Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Matti Kolu 2013.06.27.2140 CET]

p. viii in LCS (I):
"These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because behavior
is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs, migrate to specific
destinations, build dams--and they do these things over and over again.
Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist and
engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."

This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above it seems
like the consistency should refer to the (perceived) outcomes of behavior
and not behavior itself.

:wink:

Matti

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)]

Matti Kolu (2013.06.27.2140 CET)--

p. viii in LCS (I):
"These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because behavior
is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs, migrate to specific
destinations, build dams--and they do these things over and over again.
Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist and
engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."

This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above it seems
like the consistency should refer to the (perceived) outcomes of behavior
and not behavior itself.

RM: Actually it was never brought up before. But you make an
interesting point. I think the quoted passage is good as is because I
am talking about behavior from the point of view of an observer. What
an observer sees as behavior is consistently produced results: webs,
migrations, dams, etc. What an observer of the caliber of Bill Powers
understood is that these consistent results are being produced in the
face of variable (and often invisible) disturbances. What I am saying
here is that Bill realized that behavior _is_ control (indeed, LCS III
was subtitled "The fact of control" to emphasize this very important
point).

PCT is a theory that explains _how_ organisms are able to produce
consistent results -- to control -- in the face of variable and
typically invisible disturbances. So the theory says what you suggest
I should say in the first sentence: that organisms are able to produce
consistent results because they control perceptions of those results.
So the reason I did not say that "perceived outcomes of behavior are
consistent" rather than that "behavior is quite consistent" is because
I was talking about a fact (that behavior is control) and not the
explanation of this fact (perceptual control theory).

Hope this helps.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.0537 EDT)]

Hmm. I think Matti has a point - sort of. What you say, Rick, is true
enough: dams are built, migratory birds and other migratory life forms leave
one place and arrive at another, and webs are weaved. And, consistent with
PCT, none of the behaviors involved in that are exactly identical. But,
then, a given dam isn't exactly like another, even if built by the same
beavers; no particular bird starts out leaving exactly the same place or
winds up in exactly the same place; and no two webs are exactly alike, even
if woven by the same spider. As for the observer view point, we can and do
observe beavers building, birds and butterflies flying and spiders weaving.
So, from my point of view, there is consistency (not identicality) in
results and there is consistency in the patterned behaviors that produce
them.

So what? Well, I think it goes not to consistency but to variability. We
are able to vary our behavior so as to achieve (and perceive) the result
we're after despite those darned things called "disturbances."

Fred Nickols

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 5:28 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)]

> Matti Kolu (2013.06.27.2140 CET)--
>
> p. viii in LCS (I):
> "These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because
> behavior is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs, migrate
> to specific destinations, build dams--and they do these things over and
over again.
> Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist
> and engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."
>
> This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above it
> seems like the consistency should refer to the (perceived) outcomes of
> behavior and not behavior itself.

RM: Actually it was never brought up before. But you make an interesting
point. I think the quoted passage is good as is because I am talking about
behavior from the point of view of an observer. What an observer sees as
behavior is consistently produced results: webs, migrations, dams, etc.

What

an observer of the caliber of Bill Powers understood is that these

consistent

results are being produced in the face of variable (and often invisible)
disturbances. What I am saying here is that Bill realized that behavior

_is_

control (indeed, LCS III was subtitled "The fact of control" to emphasize

this

very important point).

PCT is a theory that explains _how_ organisms are able to produce

consistent

results -- to control -- in the face of variable and typically invisible
disturbances. So the theory says what you suggest I should say in the

first

sentence: that organisms are able to produce consistent results because
they control perceptions of those results.
So the reason I did not say that "perceived outcomes of behavior are
consistent" rather than that "behavior is quite consistent" is because I

was

talking about a fact (that behavior is control) and not the explanation of

this

···

-----Original Message-----
fact (perceptual control theory).

Hope this helps.

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.28.0915)]

Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.0537 EDT)

FN: Hmm. I think Matti has a point - sort of.

RM: Yes, as I said, Matti was correctly describing the theoretical
explanation of the phenomenon of control.

FN: What you say, Rick, is true
enough: dams are built, migratory birds and other migratory life forms leave
one place and arrive at another, and webs are weaved. And, consistent with
PCT, none of the behaviors involved in that are exactly identical.

