RM: So I don’t think memory is involved in recognizing/ identifying notes (or words or anything else); that’s done by the perceptual functions (once they have been built). But memory is involved in specifying what notes you want to hear.
RP: I fully agree with your second sentence above, that “Memory is involved in specifying what notes you want to hear.” Certainly, learned references from the category level on up involve memory.
But your first sentence, that “I don’t think memory is involved in recognizing/identifying notes (or words or anything else); that’s done by the perceptual functions (once they have been built)” seems open to discussion – because it seems that memory is a part of the perceptual function (to me at least). For example, a musician walks down the street and (not wanting to hear it) happens to hear a sound that he or she immediately perceives as a “C”. It seems as if he or she perceives the “C” because that skill is a part of the perceptual function “built” during the musician’s training – a learned skill stored as a memory in the neural network that results in the perception of “C”.
In the case just mentioned, I grant that the musician’s perception of a “C” is not part of an actively functioning control system (at that moment), since he or she is just passively hearing and recognizing the “C”. He or she is experiencing an “uncontrolled perception”, rather than a “controlled perception” or an “imagined perception.” But, none the less, the person’s perceptual function is involved – and so, apparently, are the memory traces that lead to his or her recognition of the sound as a “C”.
In other words, I see no problem in suggesting (hypothesizing) that memory can be a part of the perceptual function – especially since, at the present time, the perceptual function seems to be a PCT “black box”, subject to investigation. But as you wisely pointed out before and I now recognize, such a suggestion is speculative, and to resolve it, your statement below is quite appropriate. I hope someone follows up on it!
RM: Coming up with a proposal for how to determine how memory is involved in control of perception would, I think, go a long way toward moving the discussion of memory in perception from the realm of philosophical speculation to that of scientific research, per Andrew Nichols’ wise plea.
···
-----Original Message-----
From: “Richard Marken” (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Fri, Mar 27, 2015 9:40 pm
Subject: Re: Memory in Perception (was Where’s the dolphin?)
[From Rick Marken (2015.03.27.1840)]
Richard Pfau (2015.03.27 1930EST)–
RM: … Controlled perceptions have no memory basis; they are completely based on environmental variables. Imagined perceptions, on the other hand, have no environmental basis; they are completely based on replays of reference signals into the corresponding perceptual pathways…
RM: … I don’t think memory is involved in perception but I wouldn’t be surprised (or disappointed) to find that it is.
RP: Perhaps I am missing something, but it seems obvious that perception does have a basis in memory. For example, hearing the note “C” in music (as opposed to hearing just a sound) is dependent of learning what a “C” is and then perceiving/recognizing/identifying that note when it is heard.
RM: I agree that learning is involved here, but not memory. Learning that a particular sound is a “C” requires a perceptual function whose output will indicate that a “C” occurred when a tone of a particular frequency is played. People who can do this (I certainly can’t but I agree that some people can) have been able to build (via reorganization) such a perceptual function. It’s like building the perceptual functions for words. Before you learn a language you are just perceiving the language as a flow of sound sensations and transitions. But eventually certain patterns of sounds are heard as words. So the sounds of “Opa” have finally ended up being perceived as “Opa” by my unbelievably adorable and brilliant 1.5 year old granddaughter, who will now say “Opa” very clearly when my daughter lets her see me on the iPhone (darned if she didn’t learn “Nana” first, 4 months ago.
RM: So I don’t think memory is involved in recognizing/ identifying notes (or words or anything else); that’s done by the perceptual functions (once they have been built). But memory is involved in specifying what notes you want to hear. For example, if you have absolute pitch like you describe above, you can tune your guitar “from memory” by first setting a reference for the perception of low E for the top sting, then A, D, G B and high E. And you control for each note perception by adjusting the tuning pegs until the sound perception matches the reference. I can’t do it absolutely like that but I can do it relatively; I tune A relative to E, D relative to A, etc. Memory is involved in knowing what the perceptual relationship between the notes should sound like. So I set a reference (from memory) for the appropriate relationship between E and A to tune A and so on and control for getting that relationship perception. So the memory involved in this control task involves remembering what reference for the relationship perception to set when I tune A (E-A relationship), D (A-D relationship), etc. Memory doesn’t affect the relationship perception itself. That perception is provided to me by the incredibly cool relationship perceptual functions I developed during the 60s;-)
RF: (I, for one, can’t perceive/recognize/identify a “C” from a “D” or another note, since I haven’t learned to do so and recognition/perception of a “C” is not in my memory – whereas an experienced musician is sure to perceive/recognize/identify a “C” when heard since he or she has a memory basis for doing so).
