Memory in perceptual input

CSGnet Archive CSG2005
1

This is Phil Runkel replying to Marken, Powers, Taylor, and Forssell:

Thanks very much, friends, for your speculations about memory contained in your communications between 20 August and today. I have thought the conception of memory in PCT as captivating one, and I am glad to have your thought on the exact place and function memory ought to have in PCT. I have not yet read carefully all of your contributions, but I have copied off all of them (into a booklet 5/16” thick), and I will read them carefully before long.

PCT seems to me to postulate (along with the theory of evolution) that nothing comes from nothing. Every new thing comes about by reshaping or adding to what is already there. (I ignore the big bang; that was before my time.) I have prized this feature of PCT.

It seems to me that there must have been some sort of use of some sort of record of previous experience even at the beginning of life. Escherichia Coli must have some reference for the “taste” of nourishment.

What can we mean by control that it is “immediate,” or “direct”? Each function in the control loop requires some finite time, no matter how tiny. At the limit, I suppose, is the time required for chemical processes to occur. Any length of time beyond that rate would indicate a delayed output, and that delay would require some way of holding a signal in abeyance. Is such a thing possible in a single cell? I am ignorant of such matters.

I think of that delay, no matter what the physical media may be, or the chemical processes, as “memory.” And a reference signal itself, since it is pre-existing, must have the characteristic of memory (namely, a value and retrievability).

Well, just now I am not trying to think hard; I am only wanting to say thanks for your own thinking. I will read again and think again.

--P

2

[Martin Taylor 2005.09.04.17.43]

This is Phil Runkel replying to Marken, Powers, Taylor, and Forssell:

What can we mean by control that it is "immediate," or "direct"? Each function in the control loop requires some finite time, no matter how tiny. At the limit, I suppose, is the time required for chemical processes to occur. Any length of time beyond that rate would indicate a delayed output, and that delay would require some way of holding a signal in abeyance. Is such a thing possible in a single cell? I am ignorant of such matters.

I think of that delay, no matter what the physical media may be, or the chemical processes, as "memory." And a reference signal itself, since it is pre-existing, must have the characteristic of memory (namely, a value and retrievability).

Interesting that exactly this was a very early form of computer memory. The first computer I worked on had delay-line memories (as well as others). A signal was sent in as a vibratory impulse to one end of a stiff spiral of wire, and read out at the other end, only to be fed in again at the beginning. It could hold a pulse train as long as the delay in the wire, which could be read out once per loop delay time.

Martin

3

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.05.1720)]

This is Phil Runkel replying to Marken, Powers, Taylor, and Forssell:

And a reference signal itself, since
it is pre-existing, must have the characteristic of memory (namely, a
value and retrievability).

Yes. I think reference signals represent remembered perceptions. That is also the way they are described in B:CP. All I question is the idea that imagined (remembered) perceptions are regularly (or even rarely) inputs to perceptual functions.

It's easy to think of very clear examples of memories serving as references; My memory of the two part inventions as played by how Glenn Gould, for example, serves as the reference for what I want to perceive when I play two part inventions. What I hear when I play an invention is not _quite_ what I hear when Gould plays them; but even though I desperately want to hear them that way, I'm afraid I hear what I hear; there is no imagined perceptual input that makes what I hear sound more like what I want to hear.

Best

Rick

···

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4

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.05.0659 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.05.1720) –

Yes. I think reference
signals represent remembered perceptions. That is also the way they
are described in B:CP. All I question is the idea that imagined
(remembered) perceptions are regularly (or even rarely) inputs to
perceptual functions.

Then how do you perceive them? Look at Figure 15.3 in BCP on page 221. It
shows a control system in the imagination mode. A higher system is
sending an address signal to the memory of this system, where past values
of the perceptual signals are stored (actually, the higher system is
sending many reference signals to many systems of the order shown, so the
higher system is retrieving many remembered perceptual signals).
It’s the pattern that higher order PIFs detect in the array of remembered
signals that we call memories. But I’ve anticipated the main question:
Where are the retrieved signals going? They are going, according to the
diagram, “To higher orders.” The higher orders are receiving
remembered perceptual signals instead of the live perceptual signals that
are no longer coming from the input function of the system shown. and
what part of a higher system receives signals from lower systems? The
PIF.
Of course not all systems of the order shown are necessarily in the
imagination configuration; the proportion can probably vary all the way
from zero to 100%. But whatever the proportion, the result is experienced
by the higher systems just as if all the perceptual signals were
coming from the lower-order systems’ PIFs.

It’s easy to think of very clear
examples of memories serving as references; My memory of the two part
inventions as played by how Glenn Gould, for example, serves as the
reference for what I want to perceive when I play two part inventions.
What I hear when I play an invention is not quite what I hear when
Gould plays them; but even though I desperately want to hear them that
way, I’m afraid I hear what I hear; there is no imagined perceptual input
that makes what I hear sound more like what I want to
hear.

