# Learning proposal

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278>\
**Category:** CSG1996\
**Created:** [November 26, 1996, 5:15pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278 "1996-11-26T17:15:24Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 10\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ba8739/32.png) [@Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Abbott)\
**Post date:** [November 26, 1996, 5:15pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/1 "1996-11-26T17:15:24Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (961126.1215 EST)]

> Rick Marken (961125.1600) --

> > Bruce Abbott (961125.1540 EST)

> > Actions are movements, acts are perceived consequences of movements. An act  
> > might be a circle, drawn in the air by the tip of my finger as a result of a  
> > certain sequence of actions (muscle contractions)...The act is a perception  
> > arising from behavior.

> > A particular act may be intended or unintended.

> This is an interesting new concept -- an unintented perceived consequence of  
> actions. Ok. So learning (according to your model) involves changing  
> perceived consequences of action from being unintended to being intended.  
> This means developing a reference for some state of these perceptions.

Hey, an "interesting new concept." Now we're getting somewhere! Yes,  
exactly: this means developing a reference for some state of these perceptions.

> > When the rat first depressed the lever, that act was probably a side-effect  
> > of activity related to controlling some other variable. When that act is  
> > followed by the delivery of a food pellet, the rat tends to repeat the  
> > series of acts that immediately preceded that delivery.

> Interesting. So the rat has some memory of all the perceived consequences of  
> its actions -- intended and unintended -- that happened "prior" to the  
> reward.

That's right, Rick: I am assuming that the rat remembers what was doing when  
the pellet appeared. You're doing great!

> And then, for some reason, after the reward the rat "tends" to repeat  
> a "series of acts" that immediately preceded that delivery.

> The number of perceived consequences of actions (acts) that precede (by how  
> much?) a reward is very large - - probably equivalent to the number of  
> afferent neurons in the NS. Which acts or series of acts does the rat \_tend\_  
> to repeat?

Before continuing, I want to make it clear that I include the sensory  
feedback produced by those movements (including tactile and proprioceptive  
ones) among the "perceived consequences" of actions. Which acts does the  
rat tend to repeat? Excellent question. I would hypothesize that these are  
the ones that the rat was doing just prior to the appearance of the pellet.

> Why does the rat "tend" to repeat them?

I used the word "tend" because the rat is not always observed to repeat  
these acts -- quite possibly because other control systems (e.g., those  
producing exploratory behavior) sometimes get asserted at the time when this  
repetition of the acts should be getting underway. For theoretical  
purposes, we can assume that these acts \_will\_ be repeated, under the  
assumption that there are no conflicts with other systems getting in the way.

> How strong is the tendency  
> to repeat them. If a reward occurs \_while\_ the rat is repeating these acts,  
> does the rat stop repeating the acts and then restart again? If so, at what  
> point?

Great questions. I believe the proposal would say that if a reward occurs  
\_while\_ the rat is repeating these acts, that they would be cut short; now  
that the pellet is available, the portion of the sequence beginning with  
approaching the pellet and ending with its consumption would commence. When  
the pellet was gone, the rat would then repeat what it was doing previously  
when the pellet appeared.

> How does it know about the beginning and end of "acts" and "rewards".

The end of the acts is defined by pellet delivery. How the beginning would  
be defined is a matter for research, but it is no doubt related to the  
duration over which the memory of the acts prior to pellet delivery  
persists. Appearance of the pellet is what the currently active control  
system is "looking for." The appearance and disappearance of the pellet is  
a simple matter of perception.

> Your model has more loose ends than I originally suspected.

Yes, it does have a number of gaps -- I've only begun to develop it. It  
requires that I suggest specific mechanisms, such as one to activate the  
"replay" of the perceptual memory for recent acts -- which would act as the  
reference variables for reproducing the remembered acts via lower control  
systems.

> > What was a side-effect of activity directed toward other goals

> What does this mean? The side-effect (non-goal directed) activity was  
> directed toward goals all along?

No. An example may clarify: Depressing the lever occurred not because the  
rat wanted to press the lever, but because, e.g., it wanted to rear up and  
sniff the upper part of the chamber. It placed its paw against the lever  
and, pushing down in order to raise itself up, as a side-effect the rat  
tripped the switch.

> > now becomes the goal itself -- the rat intends to repeat that perceived  
> > pattern of activity, i.e., what it was \_doing\_ on the previous occasion just  
> > before the pellet was delivered.

