Models, Meanings, Coercion

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
1

[From Rick Marken (980805.2210)]

i.kurtzer (980805.2000)

I have given a situation where there is no affect of pushing
on the house's location.

I believe you mean "effect", not "affect". There is very little
effect, true. But there is some effect.

The answer [to the question "then did you control your perception
of "where the house is"?] is clearly "no".

I agree; in the "measure of control" sense I would categorize
this as "no control".

Me:

[Control] continues in the house example, too as long as you keep
trying to control the position of the house.

isaac:

trying = control, mmm...?

I think we would say "controlling for" to refer to the controlling
done by the person pushing on the house; the person is controlling
for a particular perception of the house -- unsuccessfully.

One of the major theoretical terms [control] is now ambiguous?
to who,

To me.

or more likely for what reason?

Because that's the way language is.

There is no feedback in the situation i gave; there is no affect
of output on input, so the process does not exist.

But there is feedback; the pushes have a physical effect -- a
very, very small physical effect -- on the controlled perception.

You cannot say that control continues to exist no matter how
ineffectual the outputs are, AND that coercion (as one person
having effective unilateral control of another's agents qi or o)
exists

Sure I can -- and I do.

In my spreadsheet model of coercion, the coercer is in complete
control of the coercee's behavior (qi' or qo') despite the fact
that the coercee is controlling these same variables completely
ineffectually. This sentence evokes in me (and, I bet, in others
who understand the PCT model) images that correspond pretty
closely to what is going on in the PCT model of a coercive
interaction.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

2

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)

[From Rick Marken (980805.2210)]

i.kurtzer (980805.2000)

>> I have given a situation where there is no affect of pushing
>> on the house's location.

There is very little effect, true. But there is some effect.

there is zero, the house remains immobile.

The answer [to the question "then did you control your perception

> of "where the house is"?] is clearly "no".

I agree; in the "measure of control" sense I would categorize
this as "no control".

In the sense that the experimental record is based on there is no control.
Any other sense is a misuse of a major term and should be avoided if clarity
is to be achieved.

> [Control] continues in the house example, too as long as you keep
> trying to control the position of the house.

> > trying = control, mmm...?

I think we would say "controlling for" to refer to the controlling
done by the person pushing on the house; the person is controlling
for a particular perception of the house -- unsuccessfully.

I remember Wayne Hershberger suggesting this convention. I would rather
appeal to the intention rather than an empirical counterfactual. For example,
"the agent intends"--which is true whether or not control is achieved--rather
than "the agent is controlling for"--which is true by control _not_ being
acheived. Its best to avoid counterfactuals and their ilk in definitions. Of
course, i would mainly want to distinguish these terms.

One of the major theoretical terms [control] is now ambiguous?
to who, or more likely for what reason?

Because that's the way language is.

Not scientific language. If this is science then the terms are fixed.

> There is no feedback in the situation i gave; there is no affect
> of output on input, so the process does not exist.

But there is feedback; the pushes have a physical effect -- a
very, very small physical effect -- on the controlled perception.

No, there is no effect. If you do not overcome the frictional and inertial
forces then houses do not move at all--and this is assuming the house is on a
sled. Physical threshholds exist and house-moving is one of them.

You cannot say that control continues to exist no matter how
ineffectual the outputs are, AND that coercion (as one person
having effective unilateral control of another's agents qi or o)
exists

Sure I can -- and I do.
In my spreadsheet model of coercion, the coercer is in complete
control of the coercee's behavior (qi' or qo') despite the fact
that the coercee is controlling these same variables completely
ineffectually.

This is by definition a contradiction. The coercee is in some way controlling
something that they in no way control as that something is completely
controlled by the coercer. This is double-speak of the worst kind. Did you
make a mistake or is this what you intend?

This sentence evokes in me (and, I bet, in others
who understand the PCT model) images that correspond pretty
closely to what is going on in the PCT model of a coercive
interaction.

this is not a valid argument.

i.

3

[From Bruce Gregory (980806.1100 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)

I remember Wayne Hershberger suggesting this convention. I would rather
appeal to the intention rather than an empirical counterfactual.
For example,
"the agent intends"--which is true whether or not control is
achieved--rather
than "the agent is controlling for"--which is true by control _not_ being
achieved. Its best to avoid counterfactuals and their ilk in
definitions. Of
course, I would mainly want to distinguish these terms.