Of course not. You are substituting memories of Glenn Gould playing for
perceptions of yourself playing. What you do not know is the
extent to which what you hear yourself playing, even though still not
perfect, is being filled in by memories of Glenn Gould (or others)
playing, in spots where your actual playing doesn’t meet your hopes but
you are unaware of the extent to which it doesn’t. It’s possible that you
play even less like Gould than you think you do. I’m only guessing, of
course, because I have never heard you play (how could that be!?). But I
have definitely heard other musicians playing or singing a lot worse than
they thought they were playing or singing. I suspect that playing music
at an advanced level is a lot like doing competent science: you have to
be exceedingly careful not to fool yourself by imagining results
different from those you are actually obtaining, and more like what you
wanted or predicted. Like Millikan and his oil drops.
One thing you are imagining is that the music, played either by him or by
you, carries emotional content. The emotional content is being supplied
entirely by you, from memories of physiological and cognitive states that
you experienced in the past. The real music is mixed with imagined
emotional experiences. This is how music engages us, I think. It evokes
perceptions that are unique to us, yet in many ways are common to all
people who have had similar experiences. It would be interesting to know
how that works. I suspect it has something to do with the fact that sound
is carried by the same kind of means that neural signals are carried:
varying frequencies. So a sound can imitate a neural signal, and a
pattern of sounds can imitate a pattern of neural signals (I see I’m
starting to use Bruce Gregory’s term, “patterns”, more).
So imagination can be involved with music in many ways.
As I was going back over these ideas, and that diagram, it finally struck
me that the memory box may be superfluous. In fact it confuses the issue,
because all that ever appears in the upgoing perceptual pathway of
a single control system is a single signal with some momentary magnitude.
One signal does not consitute a pattern. Why do we need an address to
retrieve a single value of a perceptual signal, for example “157
impulses per second?” How can the downcoming address signal be any
simpler than the perceptual signal it supposedly retrieves? And if it’s
not simpler, then why should we think that evolution (or Intelligent
Design, who cares?) has produced a very complex way of doing something
simple? It’s much simpler to think that the upgoing perceptual signal
is the downgoing reference signal, rerouted.
In that case, where are memory patterns stored? Not in the input
function, the PIF, of the higher system, because that is what
recognizes the patterns in the upgoing signals, whether remembered
or real. Not in the PIF of the lower system, because it’s disconnected
from the upgoing path. And not in the switches, because at least so far
there is nothing to coordinate their states. And it’s not in what Martin
Taylor has called the RIF, the reference input function, where signals
from many higher-order systems converge on a single lower0order
comparator and are weighted to preserve negative feedback. It must be
located in the region where a single output function at the higher level
sends multiple outputs to different lower-level comparators (or
RIFs). That pattern of outputs is what is required to cause a particular
perception to vary in the same higher control system. So with many lower
systems in the imagination mode, this spray of outputs from the higher
system would evoke a pattern of perceptions like the pattern that would
result from really acting on the outside world via lower systems. Et
voila’, a memory – or an imagined perception. So the memory is more or
less implicit in the interface between the higher system’s output
function and the lower systems’ RIFs – comparators. And we can forget
those fancy notions about associative addressing, until something makes
us need them again.

I’m sure that’s still not the right story, but it’s closer.

Best,

Bill P.

5

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1120)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.05.0659 MDT)--

Rick Marken (2005.09.05.1720) --

Yes. I think reference signals represent remembered perceptions. That is
also the way they are described in B:CP. All I question is the idea that
imagined (remembered) perceptions are regularly (or even rarely) inputs to
perceptual functions.

Then how do you perceive them?

As perceptual signals entering the loop _after_ the perceptual function and
as perceptions (now imaginations) based on imagined inputs.

Look at Figure 15.3 in BCP on page 221.

I'll have to imagine it;-) I don't have ot here at work.

It shows a control system in the imagination mode. A higher system is sending
an address signal to the memory of this system, where past values of the
perceptual signals are stored (actually, the higher system is sending many
reference signals to many systems of the order shown, so the higher system is
retrieving many remembered perceptual signals). It's the pattern that higher
order PIFs detect in the array of remembered signals that we call memories.
But I've anticipated the main question: Where are the retrieved signals going?
They are going, according to the diagram, "To higher orders." The higher
orders are receiving remembered perceptual signals instead of the live
perceptual signals that are no longer coming from the input function of the
system shown. and what part of a higher system receives signals from lower
systems? The PIF.

That's fine. But in this case I think that _all_ the inputs to the higher
order PIF must imagined. I know that's a change to your version of the model
but it seems to fit better with my experience. What I'm objecting to (based
on subjective experience) is the idea that some of the inputs to the higher
level PIF are imagined and some are based on sensory input. I know that your
model (and my spreadsheet implementation thereof) make this possible. It
just doesn't seem to happen to me. My experience is that I'm perceiving or
I'm imagining and I know when I'm doing one or the other.