> OK. So the rat ends up repeating (for some unspecified reason and by some  
> unspecified means) one perceived consequence of its actions -- say, the  
> perception of the lever in a particular state. But what if putting the  
> level in a particular state was not the repeated act? Suppose the  
> rat had repeated the tongue movement perception it produced just before  
> the reward. How does the rat select new perceptual consequences to repeat?

Good question. It could try something else at random, though I doubt this  
would be the case. More likely it will return to exploration of the chamber  
("looking for food"), which may eventually lead to another tripping of the  
lever. This is probably the default mode what might be called the "food  
acquisition" control system.

> Your model assumes that learning leads to the particular act or act stream  
> (perception of the lever in a particular state) that produces reward. But it  
> is often the case that quite different acts -- ones that have never before  
> been followed by reward -- must be produced in order to produce the reward.

Yes, and my proposal allows those previously unrewarded acts to occur.

> The "acts" you describe are actually perceptual \_variables\_.

Yes, but they are very special ones: they are under the animal's control.

> Under most  
> circumstances, organisms can control a reward only by varying the reference  
> state to which the "act" perception is brought.

That is how the act is voluntarily produced.

> This can be demonstrated in a  
> tracking task where subjects must (and DO) learn how to vary their reference  
> for the kinesthetic perception of handle position in order to get the reward  
> of having the cursor stay in the intended location.

Yes, it's called "trial and error" learning. But these are not random  
changes; one tries slight variations, looking for improvement in terms of  
minimal cursor movement, reduction in overshoot, etc. What goes on is, I  
think, more sophisticated than e-coli type random reorganization.

> This is basic hierarchical control theory. I suggest that you carefully  
> reread my "Spreadsheet hierarchy..." paper (and play with the spreadsheet  
> model a bit) to see how it works.

I know how it works, I've played with the model, and it's a nice  
demonstration. But I doubt that it works efficiently enough in the enormous  
parameter space in which living organisims exist. Something vastly more  
efficient is required there than random reorganization of parameters, in my  
opinion, and my little story, vague as it is in some important details, at  
least provides a starting point on the way toward an alternative.

I'd like you to try the following and give my your thoughts:

Demonstration 1  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Move your arm so that your finger tip traces out a circle in the air.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Now that you've done it, can you remember what it looked like? Felt like?  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Can you reproduce the act? If so, how?

Demonstration 2  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Watch someone else perform some simple act (e.g., picking up a coffee cup).  
&nbsp;&nbsp;Now reproduce that act (i.e., do it yourself). Were you able to? How did  
&nbsp;&nbsp;you do that?

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ba8739/32.png) [@Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Abbott)\
**Post date:** [November 27, 1996, 2:02am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/2 "1996-11-27T02:02:51Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (961126.0900 EST)]

> Rick Marken (961126.1330) --

> > Bruce Abbott (961126.1215 EST)

> > That is how the act is voluntarily produced.

> But that doesn't explain how the animal learns to control. If you ever  
> actually develop a working version of this model, you will find that the  
> model, as you describe it, cannot possibly learn to control -- a big failing  
> in a model of learning;-)

I think I'm hearing wishful opinion; certainly I don't find any scrap of  
reasoning to back it up. It won't work because Rick Marken says it won't,  
that about it?

> > I'd like you to try the following and give my your thoughts:

> > Demonstration 1  
> > Move your arm so that your finger tip traces out a circle in the air.  
> > Now that you've done it, can you remember what it looked like? Felt like?  
> > Can you reproduce the act?

> Yes.

> > If so, how?

> Got me. I think it has something to do with my ability to select remembered  
> reference specifications for perceptions.

How do you select remembered reference specifications for perceptions?

> > Demonstration 2  
> > Watch someone else perform some simple act (e.g., picking up a coffee cup).  
> > Now reproduce that act (i.e., do it yourself). Were you able to?

> Yes.

> > How did you do that?

> Again, it was probably by selection of remembered reference specifications  
> but, in this case, the selection was based on what I \_imagined\_ the  
> perceptual consequences of controlling these perceptions would be \_for  
> another person\_, one who would be in the same position watching me as I was  
> when watching the person I am now trying to imitate.

How were you able to imagine what the perceptual consequences of controlling  
these perceptions would be for another person? How were you able to turn  
these into reference specifications for exactly the right control systems?