RM: I think your point here is that the word "behavior" is ambiguous;
it refers to both means and ends, acts and results. So the behavior
"building dams" refers to both the consistently produced ends (dams)
and the highly variable means (building) that are used to produce
those ends. In my forward to LCS I I think I was clear that the
"behavior" I was talking about was the results (ends) produced. But
maybe I could have been clearer by noting that these results are
produced by highly variable means, another clue Bill used to
understand that behavior is control; the means used to produce a
result _must_ vary to compensate for the disturbances that would
prevent that result from occurring.

FN: But, then, a given dam isn't exactly like another, even if built by the same
beavers; no particular bird starts out leaving exactly the same place or
winds up in exactly the same place; and no two webs are exactly alike, even
if woven by the same spider.

RM: Now we're getting into the observations that lead to the
conclusion that control is hierarchical (another observable fact about
behavior) Yes, the results themselves are somewhat variable because
they are the means of achieving other results; the exact nature of the
dam must vary because the dam is itself a means of stopping the flow
of water and this means must vary due to varying disturbances such as
the nature of the materials available to build the dam, the shape of
the part of the river where the dam is built, etc. All these are
observations about "behavior" that can (and must) be made before one
starts developing a model that can account for these observations. In
other words, we can say a lot about the phenomenon of behavior -- it
being a process of control and that this control is a hierarchical
process -- before we say anything about how we explain what we see -
the theory that behavior is the control of perception.

I think one of Bill Powers' greatest contributions to our
understanding of human nature was describing what it is we should be
trying to explain. Before Bill, people thought that behavior was
caused output, or the output that occurs after some central processing
of input. What Bill understood was that behavior IS control --
hierarchical control -- not caused output. This is a factual, not a
theoretical point; you don't need PCT to know that this is true. Of
course, Bill's familiarity with the behavior of artificial control
systems surely helped him make this observation about behavior; and
his understanding of control theory helped him realize that the
controlling that he observed involved the control of perception (which
is his theoretical contribution).

So I think Bill made two really enormous contributions to our
understanding of living systems, one factual and one theoretical. The
factual contribution is that behavior IS control; the theoretical
contribution is that control involves control of input (perception)
not output. The only problem with Matti's suggestion, as far as I'm
concerned, is that it conflates these two contributions by conflating
theory and fact. It is a testable theory that organisms control
perceptions; it is an observable fact that they control.

Best

Rick

···

As for the observer view point, we can and do
observe beavers building, birds and butterflies flying and spiders weaving.
So, from my point of view, there is consistency (not identicality) in
results and there is consistency in the patterned behaviors that produce
them.

So what? Well, I think it goes not to consistency but to variability. We
are able to vary our behavior so as to achieve (and perceive) the result
we're after despite those darned things called "disturbances."

Fred Nickols

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 5:28 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)]

> Matti Kolu (2013.06.27.2140 CET)--
>
> p. viii in LCS (I):
> "These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because
> behavior is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs, migrate
> to specific destinations, build dams--and they do these things over and
over again.
> Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist
> and engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."
>
> This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above it
> seems like the consistency should refer to the (perceived) outcomes of
> behavior and not behavior itself.

RM: Actually it was never brought up before. But you make an interesting
point. I think the quoted passage is good as is because I am talking about
behavior from the point of view of an observer. What an observer sees as
behavior is consistently produced results: webs, migrations, dams, etc.

What

an observer of the caliber of Bill Powers understood is that these

consistent

results are being produced in the face of variable (and often invisible)
disturbances. What I am saying here is that Bill realized that behavior

_is_

control (indeed, LCS III was subtitled "The fact of control" to emphasize

this

very important point).

PCT is a theory that explains _how_ organisms are able to produce

consistent

results -- to control -- in the face of variable and typically invisible
disturbances. So the theory says what you suggest I should say in the

first

sentence: that organisms are able to produce consistent results because
they control perceptions of those results.
So the reason I did not say that "perceived outcomes of behavior are
consistent" rather than that "behavior is quite consistent" is because I

was

talking about a fact (that behavior is control) and not the explanation of

this

fact (perceptual control theory).

Hope this helps.

