[From Rick Marken (950526.2100)]
(No, I have no idea what the title of this post means, but it is related
to the "flies" thread and perhaps Bruce will _miraculously_ convert to
my point of view).
Bruce Abbott (950526.2000 EST)]
And you're right, I haven't changed my position on this matter [the
importance of PCT accounting for conventional behavioral science
data]. Why would I want to change it from right to wrong? (;->
You wouldn't, of course, unless you enjoyed experiencing error. What
I hope you will be able to do (and precious few have) will be to change
the reference for what your position is, so that what you currently
perceive as the wrong position is perceived as the right one.
You agree that you are controlling for what I said you were controlling
for:
the idea that descriptions of the appearance of behavior from the
point of view of a human observer (the typical way behavior is
described in the behavioral sciences) should be accounted for by PCT.
You say:
And I keep explaining why I think they should and can be--and how.
I've never heard you try to knock down my argument, or even note
it.
How about stating, just for the record, what my argument was?
I believe that you think PCT should account for descriptions of the
appearance of behavior (actually, for the findings of conventional
psychology) for at least two reasons: 1) to convince psychologists
(including yourself) that PCT is a viable alternative to conventional
theories and 2) because a new theory should be able to account for all
the data that has been handled by previous theories, and then some (in
the way that relativity physics handled all the data handled by
Newtonian physics, and then some).
I think we have tried to deal with these points, though perhaps it has
not seemed so to you. This whole flurry of posts about "describing
fly landing behavior" gets to the nitty gritty of my objection to your
argument.
I have tried to answer the first part of your argument by arguing that
PCT is not about the same phenomenon that conventional theories of
behavior are about. Conventional theories are about "behavior" which
is tacitly assumed to be caused results of action; PCT is about controlled
results of actiony -- results that are brought to reference states and
protected from the effects of disturbance. Many of the demos and
experiments that we have described on the net are aimed at
communicating the crucial difference between caused and controlled
results. This whole discussion about fly behavior turns on this
difference. Conventionally, fly landing behavior is described as a
sequence of caused results; PCT requires a description of this behavior
in terms of controlled results -- controlled perceptual variables.
The answer to the second part of your argument is based on the same
point: the distinction between caused and controlled results of action.
PCT cannot be expected to handle data that has been "handled" by
previous theories when this data is not about controlled results of
action. The analogy is not
PCT : Conventional Psychology :: Einstein : Newton.
It is more like:
PCT : Conventional Psychology :: Newton : Aristotle.
I suppose when your kids ask you how to do something you just tell
them to control their own perceptions. I'll bet they're pretty
perplexed.
My kids no longer ask me how to do anything; they just tell me what to
do;-). But when they did ask I would unquestionably try to tell them
how to do something in terms of the perceptions they should try to
control. I have tried to suggest that they do things by controlling MY
perceptions of THEM -- but that never went over too well.
I was, of course, describing what the fly does from the observer's point
of view, with (as I'm now saying at least for the second time) some
additional information about perceptual variables thrown in to help
guide speculation about how the control systems involved might
operate.
I'm afraid I did not notice any mention of possible controlled variables
in your description of the fly's behavior.
People have speculated whether the fly does an inside loop (touching
the ceiling at the top of the loop) or a half roll in order to position
itself legs up and parallel with the ceiling. As I explained, neither
suggestion is correct.
If this is an example of speculating about a controlled variable, then
your concept of a controlled variable differs considerably from mine.
This is speculation about characteristics of overt behavior; it says
nothing about the perceptual variables that the fly might be
controlling. The fly cannot perceive itself doing loops, half rolls,
touching ceilings, etc. The fact that "neither suggestion is correct" is a
forgone conclusion in PCT; if it can't be perceived, it can't be
controlled.
Me:
Why not help out and post some examples [of PCT-type research].
That's what the net's for, no?
Bruce:
You mean in addition to the Nachtigall and Dethier book references
Of course. Neither Nachtigall nor Dethier did any PCT-type research.
How specific do you want?
Take a look at Avery's description of Srinivasan's bee research. Avery
cleary described just what we need to know: the hypothetical controlled
variable (Avery told us it was integrated visual flow) and the methods
used to test the hypothesis (Avery explained the different disturbing
conditions and how variations in the bee's actions were consistent
with the idea that they were controlling visual flow by compensating
for these disturbances).
Why don't you have a look at this book, Rick, and judge Nachtigall's
understanding for yourself?
Based on your description of his work and the extended quote from his
book, I judge that I can eliminate Nachtigall's book from my list of
books that are possibly relevant to PCT research.
···
-----------
Maybe it's best to finish this up with a question related to your first
question to me:
Why do you think we (PCTers) don't believe that PCT needs to account for the
descriptions of behavior provided by conventional psychology?
Best
Rick