# Language, models, misc

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/language-models-misc/6200>\
**Category:** CSG1992\
**Created:** [May 16, 1992, 4:08pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/language-models-misc/6200 "1992-05-16T16:08:22Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [May 16, 1992, 4:08pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/language-models-misc/6200/1 "1992-05-16T16:08:22Z")

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[From Bill Powers (920515.2000)]

Avery (& anyone else):

My mailing address is  
73 Ridge Place, CR 510 (that's "County Road 510")  
Durango, CO 81301

> **···**
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------  
> David Goldstein (920515)
> 
> Ann Landers has said, and I agree, that people usually are wrong when they  
> conceal a patient's true condition from the patient. They're really  
> controlling for their own feelings, not those of the other person.
> 
> If the older person has gone through some extensive medical testing, it  
> must be clear that there was a reason for it. I don't think it would be too  
> difficult to find out if the person wants to know the bad news. Ask the  
> person. "Do you think anything really serious might be wrong with you?"  
> That ought to be enough of a disturbance to elicit denials if the person  
> doesn't want to hear about anything bad. A more likely reply would be "I  
> don't know -- nobody around here will tell me a damn thing."
> 
> Does anyone really think he or she could visit a beloved relative in a  
> hospital and conceal the knowledge that this relative is dying? Denial  
> exists on both sides of the question.  
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Greg Williams (920515a) --
> 
> RE: Fine kettle of fish..
> 
> Good point about the adjunct to HPCT in the form of proposals about free  
> will. HPCT is about control, nothing else. It's not even about  
> consciousness or awareness, much less "volition" in the usual sense. Any  
> remarks I've made on such subjects have come from an attempt to understand  
> personal experience in ways that HPCT doesn't help with. Of course knowing  
> that the vehicle is a hierarchy of control does make more sense of some  
> experiences.
> 
> > According to PCT, we are CYBERNETIC beings, behaving/acting in certain  
> > ways because of the history of each of our control structures IN  
> > INTERACTION WITH each of our environments (or more exactly, those  
> > portions of our environments which affect our individual control  
> > structures -- what Maturana terms our "niches").
> 
> We are also reorganizing beings. Reorganization is fundamentally a  
> cybernetic process, of course, but it isn't necessarily totally "random" or  
> "statistical" in nature. All that's meant by saying that a process is  
> random is that we know of no algorithm that will predict what it will do  
> next. A random reorganizing system is powerful because it doesn't take  
> anything for granted. But reorganization could be quite systematic in some  
> way that is too subtle, or too advanced, for us to find order in it.
> 
> If determinism (of any sort) is an article of faith, then the idea that  
> there may be system behind our own reorganizations will cut no ice: one  
> will say, "Well, whatever that system may be, it must be deterministic and  
> result from interactions between organism and environment." But if one is  
> open-minded, it's not hard to entertain the possibility that reorganization  
> may have a systematic but not deterministic component. After all, until  
> you've found the deterministic links, all things remain possible -- unless  
> you've ruled them out in advance.  
> ------------------------------------------------------------------  
> I've now heard ouches from two owners of linguistic toes.
> 
> Bruce Nevin (920514) --
> 
> I said
> 
> > > If it seems that there is structure in language, then a model that  
> > > explains this phenomenon should not contain that structure, but only  
> > > components that lead to phenomena which can be seen as having that  
> > > structure.
> 
> And you said
> 
> > If it seems that there are words in language, then a model that \>explains
> 
> this phenomenon should not contain words, but only components \>that lead to  
> phenomena which can be seen as being words.
> 
> -- and so on to word dependencies, dependencies on dependencies, etc.
> 
> This isn't quite the direction of my thought, although I can't guarantee  
> that there is any direction to my thought. I think you're talking about  
> phenomena, observed order, facts. I'm talking about explaining those  
> phenomena by using a model.
> 
> In the case of words, I would wonder "What is a word? What is the system  
> doing when it produces and hears or sees those things we call words?" When  
> I examine words closely, they seem to be just familiar chunks of sound or  
> objects on paper. The meanings they seem to have (for those words that can  
> individually designate meanings) turn out to be ordinary perceptions. So  
> both words and their meanings are ordinary perceptions. The model,  
> therefore, would not explain words in terms of words, but in terms of the  
> way one perception can be used to indicate another, regardless of the  
> classification of the perception. The process of indication, evocation,  
> association, or whatever you want to call it, is what needs modeling,  
> because we already have a start on a model for how ordinary perceptions of  
> different levels depend on other perceptions hierarchically.
> 
> When it comes to apparent word dependencies, I don't deny that such  
> dependencies exist phenomenally. But I want to know why they exist and how  
> they CAN exist, in terms of a model. The dependencies themselves are just  
> observations and interpretations. Because words are just ordinary  
> perceptions, the observed dependencies between words must also exist  
> between perceptions of other kinds (although perhaps not exactly the same  
> dependencies). Dependency itself, therefore, is what needs modeling, not  
> any particular dependencies. When you understand dependency itself as a  
> type of controlled perception, probably as an example of a larger type such  
> as relationship or sequence, you will understand not only word dependencies  
