Misc Replies

[Avery_Andrews2]

[Avery Andrews 970918.1536]
(Rick Marken (970917.0945))

ADA:
> I think that what linguists are really describing is a perceptual
> system

It makes more sense to me to think that they are describing
perceptual regularities in language (like "adjective before
noun") that are being detected by their own perceptual systems.

Proximately, yes, but this is true of any scientific activity.
Distally, we hope that the regularities we think we're perceiving
are actually there, and worthy targets of explanatory efforts.
So I think I'm observing regularities in the operation of a perceptual
system. I could of course be quite wrong about this, it's just what
I think.

The interesting question to me is whether these perceptions are,
indeed, controlled by speakers. I think that many of these
perceptions are controlled and that this has been demonstated
by linguists themselves -- like when they ask a speaker "would
it be OK to say it this way?".

This is close to proclaiming Chomsky as the father of PCT research in
linguistics (since one of the things he's famous for is embracing speaker
judgements of OK-ness as evidence in linguistics). Hmmm.

ADA:
> but I've still had no success in figuring out how to demonstrate
> whether grammatical generalizations are controlled-for perceptions
> or side-effects, so I just have to settle for trying to describe
> them in a sensible manner. Sigh.

I think that's a good first step. I really think it shouldn't be
too hard to test to see whether certain grammatical rules are
controlled for; just give native speakers sentences that violate
these rules to various degrees and ask them to "fix them up, if
necessary"

I'd agree that it's not too hard to demonstrate that something is
controlled that has the effect of causing the regularities, but I don't
think it's so easy to demonstrate *exactly what* is being controlled for.

> RM:
> Instead of looking for consistent examples of these perceptions
> in their own experience (when they observe language), PCT
> suggests that linguists should Test...to determine whether any
> of their _own_ perceptions of language are actually being controlled
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> by the speakers themselves.
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Avery:

> I actually don't understand this last bit, maybe I'm just being dense.

No. I'm being too simple minded. When you do The Test you are
really looking for evidence that something you perceive (like
the knot/target relationship in the rubber band demo) is under
control; if what you perceive is under control, then presumably
the controller (the person whose controlling is being Tested) is
also perceiving (and controlling) it.

In the quote above, does `their _own_' refer to the speakers or the linguists?
(it's ambigous for me). If it's the speakers, then there are systematic
observations of things such as repair strategies, although there is a
big problem in finding informative ways of interfering with somebody's
linguistic output - we cannot for example simply substitute one word for
another in the speech-stream and see what happens as a result. The closest
I've seen that you might get is a peculiar room in a MOO I visited once
where you could throw the room into a mode so that it would operate on
what people said in some way, such as spelling everything as if they were
lisping, or reversing or scrambling the word-order. But MOO interaction is
not exactly ordinary language use.

Avery.Andrews@anu.edu.au

[HANS_BLOM2]

[Hans Blom, 970918]

(Rick Marken (970917.0945))

In other words: you perceive -- in imagination -- only how you
act. Do you see what I mean?

No. You perceive the perceptual consequnces of setting lower level
references; in imagination, you don perceive actions, you perceive
(as always) the perceptual consequences of action.

If you don't see what _I_ mean, can you at least see what the meaning
of _your_ "imagination mode" diagram is? [Some exasperation shows at
this point, I hope]. In it, the "imagined world" is a simple one-to-
one connection, and thus p (imagined world) = a (imagined world). So
the diagram shows that, in imagination mode, the perceptual
consequence of an action is that action. That sounds deep. But is it
what you intended to tell? I doubt it. But your diagram says it.
There's a riddle here.

So I ask you once again: put the "imagination mode" diagram side by
side with the standard diagram and compare the properties of the
environment functions in both. Am I asking too much?

"Lying with statistics" was a hot item once.

I'm sorry that you didn't like the results of my open-loop control
experiment. But if you say I am intentionally "lying" in my data
presentation (not a nice accusation) then I think it behooves you to
explain what the lie was.

I did not accuse you of lying, Rick. If there is anything that I
"accuse" you of, it is the fact (in these circles I can use that word
that you are a controller, that you have goals, and that all your
actions serve those goals. If serving one's own goals is "lying", we
all do it. And whether it is "intentional" or not would be a matter
of some debate: whereas the controller in us most certainly intends
this kind of goal-directed behavior (that's what a controller is all
about, isn't it?), the high-level conscious part in us may not be
aware that the lower-level controller in us intends to do exactly
that which we do. HPCT explains all that...

Note: In English a "lie" refers to an intentional deception -- a
definite "no no" in science; it is not the same as a "mistake". I'll
just assume that you think I made some kind of mistake in the data
analysis that makes the open-loop (model based) control model look
bad -- and that I didn't lie. So why not just explain my mistake;
how would a different way of analyzing the data show that control is
model based?

Do your own experiment and see. Where you see only random behavior,
you remind me of that ancient saying "They have eyes but do not see".
Especially the proportional part is utterly convincing -- imho.