Let me give you an example of another reason why I have a problem with the
idea that perceptions can be based partially on imagination. Here's
something Dag wrote a couple days ago:

Dag Forssell (2005.09.01 16:45 PST)--

If a couple gets into a rut where she perceives him as nagging,
he can utter one word, a certain way perhaps, and she will go
ballistic. Not because of what he was about to say, but because
she added 90% plus to finish the sentence and as a result had
an instant error signal. Of such stuff divorces are made, I think.

My problem with this analysis is that it assumes that the perception of the
husband as nagging is incorrect. And that the perception is incorrect
because it is based on imagination, and an incorrect imagination to boot.
This analysis suggests that the way for the wife to stop acting (by going
ballistic) to prevent the husband from nagging is to re-imagine what the
husband is doing so that what the wife perceives is the husband whispering
sweet nothings rather than nagging. And, indeed, this is Dag's conclusion:

If you dearly love someone, you would overlook various and sundry
problems others with a different perspective might see and object to.

So the way to get along with people is to imagine correctly so that we will
perceive things as we want them to be. This is an approach to solving human
conflicts that I had not picked up from my modest understanding of PCT. I
thought we resolve conflicts by changing what (and how) you want (by going
up a level) rather than by changing what (and how) you perceive (by creative
imagination). But I'm sure that you will explain that I was wrong about
that, as I have been about so many other things that have to do with
applying PCT.

Best

Rick

···

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MindReadings.com
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Cell: 310 729 1400

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6

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1311 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1120) –

My problem with this analysis is
that it assumes that the perception of the

husband as nagging is incorrect. And that the perception is
incorrect

because it is based on imagination, and an incorrect imagination to
boot.

I think you missed the point. The problem was that the wife reacted to
something the husband didn’t say, which necessarily means she
imagined it. Imagining something doesn’t mean it’s necessarily wrong.
It’s just imagined, and therefore could be wrong because it’s not
being updated from the real world.

So the way to get along with
people is to imagine correctly so that we will

perceive things as we want them to be. This is an approach to
solving human

conflicts that I had not picked up from my modest understanding of PCT.

You didn’t pick it up from anything said on CSGnet, either. You imagined
it. Nobody said that.

Best,

Bill P.

7

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1316 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1120)]

> Then how do you perceive them?

As perceptual signals entering the loop _after_ the perceptual function and
as perceptions (now imaginations) based on imagined inputs.

> Look at Figure 15.3 in BCP on page 221.

I'll have to imagine it;-) I don't have ot here at work.

>Where are the retrieved signals going?
> They are going, according to the diagram, "To higher orders." The higher
> orders are receiving remembered perceptual signals instead of the live
> perceptual signals that are no longer coming from the input function of the
> system shown. and what part of a higher system receives signals from lower
> systems? The PIF.

That's fine. But in this case I think that _all_ the inputs to the higher
order PIF must imagined.

By imagining that this rule applies, you are creating a perception of a system in which perceptual signals are derived completely from real data or completely from imagined data, with no cases where some of the information is real and some is imagined. Fine. I agree that in that imaginary universe, you either perceive correctly or totally in imagination. That's the way you're imagining it. But that doesn't make this assumption true, and nothing requires me to imagine it that way.

I know that's a change to your version of the model but it seems to fit better with my experience. What I'm objecting to (based on subjective experience) is the idea that some of the inputs to the higher level PIF are imagined and some are based on sensory input. I know that your model (and my spreadsheet implementation thereof) make this possible. It just doesn't seem to happen to me. My experience is that I'm perceiving or I'm imagining and I know when I'm doing one or the other.

To say "I know" is somewhat different from saying "I'm convinced." You're convinced that whatever you think you're really perceiving involves no imagination. But you could be wrong. You may simply wish to believe that you always know when you're imagining, and so interpret your experiences to make that seem true. Do you never read your own words and perceive them as wonderful, only to have people later point out errors? Don't you ever feel you have played the piano beautifully, only to find that someone else didn't hear the result the same way? Do all of your perceptions always turn out to represent the world as it actually was, with no little tinge of wishful thinking, no overly favorable interpretations, no misremembering that conveniently deletes embarrassing moments or glosses over gaffes on your part? Have you never deluded yourself about anything?

I simply find your claim that you always know when you're imagining parts of experiences difficult to accept. I certainly don't know anyone else of whom that is true, including myself. Are you really sure you want to make that claim?

Here's an example that may be sufficiently far from the present to be considered objectively. You once expressed vehement certainty that O.J. Simpson was guilty of murder. I, on the other hand, after watching pretty much the same T.V. shows, remained uncertain. Was your perception of his guilt based on strictly real-time perceptions? If so, what did I miss? Or could it be that you imagined some things that were not actually portrayed on the screen, and that your perception was based in part on things you imagined to be true, but never actually saw?

