paper that is referenced in the blog. I think there is no way to have a coherent discussion of consciousness (or free-will, for that matter) without a good model of intentionality – that is, without PCT. Otherwise things get very confused, as they are in this piece. But this piece will be a good start a writing a paper I’m that I am trying to write on consciousness. So, again, thanks for posting this!

Best

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

Rick

11

[From Rupert Young (2016.05.07 20.30)]

If humans had free will why would anyone "choose" a bad decision?

The classical understanding of free will is that we could have done
something other than we actually did (upon which personal
responsibility lies), as exemplified by the allegory of Eve
“choosing” to pick the fruit from the tree of knowledge in the
garden of Eden. But PCT shows that she could not have chosen
differently because her behaviour was an outcome of the
(pre-existing) perceptions being controlled. Whether those
perceptual goals are “created” or learned, choice, and hence free
will, is an illusion.
Regards,
Rupert

···

On 02/05/16 07:07, Warren Mansell
wrote:

    I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra

about the impossibility of free will has been going on for
decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design
of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an
experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

12

Do people make bad decisions on purpose? It doesn’t become obvious to the decider that it was a bad decision until they perceive the effect of the decision as being undesirable. And what is perceived as bad in one context may be perceived good in another context, or perceived differently by another person.

Johnny learned in school that saving money was a good thing. It made sense at the time, so he thinks he’s making a good decision by putting his $10 in the bank. As he’s walking home, a friend offers him some candy bars at a discounted price. Now Johnny thinks he made a bad decision, since he has no spending money in his pocket. Meanwhile, his mom still sees depositing it as a good decision. The perception of whether it was good or bad is based, at least in part, on opinion, is it not?

In my mind, making a bad decision doesn’t prove that the undesirable outcome was pre-determined.

I’m curious how PCT shows that Eve could not have made another choice. To whom do the pre-existing perceptions belong, what are the pre-existing perceptions being controlled, and by whom?

*barb

··· 
  On 02/05/16 07:07, Warren Mansell

wrote:

    I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra

about the impossibility of free will has been going on for
decades. It’s all down to the assumptions inherent in the design
of the experiment and in equating ‘will’ with conscious
introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an
experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will…

If humans had free will why would anyone "choose" a bad decision?



The classical understanding of free will is that we could have done

something other than we actually did (upon which personal
responsibility lies), as exemplified by the allegory of Eve
“choosing” to pick the fruit from the tree of knowledge in the
garden of Eden. But PCT shows that she could not have chosen
differently because her behaviour was an outcome of the
(pre-existing) perceptions being controlled. Whether those
perceptual goals are “created” or learned, choice, and hence free
will, is an illusion.

Regards,

Rupert
13

Hi Rupert

Don't we normally experience "choice" when there is conflict between two goals or references? There can be no choice when behaviour (output) is fixed by the combination of a single reference value and input.

Perhaps the illusion of "choice" is that it's determined by random reorganisation. So possibly Eve didn't "choose" the apple, she reflected a bit, her awareness went up a level and her reorganising system did the work? Assuming the she was in conflict that is...

All the best
Vyv

···

On 7 May 2016, at 20:30, Rupert Young <rupert@perceptualrobots.com> wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2016.05.07 20.30)]

On 02/05/16 07:07, Warren Mansell wrote:
I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra about the impossibility of free will has been going on for decades. It's all down to the assumptions inherent in the design of the experiment and in equating 'will' with conscious introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will....

If humans had free will why would anyone "choose" a bad decision?

The classical understanding of free will is that we could have done something other than we actually did (upon which personal responsibility lies), as exemplified by the allegory of Eve "choosing" to pick the fruit from the tree of knowledge in the garden of Eden. But PCT shows that she could not have chosen differently because her behaviour was an outcome of the (pre-existing) perceptions being controlled. Whether those perceptual goals are "created" or learned, choice, and hence free will, is an illusion.