I think your point is a very good one. It is odd to call something coercion
when both agents have the same intentions. Odd, but not impossible.

Bruce Gregory

4

[From Bruce Gregory (980806.1300 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980806.1000)

So I take it that you would say that Galileo's confession of
his errors involved no coercion. Both agents (Galileo and the
Pope) had the same intentions; to see Galileo confess his
errors.

I doubt that Galileo and the inquisitors had the same intentions. What makes
you think that Galileo thought he had made errors, or that we wanted to
confess anything? If Galileo were confessing to a priest, and had gone of
his own volition, I would think that he and priest might have the same
intentions. You, I assume, would say that he was being coerced in both
cases. We can agree, I hope, that Galileo would feel quite differently in
the two situations.

Bruce Gregory

5

[From Rick Marken (980806.1000)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)--

Me:

In my spreadsheet model of coercion, the coercer is in complete
control of the coercee's behavior (qi' or qo') despite the fact
that the coercee is controlling these same variables completely
ineffectually.

isaac:

This is double-speak of the worst kind.

Sorry if it disturbs you.

Instead of just pointing out what's wrong with everything I
say about my model of coercion perhaps you could explain
what I should be saying about it.

Bruce Gregory (980806.1100 EDT) to i.kurtzer (980806.0230)

I think your point is a very good one. It is odd to call
something coercion when both agents have the same intentions.
Odd, but not impossible.

So I take it that you would say that Galileo's confession of
his errors involved no coercion. Both agents (Galileo and the
Pope) had the same intentions; to see Galileo confess his
errors. I presume you would see the possibility that coercion
was involved in this case as "odd". Is that right?

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

6

i.kurtzer (980806.1300)

[From Rick Marken (980806.1000)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)--

> In my spreadsheet model of coercion, the coercer is in complete
> control of the coercee's behavior (qi' or qo') despite the fact
> that the coercee is controlling these same variables completely
> ineffectually.

isaac:

> This is double-speak of the worst kind.

Sorry if it disturbs you.

I would rather you acknowledge whether this was or was not a contradiction.

Instead of just pointing out what's wrong with everything I
say about my model of coercion perhaps you could explain
what I should be saying about it.

two agents A and B--A is the "stronger one"

Rick, is strength is simulated as a function of gain becaue it was once max.
output in the arguments?

i will leave out the B's-qo option (where A controls B's qo) as B never
control's B's qo. Moreover, A can control B's qo without any conflict over a
range of references of both parties--simply by disturbing B's qi. This works
the other way as well as gain is irrelevant.

1. rick has a simulation of two agents interacting so that both have the same
qi.
2. Agent A is simulated as far more strong
3. By the working equations Agent A has a greater effect on the common qi than
B
4. By making A strong enough the qi is predictable without having to look at
B.
5. qi follows A's reference.
6. A is controlling qi.
7. B is not controlling qi.
8. HOW this maps to CLASSIFYING types of interactions has not been explicated
by the simulation's author.

Until your recent post on the various meaning of control, we have agreed with
1-7.
I trust that you made a mistake, and intend "control" to mean what you have
based your experimental record on.
However, 8 is the doozy. It is your proposal, what do you propose?

i.

7

[From Bill Powers (980806.1217 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)--

isaac:

>> I have given a situation where there is no affect of pushing
>> on the house's location.

Rick:

There is very little effect, true. But there is some effect.

Isaac:

there is zero, the house remains immobile.

I can tell you're not an engineer. If the coefficient of deformation of the
house is 1e-8 meter/Kg then its center of gravity will move by 1e-7 meters
(about one wavelength of ultraviolet light) under an applied force of 10
kilograms. Whaddaya mean, the house remains immobile?

In the sense that the experimental record is based on there is no control.
Any other sense is a misuse of a major term and should be avoided if clarity
is to be achieved.

You guys both need to talk about a control system that is trying to control
but failing, as opposed to the case in which there is no control system in
the first place.

The person trying to move the house (say, by 1 meter), has a reference
level for the house's position that is 1 meter different from its perceived
position. This error leads to exertion of an output force of one kilogram,
which moves the lever of the bulldozer into the "Forward" gear and holds it
there. This force is maintained until the house has moved nearly one meter,
after which the force on the gear lever is reduced to zero just as the
position change reaches one meter.