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Ted Cloak (2013.06.28.1100 MST)]

I think we should expect the behavioral output, of either kind, to very
within limits set by the reference standards. For example, Mr. Beaver has
minimum standards for what should be perceived as a satisfactory dam. The
activity of his dam-building system ceases when those standards are met,
whether the observer would call the result a dam or not. Experiments could
be run to ascertain what Mr. Beaver's minimum standards are.

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.28.0915)]

Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.0537 EDT)

FN: Hmm. I think Matti has a point - sort of.

RM: Yes, as I said, Matti was correctly describing the theoretical
explanation of the phenomenon of control.

FN: What you say, Rick, is true
enough: dams are built, migratory birds and other migratory life forms
leave one place and arrive at another, and webs are weaved. And,
consistent with PCT, none of the behaviors involved in that are exactly

identical.

RM: I think your point here is that the word "behavior" is ambiguous; it
refers to both means and ends, acts and results. So the behavior "building
dams" refers to both the consistently produced ends (dams) and the highly
variable means (building) that are used to produce those ends. In my
forward to LCS I I think I was clear that the "behavior" I was talking about
was the results (ends) produced. But maybe I could have been clearer by
noting that these results are produced by highly variable means, another
clue Bill used to understand that behavior is control; the means used to
produce a result _must_ vary to compensate for the disturbances that would
prevent that result from occurring.

FN: But, then, a given dam isn't exactly like another, even if built
by the same beavers; no particular bird starts out leaving exactly the
same place or winds up in exactly the same place; and no two webs are
exactly alike, even if woven by the same spider.

RM: Now we're getting into the observations that lead to the conclusion that
control is hierarchical (another observable fact about
behavior) Yes, the results themselves are somewhat variable because they are
the means of achieving other results; the exact nature of the dam must vary
because the dam is itself a means of stopping the flow of water and this
means must vary due to varying disturbances such as the nature of the
materials available to build the dam, the shape of the part of the river
where the dam is built, etc. All these are observations about "behavior"
that can (and must) be made before one starts developing a model that can
account for these observations. In other words, we can say a lot about the
phenomenon of behavior -- it being a process of control and that this
control is a hierarchical process -- before we say anything about how we
explain what we see - the theory that behavior is the control of perception.

I think one of Bill Powers' greatest contributions to our understanding of
human nature was describing what it is we should be trying to explain.
Before Bill, people thought that behavior was caused output, or the output
that occurs after some central processing of input. What Bill understood was
that behavior IS control -- hierarchical control -- not caused output. This
is a factual, not a theoretical point; you don't need PCT to know that this
is true. Of course, Bill's familiarity with the behavior of artificial
control systems surely helped him make this observation about behavior; and
his understanding of control theory helped him realize that the controlling
that he observed involved the control of perception (which is his
theoretical contribution).

So I think Bill made two really enormous contributions to our understanding
of living systems, one factual and one theoretical. The factual contribution
is that behavior IS control; the theoretical contribution is that control
involves control of input (perception) not output. The only problem with
Matti's suggestion, as far as I'm concerned, is that it conflates these two
contributions by conflating theory and fact. It is a testable theory that
organisms control perceptions; it is an observable fact that they control.

Best

Rick

As for the observer view point, we can and do observe beavers
building, birds and butterflies flying and spiders weaving.
So, from my point of view, there is consistency (not identicality) in
results and there is consistency in the patterned behaviors that
produce them.

So what? Well, I think it goes not to consistency but to variability.
We are able to vary our behavior so as to achieve (and perceive) the
result we're after despite those darned things called "disturbances."

Fred Nickols

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 5:28 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)]

> Matti Kolu (2013.06.27.2140 CET)--
>
> p. viii in LCS (I):
> "These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because
> behavior is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs,
> migrate to specific destinations, build dams--and they do these
> things over and
over again.
> Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist
> and engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."
>
> This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above
> it seems like the consistency should refer to the (perceived)
> outcomes of behavior and not behavior itself.

RM: Actually it was never brought up before. But you make an
interesting point. I think the quoted passage is good as is because I
am talking about behavior from the point of view of an observer. What
an observer sees as behavior is consistently produced results: webs,

migrations, dams, etc.

···

-----Original Message-----

What

an observer of the caliber of Bill Powers understood is that these

consistent

results are being produced in the face of variable (and often
invisible) disturbances. What I am saying here is that Bill realized
that behavior

_is_

control (indeed, LCS III was subtitled "The fact of control" to
emphasize

this

very important point).