> I think these demonstrations indirectly suggest just how impossible it would  
> be for a rat to know which perceptions (acts) to repeat after receiving a  
> reward. In these demonstrations I knew, in advance, which perception I was to  
> repeat. The rat has no idea when it is going to get a reward so it has no  
> idea what perception(s) to repeat when it finally actually does get one.

I'm hypothesizing that it remembers what it was doing when the pellet  
appeared and uses the remembered reference specifications for those acts to  
repeat those acts. That severely limits the number of perceptions that need  
to be repeated. Also, I think that the perception of "doing" something  
probably doesn't normally include the thousands of parallel control systems  
involved in keeping physiological variables within normal limits, so that  
would impose a further restriction on the possibilities.

> A reward occurs at some point during hundreds (thousands?) of continuous  
> parallel streams of controlled and uncontrolled perceptions: the organism is  
> continuously perceiving and controlling many visual, kinesthetic, visceral,  
> auditory, etc perceptions before and during the occurance of the reward. Your  
> model has the rat selecting, from all these perceptions (controlled and  
> uncontrolled) one or a "series" of several percpetions to repeat. The chance  
> that the organism will repeat just \_the\_ one perception (or series of  
> perceptions) that actually has anything to do with the occurance of the  
> reward is ridiculously small.

I doubt it it's at all that complex. If I drop my pen on the desk and it  
happens to make a neat sound, I don't perceive having any trouble  
identifying which perceptions I have to repeat so I can hear that sound  
again. I doubt that the rat has any more trouble than I do.

> I think this model of yours is based (surprise) on an old S-R proclivity to  
> perceive the world only at the event level. There are stimulus events (lights  
> going on or off, levers appearing or disappearing), response events (presses,  
> licks, pecks) and reinforcing events (food pellets, shocks). It's a nice,  
> discrete world where there is a place for everything and everything is in its  
> place. It's a world that exists at only one level of the 9+ level PCT  
> hierarchy.

Most things we do require that we complete one sequence (bring one  
perception to reference) before we initiate the next. I've got to pick up  
my shoe before I can put it on, stand up before I can walk, walk to the door  
before I can open it. The rat must approach the lever before it can press  
it, approach the food cup before it can sieze the food, place the food in  
its mouth before it can chew and swallow the food. These are not  
requirements of the nice, neat, artificial world of the operant chamber but  
of the world in which all of us live, all of the time. To control some  
variables effectively, one must organize a sequence correctly. My  
hypothesis is intended to deal with that process, so naturally, it focuses  
on these discrete events that signal the successful completion of one  
control process and the initiation of the next.

> When you eventually decide to leave the dark side and go all the way with the  
> brilliance of PCT, you'll realize that the world we experience is a world of  
> many different \_types\_ of continuously changing perceptual \_variables\_.

Yes, I know all about continuously changing perceptual variables: I model  
them all the time. But I am really amazed at your world. It is a world  
where all the difficult problems (like learning) have already been solved, a  
bright, changeless, pristine world in which no theoretical concept will ever  
need revision, so perfect are they in conception, so wonderous to behold.  
Not at all as it is over here on the Dark Side, where mere mortals must  
struggle to understand the nature of underlying reality from vague shadows  
cast upon the wall.

Tell me about some of the empirical observations you see as offering  
difficulties for HPCT as now constructed.

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/9fc348/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken)\
**Post date:** [November 27, 1996, 4:42pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/3 "1996-11-27T16:42:54Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (961127.0840)]

Me:

> you will find that the model, as you describe it, cannot possibly learn to  
> control -- a big failing \>in a model of learning;-)

Bruce Abbott (961126.0900 EST) --

> I think I'm hearing wishful opinion; certainly I don't find any scrap of  
> reasoning to back it up. It won't work because Rick Marken says it won't,  
> that about it?

It seems like cruelty to nightcrawlers to throw any more light on the dark  
side than has already being thrown by Jedi knight sublime "Luke" Powers.  
After all, when the force is with you, you know that people who actively  
shield themselves from the light are \_controlling\_ for being in the dark.

But let me quickly explain why your learning model will not learn to control.  
The basic problem (among MANY) is that your model, as described, simply  
causes a reference to be set for the \_specific perception\_ (act) that  
occurred prior to the reward.