Best,

Bill P.

8

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1330)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1311 MDT)--

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1120) --

My problem with this analysis is that it assumes that the perception of the
husband as nagging is incorrect. And that the perception is incorrect
because it is based on imagination, and an incorrect imagination to boot.

I think you missed the point. The problem was that the wife reacted to
something the husband didn't say, which necessarily means she imagined it.

OK. Then it wasn't a case of imagination contributing to perception; it was
just a case of imagining something that would make you mad. I though Dag had
posted it as an example of how imagination contributes to perception because
that's what we were talking about.

So the way to get along with people is to imagine correctly so that we will
perceive things as we want them to be. This is an approach to solving human
conflicts that I had not picked up from my modest understanding of PCT.

You didn't pick it up from anything said on CSGnet, either. You imagined it.
Nobody said that.

Of course I imagined it; it was a conclusion (which is an imagined
perception) derived from the example. If that conclusion is wrong then I
would appreciate it if Dag or you could tell me what I was supposed to have
concluded based on the anecdote.

Best

Rick

···

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MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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9

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1451 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1330) --

> I think you missed the point. The problem was that the wife reacted to

> something the husband didn't say, which necessarily means she imagined it.

OK. Then it wasn't a case of imagination contributing to perception; it was
just a case of imagining something that would make you mad. I though Dag had
posted it as an example of how imagination contributes to perception because
that's what we were talking about.

The wife perceived her husband as nagging her, on the basis of what she imagined he was about to say. Her husband was really there and he was really talking, so she didn't imagine that part, but she imagined him to be saying something he wasn't saying, so she perceived him as nagging her.

Why not just accept the simple explanation?

Best,

Bill P.

10

[From Don Hemminger (2005.09.06.1700 EDT)]

It seems like this discussion revolves around the difference (if any)
between "an imagined perception" and "a perception of my imagination".
Rick's arguments seem to suggest:

     - A concept is a 2nd class citizen. Not exactly a perception.
     - If you have a visual Perception (you see it) and a mental
perception (a concept), the Visual perception is the only real
perception

The question I would ask, which Bill did ask, is:

    "How you think of it is also a perception, isn't it?"

Best
Don Hemminger
SCC Web Systems - 14000E
937.512.2015

Excerpts from recent Posts

···

---------------------------------------
Bill & Rick 08/81

[Rick] What I would have is the "cognition" of a damaged vase, a
perception that exists only in my mind as a concept.

[Bill] Where do other perceptions exist? If you know that the vase is
damaged, do you still think of it as an undamaged vase when the part you
can see looks undamaged? How you think of it is also a perception, isn't
it?

[Rick] Would you actually see a vase with a crack in it?

[Bill] I don't have to see the crack; I can imagine it. In my mind, I
would "know" that on the side I can't see, there is a crack, which I
could see in my mind's eye looking just the way it looked the last time
I saw it. (of course this being imagination, I could be mistaken as the
woman in my story was). I would know that there is a crack in the same
way I would know about how heavy the vase is, and how valuable.

None of those things is perceived at the level of sensations or
configurations. But the higher systems are getting signals as if those
things were being perceived; that's what we mean by imagining.

Rick 08/31

Well, then my perceptual experience may differ considerably from yours
(and hers). In the same situation, all I would see is a crack free vase,
no matter how hard I was imagining the crack on the other side.

Rick 09/01

What I was saying is that, experientially, the perception that is the
output of this higher level perceptual input function -- the one that
depends on the actual and imagined lower level perceptions of the vase
-- is more like a concept, in my head. The imagined crack does not lead
me to actually see a cracked vase.

So I think we have the same concept (and experience) of the contribution
of imagined perceptions (like that of the crack configuration) to higher
level perceptions. What I am thinking is that this contribution of
imagined perceptions to higher level perceptions seems to happen only at
the higher levels of perceptions; the kinds of perceptions that we think
of as thoughts or cognitions. I can't think of an example where
imagining a sensation, for example, would change my perception of a
configuration.

11

[From From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1410)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1316 MDT)

You're convinced that whatever you think you're really perceiving
involves no imagination. But you could be wrong.

You betcha!

You may simply wish
to believe that you always know when you're imagining, and so
interpret your experiences to make that seem true.

No. I don't really care either way. If my perceptions are largely imaginary
that would be fine with me. My objection to the idea that perception is
largely (or somewhat) imagination is based solely on the following 1) that
there is no evidence that it is (our models don't require it in order to
work nearly perfectly) and 2) there is some evidence against it (the sour
milk experiment).

Do you never read
your own words and perceive them as wonderful, only to have people
later point out errors? Don't you ever feel you have played the piano
beautifully, only to find that someone else didn't hear the result
the same way?