Regards,
Rupert

14

Eve made a “choice” based upon the perceptual goals she had at that
point in time. She did what she wanted to do. If she had done
something different she would have done something that she did not
want to do; she would have been controlling goals which she did not
have at that time. In other words, there was no choice, and what she
did was “pre-determined”.
The TCV is an exercise in “pre-determination”. It says that if you
know what perceptual goals someone has then you know in advance what
someone will do (control those perceptual goals). For example, to
test if someone controls for the straightness of pictures, when you
are at a friend’s house tilt (when they are not looking) one of
their pictures, and, if they are a picture-straightener, then they
will act to maintain their perception of the straightness of the
picture. They have no “choice” in the matter. But that is not a
problem, it just highlights the meaninglessness of the concept of
“free will”. Why would anyone want to do anything different than
what they want to do?
I think the problem lies with the phrase “pre-determined” and that
determinism, in general, is seen as incompatible with freedom.
“Pre-determined” implies that there is some external force or entity
determining what we are going to do. That is not the case. Rather
the deterministic world is the means by which we achieve our
perceptual goals; how we achieve our desires. Without determinism
PCT is not possible. I think I posted some stuff (attached) about
this on CSGNET before.
Although we could not have done things differently (no choice or
free will) this is not a problem for PCT and our freedom to control
it does have profound implications for how we as a society view
personal responsibility. Perhaps we should view any retribution as
treatment rather than punishment!
Regards,
Rupert

FreeWill1.pdf (104 KB)

···

On 07/05/2016 21:12, wrote:

bara0361@gmail.com

          In my mind, making a bad decision doesn't prove that

the undesirable outcome was pre-determined.

            I'm curious how PCT shows that Eve could not have

made another choice. To whom do the pre-existing
perceptions belong, what are the pre-existing
perceptions being controlled, and by whom?

15

Hi Vyv,

  Sure, there may be conflict resolution involved (and many

levels), but the outcome is dependant upon a higher level goal and
still follows the principle of could not have done differently.

  Although the changes within reorganisation may be random the

organisation that is accepted is dependant upon pre-exisiting
perceptual goals so the same applies.

Regards,

Rupert

pr-logo8.png

···

On 07/05/2016 22:21, Huddy, Vyv wrote:


Hi Rupert Don't we normally experience "choice" when there is conflict between two goals or references? There can be no choice when behaviour (output) is fixed by the combination of a single reference value and input. Perhaps the illusion of "choice" is that it's determined by random reorganisation. So possibly Eve didn't "choose" the apple, she reflected a bit, her awareness went up a level and her reorganising system did the work? Assuming the she was in conflict that is...
All the best
Vyv


On 7 May 2016, at 20:30, Rupert Young wrote:
[From Rupert Young (2016.05.07 20.30)]

On 02/05/16 07:07, Warren Mansell wrote:
I lament when I read articles like this - the same mantra about the impossibility of free will has been going on for decades. It's all down to the assumptions inherent in the design of the experiment and in equating 'will' with conscious introspection. I guess if we thought carefully there could be an experiment we could design to show the primacy of free will....


If humans had free will why would anyone "choose" a bad decision?
The classical understanding of free will is that we could have done something other than we actually did (upon which personal responsibility lies), as exemplified by the allegory of Eve "choosing" to pick the fruit from the tree of knowledge in the garden of Eden. But PCT shows that she could not have chosen differently because her behaviour was an outcome of the (pre-existing) perceptions being controlled. Whether those perceptual goals are "created" or learned, choice, and hence free will, is an illusion.
Regards,
Rupert

–
Regards,
Dr Rupert Young

www.perceptualrobots.com
Twitter
LinkedIn
YouTube

+44 7795 480387

rupert@perceptualrobots.com

16

[From Rick Marken (2015.05.10.0930)]

···

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: I haven’t had the time to participate in this discussion, partly due to prioritization but also because I don’t know what “free will” is and I don’t think the people who talk about it do either. But I will say that part of the “answer” to the question of whether we have free will or not is in Ch. 4 of “Controlling People”. There is no “free will” in the hierarchy of control in the sense that the selection of a reference for a perception determines what must be done to protect that perception from disturbance. However, the selection of references is autonomous – the system selects these reference (goals) itself. But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

RM: The only place anything like free will might exist is in the reorganization system. We do seem to be free to will certain arbitrary changes in our goals. This would mean that the actions on the hierarchy of control taken by the reorganizing aspect of us may not be completely random; or maybe that randomness is our “free will”.