Ignoring the problems of 1) how the model decides \_which\_ of the many  
perceptions that preceded the reward should be repeated 2) how the model  
knows how to produce (using the appropriate actions) a perception it has  
never produced before and 3) how the model can repeat an uncontrolled  
perception is \_has\_ produced before when circumstances demand a new set of  
actions in order to producethat perception, the model's main problem is that  
it only learns to repeat the specific perceptions (acts) that have been  
followed by reward. For example, the model will only repeat the \_specific\_  
movement perceptions that produced reward on the previous occasion. If the  
movements required to produce reward are different on the next occasion, the  
model will be completly flummoxed until it manages to produce the movement  
perceptions that happen to produce the reward.

The problem with your dark side model (as described) is that it learns to  
repeat acts (perceptions that occur before the reward). Control systems can't  
control by repeating acts; they control by varying the references for lower  
order acts (perceptions) \_as necessary\_ in order to control higher order acts  
(perceptions). Control systems control by using the appropriate \_transfer  
function\_ relating error to output (even if the output is a reference  
specification for the perception controlled by a lower order system). So, in  
order to learn to control new perceptions (or old perceptions in new  
environments), a control system must learn \_transfer functions\_.

One more point. You say:

> I'm hypothesizing that it [the rat] remembers what it was doing when the  
> pellet appeared and uses the remembered reference specifications for those  
> acts to repeat those acts. That severely limits the number of perceptions  
> that need to be repeated.

This is more dark side thinking. When you look at a rat, all you see is one  
or two activities that produce reward. But that's YOUR perception of the  
situation -- actually, it's just the aspect of your perception of the  
situation to which you attend. The rat is actually producing (and  
controlling) many, many "acts" (perceptions) "when the pellet appears". A rat  
(like everyone else) is always controlling all the perceptions it controls;  
it's controlling the force at its joints, its center of gravity, it's  
movement patterns (transitions), it's relationship to other objects, etc,  
etc. The rat doesn't stop controlling all these variabls and just control  
"the lever" at some point. Pressing the lever is just one visible side  
effect of the rats continuous control of a zillion perceptual variables  
that it is continuously controlling. The lever press is the side effect you  
notice, however, because you know that that is the one event that will  
produce reward. But the rat is just busy controlling everything it controls -  
- its saliva flow, its surface temperature, its balance, its gait, its  
movements etc etc - - \_while\_ it is controlling its orientation relative  
to something in the cage (lever), the visual patterns on its retina, the  
auditory patterns, etc etc.

When you write your response to this post, try to think about all the  
perceptions you are controlling \_besides\_ your perception of your reply to  
this post. Your attention may be focused on your reply but try to move your  
attention to other aspects of your perceptual experience - - your posture,  
the music in the background, the smell of turkey cooking (they do eat turkey  
on the dark side, don't they?), etc etc. All these perceptual variables are  
there, and most are under control, even when you think that the \_only\_ thing  
your are controlling (your only "act") is your response to the post.

It is this rich, personal world of perceptual experience -- a world that  
demonstrably (using PCT methods) exists in other organisms --that is not seen  
by those on the dark side. This is why those on the dark side are willing to  
use "behavior modification" for "the good" of another organism. This is why  
I work with Luke to throw light on the dark side; and this is why PCT is the  
dark side's worst nightmare;-)

Best

Han Solo

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ba8739/32.png) [@Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Abbott)\
**Post date:** [November 27, 1996, 5:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/4 "1996-11-27T17:44:58Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (961127.1245 EST)]

> Rick Marken (961127.0840) --

This arrives as I'm heading off to class, but in a quick scan I noticed  
something missing in your reply.

You didn't answer any of my questions.

An oversight?

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ba8739/32.png) [@Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Abbott)\
**Post date:** [November 28, 1996, 1:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/5 "1996-11-28T01:12:08Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (961127.2010 EST)]

> Rick Marken (961127.0840) --

> But let me quickly explain why your learning model will not learn to control.  
> The basic problem (among MANY) is that your model, as described, simply  
> causes a reference to be set for the \_specific perception\_ (act) that  
> occurred prior to the reward.

I follow you so far . . .