That's the case where the control system works. Now for the case in which
it tries and fails. The driver of the bulldozer climbs down to the ground,
and pushes on the house. His reference level for the house's new position
is the same as before. Now, the house moves only 10e-7 meters with the
driver pushing with a force of 100 kilograms, the most he can produce.
Control has almost completely failed, although the driver has exhausted
himself trying. He has corrected only one ten millionth of the error.

And finally, the last case. The house stays where it is; no purposeful
agent pushes on it; there is no control because there is no control system.

Best,

Bill P.

8

[From Bruce Gregory (980806.1450 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980806.1150)

No. I would say there is the _possibility_ that coercion exists in
both cases. My point (which is the point made by the coercion model)
is that you can't tell that a person is _not_ being coerced by
simply looking at their overt compliance with the desires of
another person; matching references (and lack of physical force)
is not evidence of non- coercion.

I agree.

This was Bill Powers' (980804.1955 MDT) point when he said:

> is a given student behaving according to the rules because he
> agrees that they are good rules and should be followed, or
> because of knowing he or she will be overpowered and forced to
> obey them if he or she refuses? Clearly these questions can't be
> answered just by observing that a student is obeying the rules,
> because he or she would be seen to obey the rules in either case.
> If you judge that the student is really following the rules
> voluntarily, you must be using some other evidence beside the fact
> that the student is following the rules.

I am not sure what it means "to follow the rules voluntarily". I am not even
sure that I follow the rules voluntarily. How is voluntary compliance
modeled in PCT?

Bruce Gregory

9

[From Rick Marken (980806.1150)]

Bruce Gregory (980806.1300 EDT)--

What makes you think that Galileo thought he had made errors, or
that we wanted to confess anything?

I didn't say that I thought Galileo thought he made errors. I said
that one of Galileo's intentions -- the one that was important to
the Pope -- became the same as the Pope's. Galileo and the Pope
both intended that Galileo write a confession of errors; Galileo
wrote such a confession. Galileo was asked to write a confession
and he wrote it (or, at least, signed it). You can't write (or
sign) a confession if you don't intend to produce this perception
(confession or signature). I believe Galileo even resisted some
disturbances (requests from friends that he not write the
confession) and wrote the confession anyway. So Galileo's
intentions were aligned with the Pope's. No one was physically
forcing Galileo's hand to write the confession or to sign it.

If Galileo were confessing to a priest, and had gone of his own
volition, I would think that he and priest might have the same
intentions. You, I assume, would say that he was being coerced in
both cases.

No. I would say there is the _possibility_ that coercion exists in
both cases. My point (which is the point made by the coercion model)
is that you can't tell that a person is _not_ being coerced by
simply looking at their overt compliance with the desires of
another person; matching references (and lack of physical force)
is not evidence of non- coercion.

The Pope wanted Galileo to confess errors and Galileo complied
(aligned his intention with that of the Pope); Galileo may have
done this voluntarily; some people think he did; others think
he did it because he feared the credible threat of torture that
existed if he didn't. We need much more than evidence of matching
intentions and lack of force to determine whether or not coercion
was involved in the Galileo case (and, of course, there is
considerable evidence that coercion _was_ involved).

This was Bill Powers' (980804.1955 MDT) point when he said:

is a given student behaving according to the rules because he
agrees that they are good rules and should be followed, or
because of knowing he or she will be overpowered and forced to
obey them if he or she refuses? Clearly these questions can't be
answered just by observing that a student is obeying the rules,
because he or she would be seen to obey the rules in either case.
If you judge that the student is really following the rules
voluntarily, you must be using some other evidence beside the fact
that the student is following the rules.

This is exactly my point in the Galileo case: is Galileo confessing
because he agrees with the Pope or because he knows that he will be
forced to confess if he refuses? Clearly this question can't be
answered just by observing that Galileo confessed, because he would
confess in either case. If you judge that Galileo is really
confessing due to coercion, you must be using some other evidence
beside the fact that Galileo confessed.

I think Tim Carey (980806.1845) is getting the point because
he suggests several possible pieces of evidence that would
suggest non-coercion in Bill's "student following rules" example.

If a teacher was not present and students still followed the
rules, would you conclude that these students agreed with the
rules? What about if students reported to their parents that
they liked going to the school and they liked their teachers
would you conclude that these students agreed with the rules?
What about if...