RM: I think what people mean when they talk about wanting to be “free” is really wanting to be in control. And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

17

I am with Rick on this. I wanted to add that for human beings there are so many potential higher level controlled variables to apply to any one situation, a likely candidate for what we call ‘free will’ is where we hold these alternatives in awareness and allow reorganisation to do its magic!

···

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: I haven’t had the time to participate in this discussion, partly due to prioritization but also because I don’t know what “free will” is and I don’t think the people who talk about it do either. But I will say that part of the “answer” to the question of whether we have free will or not is in Ch. 4 of “Controlling People”. There is no “free will” in the hierarchy of control in the sense that the selection of a reference for a perception determines what must be done to protect that perception from disturbance. However, the selection of references is autonomous – the system selects these reference (goals) itself. But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

RM: The only place anything like free will might exist is in the reorganization system. We do seem to be free to will certain arbitrary changes in our goals. This would mean that the actions on the hierarchy of control taken by the reorganizing aspect of us may not be completely random; or maybe that randomness is our “free will”.

RM: I think what people mean when they talk about wanting to be “free” is really wanting to be in control. And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

18

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

HB : I agree with you

RM : But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

HB :I don’t agree with you. It seems that you want again to change PCT.

References are exclusivelly formed inside organism, so living beings are autonomous creatures. That’s Bill’s standing point which is obviously seen from generic diagram. Comparator can be one neuron or the whole nervous system and always references are produced inside, because generally and continuosly perception is matched to references which are genetically set. It seems that you wanted to say that at higherst level references are not formed (selected) inside organism but are coming from outside

From Bill’s diagram it’s obviously that perception meets references which are formed inside organism in comparator. But if you think that you can show to me how the highest level is something special, show me how it looks like in generic diagram. Where is that »highest« level and where do the references come from continuosly on the highest level, so that you can say they are not selected autonomously ?

It also seems that you want to prepare ground for your RCT in which people can control other people, so references can be somehow introduced into organism from outside. With what ? With introducing references through perception ? Show me in diagram how that looks like ?

We’ve talked many times that people can’t »control« other people and in these sense they can’t »set« the references for others.

Allowing that highest level reference signal is not selected autonomously by organism, you allow the possibility that references for the highest level are introduced from »outside« the organism contionuosly. Bill would never allow this sort of thinking.

The quaetsion mark in diagram on p. 191 (B:CP 2005) does not mean the posibilty that references can be formed outside organism, but it shows the problem where references for the highest level are formed in organism. How organism works so that references are produced inside organism and how are they set genetically ? You have to solve the riddle with »question mark« inside organism. Maybe you could do it together with Bruce.

People can be influenced through perception, or by physical intruding into organism and changing something. Changing references in organism can be probably done by »genetic engeenering« if that’s what you meant »by selection on highets level« which is not done autonomously ???

In any way perception will still be compared (controlled) in organism with references that are produced inside organism like diagram shows. And the diagram is general so it’s valid for all levels including the highest level.

RM :

And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

HB : You really don’t want to abondon the idea that PCT is »protecting theory«. I proved too you many times that you are doing wrong generalization. On the bases of 1% occurance of term »protect« in PCT you are concluding that PCT is »protecting« theory. Is this have to do something with science ?

I have a proposal. Whenever you’ll get on the idea to change PCT or start misleading the CSGnet, you send the request to Powers ladies. And then they can resend message to me, and to some other PCT masters. I’ll answer.and I hope others will do so too. Then Powers ladies can decide (as the owner) whether your modification is appropriate or not. This is one way that you stop »contionuosly« misleading the CSGnet forum.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2016 6:29 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

[From Rick Marken (2015.05.10.0930)]

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: I haven’t had the time to participate in this discussion, partly due to prioritization but also because I don’t know what “free will” is and I don’t think the people who talk about it do either. But I will say that part of the “answer” to the question of whether we have free will or not is in Ch. 4 of “Controlling People”. There is no “free will” in the hierarchy of control in the sense that the selection of a reference for a perception determines what must be done to protect that perception from disturbance. However, the selection of references is autonomous – the system selects these reference (goals) itself. But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

RM: The only place anything like free will might exist is in the reorganization system. We do seem to be free to will certain arbitrary changes in our goals. This would mean that the actions on the hierarchy of control taken by the reorganizing aspect of us may not be completely random; or maybe that randomness is our “free will”.

