# memory; falsifiability

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/memory-falsifiability/14236>\
**Category:** CSG1995\
**Created:** [February 28, 1995, 6:48pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/memory-falsifiability/14236 "1995-02-28T18:48:56Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [February 28, 1995, 6:48pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/memory-falsifiability/14236/1 "1995-02-28T18:48:56Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (950228.1100 MST)]

I accidentally send a message for Isaac Kurtzer and Tom Bourbon to CSG-  
L; no harm done, I hope.

> **···**
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Joel Judd (950227.1515 CST)--
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I guess if you mean by "explicit" the EXACT, SAME, UNCHANGING  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;object or concept or thing, then for me there is no explicit  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;storage and retrieval of information. Maybe I'm reading too much  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;into your question, but it seems to border on the real reality  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;problem, or at least the implication that we somehow induct what IS  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"out there" into the brain.
> 
> I don't follow this. If memory involves recording and retrieval of  
> perceptual signals, doesn't this still leave the same problematic  
> relationship between perceptual signals and "out there"?
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Without oversimplifying, if HPCT describes perceptual control, then  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;an implication for me is that imagination and memory are closely  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;related and may, in some cases, actually be the same thing.
> 
> But what about the relationship of memory to past events? If higher  
> systems select lower-level reference signals from recorded values of the  
> lower-level perceptual systems, imagination would, as you say, also  
> involve memory. But where do the recorded values come from, if not  
> recordings of perceptual signals?
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The \<car\> I recall by replaying, so to speak, relevant perceptual  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;levels; yet, each time I recall it, and as time passes, the  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;memory/imagination changes.
> 
> This is perfectly consistent with the model proposed in BCP. Recorded  
> perceptual signals are played back into the same channels that interpret  
> present-time perceptions, so if the perceptual system changes, so will  
> the memories. Also, for other kinds of failure of memory, we have to  
> remember that there are three other components of any memory: the  
> recording method, the recording itself as a physical trace, and the  
> playback method. Changes in any of these will also result in changes in  
> experienced memories. And if the original perception has a dubious  
> relationship to the external world (as in optical illusions), so will  
> the memory.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Let me cite part of Campbell and Bickhard (1986) and then run for  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the day:
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"For the interactive approach, in contrast, representation is NOT  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;constituted by any kind of structural correspondance between what  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;represents and what is represented.
> 
> This is essentially the PCT approach, as least as far as representation  
> goes. A signal that represents the presence of chocolate is not itself  
> made of chocolate; a signal representing presence of a square does not  
> have a square shape. A signal simply indicates that an amount of a given  
> function of lower-level signals exists; it's like a meter reading. A  
> meter reading indicating -10db of audio level does not make a sound.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Representation is an interactive functional property rather than a  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;structural property ...The ontology of representation and knowledge  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;is system organization, which could be regarded as a kind of  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;structure....
> 
> I suppose that must mean something, but I can't figure out what. Can you  
> explain this to me in simple words?
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For the interactive perspective, then, learning cannot have  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;anything to do with structures being stamped in or imported from  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the environment.
> 
> Is there anybody who has seriously proposed this? This strikes me as one  
> of those "opposing views" that nobody supports.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Representation and knowledge (and by extension, memory) are  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;constructed indirectly via new system organization rather than  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;directly in terms of basic elements of representation (encodings)."
> 
> Why "by extension, memory?" If you have some sort of representation in  
> the system, why can't IT be stored and recalled? I'm not sure what the  
> implied alternative is here. Why reject the simplest explanation?  
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> John Anderson (950227.2200 EST) --
> 
> Nice review of that report on infant arm movements, which I had seen.  
> These people actually did the Test, by applying forces to the arms to  
> find out whether the movements were intentional or accidental. Or at  
> least they did a rough version of it.  
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Bill Leach (950227.20:58 EST(EDT)--  
> Replying to Bruce Buchanan (950227.01:30 EST) --
> 
> Bruce B:
> 
> > Clever people who have read Popper may also try to think of tests which  
> > might show that the model is inadequate or false ("falsifiability"  
> > criterion), a more decisive kind of test than looking only for  
> > confirming instances.
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I still will maintain that there is a most significant difference  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;here, these "thought tests" are not subjected to any experimental  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;validation. The 'falseifications" can be every bit as incorrect as  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the "theory".
> 
> Actually, every PCT experiment opens the model to falsification. Even  
> when just fitting a model to data, we require such a good fit that a bad  
> fit is taken as evidence that the model doesn't describe the behavior.  
> This has shown up in the sleep-deprivation data that Martin Taylor was  
> involved in taking. A subject who is falling asleep at the control stick  
> produces behavior that the model simple can't imitate; the conclusion is  
> that this is not control behavior as defined in PCT: the hypothesis that  
> control behavior (at least of the kind we're modeling) is taking place  
> is falsified.
> 
> PCT models become even more vulnerable to falsification when the  
> parameters found from one experimental run are used to predict handle  
> movements with a new disturbance pattern or even the addition of a  
> disturbance that affects a new aspect of the display. Generally, the  
> predictions are very nearly as accurate as the fit of the model to the  
> initial run. But there is no a priori reason that they should be so  
> accurate, or even close. After all, we have a person holding the control  
> stick and subject to no other physical constraints at all. The person  
> can move the handle in any way desired in order to accomplish the task.  
> PCT claims that there is just one way, and goes further to predict not  
> only performance, but errors. So it is hard to dismiss PCT as simply a  
> "perspective" on behavior, because perspectives can't be proven wrong,  
> while PCT can.
> 
> The least falsifiable hypotheses are those obtained from statistical  
> methods. Large numbers of observations contrary to hypothesis are  
> permitted, yet they don't count against the hypothesis unless they  
> clearly predominate.
> 
> I have always agreed with Popper's dictum of falsifiability. If an idea  
> is stated so generally and vaguely that there wouldn't be any way to  
> find out if it's wrong, then there's not much to be impressed with if it  
> seems to be true.  
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best to all,
> 
> Bill P.