No, you did not make a mistake. I was just reminding you that you
were subjective. But that is not an accusation, either: all good
controllers are...

Greetings,

Hans

[Human_Factors_Lab]

[From Rick Marken (921212.1100)]

Penni Sibum (921211)--

i think this ``virtual synonymy'' is a rhetorical move of pct's that
irritates people w/ a scientific bent (like me).

Rhetorical move or not, PCT definitiely does irritate people (especially
psychologists and cognitive scientists) with a scientific bent.

i find yr generalization to everything else, including the
kinds of things implied by ``purpose,'' completely unwarranted. so i
wish you'd stick to making claims you can justify....

You could help us out enormously by pointing out the unwarranted things
implied by "purpose" that we generalize to in PCT. This would be
especially helpful coming from someone with a scientific bent. Once we
knew what we shouldn't say about purpose, then we might be able to stop
irritating those with a scientific bent -- and who wouldn't want to stop
doing that?

Bill Powers (921212.0300) --

Might as well get the mail and write about it. What else can you
do when you're awakened at such an hour to be told you have a new
grandson (my daughter Barbara's second)?

Mazel tov.

RE: Science and religion

It will not be possible for science and religion to get together
until both realize that neither is Revealed Truth, and that both
are human ideas. Of course that is precisely what both sides have
been rejecting since the start of science. One side points the
finger at Nature, the other at God. Neither side, apparently,
notices whose finger is doing the pointing.

I partly disagree with this. I think there are many scientists
(the good ones) who understand that their models are human ideas
and that "nature" -- the cauldron in which these ideas are tested --
is just their own perception. I think there are also religionists
who understand that religious models (myths) are human ideas
and that "spiritual experience" -- the cauldron in which these
ideas are tested -- is just their own perception (human experience).
I would venture to guess that there are far more scientists like
the above than there are religionists. And I would argue that the
reason for this is that implicit (or explicit) in most religions
is the idea that you MUST believe that these ideas are Revealed Truth
or else you , your people or the human race are in deep doo doo. I don't
think this latter assumption is part of science -- although I agree that
many scientists act AS THOUGH such an idea were part of the game; and
that is where science and religion become one -- as you say, when
their ideas (models, myths) are treated as revealed truth rather
than human invention -- invented for a PURPOSE (oops, I think I heard
a gasp from another person with a scientific bent).

[While reviewing this I saw Greg Williams post which basically said
exactly the same thing -- science at least pays lip service to the
idea that its ideas are not Revealed Truth while few religions do
this -- and, of course, I heartily agree with him (and, by implication,
with myself)]

Gary Cziko (921211.1544 GMT)

Rick (Marken), do you remember how at the Indiana PA meeting in 1990 you
were wondering how Ed Ford could say that we create our perceptual world?
I believed you grabbed a chair and made comments about how you couldn't
arbitrarily create or "uncreate" its perception. Isn't Bill's comment
directly related to this issue.--Gary

I didn't mean to say that perceptions are not "creations" of perceptual
functions in the nervous system. I was suggesting that one cannot
willfully and arbitrarily change the functions so that you see the world
in a different way. I think these functions can be (and are) changed by
reorganization --and this process may be willful sometimes; actually,
I can think of instances where it seems that it is. Learning to do
surgery, for example, might involve learning that what was perceived
as a diffuse mass of gunk is actually distinct sets of arteries and
nerves -- some of which should be cut, others not. So I'm prepared to
admit that I may have misspoke -- in part. Another thing I was thinking
of was the fact that you cannot arbitrarily change a perception and expect
to maintain control of the perceptual variable. I think of it in terms of
the spreadsheet model (of course). Suppose that system 1, level 2 is
controlling a perception p = x+ y (perceptions at this level are
just linear combinations of lower level perceptions). I think of an
arbitrary change as one in which the perception becomes something like
p = x-y. Now the perception, p, corresponds to a whole new function
of lower level experience; its as though the combination of sound
intensities that coresponded to the perception of a minor third now
sound like a major fifth. Besides the puzzling experiential result, such
an arbitrary change in a perceptual function would very likely lead to
conflict between control systems -- espectially if another system at
the same level of the hierarchy had already been controlling x-y. So
that is the phenomenon I was thinking of when I said one could not
arbitrarily change perceptions; I really meant that if we really could
will such changes (and maybe we can), doing so would (I think --from
my experience doing this with the model) be most likely to produce
control problems. Of course, if you already have a control problem
(conflict) then changing perception ("creating a new perception from
the same raw material") might be one reasonable possibility -- and I
think this is what does happen -- in therapy, education and everyday
problem solving; it's just one aspect of reorganization.

Best regards

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken USMail: 10459 Holman Ave
The Aerospace Corporation Los Angeles, CA 90024
E-mail: marken@aero.org
(310) 336-6215 (day)
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