RM: I think what people mean when they talk about wanting to be “free” is really wanting to be in control. And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

19

Barb P: I will appreciate if the conversation here can continue on a professional level, minus personal attacks.

Now, one thing at a time.

Rick, could you please clarify for me: In your statement below, did you mean not selected autonomously from the lower levels? I wonder if there might have been a misunderstanding that you were saying not autonomously from the rest of the world.

“RM : But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.”

Thanks,

*barb

···

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 6:39 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

HB : I agree with you

RM : But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

HB :I don’t agree with you. It seems that you want again to change PCT.

References are exclusivelly formed inside organism, so living beings are autonomous creatures. That’s Bill’s standing point which is obviously seen from generic diagram. Comparator can be one neuron or the whole nervous system and always references are produced inside, because generally and continuosly perception is matched to references which are genetically set. It seems that you wanted to say that at higherst level references are not formed (selected) inside organism but are coming from outside

From Bill’s diagram it’s obviously that perception meets references which are formed inside organism in comparator. But if you think that you can show to me how the highest level is something special, show me how it looks like in generic diagram. Where is that »highest« level and where do the references come from continuosly on the highest level, so that you can say they are not selected autonomously ?

It also seems that you want to prepare ground for your RCT in which people can control other people, so references can be somehow introduced into organism from outside. With what ? With introducing references through perception ? Show me in diagram how that looks like ?

We’ve talked many times that people can’t »control« other people and in these sense they can’t »set« the references for others.

Allowing that highest level reference signal is not selected autonomously by organism, you allow the possibility that references for the highest level are introduced from »outside« the organism contionuosly. Bill would never allow this sort of thinking.

The quaetsion mark in diagram on p. 191 (B:CP 2005) does not mean the posibilty that references can be formed outside organism, but it shows the problem where references for the highest level are formed in organism. How organism works so that references are produced inside organism and how are they set genetically ? You have to solve the riddle with »question mark« inside organism. Maybe you could do it together with Bruce.

People can be influenced through perception, or by physical intruding into organism and changing something. Changing references in organism can be probably done by »genetic engeenering« if that’s what you meant »by selection on highets level« which is not done autonomously ???

In any way perception will still be compared (controlled) in organism with references that are produced inside organism like diagram shows. And the diagram is general so it’s valid for all levels including the highest level.

RM :

And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

HB : You really don’t want to abondon the idea that PCT is »protecting theory«. I proved too you many times that you are doing wrong generalization. On the bases of 1% occurance of term »protect« in PCT you are concluding that PCT is »protecting« theory. Is this have to do something with science ?

I have a proposal. Whenever you’ll get on the idea to change PCT or start misleading the CSGnet, you send the request to Powers ladies. And then they can resend message to me, and to some other PCT masters. I’ll answer.and I hope others will do so too. Then Powers ladies can decide (as the owner) whether your modification is appropriate or not. This is one way that you stop »contionuosly« misleading the CSGnet forum.

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2016 6:29 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

[From Rick Marken (2015.05.10.0930)]

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: I haven’t had the time to participate in this discussion, partly due to prioritization but also because I don’t know what “free will” is and I don’t think the people who talk about it do either. But I will say that part of the “answer” to the question of whether we have free will or not is in Ch. 4 of “Controlling People”. There is no “free will” in the hierarchy of control in the sense that the selection of a reference for a perception determines what must be done to protect that perception from disturbance. However, the selection of references is autonomous – the system selects these reference (goals) itself. But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

RM: The only place anything like free will might exist is in the reorganization system. We do seem to be free to will certain arbitrary changes in our goals. This would mean that the actions on the hierarchy of control taken by the reorganizing aspect of us may not be completely random; or maybe that randomness is our “free will”.

RM: I think what people mean when they talk about wanting to be “free” is really wanting to be in control. And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.

20

Barb,

This is nice thought. Only if it would come a little sooner. But I’ll respect your wish. Anyway you invited me to »look arround« from time to time. And another time it will be who knows. J

Best,

Boris

···

From: bara0361@gmail.com [mailto:bara0361@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 3:07 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

Barb P: I will appreciate if the conversation here can continue on a professional level, minus personal attacks.