All fine suggestions. And all would certainly provide some
evidence (still debatable, but evidence nevertheless) that the
students are following the rules voluntarily and not as a
result of the threat of coercive force. If this evidence exists,
then why it (rather than ugly accusations about what Bill and I
were saying about coercion and RTP) wasn't posted during the
coercion debate is beyond me.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

10

[From Tim Carey (980807.0610)]

confession) and wrote the confession anyway. So Galileo's
intentions were aligned with the Pope's. No one was physically
forcing Galileo's hand to write the confession or to sign it.

How are you able to determine someone's intentions by observing a small
sample of their actions (i.e., writing a confession)?

No. I would say there is the _possibility_ that coercion exists in
both cases. My point (which is the point made by the coercion model)
is that you can't tell that a person is _not_ being coerced by
simply looking at their overt compliance with the desires of
another person; matching references (and lack of physical force)
is not evidence of non- coercion.

Good point. Do you mean here that you can't tell that someone is _not_
being coerced simply because you observe overt compliance? Does this also
mean, then, that if you can't tell that it's NOT coercion, you also can't
tell that it IS coercion? So when a child walks to the RTC we certainly
can't tell that coercion is NOT involved just by observing his walking,
how, then, just by observing his wallking can we conclude that coercion IS
involved?

I think Tim Carey (980806.1845) is getting the point because
he suggests several possible pieces of evidence that would
suggest non-coercion in Bill's "student following rules" example.

And since we need evidence to decide whether coercion IS or IS NOT
involved, what pieces of evidence are there that would suggest coercion?

result of the threat of coercive force. If this evidence exists,
then why it (rather than ugly accusations about what Bill and I
were saying about coercion and RTP) wasn't posted during the
coercion debate is beyond me.

Since we have now decided that we need to do more than just observe overt
compliance to decide whether the coercion IS or IS NOT involved; and since
you guys were the ones claiming that coercion IS involved in RTP (since
it's part of a coercive school system) wasn't the onus on you guys to
produce the evidence?

Regards,

Tim

11

i.kurtzer (980806.1515)

[From Bill Powers (980806.1217 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230)--

isaac:

> >> I have given a situation where there is no affect of pushing
> >> on the house's location.

Rick:

>> There is very little effect, true. But there is some effect.

Isaac:

>there is zero, the house remains immobile.

I can tell you're not an engineer.

could you tell rick is a material scientist because he hed denied what i said?
I very much doubt he had the below in mind.

If the coefficient of deformation of the
house is 1e-8 meter/Kg then its center of gravity will move by 1e-7 meters
(about one wavelength of ultraviolet light) under an applied force of 10
kilograms. Whaddaya mean, the house remains immobile?

I wished to bring up an example of a threshhold effect. We can substitute
string-breaking. There are also threshholds for detemining the status of the
world. Since persons cannot detect spatial resolutions of one wavelenth of
ultraviolet light and noone suggested giving him such equipment, then for a
significant range of forces there is no effect of output on input, and hence
that person cannot and does not control the house position by pushing on it.
If you want to consider such minutia meaningful, then you have a lot of other
correcting to do as well. It was a pedagogical aid. A clear situation. And
by that scenario for all meaningful purposes except with a material scientist
the house does not move. And a person that is pushing on it with the intent
of moving it 3 ft, is for all meaningfull purposes not controlling.

You guys both need to talk about a control system that is trying to control
but failing, as opposed to the case in which there is no control system in
the first place.

The person that wants to move the house fits the bill as a "control system
that is trying to control but failing [to control]".

i.

12

[From Bill Powers (980806.1431 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (980806.1300 EDT)--

I doubt that Galileo and the inquisitors had the same intentions. What makes
you think that Galileo thought he had made errors, or that we wanted to
confess anything?

Since no force was being applied at the time of the recantation, some
people here would claim that no coercion was taking place. In that case, if
Galileo did recite the words of the recantation, it could only have been
because doing so satisfied one of his reference levels. So his desire to
recite the recantation matched the desire of the inquisitors to have him
recite those words, and by certain lines of reasoning, he was not coerced
into recanting his model of the solar system.

I think he was coerced simply by his knowledge of what the inquisitors
would do to him if he refused, or did not appear sincere enough. Those who
say that coercion must involve the actual application of force, evidently,
would not call this coercion.

Best,

Bill P.