RM: What these musicians have learned is how to perceive “C”, etc.
RF: Hearing such a “C” by a musician would seem to be a controlled perception, for example, when the person is tuning or playing a stringed instrument.
RM: Yes it is a controlled perception; the perception of a sound as “C” results from having developed the perceptual function whose output corresponds to “C” when the appropriate sound frequency exists in the environment (and, thus, at the input to the perceptual function). The perception of “C” is based entirely on environmental variables (sounds pressure variations), not on memory. At least that’s the way it would be modeled in PCT.
Best
Rick
With Regards,
Richard Pfau
-----Original Message-----
From: “Richard Marken” (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com
Sent: Fri, Mar 27, 2015 3:17 pm
Subject: Memory in Perception (was Where’s the dolphin?)
[From Rick Marken (2015.03.27.1215)]
Rupert Young (2015.03.26 21.45)–
RY: However, I would also question whether there is an environmental basis of every perception. As we go up the hierarchy perceptions become more abstract and subjective and less related to objective reality. If imagination, thoughts and beliefs are perceptions then do these always have an environmental basis? How about unicorns, fear and gods?
RM: Perhaps the most difficult thing for me to understand (and accept) when I first got into PCT was the idea that all behavior is the control of perception – even very complex behavior like playing chess. Doing complex things, according to PCT, involves controlling complex (high level) types of perceptions, such as programs, principles and system concepts. As Powers mentions in the first paragraph on “Higher Levels” of perception in B:CP (p. 155 in 2nd edition), these higher level perceptions seem more like they are inside rather than external to ourselves; they seem subjective rather than objective. So a lower level perception, like the perception of the a chess piece, seems like it’s external/objective while the perception of a chess heuristic, like “control of the center” seems like it is internal/subjective.
RM: But as Powers mentioned in that first paragraph, “the model makes no special distinction between these subdivisions”. That is, both higher and lower level perceptions are seen as ultimately functions of sensory effects of environmental variables. So perceptions of all types have an environmental basis in PCT. The perception of the principle “control of the center” is as much a function of environmental variables as is the perception of the configurations “knight”, “bishop” etc, that are components of the “control of the center” perception.
RM: This is relevant to the current discussion because it might explain why it is thought that some perceptions don’t have an environmental basis or are partially (or entirely) based on memory. We tend to think of memory (or thought) being involved in the “higher level” perceptions, like the perception of “control of the center”. Well, I did. these high level perceptions do seem more like “thoughts” than “perceptions”. And they are thoughts (imaginations) when we think about them. But they are controlled perceptions when we are actually behaving. For example, a skilled chess player is perceiving the degree to which he has “control of the center” as the play progresses; and he is acting to get this perception to the desired reference state by moving the pieces appropriately.
RM: The perception of the degree of “control of the center” is a function of the pattern of pieces on the board and the perception of the rules that constrain how they can change position. So a high level perception – a perception that seems like an internal thought – is still based completely on lower level perceptions that are ultimately a function of variables in the environment.
RM: So it has taken me a while to understand (and actually experience) the fact that higher level perceptions --like the perception of “control of the center” in chess --which seem like internal thoughts are, in fact, environmental variable-based perceptions, just like the perception of the color, shape or position of a chess piece. Higher level perceptions exist, in the PCT model, without any input contribution from memory. However, like any other perception, it is possible to have these perceptions in imagination; I can see the abstract concept of “control of the center” in my mind’s eye just as easily as I can see, in my minds eye, the chess pieces – the knights and bishops – that are used to bring about the desired level of the perception of control of the center. When I do this, all these perceptions – lower level and high – are completely memory based-- they are replays of references for those perceptions.
RM: I think the important distinction here is between controlled and imagined perceptions. Controlled perceptions have no memory basis; they are completely based on environmental variables. Imagined perceptions, on the other hand, have no environmental basis; they are completely based on replays of reference signals into the corresponding perceptual pathways. Controlled perceptions, when imagined perceptions, are thoughts; controlled perceptions, when controlled, are perceptions. At least, this is the way it works in the current version of the PCT model.
RM: Since there is no research that suggests that the current PCT model needs revision, I’m sticking with it for now. But I would like to hear suggestions about how we would test to determine whether there is a memory component to controlled perceptions. I personally have no dog in this fight; I don’t think memory is involved in perception but I wouldn’t be surprised (or disappointed) to find that it is. I would just like to see a demonstration of how memory is involved in controlled perception.
RM: Coming up with a proposal for how to determine how memory is involved in control of perception would, I think, go a long way toward moving the discussion of memory in perception from the realm of philosophical speculation to that of scientific research, per Andrew Nichols’ wise plea.
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
