[From Bill Powers (960430.1700 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (960430.1215 EDT) --
Bill and Rick are of the "Soft" school. PCT describes are
hierarchical control system, but an autonomous "force"
(consciousness) can intervene and redirect elements of the system.
Peter belongs to the "Hard" school which maintains that it is "PCT
all the way down" (more accurately "PCT all the way up"). In the
Hard school, there is no need to invoke a consciousness or
awareness out side the hierarchical system -- consciousness and
awareness are part and parcel of the hierarchical system.
Nice distinction, but you got it backward. Rick and I are the Hard
school, Peter is describing the Soft school.
Rick, Peter, and I, I presume, begin with the same observations: there
seems to be an observer and an observed, with the observer being some
sort of receiver of information from the observed. Rick and I do not
postulate any kind of receiver; we just say there is one. It might
consist of neural circuits (a higher-level system), or ectoplasm, or a
fourth-dimensional pseudopod of a Cosmic Panjandrum. Who cares? We don't
know what it is, so the best we can do is try to characterize what it
does.
The view Peter puts forth, on the other hand, attempts to explain the
nature of this receiver. It is said to consist of "reverberating
reentrant (or recursive) signals." It is "the whole system." It is
"coherence." It is "patterns." This, I submit, is the Soft, or Arm-
Waving, terminology. These terms don't actually represent descriptions
of mechanisms; they're just suggestive words unconnected to any specific
functions. They create the impression that one is talking about a
mechanism, but somehow the mechanism itself is not described, nor is it
explained how such a mechanism could result in the observed phenomena.
That is the essence of the Soft approach.
The Hard approach doesn't fingo any hypotheticorum. If we don't know how
it works, we say so. We try to think of experiments that would at least
shed some light on the function of the apparent phenomenon. We don't
say, "Well, like, it's just the Whole Thing, man, it's all this
Coherence and Reverberation, you know, all that Reentrant Self-Reflexive
snake-up-its-own-ass stuff that you have to just sort of feel because
definitions are like restrictive, man. But it's all, you know, neurons."
Sorry, Peter -- got carried away a bit with memories of annual meetings
of the ASC ;-)>
I can say this with confidence: I don't know what awareness is or how it
works, and neither does anyone else.
···
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Richard Thurman (960430.0815) --
So I ask, once again, is awareness necessarily the same as
attention and/or consciousness?
Here are the theoretical distinctions I make.
1. Perception. The existence of a signal in an afferent pathway at any
level in the hierarchy. Perceptions are necessarily present when control
is taking place, because they are what is controlled.
2. Awareness. Receiving information about the activitiies of some system
in the hierarchy (by what, I refuse to try to say). It seems that what
awareness receives are copies of perceptual signals, but maybe other
signals in the hierarchy are accessible, too. Awareness receives
_selectively_ -- that is, at one time it may be receiving copies of one
set of perceptual signals, and at another time copies of another set.
This mobility of the locus of awareness is the main import of the term
"attention." These sets of perceptions may come from anywhere in the
hierarchy, bottom to top level. We can be aware of intensities, and of
system concepts, and all types of perceptions between. We are seldom
aware of more than one or two levels of information at a time, and then
only some of the existing perceptual signals are connected to awareness.
It is also possible for awareness to be recieving no signals. This is
the state of "awareness without object" that has been discussed by
numerous people. The receiver, as it were, can be tuned between
stations.
3. Consciousness. The state that consists of awareness coupled to
specific segments of the hierarchy. The _content_ of consciousness is
the activity in this subset of the learned systems, including
interpretations of experience, plus goals, plans, analyses, theories,
imagination, and everything else that the hierarchy can do. When
awareness is not connected to a given segment of the hierarchy, the
control systems involved may or may not go on working the same way as
when awareness is connected. This is something that requires
experimental investigation based on our ability to measure the
properties of operating control processes.
I think that Rick and I and others agree that the center from which one
observes the world seems to stay with the center of awareness -- the
receiver -- rather than with any particuilar objects of awareness (such
as thoughts).
If you want to say that this awareness thing is a neural network, go
ahead, but you'll have to explain how it makes the world appear to us as
it does. If you can't explain that, you might as well propose that it's
a Soul, or a Universal Oneness of Being, or a Cosmic Synchronicity, or
any other words that make you feel good. But it's easiest to answer such
questions as Mark Twain answered the lady who asked him a very important
and difficult question. "Madame," he said (more or less), "I am
delighted to say that I can answer your question immediately. I don't
know."
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Stefan Balke (960430.1530 CET) --
This is a very interesting perspective, but how can you be sure
whether you are just inventing a rationalization or whether you
really raised your consciousness (going up a level) in order to see
the higher order perception?
A fair question: which part of this perspective is observational, and
which is theoretical?
Perhaps you can help to answer the question. Let me ask you a question
in return.
Are you really interested in getting an answer to your question? That
is, do you really want to know how we can be sure, or is this just a way
of expressing a sense of skepticism? I'm not asking you to defend your
question, merely to report what you find to be the answer to my
question.
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Bruce Gregory (960430.1020) --
Martin Taylor (960429 16:10) --
RE: situational awareness
Martin:
For example, a fighter pilot's "situational awareness" is usually
taken to mean the extent to which he is able to take control of
different potentially important perceptions
Bruce:
I was simply trying to say that an accident seems often to be the
result of a loss of situational awareness triggered by the effort
to control one anomalous variable.
It seems to me that situational awareness, as being defined here, refers
to whether or not a pilot is perceiving and controlling certain
variables (and not others), not whether the pilot is aware of perceiving
and controlling those variables. By disturbing situational variables and
observing whether a pilot's actions resist the disturbances, we can test
to see if there is control (and therefore, necessarily, perception) of
the variables. But how do you test whether this control involves
awareness (i.e., is conscious) without asking the pilots? You can infer
awareness by putting yourself in the same situation (in imagination),
but how do you test this inference?
I agree with Bruce in his observation that if there is no startup
transient when a pilot begins to control a variable, the error must have
been close to zero at the time of startup. Unless this is purely
fortuitous, control must have been going on all the time. If the error
was not zero, then there has to be a startup transient, an initial
action that brings the controlled variable to the vicinity of the
intended state.
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Best to all,
Bill P.