If Galileo were confessing to a priest, and had gone of

···

his own volition, I would think that he and priest might have the same
intentions. You, I assume, would say that he was being coerced in both
cases. We can agree, I hope, that Galileo would feel quite differently in
the two situations.

Bruce Gregory

13

[From Rick Marken (980806.1600)]

i.kurtzer (980806.1515) to Bill Powers (980806.1217 MDT) --

could you tell rick is a material scientist because he hed
denied what i said? I very much doubt he had the below in mind.

>If the coefficient of deformation of the house is 1e-8 meter/Kg
>then its center of gravity will move by 1e-7 meters (about one
>wavelength of ultraviolet light) under an applied force of 10
>kilograms. Whaddaya mean, the house remains immobile?

Actually, that's exactly what I had in mind, though not the actual
units of measure (remember, I said there is "very little effect,
true. But there is some effect". I think 1e-7 meters qualifies
as very little effect;-).

What I should have said (and what I didn't and Bill chastised
me for it;-() was that your house mover (the person pushing
on the house) is controlling because he is organized as a control
system with respect to his perception of house position. It
appeared to Bill that I was making a behavioral point; that
the mover is controlling because he does have a teensy, weensy
effect on the controlled variable. In fact I should have more
clearly made the "system" point; that the mover is controlling
(unsuccessfully, if the feedback connection is zero) because he
is organized as a control _system_ with respect to perception
of house position.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

14

[From Bruce Nevin (980806.1715 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980806.1431 MDT)]

Since no force was being applied at the time of the recantation, some
people here would claim that no coercion was taking place.

I'm trying to stay out of things for reasons stated, but you're going to
get me pissed off with this kind of waffley bullhooey. (See, I can talk
like Isaac too.)

Bill, as you told me in Vancouver, coercion, for you, is the coercer's hand
on the victim's arm forcing it over the salt shaker, or twisting it behind
the back. By this definition, there is no coercion in the above situation.
There is extortion: recant or else we will twist your arm behind your back
(again).

I keep not sending things because I can't get sucked into the tit for tat
stuff right now, but OK, I'll send this and also the following squirrelled
away from earlier:

[From Bruce Nevin (980806.0534 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (980806.0230) re "controlling for" and two senses of "control"

Bravo Isaac!

I remember Wayne Hershberger suggesting this convention. I would rather
appeal to the intention rather than an empirical counterfactual. For

example,

"the agent intends"--which is true whether or not control is achieved--rather
than "the agent is controlling for"--which is true by control _not_ being
acheived. Its best to avoid counterfactuals and their ilk in definitions.

Of

course, i would mainly want to distinguish these terms.

One of the major theoretical terms [control] is now ambiguous?
to who, or more likely for what reason?

Because that's the way language is.

Not scientific language. If this is science then the terms are fixed.

In ordinary discourse, selection (the acceptable combinations of words) is
a graded phenomenon: people differ in their judgements and change them over
time or across situations, people are uncertain about marginal cases, etc.
In science sublanguages, selection is binary: sensible or nonsense. In
writing about a science you can have analogic extensions of selection, such
as metaphor, but within the report portions of science discourses terms are
used strictly as defined for the science. You can't hold pop scientism to
the standards of science, but nor do you allow defined terms to be corrupted.

I have never liked the phrase "control for" and do not use it. Is it a
loose synonym for the value of the reference signal? For a process of
getting a variable under control or of searching for means of control? It
may be useful in informal philosophical ramblings relating to PCT (I could
live without it), but it has no basis in the theory or in the practice of
modelling and testing.

You cannot say that control continues to exist no matter how
ineffectual the outputs are, AND that coercion (as one person
having effective unilateral control of another's agents qi or o)
exists

Sure I can -- and I do.
In my spreadsheet model of coercion, the coercer is in complete
control of the coercee's behavior (qi' or qo') despite the fact
that the coercee is controlling these same variables completely
ineffectually.

The variable qi=qi' or the variable qi=qo' is part of the *coercer's*
behavior. If the victim is attempting to control it, all that exists of the
victim's behavior is those parts of the control loop that are out of reach
of the coercer's control, such as the reference r', the efforts o', the
output activities qo' in one of the two cases, and of course the error
signal. The part that is controlled by the coercer (the variable qi=qi' or
the variable qi=qo') is not part of the victim's behavior. That is in fact
the whole point of coercing.