PCT is a theory that explains _how_ organisms are able to produce

consistent

results -- to control -- in the face of variable and typically
invisible disturbances. So the theory says what you suggest I should
say in the

first

sentence: that organisms are able to produce consistent results
because they control perceptions of those results.
So the reason I did not say that "perceived outcomes of behavior are
consistent" rather than that "behavior is quite consistent" is
because I

was

talking about a fact (that behavior is control) and not the
explanation of

this

fact (perceptual control theory).

Hope this helps.

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.1458 EDT)]

Well, FWIW, I don't use behavior to refer to behavior and its
effects/results nor do most of the performance professionals I know. We are
all careful to draw a distinction between behavior (as an activity,
patterned or discrete) and its effects or outcomes. I have a piece coming
out in September that uses A+O=P to express the notion that actions plus
outcomes equals performance.

All that said, I think we're all pretty much in agreement.

Fred Nickols

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 12:17 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.28.0915)]

>Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.0537 EDT)
>
> FN: Hmm. I think Matti has a point - sort of.

RM: Yes, as I said, Matti was correctly describing the theoretical

explanation

of the phenomenon of control.

> FN: What you say, Rick, is true
> enough: dams are built, migratory birds and other migratory life forms
> leave one place and arrive at another, and webs are weaved. And,
> consistent with PCT, none of the behaviors involved in that are exactly
identical.

RM: I think your point here is that the word "behavior" is ambiguous; it

refers

to both means and ends, acts and results. So the behavior "building dams"
refers to both the consistently produced ends (dams) and the highly

variable

means (building) that are used to produce those ends. In my forward to

LCS I

I think I was clear that the "behavior" I was talking about was the

results

(ends) produced. But maybe I could have been clearer by noting that these
results are produced by highly variable means, another clue Bill used to
understand that behavior is control; the means used to produce a result
_must_ vary to compensate for the disturbances that would prevent that
result from occurring.

> FN: But, then, a given dam isn't exactly like another, even if built
> by the same beavers; no particular bird starts out leaving exactly the
> same place or winds up in exactly the same place; and no two webs are
> exactly alike, even if woven by the same spider.

RM: Now we're getting into the observations that lead to the conclusion

that

control is hierarchical (another observable fact about
behavior) Yes, the results themselves are somewhat variable because they
are the means of achieving other results; the exact nature of the dam must
vary because the dam is itself a means of stopping the flow of water and

this

means must vary due to varying disturbances such as the nature of the
materials available to build the dam, the shape of the part of the river

where

the dam is built, etc. All these are observations about "behavior" that

can

(and must) be made before one starts developing a model that can account
for these observations. In other words, we can say a lot about the
phenomenon of behavior -- it being a process of control and that this

control

is a hierarchical process -- before we say anything about how we explain
what we see - the theory that behavior is the control of perception.

I think one of Bill Powers' greatest contributions to our understanding of
human nature was describing what it is we should be trying to explain.
Before Bill, people thought that behavior was caused output, or the output
that occurs after some central processing of input. What Bill understood

was

that behavior IS control -- hierarchical control -- not caused output.

This is a

factual, not a theoretical point; you don't need PCT to know that this is

true.

Of course, Bill's familiarity with the behavior of artificial control

systems

surely helped him make this observation about behavior; and his
understanding of control theory helped him realize that the controlling

that

he observed involved the control of perception (which is his theoretical
contribution).

So I think Bill made two really enormous contributions to our

understanding

of living systems, one factual and one theoretical. The factual

contribution is

that behavior IS control; the theoretical contribution is that control

involves

···

-----Original Message-----
control of input (perception) not output. The only problem with Matti's
suggestion, as far as I'm concerned, is that it conflates these two
contributions by conflating theory and fact. It is a testable theory that
organisms control perceptions; it is an observable fact that they control.

