[From Bruce Nevin (2003.11.19 16:06 EST)]
Bill Powers (2003.11.19.1020 MST)–
Bruce Nevin (2003.11.19 11:21 EST)–
Oops. How do you
know that B repeats the very same utterance? From your hearing the very
same thing twice?
No. From A having the same perceptions twice – the second time in
perceptions of B’s speech, and the first time in perceptions of A’s own
speech.
But this does not establish that B is perceiving the same thing as A. It
says only that A is perceiving the same thing A perceived before, with
A’s perceptual input functions.
What you’re leaving out here is that what A is perceiving as a repetition
by B is simultaneously what B is perceiving as a repetition; that what A
and B are both perceiving is created by B’s control of B’s
perceptions.
It does not matter if B’s subjective experience differs from A’s
subjective experience. While B is talking, A’s subjective experience of B
controlling B’s subjective experience is identical (for A) to A’s memory
of A’s subjective experience of A controlling A’s subjective experience.
In the realm of perception (which is the only place that language
exists), the one is a repetition of the other. There are no differences
that make any difference to either A or B. If there is some difference
that makes a difference to you as an armchair philosopher, they don’t
care. “What do you mean?” says A. “Yeah. I said the same
thing he said” says B. “What more do you want?” they ask
in unison.
A’s perceptual input functions ignore changes
in the input that A is not equipped to perceive. If, on every trial, the
actual input comes close enough to the form that A’s perceptual input
functions are tuned to, A will perceive exactly the same thing every
time, because A experiences only the output of this input
function. Different patterns appear the same to A, not
because they have something.in common, but because the input function
cannot distinguish betwen the different patterns.
The phrase “not because they have something in common” is an
overstatement. First, it is contradicted by “the actual input comes
close enough”. Acoustical measures controvert your guess that these
‘different patterns’ that phonemically ‘appear the same’ have nothing in
common. What they have in common is “coming close enough” to
what the input functions are tuned to. They “come close enough”
because the speaker’s input functions are also tuned to a range which is
sequestered from adjacent ranges, and by monitoring his own output the
speaker tunes his references for controlling kinesthetic and tactile
perceptions of speaking. And the hearer tunes the references for his
input functions for this person’s speech.
We don’t have to
suppose that the perturbations in the atmosphere are repeated in order to
know that we have recognized in them the same words.)
Same red flag again. We have no way of comparing your perceptual input
functions with my perceptual input functions.
I have said nothing about comparing the input functions of speaker and
hearer.
I think that our difference, such as remains,
lies in your statement above. The key word is “recognized.”
This implies that the word really is in the atmospheric perturbations
somehow, and that all the listener has to do is respond perceptually to
it.
Not at all. Recognition is construction of a perception, not a passive
mirroring of some kind.
I contend that this confuses what the brain
does with what the atmosphere does. Again, my example of “2,6”.
Is an “8” really implicit in that pair of numbers presented
together? Or is there an infinity of numbers implicit there – every real
number, for that matter? If an infinity of numbers is implicit (as it is,
since an operation can be defined that will convert this pair of numbers
into any desired number), then no number is implicit, since all numerical
outcomes are equally possible.
I have conceded that it is possible for the physical effects of A’s
speaking to be different for A than for B. All evidence of physics
(acoustics) so far supports the hypothesis that the differences are kept
within ranges that are sequestered from one another, and any other
supposition becomes less plausible as the degree of variation and range
of overlap increases (such as the difference between 2,6 and 4,4 or the
range of overlap between 2,6 and 6,2). But I don’t give two twitches of a
pundit’s whiskers whether the actual reality is more plausible or less
plausible – plausibility is among the slings and arrows to which
explanations are heir, reality is whatever it is – all I need to know is
that a native speaker perceives one utterance as a repetition of another,
and a third utterance as not a repetition of either.
In fact, we know
that phoneme recognizers are categorial, that morpheme and word
pronunciations vary predictably, etc. (More detail included by
reference.
This is fine, but you’re talking about perceptual input functions and the
relation of higher-order signals to lower-order signals, the same thing I
am talking about.
Yes, I am.