> Ignoring the problems of 1) how the model decides \_which\_ of the many  
> perceptions that preceded the reward should be repeated 2) how the model  
> knows how to produce (using the appropriate actions) a perception it has  
> never produced before and 3) how the model can repeat an uncontrolled  
> perception is \_has\_ produced before when circumstances demand a new set of  
> actions in order to producethat perception, the model's main problem is that  
> it only learns to repeat the specific perceptions (acts) that have been  
> followed by reward. For example, the model will only repeat the \_specific\_  
> movement perceptions that produced reward on the previous occasion. If the  
> movements required to produce reward are different on the next occasion, the  
> model will be completly flummoxed until it manages to produce the movement  
> perceptions that happen to produce the reward.

I predict that the \_rat\_ will be completely flummoxed (for a time) if the  
requirement for producing the reward are suddenly changed, unless the the  
new requirement is likely to be met in the course of attempting to reproduce  
the old act. Not only that, I predict that the standard (nonlearning) PCT  
model would be completely flummoxed by the same change.

I do have in the back of my mind the idea that the failure of the old act to  
"produce" would lead to the repetition of previous acts that were successful  
in the past (and now being recalled from memory), but I don't have much of  
an idea yet how to construct the mechanism that might have this result, just  
a short list of its requirements.

> The problem with your dark side model (as described) is that it learns to  
> repeat acts (perceptions that occur before the reward). Control systems can't  
> control by repeating acts; they control by varying the references for lower  
> order acts (perceptions) \_as necessary\_ in order to control higher order acts  
> (perceptions).

You start by asserting that "control systems can't control by repeating  
acts," but then show how they can control \_to\_ repeat acts, as if the truth  
of the first statement somehow depends on the falsity of the second. But  
this is nonsense: both are true. By controlling \_to\_ repeat a given act, a  
rat, pigeon, or person can gain control over yet another perception. For  
example, by producing a lever press (a controlled act-perception), the rat  
gains control over food delivery.

> Control systems control by using the appropriate \_transfer  
> function\_ relating error to output (even if the output is a reference  
> specification for the perception controlled by a lower order system). So, in  
> order to learn to control new perceptions (or old perceptions in new  
> environments), a control system must learn \_transfer functions\_.

The rat must only learn that, to produce food, it must first produce a  
certain set of acts (i.e., approach and depress the lever). As the rat  
already knows how to control its own movements (i.e., it has already learned  
the relevant transfer functions), it need only learn which controlled  
movements to produce. This means identifying which movements are followed  
by pellet delivery. Because the rat already knows how to make any movements  
it wants to, all it needs in order to obtain food is some reason to want to  
approach and press the lever -- it need not learn any new transfer  
functions. As the movements it was executing at the time the pellet was  
delivered are normally the most likely to have produced the food pellet (if  
indeed the movements were involved at all), the rat's best bet is to repeat  
those movements, as best it can remember them. Whatever mechanism normally  
selects which among numerous possible acts to perform (and you seem vague  
about this mechanism yourself), it seems reasonable to assume that the  
appearance of the food (which thus removes the error in the food-seeking  
system) would lead to the playback of the memories of the just-completed  
acts, and that organisms such as the rat have the ability to control the  
references necessary to recreate those remembered acts.

How is this done? I don't know. And according to your answer, neither do  
you. This, it seems to me, is an interesting and important problem for HPCT  
research.

> One more point. You say:
> 
> > I'm hypothesizing that it [the rat] remembers what it was doing when the  
> > pellet appeared and uses the remembered reference specifications for those  
> > acts to repeat those acts. That severely limits the number of perceptions  
> > that need to be repeated.

> This is more dark side thinking. When you look at a rat, all you see is one  
> or two activities that produce reward. But that's YOUR perception of the  
> situation -- actually, it's just the aspect of your perception of the  
> situation to which you attend. The rat is actually producing (and  
> controlling) many, many "acts" (perceptions) "when the pellet appears". A rat  
> (like everyone else) is always controlling all the perceptions it controls;  
> it's controlling the force at its joints, its center of gravity, it's  
> movement patterns (transitions), it's relationship to other objects, etc,  
> etc. The rat doesn't stop controlling all these variabls and just control  
> "the lever" at some point. Pressing the lever is just one visible side  
> effect of the rats continuous control of a zillion perceptual variables  
> that it is continuously controlling. The lever press is the side effect you  
> notice, however, because you know that that is the one event that will  
> produce reward. But the rat is just busy controlling everything it controls -  
> - its saliva flow, its surface temperature, its balance, its gait, its  
> movements etc etc - - \_while\_ it is controlling its orientation relative  
> to something in the cage (lever), the visual patterns on its retina, the  
> auditory patterns, etc etc.