Of course! But I think it's possible to explain those things without
resorting to the assumption that perceptions are partially imagined.

Do all of your perceptions always turn out to represent
the world as it actually was,

How would I know? All I know are my perceptions, not the way the world
actually is.

with no little tinge of wishful thinking

I certainly have succumbed to wishful thinking, but that's thinking, not
perceiving, and I have enthusiastically conceded that thinking involves
imagination.

no overly favorable interpretations

Interpretations are thoughts,too, not perceptions. Imagining that I did
better than I did is not the same as perceiving how I am doing.

no misremembering that conveniently deletes embarrassing moments or
glosses over gaffes on your part?

Memory is all imagination. I misremember plenty!

Have you never deluded yourself about anything?

You betcha. But, again, self-delusion is a memory, not a perceptual,
phenomenon.

I simply find your claim that you always know when you're imagining
parts of experiences difficult to accept.

I didn't claim that. All I said was my _experience_ is that I know when I'm
imagining and I know when I'm perceiving. I believe it is possible that much
of what I perceive is based on imagination and I don't know it. But so far,
there is no evidence that this is the case and there is some evidence (the
lack of need for it in models and the sour milk demonstration) that it is
not. But I still don't rule it out.

You once expressed vehement certainty that O.J. Simpson was guilty of murder.

Yes. I was certain of my conclusion (an imagination) based on evidence. I
didn't see the son of a bitch do it.

I, on the other hand, after
watching pretty much the same T.V. shows, remained uncertain.

I'm shocked!!!

Was your perception of his guilt based on strictly real-time perceptions?

No. It was based on some real time perceptions but mainly on inference and
deduction based on those perceptions: ie. thinking.

If so, what did I miss?

I don't know. My guess is that you were willing to imagine some pretty
implausible scenarios in order to come up with your conclusion.

Or could it be that you imagined some things that were not actually portrayed
on the screen, and that your perception was based in part on things you
imagined to be true, but never actually saw?

I think the explanation in terms of imagination distorting perception is far
less plausible than my explanation in terms of thinking. I don't think my
imaginations distorted my perceptions; It's the way I thought about those
perceptions that made the difference. Though I also think that my thoughts
might have influence _which_ perceptions I attended to and stored as
memories.

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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12

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1430)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1451 MDT)

The wife perceived her husband as nagging her, on the basis of what
she imagined he was about to say. Her husband was really there and he
was really talking, so she didn't imagine that part, but she imagined
him to be saying something he wasn't saying, so she perceived him as
nagging her.

Why not just accept the simple explanation?

Let me see. Why don't I?

I guess the reason why I don't just accept it is because I don't believe the
phenomenon you describe exists and because I think it makes a difference,
ultimately, in how we apply PCT.

You say she imagined the husband to be saying something he wasn't. So he was
saying something "I'll make diner tonight, honey" and she perceived it as
nagging because she imagined that he said "You're a lousy cook, bitch". I
just don't believe this happens.

I could see her misperceiving slightly, hearing something like: "Honey, I'll
fake dinner tonight". And if she were expecting some kind of hostile remark
she might assume that that is what he said. But that's not a result of
imagination; the "make" and "fake" outputs could have been nearly the same
and she heard "fake" because she wanted (had a reference for) to hear
something nasty.

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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13

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1450)]

Don Hemminger (2005.09.06.1700 EDT)]

It seems like this discussion revolves around the difference (if any)
between "an imagined perception" and "a perception of my imagination".
Rick's arguments seem to suggest:

   - A concept is a 2nd class citizen. Not exactly a perception.

No. I think a concept is definitely a perception. The real McCoy.

   - If you have a visual Perception (you see it) and a mental
perception (a concept), the Visual perception is the only real
perception

Nope. I think the perception of, say, "honesty" is just as real as the
perception of the letters I'm typing.

The question I would ask, which Bill did ask, is:

  "How you think of it is also a perception, isn't it?"

No. I think of thinking as imagination. When I think about "honesty" or the
letters in front of me, I'm imagining. When I see "honesty" or the letters
on the screen then they are perceptions.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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14

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1836 MDT)]

Don Hemminger (2005.09.06.1700 EDT) --

The question I would ask, which Bill did ask, is:

    "How you think of it is also a perception, isn't it?"

Yes. Usually we mean "imagined perception" when we say "think", because the assumption behind that word is that it's internally generated. But if you know of it, it's a perception, and an internally generated perception is, by definition, imagined.

Best,

Bill P.

15

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1841 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1410) –

Do all of your perceptions always turn out to represent

the world as it actually
was,

How would I know? All I know are my perceptions, not the way the
world

actually is.

with no little tinge of wishful thinking

I certainly have succumbed to wishful thinking, but that’s thinking,
not

perceiving, and I have enthusiastically conceded that thinking
involves

imagination.