At each level of perceptual organization we
have many-to-one functions, meaning that the perceptual signals at any
given level can be the same even though the inputs to that level are all
different. Does this mean that the higher-order perceptual signal is
somehow “in” the lower-order perceptions? I don’t think so, any
more than we can say that a toy crane is “in” the Erector Set
parts from which it is made, or that Michaelangelo’s statues were
“in” the marble block as he claimed.
It seems that you’re arguing against the proposition that is in the
subject heading of this thread, “linguistic structure in our shared
environment”.
That’s a hypothesis that seems to me to be a plausible explanation –
that a given perceptible variable such as formant height is in the range
that is recognized as one vowel and out of ranges that are recognized as
other vowels (men vs. main or man, or indeed
min, mean, mud, McGregor (the first
schwa), ma, maw, moan, good, moon).
And it is confirmatory that diverse instrumental measures consistently
show physical differences that correspond with perceived differences.
Yes, those instrumental measures are perceptions too, but they are
constructed by different input functions. A theory that proposes the
kinds of variation that you propose has a lot of conspiracy to account
for.
But this hypothesis is only a plausible explanation. It is incapable of
ultimate proof requiring direct access to reality. As Rick said:
Rick Marken (2003.11.19.0820)–
We have no direct access to reality so we will
never know, for sure, the actual nature of the reality “out
there”. But I am persuaded that a very accurate guess about
the nature of reality comes from science in the form of models that
precisely fit carefully made observations.
The Journal of the Acoustic Society of America has a lot of
interesting science and engineering reported in it over the years.
Back to
Bill Powers (2003.11.19.1020 MST)–
B has no evidence
that A has recognized the same language-perceptions twice, other than A’s
saying so. But A needs no other evidence than her own perceptions.
Likewise, A has no evidence that B has recognized a repetition, but A
needs no other evidence than his own perceptions. And the observers need
no other evidence than their own perceptions.
Again, complete agreement. All you have to do now is agree that A and B
are looking at the outputs of their own perceptual input functions, not
the inputs, and not at each other’s perceptual signals, and we should
arrive at least at a resting place.
Oh absolutely. Did you think I was saying that B perceives A’s perceptual
signals? Do I have to say that? OK. B is not perceiving A’s perceptual
signals, A is not perceiving B’s perceptual signals, and observers are
not perceiving either A’s or B’s perceptual signals.
Also, please understand that I am not closing
down the argument. The open question in my mind is whether there is some
strategy by which it could be established beyond reasonable doubt that my
perceptual input functions are or are not the same in their organization
as yours. Or is neurosurgery the only answer?
Is this a question about the real structure of our nervous systems?
As long as each of us has to judge sameness
(from one person to another) strictly in terms of our own
perceptual input functions, I see no way to arrive at a firm answer. But
maybe there is one that I just don’t see. It wouldn’t be the first time
such a thing has happened.
This seems to come pretty close.
At the same time that
-
I perceive myself repeating simultaneously what you said and what I
said,
-
you also perceive me repeating simultaneously what I said and what you
said.
-
You are comparing your memories of a certain word or word sequence
a memory
at time t1
a memory
at time t2
-
You perceive these to be the same (once in your voice, once in
mine)
-
You are comparing those memories
to your
present perception of what I am saying,
- You perceive all three to be the same word sequence.
Concurrently,
memories (once in your voice, once in mine)
and one
current perception of my own speaking.
Not only do we report that we perceive them the same, but also my
performance, which constitutes a repetition for me according to my
perceptual organization, simultaneously constitutes a repetition for you
according to your perceptual organization.
It may be that our perceptual organizations differ. But my control
according to my perceptual organization is the same for you as your
control according to your perceptual organization, and vice versa. It
seems by far the most plausible hypothesis, or at least the most
parsimonious, that in relevant respects our perceptual organizations are
alike.
The corroboration
is nice, and we make use of it, but it is secondary. If A knows it wasn’t
a repetition (“I said pick up the pan, not pick up the
pawn”), the fact that B says it was a repetition is not
convincing (“Sorry, you’re wrong” “Yeah, OK, I was just
checking”). Certainly there are disturbances to recognition, but in
our laboratory scenario we ruled these out.