> but all kind of dependencies.
> 
> By remaining at the level of phenomena, we can only observe and record  
> apparent cooccurrances and dependencies of particular things. We can't  
> explain why they are related as they are. The method of modeling attempts  
> to go beneath that level to the level of underlying operations, looking for  
> operations that could produce both the phenomena and the observed  
> dependencies among them.
> 
> Avery Andrews (920515)
> 
> I said
> 
> > > A Chomksyite evidently proposes "because I can perceive a certain  
> > > structure of relationships in language, that structure produces  
> > > language."
> 
> > I wouldn't really say this, but that something is producing the  
> > structure, and knowing a reasonable amount about the structure ought to  
> > help in identifying the something.
> 
> I'll give you the same comment I give to Bruce. The question from the  
> standpoint of modeling is not WHAT structure is perceived in language, but  
> WHAT PERCEIVES STRUCTURE ITSELF. Bruce (with Harris) proposes that the  
> structure we perceive consists of words and their dependencies etc. You  
> propose that the structure can be represented as a program, a network of  
> contingencies. But structures can be of all kinds. What operation of the  
> brain underlies these symptoms we call structures? Surely, the ability to  
> perceive structure, to alter one's actions so as to create and change  
> structures that are perceived, is a more fundamental aspect of organization  
> than is the ability to perceive and control for a particular example of  
> structure.
> 
> > Actually, in the case of grammatical generations, I suspect that there  
> > really are things corresponding to them (ie., for the generalizations  
> > that lead people to postulate noun-phrases, there is a noun-phrase  
> > detector).
> 
> You can think of a noun-phrase detector in several ways. The conventional  
> way is to say that there really are such things as noun-phrases in some  
> objective world, and that all we need to do is develop detectors that can  
> respond to them. The CT way is to say that because we have developed  
> perceptual systems that respond to things in terms of noun-phrases, we can  
> create and control the occurrance of noun-phrases.
> 
> So in the CT model, a noun phrase exists because it is perceived and  
> controlled; in the same collection of words, something else might have been  
> perceived and controlled instead. But the CT model wouldn't specify noun-  
> phrases: it would look for the kind of operation that underlies the  
> perception of noun phrases; for example, the ability to recognize and  
> reproduce sequences (of any kinds of perceptions).
> 
> Also I suggest again that if you can perceive a structure, it is that  
> perception that is controlled by VARYING utterances. I know you're  
> skeptical about the possibility of a closed-loop organization here, but of  
> course if you don't try to invent one that would work, it will remain only  
> a possibility. If, on the other hand, you could find one, that might be  
> rather an important event in linguistics.
> 
> > I suspect this because grammar does not seem to be real-world  
> > interactive in the manner that most things studied in psychology are, \>so
> 
> the structures in grammar can't be coming from simple interactions \>with a  
> complex environment.
> 
> But grammar is real-world interactive during the time it develops. No  
> skill, after it becomes habitual, is real-world interactive to the same  
> extent it is while it's being learned. We reduce principles and reasoning  
> to slogans at the drop of a hat. We reduce slogans to slurred and run-  
> together events even more readily: ISWEARTOTELLLTHETHRUT  
> HANDNOTHINGBUTTHETRUTHSOHELPMEGOD. By the time we're adults, "grammar" is  
> just how we say things; most people say the same things the same way every  
> time, without considering whether it's grammatical or not. When you lose  
> the real-world interactiveness of grammar, you've also lost grammar. If you  
> hear "Every man for itself," the "itself" isn't grammatically wrong, it's  
> wrong because you said the memorized phrase wrong; you made the wrong sound  
> at the end. We no longer think of "Every man for himself" as a sentence in  
> which the words have individual meaning, sexist or otherwise. It's just  
> something you emit under certain circumstances. It's like a shaped grunt.
> 
> This is probably a good answer to your objection about treating rules as  
> controlled perceptions. As long as there is a possibility of making  
> mistakes, the rules are perceived and the utterances are adjusted until the  
> right rules are perceived. But once a person has settled on utterances that  
> will reliably fit the rules, the utterances are reduced to phrases and no  
> longer are treated as having internal structure. Then those utterances are  
> no longer rule-driven. They're just the way you talk.
> 
> This would apply to the Harris approach, too.
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Cindy Cochrane (920515) --
> 
> (Bruce)  
> \<more than one from of behavioral outputs can accomplish the same  
> \<controlled perception
> 
> (you)
> 
> > in speech and some other social/psychological behaviors. This is \>indeed
> 
> one of the ways language use differs from many of the CSG \>behaviors which  
> I've seen demonstrated.
> 
> A basic concept of CT is that you VARY your actions in order to keep  
> producing the SAME perceived result. You have to do this because the  
> environment keeps changing (and your own actions keep changing) and  
> disturbing the controlled result.
> 
> For practical reasons, the disturbances we've been using in experiments are  
> such as to require changing the AMOUNT or DIRECTION of action but not the  
> KIND. So if a disturbance alters the cursor position in a tracking  
> experiment, the handle has to be moved to a different place to keep the  
> cursor in the same place, but you don't have to drop the handle and pick up  
> a microphone or a hammer.
> 
> In general, higher systems can control their perceptions not only by  
> varying the amount of reference signal sent to a given set of lower  
> systems, but by changing WHICH LOWER SYSTEMS are provided with reference  