That's the problem for rat or human: how to identify which of these possible  
changes produced by its own movements may have triggered the release of the  
pellet. This is why I suggested that there must be some kind of integration  
of experiences going on, so that the movements reliably correlated with  
pellet delivery can be separated from those only incidentally related (a  
process to increase the signal-to-noise ratio). It's a serious problem, but  
not insoluble. But the only perceptions needed for this analysis in order  
to identify the correct \_acts\_ to perform are act-perceptions: those  
resulting from the organism's own movements.

> When you write your response to this post, try to think about all the  
> perceptions you are controlling \_besides\_ your perception of your reply to  
> this post. Your attention may be focused on your reply but try to move your  
> attention to other aspects of your perceptual experience - - your posture,  
> the music in the background, the smell of turkey cooking (they do eat turkey  
> on the dark side, don't they?), etc etc. All these perceptual variables are  
> there, and most are under control, even when you think that the \_only\_ thing  
> your are controlling (your only "act") is your response to the post.

Unless I just \_changed\_ my posture, it is not relevant, not an act. Nor is  
the music in the background, nor the smell of turkey cooking. (I \_can\_  
learn that the smell of turkey cooking means that I will probably find a  
turkey in the oven, and so on, but that is another, although related,  
story.) The number of perceptual variables changing as a result of my own  
movements is rather limited. For example, if a doorway is low and I fail to  
notice, I may hit my head on the top of the door frame. The number of  
movement-induced perceptual changes that immediately precede the sharp pain  
arising from my scalp is small; I have little difficulty identifing what I  
was doing at the time my head struck the frame.

You seem intent on trying to demonstrate that my little half-developed  
proposal could not possibly work, even with further development. I do  
appreciate your criticisms, as they help to shape my thinking. But why not  
also try to think the situation through with me to find a way for it to work  
and remain consistent with "basic PCT"? As they say, two heads are better  
than one.

> This is why  
> I work with Luke to throw light on the dark side; and this is why PCT is the  
> dark side's worst nightmare;-)

I think with regard to this problem that we are all somewhat in the dark,  
PCT or no PCT.

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/3e96dc/32.png) [@T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/T_B_Harms1)\
**Post date:** [November 28, 1996, 2:13am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/6 "1996-11-28T02:13:20Z")

</div>

> From Tracy Harms (1996;11,27.19:12 MST)

Bruce Abbott (961127.2010 EST)]

> > Rick Marken (961127.0840)[...]  
> > When you write your response to this post, try to think about all the  
> > perceptions you are controlling \_besides\_ your perception of your reply to  
> > this post. Your attention may be focused on your reply but try to move your  
> > attention to other aspects of your perceptual experience - - your posture,  
> > the music in the background, the smell of turkey cooking (they do eat turkey  
> > on the dark side, don't they?), etc etc. All these perceptual variables are  
> > there, and most are under control, even when you think that the \_only\_ thing  
> > your are controlling (your only "act") is your response to the post.
> 
> Unless I just \_changed\_ my posture, it is not relevant, not an act. Nor is  
> the music in the background, nor the smell of turkey cooking.

This looks very wrong to me. There are perceptions being actively  
controlled by a given posture even when that posture goes unchanged. Every  
posture is the result of a combination of muscular tensions, and the nature  
of muscles means that there are error-corrections which alter these muscle  
tensions over time as a given posture is held \*unchanged\*. Stand on one  
foot, as still as you are able, for five, twenty, or fourty minutes; that  
should make this clear. Meditation and military training are means by  
which people become skillful at maintaining given postures for long  
durations with little or no apparent change, but a small amount of personal  
practice quickly teaches that prolonged maintenance of a given posture is  
accomplished by constant error-correcting behavior--just as PCT theorizes.

Hearing ambiant music and smelling ambiant odors are also relevant. I  
haven't figured out how to rightly think about these things yet, but I have  
figured out enough to be confident that ongoing perceptual-control  
correction is involved in both. Sorry I'm too much the tyro to spell out  
the how and why.