I think we can show in the laboratory that there are differences in
repetitions that the listeners simply do not recognize as differences.
That’s actually pretty easy.
Of course there are, Bill. I have even emphasized those differences. I
was talking here about disturbances, such as a noise, that interfere with
recognition. Rick’s example of noise that changes the perceived vowel
quality is a sophisticated example of such disturbance. Other examples
include a hiss or squeak that masks consonant releases, or a bang or
clatter that overwhelms auditory input during entire syllables or words.
We can probably do this at every level of
organization. That is, we can show that when someone thinks he heard
“pick up the pan” twice in a row, the word “pan” was
actually pronounced differently.
Yes indeed. But the difference is not out of range for that phoneme in
that person’s dialect. The hearer did indeed hear “pick up the
pan” both times. So did the speaker, because if she didn’t she would
repeat the word. The differences were not great enough to be recognized
as pen, pawn, or pun, which are quite a lot more
different from pan and from one another than the variants of
pan are. (All in the realm of perception of course, including
instrumental measures.)
This is more informative than finding that the
person can detect obvious differences. Difference can reliably indicate
difference while at the same time sameness does not reliably indicate
sameness.
OK. What does this inform you of? It doesn’t inform the hearer of
anything. She perceives that the speaker just said pan again.
Nothing new.
When we work with
an unknown language we must rely upon the report of a native speaker
assenting or denying that something is a repetition, but once our
references are appropriately set and the interconnections of recognizers
for concurrent phonemes, syllables, intonation contours, etc. are
appropriately organized, our own perceptions suffice.
Maybe the answer to my questions is somewhere in that paragraph. But
maybe not. I think it is still possible for the informant and the
linguist to have differences in their perceptual input functions that
neither one can detect.
OK, suppose there is. Suppose there are differences in the input
functions of twins brought up in the same household and both fluent in
their native language. What difference does it make?
After all, I think this is also possible for
native speakers of the same language. If, every time you say
“qweep” I hear “qwoop”, consistently and in all
circumstances, how would we discover that we were not having the same
experience? “Give me two qweeps,” you say. I, hearing
“give me two qwoops,” will pick up two of the things you have
always called “qwoops” before, and give them to you. And you
will say what I hear as “Thank you for the qwoops,” while you
hear yourself say “thank you for the qweeps,” which you agree I
gave you two of. Furthermore, when I say “quoop”, I actually
emit sounds which to a third party sound like “flurge,” but of
course I hear then as “qwoop” and you hear them as
“queep”, while a spectrograph records the patterns that are
really there, which are neither qwoop, qweep, nor flurge. Repeat the
spectral sounds, and the three parties each hear their respective
versions, while agreeing that qwoops, qweeps, or flurges are delicious
with chocolate sauce.
The above is about subjective experience of the perception. A neural
signal doesn’t sound like anything.
You’re painting yourself into the corner that says that language is a
social reality, sustained between and among its users in the course of
using it, emergent from their individual control of perceptions but not
identical with the perceptions of any one of them. Thought you might like
to know.
Now is it possible that somewhat more subtle
differences in what we hear and experience could always be detected and
rooted out? Is simple agreement ever going to eliminate the possibility
of inadvertent and undetected disagreement? If you know, tell me how.
Knowing how would save me a lot of trouble.
If you’re talking about trouble like the difficulty getting others to
understand and participate in developing PCT, all that this gives you is
the basis for agreement about just what phonemes, syllables, morphemes,
words, phrases, sentences, arrays of word repetition (discourse
structure), and logical argumentation were transmitted. (People can still
disagree about these things, but they can be a matter of record.) What
people make of these, the meanings and intentions they read into them,
the inferences they draw from them, are not at all so amenable to
agreement. But agreement as to the former is usually a prerequisite to
effectively seeking agreement as to the latter. Subtle differences such
as those in various pronunciations of the word pan do not affect
either level of agreement one way or the other. They are below the
threshold of language.
/Bruce
Nevin
···
At 11:33 AM 11/19/2003 -0700, Bill Powers wrote:
