# Ken Hacker's !s and ?s

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/ken-hackers-s-and-s/6026>\
**Category:** CSG1993\
**Created:** [March 29, 1993, 6:54pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/ken-hackers-s-and-s/6026 "1993-03-29T18:54:57Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [March 29, 1993, 6:54pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/ken-hackers-s-and-s/6026/1 "1993-03-29T18:54:57Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (930329.1000 MST)]

Ken Hacker (930328) --

A reasonable set of comments and questions. I'll try to deal with  
some of them.

Your list of our criticisms of conventional behavior science is  
generally on the mark, but without any reasons being supplied  
they sound more extreme than they are.

Consider:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* All social science is wrong.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* All behavioral science is wrong.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* All social scientists and behavioral scientists  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;believe what is wrong.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* All social scientists and behavioral scientists do not  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;know what they are doing with research.

In the first place, I always try to put somewhere in the  
discussion the proviso "if the PCT model actually explains  
behavior...", which make this somewhat less arbitrary and ad  
hominum.

In the second place, it makes a difference just what claim of  
wrongness is made. Wrong about what? The fundamental disparity  
between PCT and conventional theories of behavior is the  
treatment of cause and effect. Under PCT, the actions of an  
organism are not caused by stimuli with the organism simply  
mediating between cause and effect. In the PCT model, but not in  
any conventional model, there is a controlled variable between  
the apparent cause and its apparent effect as usually observed.  
The behavior is directed toward control of the controlled  
variable; it is not simply a response to the stimulus or a  
dependent variable being determined by an independent variable.  
As a result, all theories in the conventional sciences that rely  
on some cause-effect or IV-DV paradigm, including methods of data  
analysis that assume such a relationship, are fundamentally  
contradicted by PCT. It isn't necessary to investigate every  
detail of any theory that is proposed; all that is needed is to  
see whether the internal validity of the theory depends on  
assuming that behavior is a dependent variable and inputs to the  
organism are independent variables. If that is true, then no more  
need be known: the theory is contradicted by PCT and in terms of  
PCT the conclusions are false.

I leave it to you to decide how much of the social and behavioral  
sciences would remain intact if it were to prove true that all  
behavior is organized around controlled variables, and none is  
open-loop.

&nbsp;&nbsp;\* Only PCT has something useful to say about how humans  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;regulate their behaviors.

As stated, this is contradictory to PCT on the face of it. Human  
beings, under PCT, do not regulate their behaviors at all, as  
least as behavior is conventionally understood. PCT says nothing  
at all about the regulation of behavior; it is concerned with the  
regulation of perceptions, of inputs. Behavior, or action,  
becomes what it must become to prevent disturbances from having  
an important effect on the controlled inputs. So it is true that  
only PCT has something useful to say about the regulation of  
input, if that is what is meant by behavior. But that is not what  
conventional sciences have meant by behavior.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* Communication theory is wrong.

Communication theory, as a mathematical treatment of certain ways  
of representing variables and signals, is completely right in  
terms of its mathematical operations. Where I have difficulties  
with it is in the initial definitions and assumptions, which do  
not seem to me to have any necessity to them. But that's me, not  
PCT.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* PCT equations (confirmed by PCT theorists) PROVE  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that PCT is correct.

Fortunately, confirmation of the PCT equations by comparison with  
experiment is done by public methods easily replicable by anyone,  
with high reliability. No faith or special knowledge is required.  
The validity of these equations is put at risk every time they  
are used to fit a model to real behavior. The equations don't  
prove that PCT is correct; as far as they go, they ARE PCT.

&nbsp;&nbsp;\* PCT is real science. Other approaches to human behavior  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are pseudo-scientific or "half-assed."

PCT is real science because it risks everything with every  
application to data. It isn't simply assumed to be correct and  
twisted to make the data seem to fit it. It can't live with  
serious exceptions or counterexamples. Its premises are  
themselves testable through experiment, and are tested every time  
they are used.

I would accept as real science any other approach to behavior  
that had the same characteristics. We're not talking about  
control theory here: we're discussing what science is about.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\* People who challenge PCT are misguided, ignorant,  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;and not yet fully developed intellectually.

Depends on how they go about challenging it. I see no shame in  
being any of the things you mention -- is there anyone who  
doesn't fit the description? I object to only one kind of  
challenge to PCT: the kind that is made without knowing what PCT  
is about, and is based only on a difference in conclusions.

