Law, Truth, Science, Apology

[From Rick Marken (950213.2200)]

John Staddon (950211) --

the legal concept of "responsibility" requires that behavior be
predictable, not the converse,

I thought the legal concept of responsibility required evidence that
the accused actually 1) caused the result 2) intended that the result
occur and 3) knew that the result was "wrong". In Staddon's causal
model of the accused, the only evidence that can be evaluated sensibly is
evidence that the accused actually caused the result. A causal system
has no intentions (it doesn't control) and it makes no sense to ask
whether such a system knew that a particular result was wrong; in a causal
system, results are just results.

It is interesting that in his reply, Staddon never addressed the substance
of the criticism of his Atlantic article. The main criticism was that the
causal model assumed in the article does not explain intentional (purposive)
behavior. Staddon doesn't even mention "purpose" in his reply. Could he be
purposefully avoiding something?

Martin Taylor (950213 14:10) --

Personally, I just gave up the goal of "trying to get Rick to see things
my (the right) way" and have settled for bringing truth and
understanding to the rest of the CSG world.

Don't give up on me, Martin! I might see the truth yet. Data works
quite well on me. Once you get the right kind of data you might get me
to understand some of the remarkable truths you have brought to the
CSG world, like the ever popular "There is information about the
disturbance in the perceptual signal" and the newer, but just as exciting
"There are alerting stimuli that cause people to shift their attention
to problem situations":wink:

I know that these things must be true because you said they are true.
But I'm trying to act like a real scientist so if you could show me how
you know these things are true it would make me feel a lot more
comfortable when I go and tell these truths to Tom and Bill.

Bill Powers (950213.0845 MST) --

When the person [in a compensatory tracking task] succeeds in
controlling the remote variable quite accurately despite those
invisible disturbances, the message is not just that PCT predicted this
ability, but that NO OTHER THEORY IN WHICH SCIENTISTS
CURRENTLY BELIEVE CAN PREDICT OR EXPLAIN IT.

You know this. I know this. But scientists who believe in other
theories don't know this -- and they don't really WANT to know this.
Indeed, we have run into many scientists who believe in PCT and, at
the same time, other theories which CANNOT PREDICT OR EXPLAIN
the result you describe above. Your ideal scientist will see what
happens in the tracking task and kiss S-R, cognitive, information,
reinforcement, complex systems, etc theories goodby. But most real
scientists just tuck their cause-effect theories comfortably into their
existing structure of beliefs (which might include PCT) and carry on
as though nothing special happened at all.

You know why this happens; I know why this happens: scientists are a bunch
of perceptual control systems, just like the rest of us.I just like to
kvetch about it every couple of days;-)

By the way, Bill. The post on positive feedback was a work of art.
Thanks.

Marc S. Abrams (950213.2135) --

Apology accepted.

Now, why don't we talk about PCT. Maybe you could tell us what
initially attracted you to PCT and what you like about the theory
and what you understand the theory to be about.

Best

Rick

[Martin Taylor 950214 12:10]

Rick Marken (950213.2200)

Don't give up on me, Martin! I might see the truth yet.

I didn't say I'd given up on you. I said I'd given up on the goal of
"trying to get Rick to see things my (the right) way", which is very
different. It's my way of relaxing:-) I'm very hopeful that you
will see the truth yet, in your own time and in your own way.

...you might get me
to understand some of the remarkable truths you have brought to the
CSG world, like the ever popular "There is information about the
disturbance in the perceptual signal" and the newer, but just as exciting
"There are alerting stimuli that cause people to shift their attention
to problem situations":wink:

I know that these things must be true because you said they are true.

Just as with the "given up on you" notion, you make subtle changes in what I
try to get across on these topics, and then say that I'm incorrect. That's
why I have given up on the goal, but not on the prospect of your discovering
the truth for yourself. The things you quote are not the things I have said
must be true.

My procedure in both cases was what Bill P required--to present what ought
to be incontrovertible demonstrations. And the result in both cases is what
Bill has noted when PCT has been presented in the form of incontrovertible
demonstrations to other psychologists: denial, shift of the ground, or
some other way of getting around confronting the facts. In both cases,
the demonstrations come from the structure of the core theory of PCT,
not from experimental data. And perhaps that's why they don't connect
for you.