If you’re defining perception to mean experiences that do not
contain any imagined components, you can hardly expect me to deny that.
All I can say is that I don’t define perception that way. Perception, to
me, is anything experienced. In the model, it’s any signal in an upgoing
pathway. Above the level where the imagination connection is made, there
is no way for the receving system to tell whether any given perception is
drawn from wholly imagined or wholly sense-generated signals, or a
mixture of the two.

By my definition of perception, thinking is definitely a set of
perceptions, because we can observe our thoughts. Mine are (in part) a
combination of sentences and images, as well as some perceptions of lower
order like relationships. I suppose people differ in what they experience
as thoughts.

Have you never deluded yourself about anything?

You betcha. But, again,
self-delusion is a memory, not a perceptual,

phenomenon.

So our differences here hinge completely on the definition of perception!
I say that anything you can experience (including memories) exists as
perceptual signals. Some perceptual signals come (ultimately) from
sensory organs, some do not. Self-delusion is perceiving something on the
basis of imagined evidence. You would probably agree with that if I
stipulated that the evidence was entirely imagined, but not if I
said that some of it (not all, but some) was imagined.

I simply find your claim
that you always know when you’re imagining

parts of experiences difficult to accept.

I didn’t claim that. All I said was my experience is that I know when
I’m

imagining and I know when I’m perceiving. I believe it is possible that
much

of what I perceive is based on imagination and I don’t know it. But so
far,

there is no evidence that this is the case and there is some evidence
(the

lack of need for it in models and the sour milk demonstration) that it
is

not. But I still don’t rule it out.

OK, that’s good.

You once expressed
vehement certainty that O.J. Simpson was guilty of murder.

Yes. I was certain of my conclusion (an imagination) based on evidence.
I

didn’t see the son of a bitch do it.

I, on the other hand, after

watching pretty much the same T.V. shows, remained
uncertain.

I’m shocked!!!

Was your perception of his guilt based on strictly real-time
perceptions?

No. It was based on some real time perceptions but mainly on inference
and

deduction based on those perceptions: ie. thinking.

That is, imagination. Thinking is imagination, and since you experience
it, it’s a perception. Some real-time perceptions (Simpson trying
on the glove), some imagined (Simpson in a rage wielding a knife). The
imagined perceptions you made up yourself, using your ability to
manipulate symbols and all that.

If so, what did I
miss?

I don’t know. My guess is that you were willing to imagine some
pretty

implausible scenarios in order to come up with your
conclusion.

My conclusion was that I didn’t know. I didn’t see anything that said
“guilty” without requiring that I add a good dose of
imagination to it. At least some jurors agreed with that, and refused to
convict on the basis of what had been shown to them (not what they had
been asked to imagine).

Or could it be that you
imagined some things that were not actually portrayed > on the
screen, and that your perception was based in part on things you
imagined to be true, but never actually saw?

I think the explanation in terms of imagination distorting perception is
far

less plausible than my explanation in terms of thinking. I don’t think
my

imaginations distorted my perceptions; It’s the way I thought about
those

perceptions that made the difference. Though I also think that my
thoughts

might have influence which perceptions I attended to and stored as

memories.

If you imagined that Simpson was “that son of a bitch” from the
start, I can see how this might have influenced your thinking even if you
can’t.
But thinking is imagining; it’s the manipulation of imagined
symbols, images, and other perceptions. By this process, you can reach
any conclusion you please unless you lay out your rules of reasoning
publicly and get agreement on them, and stick to them. Most
“logical” reasoning of the informal sort is goal-directed; that
is, the desired conclusion is known beforehand, and we select
experiences. imagining data where necessary, to make the conclusion match
the reference-conclusion. This is how some people think science works:
you state your theory, and then try to prove that it’s true.

I didn’t see anything in the trial that would have forced me to vote
guilty, and neither did quite a few others. He may have done it, but the
trial didn’t settle that question. And neither would any amount of
“thinking.”

Best,

Bill P.

16

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1911 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.1430) --

You say she imagined the husband to be saying something he wasn't. So he was
saying something "I'll make diner tonight, honey" and she perceived it as
nagging because she imagined that he said "You're a lousy cook, bitch". I
just don't believe this happens.

Come on, you're not even trying. What he said (my scenario) was "Honey, do I have time to shave before dinner?" And her retort (as I imagine it) was "Why are you always nagging me to get dinner ready so early?" That is what is meant by basing a perception on what you imagine is going on. It's also called jumping to conclusions, taking the worst view, acting paranoid, looking for trouble, and other things.

I could see her misperceiving slightly, hearing something like: "Honey, I'll
fake dinner tonight". And if she were expecting some kind of hostile remark
she might assume that that is what he said. But that's not a result of
imagination; the "make" and "fake" outputs could have been nearly the same
and she heard "fake" because she wanted (had a reference for) to hear
something nasty.

