[Martin Taylor 960124 11:30]
Bill Powers (960123.1345 MST)
+Bruce Abbott (960124.1055 EST)
I think we can agree that one of the problems a model has to deal with
is the way organisms seem to remember what to do to achieve a particular
end. But that isn't the only way to describe the problem. "Remembering
what to do" can equally well be described as "acquiring a connection
between a higher-order error and a lower-order reference signal." This
doesn't necessarily involve memory, unless you want to include the
establishment of a neural output connection in the definition of memory
(which I don't want to do).
+This is wise; the changes in neural connectivity thought to underly memory
+are probably only a subset of the ways in which a neural output connection
+can be established. For example, connections can be effectively "changed"
+on the fly by neural inhibitory elements in much the same way that a signal
+applied to one leg of a digital "and" gate can determine whether the signal
+applied to the other leg is "passed through" or not. We probably wouldn't
+want to label such dynamic changes "memory" unless the altered conductivity
+arose from more permanent changes in neural structure, and even then a
+"memory" would not reside in any individual neuron.
Insofar as we have no idea about what we are not aware of, I go along with
not wanting to identify changes in neural connectivity with ALL of memory,
but how can one not say that a change in connectivity is a part of memory?
Apart from recurrent circuits and possibly analogous biochemical circuits,
I'm not aware of changes other than neural connectivity that are easily
identified with memory. For that reason, any time someone mentions "memory"
I tend to translate it into "changes in neural connectivity" unless there
is reason in that specific case to treat it otherwise.
Bruce's objection, that the dynamic behaviour of a particular connection
varies with the ongoing data, seems less of an objection than a description
of how we remember something at one moment that we could not remember a
little earlier. In other words, it supports the idea of memory as
connectivity, rather than providing an objection.
But then I have no idea of what I am not aware of, and can now remember
only what I remember now.
Martin