Best

Rick

> As for the observer view point, we can and do observe beavers
> building, birds and butterflies flying and spiders weaving.
> So, from my point of view, there is consistency (not identicality) in
> results and there is consistency in the patterned behaviors that
> produce them.
>
> So what? Well, I think it goes not to consistency but to variability.
> We are able to vary our behavior so as to achieve (and perceive) the
> result we're after despite those darned things called "disturbances."
>
> Fred Nickols
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
>> Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 5:28 PM
>> To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
>> Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS
>>
>> [From Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)]
>>
>> > Matti Kolu (2013.06.27.2140 CET)--
>> >
>> > p. viii in LCS (I):
>> > "These disturbances are pervasive but difficult to notice because
>> > behavior is ordinarily quite consistent. Organisms weave webs,
>> > migrate to specific destinations, build dams--and they do these
>> > things over and
>> over again.
>> > Powers, looking at behavior through the eyes of a trained physicist
>> > and engineer, saw that such consistency was quite surprising."
>> >
>> > This might have been brought up before. In the first sentence above
>> > it seems like the consistency should refer to the (perceived)
>> > outcomes of behavior and not behavior itself.
>>
>> RM: Actually it was never brought up before. But you make an
>> interesting point. I think the quoted passage is good as is because I
>> am talking about behavior from the point of view of an observer. What
>> an observer sees as behavior is consistently produced results: webs,
migrations, dams, etc.
> What
>> an observer of the caliber of Bill Powers understood is that these
> consistent
>> results are being produced in the face of variable (and often
>> invisible) disturbances. What I am saying here is that Bill realized
>> that behavior
> _is_
>> control (indeed, LCS III was subtitled "The fact of control" to
>> emphasize
> this
>> very important point).
>>
>> PCT is a theory that explains _how_ organisms are able to produce
> consistent
>> results -- to control -- in the face of variable and typically
>> invisible disturbances. So the theory says what you suggest I should
>> say in the
> first
>> sentence: that organisms are able to produce consistent results
>> because they control perceptions of those results.
>> So the reason I did not say that "perceived outcomes of behavior are
>> consistent" rather than that "behavior is quite consistent" is
>> because I
> was
>> talking about a fact (that behavior is control) and not the
>> explanation of
> this
>> fact (perceptual control theory).
>>
>> Hope this helps.
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Rick
>> --
>> Richard S. Marken PhD
>> rsmarken@gmail.com
>> www.mindreadings.com

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.28.1245)]

Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.1458 EDT)--

FN: Well, FWIW, I don't use behavior to refer to behavior and its

effects/results nor do most of the performance professionals I know.
We are all careful to draw a distinction between behavior (as an
activity, patterned or discrete) and its effects or outcomes.

RM: That's great. But, of course, the distinction between behavior (as
activity) and it's effects is relative, not absolute. For example, are
the movements we see as "walking" a "behavior" (in your sense) or an
effect of "behavior"? Clearly they are both.The are a result of muscle
movements and a "behavior" that produces the result of moving a person
from one place to another.

So it's really ok to call just about anything a person does
"behavior", even if we reserve the word "behavior" for "activity,
patterned or discrete" since every result of "behavior is itself a
"behavior"; all results of "behavior" (except the highest level ones)
are "activities, patterned or discrete" that are the means of
achieving some other result. I think the only solution is to talk
about behavior in terms of control.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Fred Nickols (2013.06.29.0707 EDT)]

Rick Marten writes in part: "...it's really ok to call just about anything
a person does "behavior", even if we reserve the word "behavior" for
"activity, patterned or discrete" since every result of "behavior is itself
a "behavior"

I don't agree. Let's try a different example. If I hold out my hand at
arm's length and clench my fingers and thumb into a fist (in order to "make"
a fist) there are lots of discrete behaviors involved (some of which are
also involved in making a pointing configuration with the forefinger
extended). The outcome, however, is a clenched "fist." I don't view a
"fist" as behavior; making a fist is behavior and it is what I refer to as a
"patterned" behavior.

Consider a different example: riding a bicycle - and let's use your example
of walking from one place to another. Riding a bicycle is another patterned
behavior. Being at the intended destination is an outcome. Being at that
destination and getting there are two different things.

I am not at all convinced that, as you say, "every result of behavior is
itself a behavior."

Fred Nickols

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@GMAIL.COM]
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 3:44 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Marken's foreword to LCS

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.28.1245)]

> Fred Nickols (2013.06.28.1458 EDT)--
>
>FN: Well, FWIW, I don't use behavior to refer to behavior and its
effects/results nor do most of the performance professionals I know.
We are all careful to draw a distinction between behavior (as an activity,
patterned or discrete) and its effects or outcomes.