> signals by that higher system. This is changing the kind of behavioral  
> action rather than just the amount. This is tricky to implement in a model  
> when you don't already have a lot of control systems available in the  
> model, which is about where we are.
> 
> > Another way that it differs is that at some levels of language use, \>such
> 
> as decisions about wording, the target perception itself is \>neither  
> particularly quantifiable (e.g., I want my hearers/readers to \>think I am  
> witty) nor is it s simple (e.g., I want my hearers/readers \>to think a) I  
> am witty, b) I know what I am talking about, c) see the \>rlevance of what I  
> am saying to their own perceived needs, d) think my \>wording and grammar  
> are acceptable, e) see me as a colleague, or \>whatever).
> 
> I disagree along two dimensions. First, "witty" is certainly quantifiable  
> by the person doing the controlling and perceiving. Some sayings are  
> wittier than others. Some sayings intended to be witty leave you with a red  
> face because they fall so flat. Wittiness is a perception that varies along  
> a scale from zero to hilarious. It's your call as to where the wittiness  
> falls on this scale, but that's because it's your perception under your  
> control (subject to disturbance).
> 
> Second, the HPCT model is anything but "simple." You can have a given act  
> serving many different goals at once; a given goal being satisfied by a  
> changing mix of different lower-level actions. You can have many different  
> goals being served by many different actions, no one of which is under the  
> exclusive jurisdiction of any one higher-level system. The HPCT model is  
> just about as complex as real people are. Or it's intended to be so.
> 
> > Somehow, as we speak or write -- and perhaps when we read and listen \>--
> 
> we edit for the differences between our perceived goals and our \>perceived  
> (and contructed) meaning associated with the words we are \>perceiving.
> 
> (I edited "Somewho", illustrating that we also edit as we read). I agree  
> with this concept: we're varying our actions to reduce the difference  
> between the words we emit and the meanings we intend them to have until the  
> difference is as small as we can make it. That's the basic CT picture of  
> language production in the domain of meaning.
> 
> > when I try to think of all of the variables that I'd have to quantify  
> > in order to test the model at a level of granularity similar to the  
> > little man (or the baby) I lose control. :-\>
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;^^  
> Me too. But Rome wasn't built in a day. OO  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(----)
> 
> As to your suggestion about basic research, I applaud. That's exactly  
> what's needed. The problem, however, is to keep the standards high enough  
> to get what I would admit to be data. Traditional statistical analysis is  
> based on very low standards of acceptance and extremely noisy data. I would  
> rather see less data and higher standards: say, correlations above 0.95 and  
> p \< 0.000001. This should reduce the literature to a readable size and make  
> its contents worth reading.
> 
> I don't think you can get data like that without using a good model. The  
> model implied by most statistical analyses is that behavior is a linear  
> function of inputs: y = ax + b. That model is so wrong that the data are  
> very bad.  
> -------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Penni Sibun (920512) --
> 
> RE: looking for ways people correct errors.
> 
> > the way to study this is to get lotsa data and look for patterns. you  
> > can't claim to know what's going on in any particular case, but out of  
> > the regularities you can develop a set of hypotheses about types of  
> > errors and conditions under which they occur.
> 
> I don't like this approach unless it's done under the right model and with  
> great awareness of the pitfalls of mass studies. If you find that EVERYONE  
> corrects a certain kind of error, that's one thing. But if you find that 80  
> percent correct it and 20 percent don't, you don't have a scientific fact,  
> because you can't explain why the 20 percent don't. As most data obtained  
> with statistical studies leaves large amounts of unexplained behavior, the  
> custom has grown up of ignoring the counterexamples, and saying "people  
> correct this kind of error" when what you mean is "some people correct this  
> kind of error and some don't." This custom is the reason for the lack of  
> progress generally in the behavioral sciences. Hypotheses are accepted when  
> they ought to be rejected. The variance is blamed on the innate cussedness  
> of organisms rather than on the use of an inadequate model.
> 
> > also, because language use just isn't a thing-in-isolation; it's a  
> > social phenomenon, so you're missing the same things the gb'ers miss  
> > if youu focus on one person.
> 
> I don't like this either (I'm sure I would like you if we met, so don't  
> take this personally). Social phenomena have to have a place to live, and  
> where they live is in individuals. If you understand how each individual  
> deals with the surrounding world (including the other people in it), you  
> can deduce the social phenomena. If you study only mass phenomena, you can  
> say something about similar-sized masses of people, but nothing useful  
> about any particular person. See my article in Wayne Hershberger's  
> \_Volitional Action\_, in which I show that a mass measure of the  
> characteristics of a population of 4000 simulated people produces a  
> relationship between two variables has to opposite slope to its true form  
> in EVERY INDIVIDUAL.
> 
> Working with individuals takes a lot more time and trouble than doing  
> surveys of thousands of people in parallel. But if you test a model over  
> and over against individual behavior, you get a picture of the distribution  
> of characteristics that doesn't generalize a slight preponderance to a  
> universal. You don't throw out any exceptions to the model: you change the  
> model. What you end up with is a hell of a lot more impressive than  
> anything you can get out of any kind of mass measure.
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Best to all,
> 
> Bill P.

