[From Rick Marken (950614.0930)]
Me:
The subject's goal directed behavior in this [E. coli] task seems to be
inconsistent with my qualitative understanding of reinforcement theory
which says that responses (bar presses) are selected by their consequences
(direction of movement after a press). Random consequences should select
random responses.
Bill Powers (950614.0630 MDT) --
The problem with the E. coli example is that the consequences are not
totally random...So the E. coli demonstration is probably not the key to
showing what is wrong with reinforcement theory, as we both once thought it
was. We must go back to PCT basics: resistance to disturbance, and the
arbitrariness of reference signal settings.
It is with some sadness that I admit that this is true. E. coli seemed like
such a pretty little demo of the impossibility of a reinforcement model of
purposeful behavior; and it is pretty as long as one looks only at direction
of dot movement rather than _change_ in direction of dot movement as the
consequence of responding.
As Bruce has said, we are talking about mutually-exclusive interpretations,
but without added information of some kind we are in a Necker-Cube kind of
situation. As long as information is missing, we can flip back and forth
between the two views; each one, temporarily, seems convincing.
Yes, and it seemed like the E. coli demo brought in that missing information;
seeing that the consequences of responses were random would make it clear
that these consequences could not be shaping the responses that produce a
systematic result.
I loved my little E. coli demo. But I have to admit that, in its present
form, it is not a rejection of the "control by consequences" view of the
Necker Cube of purposeful behavior.
Back to the drawing board. Sob.
Best
Rick