Now, one thing at a time.

Rick, could you please clarify for me: In your statement below, did you mean not selected autonomously from the lower levels? I wonder if there might have been a misunderstanding that you were saying not autonomously from the rest of the world.

“RM : But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.”

Thanks,

*barb

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 6:39 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

HB : I agree with you

RM : But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

HB :I don’t agree with you. It seems that you want again to change PCT.

References are exclusivelly formed inside organism, so living beings are autonomous creatures. That’s Bill’s standing point which is obviously seen from generic diagram. Comparator can be one neuron or the whole nervous system and always references are produced inside, because generally and continuosly perception is matched to references which are genetically set. It seems that you wanted to say that at higherst level references are not formed (selected) inside organism but are coming from outside

From Bill’s diagram it’s obviously that perception meets references which are formed inside organism in comparator. But if you think that you can show to me how the highest level is something special, show me how it looks like in generic diagram. Where is that »highest« level and where do the references come from continuosly on the highest level, so that you can say they are not selected autonomously ?

It also seems that you want to prepare ground for your RCT in which people can control other people, so references can be somehow introduced into organism from outside. With what ? With introducing references through perception ? Show me in diagram how that looks like ?

We’ve talked many times that people can’t »control« other people and in these sense they can’t »set« the references for others.

Allowing that highest level reference signal is not selected autonomously by organism, you allow the possibility that references for the highest level are introduced from »outside« the organism contionuosly. Bill would never allow this sort of thinking.

The quaetsion mark in diagram on p. 191 (B:CP 2005) does not mean the posibilty that references can be formed outside organism, but it shows the problem where references for the highest level are formed in organism. How organism works so that references are produced inside organism and how are they set genetically ? You have to solve the riddle with »question mark« inside organism. Maybe you could do it together with Bruce.

People can be influenced through perception, or by physical intruding into organism and changing something. Changing references in organism can be probably done by »genetic engeenering« if that’s what you meant »by selection on highets level« which is not done autonomously ???

In any way perception will still be compared (controlled) in organism with references that are produced inside organism like diagram shows. And the diagram is general so it’s valid for all levels including the highest level.

RM :

And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

HB : You really don’t want to abondon the idea that PCT is »protecting theory«. I proved too you many times that you are doing wrong generalization. On the bases of 1% occurance of term »protect« in PCT you are concluding that PCT is »protecting« theory. Is this have to do something with science ?

I have a proposal. Whenever you’ll get on the idea to change PCT or start misleading the CSGnet, you send the request to Powers ladies. And then they can resend message to me, and to some other PCT masters. I’ll answer.and I hope others will do so too. Then Powers ladies can decide (as the owner) whether your modification is appropriate or not. This is one way that you stop »contionuosly« misleading the CSGnet forum.

Best,

Boris

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2016 6:29 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: just passing it along

[From Rick Marken (2015.05.10.0930)]

On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:58 PM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

BP: I do my best to spread the word about PCT, and sometimes get emails from friends about other articles. One of them shared this one, and wondered what this group might think of it, whether it has relevance here.

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

RM: I haven’t had the time to participate in this discussion, partly due to prioritization but also because I don’t know what “free will” is and I don’t think the people who talk about it do either. But I will say that part of the “answer” to the question of whether we have free will or not is in Ch. 4 of “Controlling People”. There is no “free will” in the hierarchy of control in the sense that the selection of a reference for a perception determines what must be done to protect that perception from disturbance. However, the selection of references is autonomous – the system selects these reference (goals) itself. But the highest level reference is not selected autonomously and it does determine the selection of all lower level references.

RM: The only place anything like free will might exist is in the reorganization system. We do seem to be free to will certain arbitrary changes in our goals. This would mean that the actions on the hierarchy of control taken by the reorganizing aspect of us may not be completely random; or maybe that randomness is our “free will”.

RM: I think what people mean when they talk about wanting to be “free” is really wanting to be in control. And in order to control you really do have to be “free” (in the sense of being able to vary ones actions in the appropriate dimensions) to take the actions that are necessary to protect a controlled variable from disturbance.

RM: Freedom’s just another word for being in control.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.