RM: That's great. But, of course, the distinction between behavior (as
activity) and it's effects is relative, not absolute. For example, are the
movements we see as "walking" a "behavior" (in your sense) or an effect of
"behavior"? Clearly they are both.The are a result of muscle movements and
a "behavior" that produces the result of moving a person from one place to
another.

So it's really ok to call just about anything a person does "behavior",

even if

we reserve the word "behavior" for "activity, patterned or discrete" since
every result of "behavior is itself a "behavior"; all results of

"behavior"

(except the highest level ones) are "activities, patterned or discrete"

that are

the means of achieving some other result. I think the only solution is to

talk

···

-----Original Message-----
about behavior in terms of control.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.29.1320)]

Fred Nickols (2013.06.29.0707 EDT) --

FN: Rick Marten writes in part: "...it's really ok to call just about anything
a person does "behavior", even if we reserve the word "behavior" for
"activity, patterned or discrete" since every result of "behavior is itself
a "behavior"

I don't agree. Let's try a different example. If I hold out my hand at
arm's length and clench my fingers and thumb into a fist (in order to "make"
a fist) there are lots of discrete behaviors involved (some of which are
also involved in making a pointing configuration with the forefinger
extended). The outcome, however, is a clenched "fist." I don't view a
"fist" as behavior; making a fist is behavior and it is what I refer to as a
"patterned" behavior.

RM: Yes, I see your point. If you want to reserve the word "behavior"
to describe only the actions used to produce a result, then the finger
movements that result in a fist are behavior and the fist is a result.
But I believe it is also possible to see the fist as an action that is
used to produce a result. You can see what result is being produced by
the fist by asking why the fist is being made. In your description
above, you are making the fist in order to demonstrate that the fist
is not a "behavior" in your sense; so the fist is the action that is
used to produce the result of "demonstrating that the fist is not an
action". A less esoteric example comes from real life, where fists are
actions taken in order to produce the result of "threatening" or
"hitting". And "threatening" and "hitting" are themselves actions that
are taken to produce other results, such as "scaring" or "hurting"
others.

FN: Consider a different example: riding a bicycle - and let's use your example
of walking from one place to another. Riding a bicycle is another patterned
behavior. Being at the intended destination is an outcome. Being at that
destination and getting there are two different things.

RM: Yes, but think about why the outcome is produced? I walk to a
destination in order to produce some other outcome (like buying food
if a market is the destination or watching a movie if a theater is a
destination). So walking is a behavior (in your sense) that produces
the outcome "getting to the market"; and "getting to the market" is a
"behavior" (again in your sense) that produces the outcome "shopping".

FN: I am not at all convinced that, as you say, "every result of behavior is
itself a behavior."

RM: You may be right to doubt that _every_ result of behavior is
itself a behavior.I can think of results that are itself not in
themselves "behavior"; they are what in PCT we call the highest level
results (or controlled variables) that we produce. Perhaps that one of
the highest level result could be called "meaning of life". I can't
think of any result we might be trying to produce by trying to produce
meaning in our lives; producing meaning in our lives seems to me to be
a result that is not itself the means of producing some other result.

I can understand why you would want to restrict the meaning of
"behavior" to refer to just those things we see people doing that we
would call actions, or the means used to produce results. But I think
limiting the meaning of behavior in this way is not really that
clarifying. Think of it in terms of the title of Bill's book,
Behavior: The Control of Perception. Clearly, the meaning of
"Behavior" in the title is not limited to just actions that produce a
result. Rather, it refers to all the stuff we see people doing (and
give a name to); moving fingers, making a fist, striking an opponent,
mowing the lawn, taking a swim, etc. I think a basic point Bill makes
in B:CP, as reflected in the title, is that what people call
"behavior" is a process of control; behavior is varying one's actions
as necessary to produce intended (controlled) results. So the only
"right" way to define "behavior" is as "control". And what are being
controlled are perceptions.