The point you're missing is that the imaginary part doesn't have to be substituted for something real. It can simply be made up, completely. Whether the imagined data can be justified is totally irrelevant; the point is that it is imagined. If it's not based on current sensory inputs and it's a perception (something you experience), then it's imagined, regardless of how or why it was constructed.

Remember the categories Clark and I made up.

Directly Perceived Reality: everything that is experienced at every level, including what is imagined. Thus: it's all perception.

Deduced Reality: the subset of DPR that contains thoughts and perceptions about other thoughts and perceptions (usually imagined).

Real Reality: The imagined but unknowable world that is the cause of DR and DPR. A subset of Deduced Reality.

Best,

Bill P.

17

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.2100)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1841 MDT)

I'm sorry to disagree with you so strongly about this memory in perceptual input thing but, for the first time, I think you are really off the mark. But maybe I can be convinced. At least I am dispelling some of my lapdog reputation;-)

All I can say is that I don't define perception that way. Perception, to me, is anything experienced.

Good, argument over;-)

So our differences here hinge completely on the definition of perception! I say that anything you can experience (including memories) exists as perceptual signals. Some perceptual signals come (ultimately) from sensory organs, some do not. Self-delusion is perceiving something on the basis of imagined evidence. You would probably agree with that if I stipulated that the evidence was entirely imagined, but not if I said that some of it (not all, but some) was imagined.

Not quite. I'll agree with you if you said the delusion was based partly on imagined perceptions, as long as the delusional perception is also considered an imagination.

Thinking is imagination, and since you experience it, it's a perception.

Yes, an imagined perception.

My conclusion was that I didn't know. I didn't see anything that said "guilty" without requiring that I add a good dose of imagination to it. At least some jurors agreed with that, and refused to convict on the basis of what had been shown to them (not what they had been asked to imagine).

All of the jurors in the criminal trial agreed with you because their decision was based entirely on imagination. In the civil trial all of the jurors, based on the data, came to the same conclusion that I did: he did it.

If you imagined that Simpson was "that son of a bitch" from the start, I can see how this might have influenced your thinking even if you can't.

I didn't think that -- in fact I was a big OJ fan before the facts made it obvious that he was a murderer -- but if I had it would have certainly influenced by thinking; it might have even influenced my perceiving -- I think imagination can lead you to set references for the kinds of perceptions you want to have. Control of perception, remember.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

18

[From Rick Marken (2005.09.06.2130)]

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1911 MDT)--

Come on, you're not even trying. What he said (my scenario) was "Honey, do I have time to shave before dinner?" And her retort (as I imagine it) was "Why are you always nagging me to get dinner ready so early?" That is what is meant by basing a perception on what you imagine is going on. It's also called jumping to conclusions, taking the worst view, acting paranoid, looking for trouble, and other > things.

How do you know it's not just good old fashioned perceiving? If she's looking for trouble (has a reference to be in an argument, say) then what the husband said would be quite a disturbance that can be countered nicely by saying something that would get the trouble going. Control of perception, remember.

Directly Perceived Reality: everything that is experienced at every level, including what is imagined. Thus: it's all perception.

Deduced Reality: the subset of DPR that contains thoughts and perceptions about other thoughts and perceptions (usually imagined).

Real Reality: The imagined but unknowable world that is the cause of DR and DPR. A subset of Deduced Reality.

I'll believe that DPR includes what is imagined when you have to include a source of imagined perceptions in a model of behavior.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

19

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.07.0622 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2005.09.06.2100) –

Bill Powers (2005.09.06.1841
MDT)

I’m sorry to disagree with you so strongly about this memory in
perceptual input thing but, for the first time, I think you are really
off the mark.

Seems to me you’re disagreeing more with yourself than with me. Is
thinking imagination? Or is thinking not imagination because it
influences your perceptions? Or does thinking not influence your
perceptions? You seem to be picking whichever one suits the argument of
the moment.

All I can say is that I don’t
define perception that way. Perception, to me, is anything experienced.

Good, argument over;-)

Ah, good, that was easier than I thought it would be. But wait

···

So our differences here hinge
completely on the definition of perception! I say that anything you can
experience (including memories) exists as perceptual signals. Some
perceptual signals come (ultimately) from sensory organs, some do not.
Self-delusion is perceiving something on the basis of imagined evidence.
You would probably agree with that if I stipulated that the evidence was
entirely imagined, but not if I said that some of it (not all, but
some) was imagined.

Not quite. I’ll agree with you if you said the delusion was based partly
on imagined perceptions, as long as the delusional perception is also
considered an imagination.

Even if it’s based partly on real-time sensory data and you think it’s
not imagined? Does this mean your perception of OJ as guilty is imaginary
or deluded?

Thinking is imagination, and
since you experience it, it’s a perception.

Yes, an imagined perception.