Tracy Bruce Harms tbh@tesser.com  
Boulder, Colorado

> **···**
>
> ==========================================================================  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"There is only one way I can see for fallible, ignorant human beings  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to live in accord with their own real natures and that is to discard  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;forever the principle of controlling each other's behavior, dropping  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;even the \*desire\* to control other people, and seeing at every level  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the fallacy in the logic that leads to such a desire."  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;William T. Powers

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/ba8739/32.png) [@Bruce\_Abbott](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Abbott)\
**Post date:** [November 28, 1996, 4:43pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/7 "1996-11-28T16:43:47Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (961128.1120 EST)]

> Tracy Harms (1996;11,27.19:12 MST) --

> > Bruce Abbott (961127.2010 EST)

> > Unless I just \_changed\_ my posture, it is not relevant, not an act. Nor is  
> > the music in the background, nor the smell of turkey cooking.

> This looks very wrong to me. There are perceptions being actively  
> controlled by a given posture even when that posture goes unchanged. Every  
> posture is the result of a combination of muscular tensions, and the nature  
> of muscles means that there are error-corrections which alter these muscle  
> tensions over time as a given posture is held \*unchanged\*. Stand on one  
> foot, as still as you are able, for five, twenty, or fourty minutes; that  
> should make this clear. Meditation and military training are means by  
> which people become skillful at maintaining given postures for long  
> durations with little or no apparent change, but a small amount of personal  
> practice quickly teaches that prolonged maintenance of a given posture is  
> accomplished by constant error-correcting behavior--just as PCT theorizes.

I agree completely that we are actively controlling perceptions all the  
time, just as you (and PCT) describe. But it is the consequences of  
movements that I want the model to focus on -- the dynamic changes in the  
values of these movement-related perceptions. At least, that seems to make  
sense to me. I'm open to suggestions.

> Hearing ambiant music and smelling ambiant odors are also relevant. I  
> haven't figured out how to rightly think about these things yet, but I have  
> figured out enough to be confident that ongoing perceptual-control  
> correction is involved in both. Sorry I'm too much the tyro to spell out  
> the how and why.

Relevant to what? Let's say that you're trying to figure out how to get the  
refridgerator door open. What do the music and ambiant odors have to do  
with that problem?

> &nbsp;&nbsp;"There is only one way I can see for fallible, ignorant human beings  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;to live in accord with their own real natures and that is to discard  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;forever the principle of controlling each other's behavior, dropping  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;even the \*desire\* to control other people, and seeing at every level  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;the fallacy in the logic that leads to such a desire."  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;William T. Powers

So if my neighbor wants to kill me, I should let him do it, right?

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/3e96dc/32.png) [@T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/T_B_Harms1)\
**Post date:** [November 28, 1996, 5:56pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/8 "1996-11-28T17:56:36Z")

</div>

> From Tracy Harms (1996;11,28.10 MST)

Bruce Abbott (961128.1120 EST), in response to Bill's sentence which  
appears in my .sig you quip

> So if my neighbor wants to kill me, I should let him do it, right?

I am pretty much stunned by the facetious shallowness of your reply. This  
is the sort of conversation I brace myself for when I go to UseNet's  
alt.politics.whatever, but not at all what I expected here. In my  
judgement this is not a genuine question, but an expression of  
belligerence. Frankly, Bruce, I'm not in the mood for an argument of that  
sort.

Tracy Bruce Harms tbh@tesser.com  
Boulder, Colorado

> **···**
>
> ==========================================================================  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"There is only one way I can see for fallible, ignorant human beings  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to live in accord with their own real natures and that is to discard  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;forever the principle of controlling each other's behavior, dropping  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;even the \*desire\* to control other people, and seeing at every level  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the fallacy in the logic that leads to such a desire."  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;William T. Powers

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/9fc348/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken)\
**Post date:** [November 29, 1996, 10:17pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/9 "1996-11-29T22:17:26Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (961129.1420)]

Bruce Abbott (961127.1840 EST) --

> These seem to be serious gaps in what was supposed to be an HPCT-based  
> explanation, if I understood you correctly...I dare say that it hardly seems  
> less speculative than the little story I offered . . . Or did I miss  
> something?

The speculativeness of your story wasn't the problem; it was the  
plausibility of your story, given what we know about how behavior  
(control) works.

> What empirical observations DO you see as offering difficulties for HPCT  
> as now constructed? Surely after 14 or so years you've run into \_some\_.