Here's the claims: (1) It is through the perceptual function that the
information needed for control is obtained. (2) There are more perceptual
functions involving controllable perceptions than can be controlled at
any moment, and there is a need for some mechanism to shift what is
controlled when some currently uncontrolled perception is disturbed
sufficiently to matter.

There's no claim (1) that there is information about the disturbance in the
perceptual signal. There's no claim (2) (at least not a theoretically based
one) that there are alerting stimuli, and even though the different senses
seem to have evolved to provide or not to provide alerts there is no claim
that the signals from the more alerting senses (touch, hearing, peripheral
vision) "cause" people to shift their attention. Whether attention shifts
or not under alerting conditions may well be a matter of higher-level
control, as I acknowledged whenever Bill P. mentioned that possibility.

Perhaps I should ask you to take the other position, and show, using only
the core PCT assumptions, how it is possible to avoid the necessity for
the existence of some alerting mechanism, given the larger number of
potentially controllable perceptions than available outputs. The fact
that the evolved existence of alerting systems had been observed long
before PCT does not alter the fact that PCT seems to demand there
be alerting systems of some kind--not necessarily "alerting stimuli."

These things are not supposed to be taken as true because I say so, but
because you should see it for yourself from the structure of the theory.
They follow from a belief that PCT, in its core form, must be true.

Looking at the world for data, to show that they are so, happened earlier
in the case of the alerting system, and makes no sense outside the theory
in the case of the "information about the disturbance in [sic!] the
perceptual signal". Both issues relate to the structure of hierarchic
control systems of the kind PCT assumes to exist within animals, not to
any particular control system.

But I'm trying to act like a real scientist so if you could show me how
you know these things are true it would make me feel a lot more
comfortable when I go and tell these truths to Tom and Bill.

Go back two or three years and re-read. It's been done.

I still have hopes;-)

Martin

[From Lash LaRue, 1995.02.14/ 1110 EST]

[Re Rick Marken (950213.2200) & John Staddon (950211)]

>the legal concept of "responsibility" requires that behavior be
>predictable, not the converse,

I thought the legal concept of responsibility required evidence that
the accused actually 1) caused the result 2) intended that the result
occur and 3) knew that the result was "wrong". In Staddon's causal
model of the accused, the only evidence that can be evaluated sensibly is
evidence that the accused actually caused the result. A causal system
has no intentions (it doesn't control) and it makes no sense to ask
whether such a system knew that a particular result was wrong; in a causal
system, results are just results.

Be careful about how you generalize about "the law." It is messy,
and at times quite inconsistent. Sorry about that, but PCT should be
able to predict as much. We are humans are inconsistent and messy,
which fact helps out in the process Powers has labelled
"reorganization." And the law reflects our messiness.

But to take the points above in the order stated:
    1) "caused the result" : not all crimes have a "causal" element,
or perhaps a better way of putting it is that not all crimes have a
causal element, given the way that lawyers define "cause." For
example, attempted homicide is a crime that is distinct from
homicide. Some lawyers have used the phrase "inchoate crimes" to
refer to this category of crime. Another example would be
conspiracy; the conspirators need not succeed in their project for
them to be guilty. And I could multiple examples forever.
    1)a) there is a subtle point about "acts" that may also be
relevant. In homicide, the result of death defines the crime; but in
other cases, such as speeding, the act is a crime without regard to
the result.
    2) "intended the result" : not generally a requirement. For
example, if you behave recklessly, and someone dies, then you are
still guilty of homicide. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once gave the
following example. Someone leaves a baby on a doorstep on a cold
February night, hoping that another will discover the baby and take
custody of it; if the baby dies, it is homicide.
    2)a) this point can in some cases overlap with 1)a). Sometimes
the law works in the following way: if you "intend" the "act," and
then a bad consequence follows, then you are responsible for the
consequences. This particular principle is highly controversial, and
so do not generalize it too strongly; but quite often, the law works
out to that result.
    3) "knew that the result was wrong" : the law generally assumes
this, and the standard maxim is: "ignorance of the law is no excuse."
However, one can enter a plea of insanity; and then this principle
comes into play.

The law can get technical and confusing on all of these issues, so
perhaps none of the above makes much sense. But don't suppose that
the law takes the "subjective" point of view that the media normally
portray it as taking.

Best wishes, Lash

Lewis Henry LaRue
Washington and Lee University
School of Law
Lexington, VA 24450

e-mail address: LHL@WLU.EDU
telephone: 703-463-8513