So I think Bill's genius is reflected not only in the contents of his
book but also in its brilliant (and, I'm sure, very carefully
selected) title : Behavior: The Control of Perception. That title
wraps up the whole point of the book: Behavior is Control and what is
controlled is Perception. That is all ye know on earth, and all ye
need to know (with apologies to John Keats), though of course we will
spend a lot of time unwrapping that title in the course.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

]Martin Taylor 2013.06.29.16.36]

I think you are arguing about levels of control/behaviour/action/perception. But I think Fred is dealing with the difference between getting there and being there, or between the reference value and the dynamics of the control loop. In one way of looking at it "behaviour" is the approach of the perception to to, and its maintenance near, the reference value _at one level_. Mostly, the higher-level dynamics involve lower levels that have reached, and are maintained, near their dynamically changing reference levels. The overt physical actions aren't usually what we see as people "doing". My favourite example of the guy pushing on a button beside a door has all sorts of "actions". He is tensing various muscles. he is pressing a bell-button, he is trying to hear a particular kind of sound, he is acting to get a door opened, he is controlling for seeing Aunt Millie at the door, he is controlling for tasting some tea and cookies, he is acting to control a future event, the reading of Aunt Mille's will that contains a nice bequest to him ... Which are the actions? Which are or are not the behaviours? Which are the controlled perceptions without which the other actions would not be performed?

At one level, there's a result--the bell sound is heard, the sight of Aunt Millie at the door is seen. At another level these results are only a part of the action behaviour at a higher level. When else is involved in the actions that (with luck) will allow the eventual perception of a nice bequest from Aunt Millie?

I think your difference is only between considering a single level of control and considering the whole hierarchy.

Martin

···

On 2013/06/29 4:23 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2013.06.29.1320)]

Fred Nickols (2013.06.29.0707 EDT) --

FN: Rick Marten writes in part: "...it's really ok to call just about anything
a person does "behavior", even if we reserve the word "behavior" for
"activity, patterned or discrete" since every result of "behavior is itself
a "behavior"

I don't agree. Let's try a different example. If I hold out my hand at
arm's length and clench my fingers and thumb into a fist (in order to "make"
a fist) there are lots of discrete behaviors involved (some of which are
also involved in making a pointing configuration with the forefinger
extended). The outcome, however, is a clenched "fist." I don't view a
"fist" as behavior; making a fist is behavior and it is what I refer to as a
"patterned" behavior.

RM: Yes, I see your point. If you want to reserve the word "behavior"
to describe only the actions used to produce a result, then the finger
movements that result in a fist are behavior and the fist is a result.
But I believe it is also possible to see the fist as an action that is
used to produce a result. You can see what result is being produced by
the fist by asking why the fist is being made. In your description
above, you are making the fist in order to demonstrate that the fist
is not a "behavior" in your sense; so the fist is the action that is
used to produce the result of "demonstrating that the fist is not an
action". A less esoteric example comes from real life, where fists are
actions taken in order to produce the result of "threatening" or
"hitting". And "threatening" and "hitting" are themselves actions that
are taken to produce other results, such as "scaring" or "hurting"
others.

FN: Consider a different example: riding a bicycle - and let's use your example
of walking from one place to another. Riding a bicycle is another patterned
behavior. Being at the intended destination is an outcome. Being at that
destination and getting there are two different things.

RM: Yes, but think about why the outcome is produced? I walk to a
destination in order to produce some other outcome (like buying food
if a market is the destination or watching a movie if a theater is a
destination). So walking is a behavior (in your sense) that produces
the outcome "getting to the market"; and "getting to the market" is a
"behavior" (again in your sense) that produces the outcome "shopping".

FN: I am not at all convinced that, as you say, "every result of behavior is
itself a behavior."

RM: You may be right to doubt that _every_ result of behavior is
itself a behavior.I can think of results that are itself not in
themselves "behavior"; they are what in PCT we call the highest level
results (or controlled variables) that we produce. Perhaps that one of
the highest level result could be called "meaning of life". I can't
think of any result we might be trying to produce by trying to produce
meaning in our lives; producing meaning in our lives seems to me to be
a result that is not itself the means of producing some other result.

I can understand why you would want to restrict the meaning of
"behavior" to refer to just those things we see people doing that we
would call actions, or the means used to produce results. But I think
limiting the meaning of behavior in this way is not really that
clarifying. Think of it in terms of the title of Bill's book,
Behavior: The Control of Perception. Clearly, the meaning of
"Behavior" in the title is not limited to just actions that produce a
result. Rather, it refers to all the stuff we see people doing (and
give a name to); moving fingers, making a fist, striking an opponent,
mowing the lawn, taking a swim, etc. I think a basic point Bill makes
in B:CP, as reflected in the title, is that what people call
"behavior" is a process of control; behavior is varying one's actions
as necessary to produce intended (controlled) results. So the only
"right" way to define "behavior" is as "control". And what are being
controlled are perceptions.