Are you asking "what empirical observations \_have already been\_ made that  
offer difficulties for HPCT as now constructed?" If so, then obviously the  
answer is "none". Otherwise we would already have fixed the model or  
abandoned it.

The closest I ever came to making an observation that "offered difficulties"  
for HPCT was when I discovered the "Marken effect"; the fact that control  
is better when the disturbance to a controlled variable is the output of a low  
gain control system rather than an inanimate source generating the \_same\_  
disturbance waveform. A simple control model exhibits identical behavior  
in both disturbance conditions but people do much better against the "live"  
disturbance than against a playback of the \_same\_ disturbance waveform.

This result came as a surprise to both Bill P. and me. Bill quickly found the  
solution, however. The control model acts just like the human when a transport  
lag is included in the model. So a result that appeared at first glance to  
offer difficulties for the HPCT model actually provided more support for it.

Bruce Abbott (961127.2010 EST)

> You start by asserting that "control systems can't control by repeating  
> acts," but then show how they can control \_to\_ repeat acts.

Your problem here is that you are ignoring the hierarchical nature of  
control. In a hierarchical control organization, a control system at  
any level above the lowest in the hierarchy must vary its \_actions\_ (the  
reference for lower order "acts") in order to produce an "act" ( the  
intended state of its own controlled perceptual variable). Your model says  
that a control system repeats a particular action (the reference for a lower  
order "act", such as pressing a lever) when a reward occurs. Again,  
I suggest that you build the model and see what happens. I don't believe  
that such a model could possibly learn to control.

The rest of your post was nicely answered by Tracy Harms(1996;11,27.19:12 MST)  
and Bill Powers (961128.2200 MST).

Tracy Harms (1996;11,28.10 MST) --

> Bruce Abbott (961128.1120 EST), in response to Bill's sentence which  
> appears in my .sig you quip

> > So if my neighbor wants to kill me, I should let him do it, right?

> ...Frankly, Bruce, I'm not in the mood for an argument of that sort.

I think argument can be useful, especially on this important topic. Bruce  
Abbott was responding to the following quote from B:CP:

> "There is only one way I can see for fallible, ignorant human beings  
> to live in accord with their own real natures and that is to discard forever  
> the principle of controlling each other's behavior, dropping even the

\>\*desire\* to control other people, and seeing at every level the fallacy

> in the logic that leads to such a desire."

I think this is a brilliant choice of quotes for your sig file, Tracy. It  
really captures the "bottom line" of PCT. Of course, in order to understand  
the bottom line,it's necessary to understand what was above it. Apparently,  
you do but Bruce Abbott is still having some problems with it.

Bruce seems to think that "discarding forever the principle of controlling  
each other's behavior" is an admonition to "stop all controlling" or, in other  
words, to "be a door mat". Of course, we can't stop controlling, whether  
we want to or not. But we can stop some of our controlling -- the controlling  
that involves control of other living control systems.

If you don't want your neighbor to kill you, then there are basically  
three ways to deal with the problem; 1) control him 2) negotiate with  
him or 3) defend against him. PCT suggests that option 1) always  
leads to problems -- ergo, Bill's statement above. Option 3) is what you  
do, whether you want to or not, when all else fails (or is impossible); if  
you are controlling for not getting hurt then you do what you can to resist  
disturbances to this variable. Option 2) is the "best" option; PCT shows  
how to negotiate effectively; the goal of negotiation is to help \_both\_  
parties go "up a level".

Best

Rick

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/3e96dc/32.png) [@T\_B\_Harms1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/T_B_Harms1)\
**Post date:** [December 1, 1996, 3:43am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/learning-proposal/6278/10 "1996-12-01T03:43:21Z")

</div>

> From Tracy Harms (1996;11,30.20)

Rick Marken (961129.1420)

> Are you [Bruce Abbott] asking "what empirical observations \_have already  
> been\_ made that offer difficulties for HPCT as now constructed?" If so,  
> then obviously the answer is "none". Otherwise we would already have fixed  
> the model or abandoned it.

Perhaps things are very different in psychology than they are in  
philosophy, but in philosophy serious problems may be found with a theory  
yet the theory may remain popular for generations. Searches for fixes are  
undertaken, but a theory's abandonment often does not widely occur until  
something better comes along. (In some cases, it takes much longer  
still...)

Tracy Harms