---

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**Author:** ![Avery\_Andrews3](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/f19dbf/32.png) [@Avery\_Andrews3](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Avery_Andrews3)\
**Post date:** [May 21, 1992, 5:22am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/language-models-misc/6200/2 "1992-05-21T05:22:27Z")

</div>

[Avery Andrews (920520.2000)]

(Bill Powers 920515.2000)

> > Actually, in the case of grammatical generations, I suspect that there  
> > really are things corresponding to them (ie., for the generalizations  
> > that lead people to postulate noun-phrases, there is a noun-phrase  
> > detector).

> You can think of a noun-phrase detector in several ways. The conventional  
> way is to say that there really are such things as noun-phrases in some  
> objective world, and that all we need to do is develop detectors that can  
> respond to them. The CT way is to say that because we have developed  
> perceptual systems that respond to things in terms of noun-phrases, we can  
> create and control the occurrance of noun-phrases.

I don't think that current people would say anything different to this.  
In Situation Semantics, for example, noun-phrases would exist \*because\*  
other people respond to them in regular ways.

> Surely the ability to  
> perceive structure, to alter one's actions so as to create and change  
> structures that are perceived, is a more fundamental aspect of organization  
> than is the ability to perceive and control for a particular example of  
> structure.

Indeed, but we are still amazingly ignorant about the general nature of the  
funny kinds of structure that there are out there in languages, like a  
language called Kayardild in Northern Australia where the words in some  
noun-phrases can take up to four levels of morphological case-marking,  
expressing, among other things, the tense and modality of the clause,  
and certain aspects of subordination. I go for the descriptive schemes  
(commonly though probably wrongly called `theories') that I think are  
most likely to give \*sharp\* descriptions of these things. Sharp means  
that I can describe the scheme to a programmar who can go away and  
implement it without doing any serious linguistic theorizing, (e.g., it  
is well-defined in fact, even if it doesn't bristle with horrible-looking  
symbols) & students can then use the resulting system to implement their  
answers to descriptive problems (this means that it expresses the basic  
organization of the data in a clear and straightforward manner).

The involvement with descriptive schemes isn't because I don't believe  
in real modelling, but because I wouldn't have a clue as to how to  
actually do it in this area in such a way as to do justice to the  
aspects of grammar that I like to think about. And a model that  
doen't explain how the various wierdo grammatical structures I'm  
interested in can arise will just be wrong, so the results of the  
descriptive scheme project ought to be useful as constraints on  
model building, when somebody is clever enough to figure out how to  
actually do it.

Grammar-learning & interaction: children say lots of stuff they've  
never said before as fluently as adults say things, & I doubt we really  
loose these skills. I've never denied that grammar-learning is  
interactional, & suggested various formulations for what the system  
driving acquisition might be (something like: perceive people making sense.  
e.g. when people are not perceived as making sense, the grammatical  
system starts getting Reorganized). Knowing what the grammatical systems  
of a wide variety of languages are like should help in figuring out  
what is being Reorganized, & how.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au  
(currently andrews@csli.stanford.edu\_