This is by definition a contradiction. The coercee is in some way

controlling

something that they in no way control as that something is completely
controlled by the coercer. This is double-speak of the worst kind. Did you
make a mistake or is this what you intend?

This sentence evokes in me (and, I bet, in others
who understand the PCT model) images that correspond pretty
closely to what is going on in the PCT model of a coercive
interaction.

this is not a valid argument.

Which PCT model? Remember the little loop diagrams I was drawing in
Vancouver? Here there are again, except that I can't draw circles very well.

In the following taxonomy, control loops are shown in the most skeletal
form, with only reference signals on the insides of control systems and a
value q or q' in the environment between two control systems. In the notes,
D is the dominant control system, and V is the victim. The variable q is in
the environment, and may represent either qi=qi' or qi=qo' (similarly for
q'). D, the coercer or extortionist, is above the observable variable q,
and V the victim is below q. Imagine the environment/system boundaries as
two horizontal lines drawn just above and just below q.

--rd- Coercion: D forces value of q,

    > V cannot affect value of q.

\ /
  \ /
   q
  / \
/ \

    >

--rv-

This alone is what was simulated in the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet
simulation (and this diagram) does not apply to obedient schoolchildren,
quiescent prisoners, compliant rape victims, etc. What does describe those
situations? Something for which we have not yet created a simulation or a
model. See below.

     -----Rd---- Extortion 1:
    /-------- \ I'll keep
   / \ \ controlling q'
  / ---------\---\ until you
/ / \ \ control q
---rd-- \--rd'-- to my value
\ / \ / for q. (Also:
\ / \ / maybe he'll
  \ / \ / stop if I
   q q' do what I
  / \ / \ think he wants.)
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
---rv-- --rv'--
\ \ / /
  \ ----------/--/
   \ /
    \-------- /
     -----Rv----

     -----Rd---- Extortion 2:
    /........ \ o(D)>0
   / . \ Don't interfere
  / ---------.---\ with my control
/ / . \ of q, or else
--rd- ...rd'... I'll control q'

    > . . to a value that

\ / . . you don't want.
  \ / o(D) . . (Dots indicate
   q q' imagination.)
  . . . . (Also the
. . . . victim's
. . . . hypothetical
...rv... ...rv'... as with 1)
. . . .
  . ..............
   . . .
    ......... .
     .....Rv....

     -----Rd---- Extortion 3:
    /........ \ o(D)=0
   / . \ Control q to my
  / ---------.---\ satisfaction,
/ / . \ or else
--rd- ...rd'... I'll control q'

    > . . to a value that

\ / . . you don't want.
  \ / o(D) . . (Also the
   q q' victim's
  . . . . hypothetical
. . . . as with 1)
. . . .
...rv... ....rv'..
. . . .
  . ..............
   . . .
    ......... .
     .....Rv....

     .....Rd.... Extortion 4, 5:
    ......... . V has internalized
   . . . the extortioner
  . .............. in either of the
. . . . above forms.
...rd... ...rd'...
. . . .
. . . .
  . . o(D) . .
   q q'
  / \ . .
/ \ . .
/ \ . .
---rv-- ...rv'...
\ \ . /
  \ ---------.---/
   \ . /
    \........ /
      -----Rv---

If you talk about coercion, please specify which flavor you have in mind.
They are not the same. Please do not use attributes of one to claim
conclusions about another.

You want to say that coercion is still going on even when the arm is not
being twisted. This is how the argument goes: The coercer is controlling
and can overpower the victim and (because there is no conflict within the
coercer about this) therefore will overpower the victim if and when the
victim ever resists. Because control continues even when there is no
disturbance, coercion so conceived continues even when there is no
disturbance from the victim.

Can this be true of extortion types 4 and 5? In extortion types 2 and 3 the
threat is effective in like manner to 4 and 5 because it is imagined by the
victim. Only in extortion type 1 is coercion present, and what
distinguishes it from frank coercion (the simple diagram/spreadsheet) is
that the victim imagines its cessation as a function of the extortionist's
offer. The offer in extortion type 1 is exactly parallel to the threat in
extortion types 2-5. Left out of the diagrams is the communication of the
offer or of the threat, the basis for imagining the offer or threat. But
even with communication (for example, witnessing or experiencing prior
extortion) the threat or the offer exists in the victim's imagination or
not at all. (Saying a thing is not the same as communicating it, the reason
for asking confirmation.)