No, a perception. You can’t tell whether a given perception is based on
some or many or no imagined inputs just by looking at the perception.
It’s just an ordinary perception. You’d have to test each input to the
PIF to see if a disturbance in the environment affected it. At the lower
level, the imagined input would not pass the test for the controlled
variable.

My conclusion was that I didn’t
know. I didn’t see anything that said “guilty” without
requiring that I add a good dose of imagination to it. At least some
jurors agreed with that, and refused to convict on the basis of what had
been shown to them (not what they had been asked to imagine).

All of the jurors in the criminal trial agreed with you because their
decision was based entirely on imagination.

That’s how you imagine the bases of their decisions, and therefore how
you perceive the quality of their verdict. What you imagine at one level
affects what you perceive at a higher level. You don’t know what they
based their decisions on. You imagine it.If you imagined that they
realized there was a lack of direct evidence of guilt, you would perceive
their verdict as justified. You are imagining whatever you need to
imagine to support your conclusion.

In the civil trial all of
the jurors, based on the data, came to the same conclusion that I did: he
did it.

And they had no more basis for that decision than the other jurors had.
What we had in both trials were lawyers who could evoke convincing
pictures in the imaginations of the jurors, with the most convincing ones
in the second trial being on the prosecution side.

Nobody will ever know whether OJ did it or not. The adversarial method of
arriving at verdicts is incapable of determining actual guilt or
innocence. Any lawyer would tell you that. In fact, most lawyers I have
heard on this subject say that guilt and innocence are verdicts, not
facts. Yet they still maintain that juries somehow magically arrive at
the correct verdict!

If you imagined that Simpson was
“that son of a bitch” from the start, I can see how this might
have influenced your thinking even if you can’t.

I didn’t think that – in fact I was a big OJ fan before the facts made
it obvious that he was a murderer – but if I had it would have certainly
influenced by thinking; it might have even influenced my perceiving – I
think imagination can lead you to set references for the kinds of
perceptions you want to have. Control of perception, remember.

Yes, my point exactly. But you want to exclude such perceptions from the
world of ordinary perceptions, as if something marked them as being
tainted by imagination. I say you can’t tell the difference between
“pure” perceptions and perceptions based in part or wholly on
imagination – not just by experiencing the perception. You’d have to
look elsewhere to find evidence that all is not as it seems.

When a toy train disappears behind a screen, children of some age will
track the invisible train until it reappears, or switch their focus to
the place where they expect it to reappear. Do they not still perceive
that there is a train behind the screen, even though the visual evidence
for it has disappeared?

But I forget, you have a new way out of this. The train they perceive
behind the screen is now an imagined train, so it’s not a perception,
even though they can still hear its motor and wheels. My point is simply
that they behave as if they know it’s a real train, just as you behave as
if you know OJ was really guilty.

Best,

Bill P.

20

Re: Memory in perceptual input
[Martin Taylor 2005.09.07.10.45]

[From Bill Powers (2005.09.05.0659
MDT)]
Rick Marken (2005.09.05.1720)

It’s easy to think of very clear examples
of memories serving as references; My memory of the two part
inventions as played by how Glenn Gould, for example, serves as the
reference for what I want to perceive when I play two part inventions.
What I hear when I play an invention is not quite what I hear when
Gould plays them; but even though I desperately want to hear them that
way, I’m afraid I hear what I hear; there is no imagined perceptual
input that makes what I hear sound more like what I want to hear.

Of course not. You are substituting
memories of Glenn Gould playing for perceptions of yourself playing.
What you do not know is the extent to which what you hear
yourself playing, even though still not perfect, is being filled in by
memories of Glenn Gould (or others) playing, in spots where your
actual playing doesn’t meet your hopes but you are unaware of the
extent to which it doesn’t. It’s possible that you play even less like
Gould than you think you do.

This astute observation hits close to home for me!

After 50+ years of playing the piano since my last lesson, I
thought I played reasonably well. Then I started taking lessons again
six or seven years ago.

For a long time, and possibly still continuing, the main part of
the lessons was to teach me to hear more of what I was actually
playing, and less of what I was imagining I was playing. I could move
my fingers pretty well, and all that, but I was hearing my playing as
being way better than it was. It’s too very easy to “hear one’s
own reference values” imposed upon (added to? modulated by?) the
sensory input. Getting more of the sensory input into what one hears
when one plays is a matter of much training, and it’s difficult.

I’d say from my personal experience that the above refers to
perceptions of the music at many levels, from the emotional content
down to the timings of individual notes, and even their pitch
(sometimes).

Replacing (part of) the imagined perception with (more of) the
sense-derived perception is what’s hard, but do-able with a good
teacher who notes the differences between what one does and what she
would prefer one to do, when one perceives oneself as having done
exactly what she said one should have done.

It’s not a question of refining the perceptual functions, since
all along I could hear in other people’s playing differences from how
I thought a piece should be played, differences much smaller than I
eventually began to be able to hear in my own playing.

Martin