[From Erling Jorgensen (990730.1530 CDT)]
Bruce Gregory (90729.1315 EDT)
This raises an issue that I have questions about. In the hierarchical
model, you think of the "principle level" as establishing references for
systems below it in the hierarchy. In this sense, the principle level is
"in charge". This doesn't seem to fit my experience. Most of the time,
principles do _not_ seem to be in charge.
Here is my take on it...
For control systems to work in a hierarchy, connections must be established.
At a minimum, that means perceptions being passed on from lower levels (and
being reconstructed according to the perceptual input function of the control
system in question, here one at the "Principles" level), as well as relevant
output connections to lower levels that can impact the desired perception.
In my experience, principles are generated more "locally," that is with regard
to a specific context, which then may get generalized to other contexts. I
have also postulated in the past on the net (though I have not figured out
a way to test it), that the nature of a principle-perception may be that of
a probability distribution, which is judged to be true or not true _on average_.
For instance, if I _usually_ act "honestly", then I may let a specific slip go
by (perhaps one evaluated by a parallel principle as being "minor") and not
take action to correct it.
These points suggest various ways that a given principle may not be experienced
as "in charge":
a) lower level perceptions may not be perceived as relevant -- i.e., the
ascending connection may not be there! -- in which case we generally say "the
principle does not apply."
b) a given principle control system may not know how to affect lower level
perceptions -- i.e., the output connections may not yet be established -- in
which case we speak of "acting inconsistently with one's principles."
c) if principles are enacted and evaluated on the basis of multiple occurrences
-- i.e., a distribution must be set up first -- then 1) there may not be enough
cases to bring the principle into play ("that part of my value system is still
in flux"), or 2) a given occurrence may be an acceptable outlier ("it's an
exception") -- although in this instance, we usually think of that principle
still being operative.
d) You suggest a fourth possibility, namely --
Perhaps this is simply because my attention is elsewhere.
At the present time, I am very reluctant to think that control systems operate
on the basis of attention. To me, attention seems more like a monitoring
system. I agree, however, that it seems related to the presence of sufficient
error -- as when you say,
Perhaps attention "shows up" only when control is problematical.
We know that a
mechanism in the visual system moves the focus of attention to motion in
the visual field outside the fovea region. ... Perhaps this is a general
mechanism that moves attention to where it is likely to be most useful.
I like this as a metaphor for how to think about attention. Attention follows
error, just as our visual system follows motion. Where I disagree is in
whether attention does anything "useful," at least in terms of initiating
corrective action. When I lose my balance or start to twist an ankle, my
attention is immediately drawn to it, but it seems I am already in the process
of doing something about it, like shifting weight to the other leg and trying
to brace an upcoming fall. I don't think those systems waited for attention
to give any commands.
I guess that's how I currently view principles, and attention, being integrated
into the hierarchical PCT proposal.
All the best,
Erling