Living in each other's loops

[From Rick Marken (960104.1100)]

bob hintz (960103.2300) --

In a tracking exercise, if I am working the handle, I am providing the
energy that moves the handle (or mouse) in response to my error signals.
However, if you are working the handle, but cannot see the screen, while I
can see the screen, but can only tell you how to change the handle, then I
provide information about the error and you provide the energy to correct it.

Actually, when you tell me how to change the handle, you are just providing a
perception to me (of your words) that might or might not create an error that
I want to correct (more on this below). Also, you can't really tell me how
the handle should change to control your perception of the cursor; to do so,
you would have to have detailed knowledge ot the nature of the continuously
changing physical relationship between my hand and the handle and between the
handle and the distance between target and cursor; and you would have to
communicate this knowledge to me on a continuous basis.

Babies cannot correct error by energy processes.

Have you ever seen and heard a baby cry? We're talking energy expenditure,
big time (as I recall).

They cannot acquire food without assistance.

True. The "assistance" is from an adult who is part of the environmental
component of the feedback loop relating the baby to its food input. If there
is no adult (who cares) connecting the baby to its food input, the loop is
open so that there is no possibility of control.

Crying typically is treated as an indication of error from the baby's point
of view by the caretaker

Crying is typically treated this way -- but it's the unfortunate exceptions
that are most informative. Sometimes crying is just treated as an
insuperable disturbance to perceptions that the caretaker is controlling;
some caretakers try to deal with this disturbance by abandoning or killing
the baby. It's rare, but it happens. The fact that it does happen shows that
crying, per se, is NOT "an indication of error from the baby's point of view
by the caretaker". Crying _indicates_ nothing in itself. There is no
"information" in a baby's cry; it is just something that can be perceived (by
people who are not deaf) and evaluated relative to one's own reference
signals.

When the baby stops crying, one assumes that a disturbance has been
controlled.

Babies (like real people) control perceptions; when the baby stops crying we
can assume that a perception is under control; that the effect of a
disturbance on a controlled variable has been removed or compensated for.

This would be very similar to the problem you and I would have if I can
see the screen and you are working the handle.

Yes, indeed. What you say is what I perceive -- just like crying is what a
caretaker perceives. If I want to change my perception of what you say (if I
want to hear you saying "OK" instead of "move the handle left" or "move it
right") and I know I can change that perception by moving the handle, then
I'll move the handle in whatever way I can to get you to say "OK". The
caretaker does something similar to change his perception of the sounds
made by the baby; he tries all kinds of things to get the perception of
crying to turn into a perception of quiet cooing. The caretaker is trying to
control a perception (of sound) and the baby is trying to control a
perception (of who knows what). It's all _control of perception_. But in this
case, living control systems are part of the control loops of other living
control systems: the caretaker is part of the baby's control loop and the
baby is part of the caretaker's control loop.

It is this kind of situation that allows us to observe how language
(information behavior) can actually be used to organize activity (energy
behavior) that makes a difference when energy variables are being disturbed
and it takes two or more persons to control the perception.

Tom Bourbon has done some wonderful experiments on how two or more people
control in situations like this. Language can help people organize their
activities in this situation; but it can also get in the way (I wish Tom were
on the net so that he could comment on this). But the most important point is
that language doesn't _tell_ people what to do to control their perceptions;
language is a set of perceptions which can be controlled; if they are
controlled, these perceptions will be guided to reference states (as was done
by the person controlling for hearing "OK" and the caretaker controlling for
hearing "quiet cooing").

Best

Rick

[From Bob Hintz (960105.1235)

Rick Marken (960104.1100)

I am attempting to use your reply as a model (reference) for how to set
up these messages. I do like the subject - living in each other's
loops.

Babies cannot correct error by energy processes.

Have you ever seen and heard a baby cry? We're talking energy
expenditure, big time (as I recall).

This energy expenditure will have no affect on any controlled variable
if it is not observed and responded to by a caretaker. By the same
token, if all the caretaker does is make sounds to the baby, the
controlled variable will not be affected unless it something like
lonliness. The predicament of the babysitter as opposed to a caretaker
is that babysitters is a lack of experience in deciding what would be
most likely to assist in controlling appropriate variables. A
babysitter starts from scratch which can be very frustrating to the
baby as well as the sitter.

If I am merely responding to a disturbance when the baby crys, Murder or
Assualt might be my best choices because they will always be effective
at altering the appearance of the baby (unconscious babies can look
very peaceful). A caretaker wants to alter his perception of the baby
by altering the baby's perception. I do not typically try to alter my
perception of the lawn by trying to alter the lawn's perception,
although I guess if I choose to water the lawn I am doing exactly the
same thing. However, when I mow the lawn I am doing something quite
different and am not taking into account the grass's possible preference
or reference for height. Does this seem like a significant difference.
When I water the grass I attempt to work with it as a control system in
its own right. When I mow the grass, I am simply imposing my own
reference on the a control system because I am able to do this.

Shannon is concerned about where a first reference signal might come
from or how it might come to exist. I am willing to assume that
biological system are born with them, but may not have any clear
awareness, knowledge, linkage, connection, (whatever might be the
appropriate term) to allow the production of behavior to affect the
perception necessary to create the error signal. I do think that effort
to communicate to another about one's errors, perceptions, or references
is different from effort to directly affect the environment to offset
disturbances to these perceptions.

If I am able to get up and shut the window when I am cold, then I am
doing something quite different when I ask you to do it for me.

The baby cannot get up and shut the window, and the baby cannot ask
another to do it until something like language or a system of
significant gestures is shared with at least one other person. Babies
learn to ask before they are able to do it themselves.

Another thought on tracking. Suppose that the handle is set up in such
a way the the person cannot see the screen and work the handle at the
same time. The tracking task could only be performed in a competent
fashion by two persons. One who provided information about the error
and one who manipulated the handle to offset disturbance. Would
observing different dyads solve this problem allow us to see how two
different control systems join to act as a single system. Possibly Tom
has already tried this. Does he have an email address that I could
contact him directly.

take care, bob