> **···**
>
> ----------------------------------------------  
> The questions:
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a. The scope of PCT. Is it limited to describing and  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;explaining physical behaviors of human beings such  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;as motor actions?
> 
> In that all visible behaviors are physical and entail motor  
> actions, including debating about quantum physics and women's  
> rights as well as tracking behavior, yes. One could say, given a  
> few precautions, that there are "really" only four kinds of  
> behavior: push, pull, twist, and squeeze. All the rest is  
> controlled perception, consequences of behavior. And even those  
> four are controlled perceptions. PCT can be applied to behavior  
> at any level of organization you please. HPCT is meant to apply  
> at all levels at once.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b. If there is no information inside of input, what  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;prevents one from asserting behavioristic-like  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;internal responses to internal stimuli or a kind  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;of reverse behaviorism?
> 
> Nothing. You can propose that behavior is caused by the phases of  
> the moon if you like, but you'll have to defend the proposal. See  
> my earlier post to Rick on this subject. I'm not going to  
> generalize about information and input any more until I'm sure  
> what's being claimed or asserted.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c. What happens to Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety?
> 
> I don't use it, although it's implicit in control theory. Variety  
> is defined by Ashby as follows:
> 
> "The word \_variety\_, in relation to a set of distinguishable  
> elements, will be used to mean either (1) the number of distinct  
> elements, or (2) the logarithm to the base 2 of the number, the  
> context indicating the sense used." (p.126 of \_introduction to  
> cybernetics\_).
> 
> The Law of Requisite Variety states that the output of a  
> regulator must have at least as much variety as the disturbance,  
> if the result is to be regulation of some variable. That is to  
> say, the output must have at least as many discriminable states  
> as the disturbance has.
> 
> In terms of control theory, we would say that if a controlled  
> variable is to be maintained exactly at a reference level, the  
> output of the system must be at all times quantitatively equal  
> and opposite to the magnitude of the disturbing variable, both  
> measured in terms of effect on the controlled variable.
> 
> Note that the control-theoretic statement goes much farther than  
> the LRV goes. It says that not only must the output have AS MANY  
> discriminable states as the disturbance, but that these states  
> must have the correct quantitative magnitudes, and they must  
> occur in pairs: one specific output state for each state of the  
> disturbing variable. The output and disturbing states must be  
> quantitatively equal, and of opposite signs. So the LRV, while it  
> states a weak necessary condition, by no means states a  
> sufficient condition for control or regulation to exist.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d. How does PCT account for stored knowledge such as  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;schemata (or whatever other term you choose)?
> 
> PCT itself doesn't; that's a question of fact for neurophysiology  
> or neurochemistry. I have proposed some possible relationships of  
> stored information to the operation of control systems in the  
> hierarchical model. As Greg Williams puts it, those proposals are  
> embellishments on the basic model.
> 
> "Schemata", as I have heard the term used, could have various  
> meanings, corresponding to reference signals (when they relate to  
> goals), to perceptual input functions (when they determine how  
> lower-level perceptions are interpreted) or memories (in various  
> circumstances). "Knowledge" has similar usages. Because these  
> words are used in relation to functionally very different aspects  
> of a brain model, it's hard to pin them down to any one meaning.  
> The problem is somewhat similar to the uses of "want." If you say  
> "I want some ice cream" you could mean to point to a reference  
> signal, the definition of what it is that you want, or you could  
> mean to indicate an error signal, emphasizing the fact that you  
> don't have the ice cream. In my opinion, terms like these are too  
> loose to be used in a model, although we may use them informally  
> when context supplies the missing discriminations.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d. What makes PCT more than intensive descriptions and  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;explanations of neural pathways and signals?
> 
> The fact that it makes almost no attempt to describe neural  
> pathways and signals. The primary uses of PCT are in modeling  
> externally-visible behavior in real environments, showing that  
> relationships expected under the hypothesis of control do in fact  
> occur and can be predicted. The models propose that certain  
> functions are carried out inside the control system: perception,  
> comparison, and conversion of error to output. Nothing is said  
> about what neural circuits are involved in implementing these  
> functions, although in some cases we know quite a bit about  
> specific neural signals and pathways involved in specific control  
> systems.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;e. Why must PCT be understood as some sort of revolution  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;as opposed to some sort of new and productive thinking?
> 
> Because PCT directly contradicts most traditional conceptions of  
> how behavior itself works. It also predicts phenomena of a kind  
> that conventional sciences have known nothing about, or that  
> under conventional assumptions go in a direction opposite to the  
> direction that control theory would predict and that experiment  
> supports. For example, under control theory, the prediction (and  
> the observation) is that doubling the sensitivity of a perceptual  
> function to stimuli will result in halving the input to the  
> perceptual function, not doubling its output signal.
> 
> Control theory is to conventional theory as Newtonian celestial  
> mechanics was to Ptolemaic epicycles. Many of the observations  
> may be the same, but the explanation is radically different.
> 
> f. What are essential differences between PCT and cybernetics?
> 
> Cybernetics abandoned control theory at about the time of the 5th  
> Macy conference, when most of the main misconceptions about  
> control systems were laid in.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;g. What do axioms or propositions from PCT contribute to  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;everyday human adapting, living, changing, improving,  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that other forms of analysis do not? Where is the  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;proof of human behavioral successes with PCT, as  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;opposed to success in the abstract?
> 
> I'd say you should ask people who are applying it. Try Ed Ford,  
> Dag Forssell, and David Goldstein. Or ask people in the CSG who  
> have been interacting with each other for 9 years with an  
> understanding of PCT. In a lot of cases, PCT vindicates common-  
> sense ideas that science has rejected, such as the inportance of  
> goal-setting, perception, and intention. If you see concepts like  
> that creeping back into polite scientific society, I think you  
> can credit PCT with having inspired at least some of those  
> changes in thinking. Even when an idea is rejected, something of  
> it sticks.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;h. Most scientists are concerned with not only  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;describing and explaining phenomena, but also wish  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to predict and sometimes "control" them. Why does  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PCT deny the desirability of prediction?
> 
> PCT does not deny the desirability of prediction. I, personally,  
> deny the desirability of lousy predictions, particularly when  
> they're used as if they were good predictions.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Is prediction not always part of human anticipation,  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;whether in ordinary life or in science?
> 
> Yes, I think it is. It's explained, more or less, in HPCT as a  
> phenomenon of imagination, which is part of the story of mental  
> modeling. People do it, so it belongs in the model. But I can't  
> say a lot, theoretically, about HOW they do it. Most of my  
> objections to prediction involve pointing out that it's not being  
> done very well, and shouldn't be relied on as a method of control  
> in most situations -- not if good control is important.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;i. Where do reference levels or signal originate? In  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;other words, if my control system has error  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;signals, what constitutes the sources of the error  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;signals?
> 
> I guess you haven't read anything about the hierarchical model.  
> When you say "my control system" I wonder if you have read  
> anything about the model at all. People have hundreds, thousands  
> of control systems, all active at the same time and at different  
> levels. Higher-level systems act not by producing motor outputs  
> but by adjusting reference signals for lower systems. If you  
> haven't been aware of this aspect of the model, you must have  
> found a lot of the conversations on the net pretty confusing.  
> Next you'll ask "But what about the highest levels of control  
> system? Where do THEY get their reference signals?" And I will  
> answer, your guess is as good as mine, but asking the question  
> shows that you get the picture.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What is stored that makes me think that I do not  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;like or wish to accept certain input?
> 
> You're assuming that it's something stored that "makes you think"  
> that you don't like etc. A reference signal specifies a certain  
> amount of a given perception, anywhere between the maximum  
> possible and zero. That becomes the amount that you prefer; when  
> you say you prefer that state of that perception, control theory  
> explains this by saying that there is a reference signal in some  
> control system set to that value, probably as part of controlling  
> for some higher-level perception. This may or may not involve  
> "storage" of something. There are lots of proposals on this  
> subject in BCP.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;How conscious are the processes of matching input to  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the reference signals?
> 
> It depends. The same control system can operate consciously or  
> automatically, at any level. A perceptual signal can occur with  
> or without consciousness of its presence. The nature of  
> consciousness is not explained in PCT or HPCT (or as far as I  
> know, in any T).
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As PCT should not be criticized by me or anyone else  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;for not explaining social behavior, social sciences  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which do focus on social behaviors should not be  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;excoriated for not explaining individual human control  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;mechanisms and processes.
> 
> Clark McPhail, Chuck Tucker, and Kent McClelland (the CSG's  
> sociologists) and Tom Bourbon (who has modeled simple social  
> interactions) ought to comment on this. My view is that PCT, by  
> explaining the interactions of individuals with their  
> surroundings, lays the groundwork for explaining what happens  
> when groups of independent control systems interact with other  
> control systems. Social "laws" emerge from the properties of  
> interacting individuals and the shared environment. While  
> naturalistic observation is needed to determine the existence of  
> regularities in social behavior, PCT, I claim, is needed to  
> explain these regularities.
> 
> > &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a. Communication studies, unlike traditional psychology  
> > and maybe other behavior/social sciences, no longer assumes  
> > that people are simply affected by stimuli in varying  
> > conditions and ways. Since the 1970s, my discipline has said  
> > that each human TAKES from mass media, from interpersonal  
> > interactions, from printed words, from any messages, and  
> > recodes what is decoded. We threw out Shannon and Weaver's  
> > model in the 1970s as anything useful to explain human  
> > communication. Both Aristotelian and electrical engineering  
> > models of message sending and receiving say little of  
> > importance to understanding the complexities of human  
> > communication, mainly because people do not simply take in  
> > messages. Nor do messages do contain meaning.
> 
> Good. Give my regards to Klaus. And what is the reason for all  
> these changes in thought? Is there any theory from which you  
> could have deduced all these new ideas? Or are they simply ideas  
> that were proposed, and that others found acceptable for unstated  
> reasons? Everything in this paragraph could be deduced from PCT,  
> and has been familiar to PCTers for many years (except for the  
> remaining buzzwords like "coding" and "recoding"). You're talking  
> about observable phenomena, and that's what PCT is for: to bring  
> observable phenomena into a single common framework and make some  
> sort of sense of them -- not just to accept that they happen, but  
> to explain, in terms of a unified structure of theory, why they  
> must happen. The same theory that explains tracking behavior  
> explains why people give their own meanings to their inputs, and  
> why that is the only way it can happen.
> 
> Hope you had fun with the grading....  
> --------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best,
> 
> Bill P.