So I think Bill's genius is reflected not only in the contents of his
book but also in its brilliant (and, I'm sure, very carefully
selected) title : Behavior: The Control of Perception. That title
wraps up the whole point of the book: Behavior is Control and what is
controlled is Perception. That is all ye know on earth, and all ye
need to know (with apologies to John Keats), though of course we will
spend a lot of time unwrapping that title in the course.

Best regards

Rick

[From Matti Kolu (2013.06.29.2345 CET)]

Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)--

What an observer sees as behavior

What an observer perceives depends on the observer's system concept(s). A
person who belongs to the generation that takes the nature, the phenomenon
and the fact of control for granted, doesn't perceive behavior as such -- he
perceives control all around him. He views the older generations' focus on
"behavior" as odd and off-track.

The title of B:CP is, from this vantage point, slightly peculiar. To think
that in the olden days, people tried to understand and explain "behavior"!
That the title of the book begins with "Behavior" marks Powers as belonging
to the old generation. A book in a similar vein, written by someone
belonging to the new generation, would plainly be called something like "The
Control of Perception" or "(On) the Nature of Control".

Rick Marken (2013.06.28.0915)--

The factual contribution is that behavior IS control

You are, like Powers, still leading with "behavior". You are still standing
with a part of your foot in the old paradigm.

Matti

[Martin Taylor 2013.06.29.22.54]

That is so true that I had never noticed it, as we say that a fish

notices no water.
I don’t agree. Think who Powers was writing for, and what his
intended audience would understand by the title – the direct
contrast between perception as the driver of behaviour (observable
action) versus behaviour (influences on the environment) as
controlling perception. The titles you suggest might appeal to the “second generation”
people you describe in your first paragraph, but what relevance
would they have to people whose reference perception is that they
should understand how perception causes behaviour, and who devote a
lifetime to eliminating the (inevitable) error in their control of
that perception? Why would such people even think that a book with
one of your titles might be of any interest to them? Bill’s title
offers a challenge, a disturbance to some perception the challenger
hopes the target controls. Bill was writing for people who don’t
understand the living world the way your “second generation” people
do.
The Sufi writer Idries Shah pointed out that followers of a guru can
never understand what the guru tries to explain, and in place of
understanding they substitute a formalism based on the guru’s
observable actions and sayings. They cannot test for the guru’s
controlled variables, and by aping what they see and hear, they hope
to achieve what the guru achieved. Idries Shah was talking about
religious formalism, but I suspect much the same applies to PCT.
Bill’s understanding was probably different and deeper than that of
any of his followers. It is our task to follow
blindly what he said, but to develop our own understanding of its
implications.
I will let Rick figure out where his feet are, but I doubt he would
agree with you. However, it is a novelist’s trope that the person
one most easily deceives is oneself, so his disagreement might mean
little.
Where I disagree with Rick is in his assertion that there is a real
“fact” that one can know, as opposed to a perception one believes to
be true of some real world. I don’t think Bill would have let him
get away with that.
Martin

···

[From Matti Kolu (2013.06.29.2345 CET)]
Rick Marken (2013.06.27.1420)--
What an observer sees as behavior
What an observer perceives depends on the observer's system concept(s). A
person who belongs to the generation that takes the nature, the phenomenon
and the fact of control for granted, doesn't perceive behavior as such -- he
perceives control all around him. He views the older generations' focus on
"behavior" as odd and off-track.
The title of B:CP is, from this vantage point, slightly peculiar. To think
that in the olden days, people tried to understand and explain "behavior"!
That the title of the book begins with "Behavior" marks Powers as belonging
to the old generation. A book in a similar vein, written by someone
belonging to the new generation, would plainly be called something like "The
Control of Perception" or "(On) the Nature of Control".

not

Rick Marken (2013.06.28.0915)--
The factual contribution is that behavior IS control
You are, like Powers, still leading with "behavior". You are still standing
with a part of your foot in the old paradigm.