  Bruce Nevin

15

[From Bruce Nevin (980806.2115 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980806.1600)--

the mover is controlling
(unsuccessfully, if the feedback connection is zero) because he
is organized as a control _system_ with respect to perception
of house position.

Does this (unsuccessful) control by the mover constitute the behavior of
the mover?

Is the physical resistance of the house determining the mover's behavior?

Does the (unsuccessful) control by the victim of coercion constitute the
behavior of the victim?

Is the control of the contested variable by the coercer also controlling
the victim's behavior?

Be careful to use "control" and "behavior" in the same way as you consider
these two pairs of questions. (I know there's other behavior concurrently,
it's not exhaustively "the behavior" of the mover or of the victim, I mean
the behavior relevant to the situation being described.)

  Bruce Nevin

16

[From Rick Marken (980806.2050)]

Bruce Nevin (980806.2115 EDT)--

Does this (unsuccessful) control by the mover constitute the
behavior of the mover?

Yes.

Is the physical resistance of the house determining the mover's
behavior?

No.

Does the (unsuccessful) control by the victim of coercion
constitute the behavior of the victim?

Yes.

Is the control of the contested variable by the coercer also
controlling the victim's behavior?

Remove the "also" (since I don't know what it refers to) and
it's "yes".

Hope we passed the awedition;-)

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

17

i.kurtzer (980807.1003)

[From Rick Marken (980806.1600)]

What I should have said (and what I didn't and Bill chastised
me for it;-() was that your house mover (the person pushing
on the house) is controlling because he is organized as a control
system with respect to his perception of house position.

This seems a generous distortion of "control"; The person is controlling
because they are organized as a control system no matter if they have an
effect so minute as to considered by a single wavelength?? Notice that i do
not disagree that they are organized as a control system, only that they are
controlling. And also notice that if you say they are controlling then there
can be no such thing as coersion as you have consistantly stated that in
coersion only one person--the coercer--control's qi.

i.

18

[From Bill Powers (980807.0538 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (980806.1450 EDT)--

I am not sure what it means "to follow the rules voluntarily". I am not even
sure that I follow the rules voluntarily. How is voluntary compliance
modeled in PCT?

Here is an attempt to define it:

Following a rule voluntarily means adopting the rule as your own reference
condition, and correcting any difference between the rule you perceive
yourself actually following and the rule you have adopted. To adopt the
rule as your own means to select it from a higher level (principles or
system concepts) to serve control at that level.

Following a rule involuntarily means doing so not to support your own
principles or system concepts, but to avoid pain or the loss of something
you need or want. You say "Good morning, teacher," not because you are glad
to see her again, but because if you don't she will yell at you for not
being polite. You keep your hands to yourself not out of respect for
another student's rights, but to avoid being sent to the RTC (if you want
to avoid that). This is "involuntary" because someone else is imposing the
conditions on you that make it necessary (in your opinion) to follow the
rule. Of course the ultimate case is one where someone else seizes you and
makes you go through the motions of following the rule. In that case, it's
really the other person who is following the rule.

Best,

Bill P.

19

[From Bill Powers (9800807.0558 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (980806.1515)

You guys both need to talk about a control system that is trying to control
but failing, as opposed to the case in which there is no control system in
the first place.

The person that wants to move the house fits the bill as a "control system
that is trying to control but failing [to control]".

Yes, I'd agree that correcting one ten millionth of the error is "failing
to control."

So that is one kind of "no control." How do you contrast it with the other
kind, where the person doesn't even try to control?

Best,

Bill P.
'

20

[From Bruce Gregory (980807.0950 EDT)]

Bill Powers (9800807.0558 MDT)

i.kurtzer (980806.1515)

>> You guys both need to talk about a control system that is
trying to control
>> but failing, as opposed to the case in which there is no
control system in
>> the first place.
>
>The person that wants to move the house fits the bill as a
"control system
>that is trying to control but failing [to control]".

Yes, I'd agree that correcting one ten millionth of the error is "failing
to control."

So that is one kind of "no control." How do you contrast it with the other
kind, where the person doesn't even try to control?

If I read your post of yesterday correctly, the first case involves a
non-zero reference level and a non-zero gain. The second (not trying to
control) involves either a zero reference level or a zero gain or both.

Bruce Gregory