[From Bruce Abbott (951110.1250 EST)]
Rick Marken (951109.2100) --
Bruce Abbott (951109.1515 EST) to Mary Powers --
But why do you state that whether psychology is or is not a good science,
is not really the issue
For me, it's because it's not the kind of issue that can be resolved
scientifically. It's just words: you say it's scientific, I say it isn't;
you say tomato, I say tomahto.
It is an issue that can be resolved IF the parties to the dispute can first
agree on what constitutes a science and differentiates it from nonscience
and pseudoscience. With clearly defined criteria in hand, one can then
apply those criteria to any specific example and determine whether it meets
those criteria. Until an agreement is reached on criteria, you are right,
it's all just words.
Now, how about dealing with an issue that _can_ be resolved scientifically,
viz: do the methods of psychology tell us anything about the nature of the
system under study?
Again, just words until we have our terms defined. What do you call "the
methods of psychology"? What do you mean by "the nature of the system"?
What do you think is wrong with psychological science as it is currently
being conducted? I think what's wrong is that there is no testing for
controlled variables. Is this what you think is wrong too?
1. Students are not properly grounded in the the physical sciences,
mathematics, and the relevant engineering principles.
2. Psychological researchers in every field have not yet recognized that the
key to understanding purposive behavior is the control system. And because
of Point 1, they are generally unprepared to construct control system
models or to conduct a proper analysis.
3. Without a proper internal model of the system under study, researchers have
focused mainly on attempting to make progress in understanding limited
phenomena of interest to them for theoretical or practical (potential
applications) reasons. There has not been enough interest in developing
a bottom-up approach, and when there has been an interest, the attempt has
proceded from the wrong fundamental assumptions as to the nature of the
system.
4. Because of unfortunate circumstances during the early development of the
field, many researchers have been hamstrung by incorrect conclusions about
what can and cannot be the proper subject matter of a scientific psychology,
and consequently what can and cannot be accomplished through the observation
of behavior. [I am thinking specifically of the "black box" approach, which
denies the possibility of and need for identifying the internal mechanisms
of behavior and focuses instead on merely describing observable "functional"
relationships among variables.] Those who believe in this viewpoint have a
severe conceptual roadblock in their thinking that tends to prevent them
from seriously considering any analysis of internal structure.
Believe it or not, it is possible to take a position somewhere between "it's
all mush" and "it's everything anyone could hope for in a science."
Could you describe this moderate position, please?
Well, I've been trying to for about a year now. As your question so amply
illustrates, it's been a waste of my time.
I am only attempting to pursuade that a more moderate view between
those extremes is closer to the truth.
Great. I hate (well, that's a bit extreme...) I dislike being an extremist.
What's the moderate position between the control and the input-output view of
behavior? Is it like the moderate position between the sun and the earth
centered view of the solar system?
It is paragraphs like that which show most clearly that you are not really
interested in considering my view. I'm talking about taking a moderate
position regarding the status of psychology as science, and you ask about
what the moderate position is between the control and input-output view, as
if _that_ is what I am advocating taking a moderate position about. It is a
deliberate attempt to confuse the issue.
Is it like the moderate position between the sun and the earth
centered view of the solar system?
No, it is like the moderate position between viewing both Kepler's and
Newton's efforts as "scientific" and viewing only Newton's as scientific.
Kepler deduced from the astronomical observations that the planets travel in
elliptical orbits around the sun (without understanding why). Newton's
achievement was to provide a mechanistic system that accounts for those
orbits. Both men, in my view, were doing science, even though Kepler was
only providing a "functional" account. From your criticism of so-called
conventional psychology, I would conclude by applying the same criteria to
the work of Kepler and Newton that only Newton would qualify as doing
science in your view.
This is not to say, of course, that Kepler's and Newton's insights have
equal status. Once you have Newton, Kepler's observations become merely a
"trivial consequence" of the application of Newton's analysis. However, it
is important to remember that Newton relied on Kepler's description in
formulating his analysis of planetary motions.
for the major players in this group to keep insisting that this [all
conventional psychology is irrelevant] is so, against hard evidence,
What evidence? We have evidence that the results of conventional research
tell us nothing about the nature of the the behaving system. Does this
evidence count too?
The journals you don't read anymore (because they have nothing to offer
worth reading about) are filled with examples, and I have cited several in
this forum. Your "evidence that the results of conventional research tell us
nothing about the nature of the behaving system" is based on taking one
specific method (group-statistical approach) and determining what it tells
you about the controled perception of one particular individual (very
little). Yes, it's an inappropriate method for answering that question.
But it is not the only method in the so-called "conventional" psychologist's
arsenal and that's not the only question that needs to be addressed in
psychological research.
is beyond my comprehension and, I am sure, the comprehension of those
who have done the research.
All we are saying is "give the _test for controlled variable_ a chance".
It that was all you were saying, I wouldn't be arguing with you. You are
saying much more, you are saying "your methods are useless." They are not.
What is the compromise position, though ? Is conventional IV-DV methodology
sometimes appropriate? When? Why?
Again, I must ask, for what purpose? For identifying the controlled
variable, the variant of IV-DV (or push-observe) methodology called the Test
For The Controlled Variable is appropriate. For determining the structure
of behavior, other methods work well. [I anticipate you will ask me what I
mean by the "structure of behavior" and may even deny that behavior ever
_has_ a structure, but will wait and see whether I need to explain before
doing so.] For determining the internal organization of the brain, still
other methods are appropriate. So I ask, for what purpose?
Your argument, it seems to me, comes down to something like this: the
conventional tools used by mechanics to repair cars are inapproprate: only
screwdrivers are appropriate for loosening screws, and automobiles are
screwed together. My argument is that there are many things to study about
behavior, with different tools being best suited for different projects.
The car is held together by more than just screws, and the mechanic should
be free to choose the best tool for the job.
Again, if you were only trying to convince the mechanic to use his
screwdriver, instead of his hammer, to _loosen the screws_, I would support
you 100%.
If you fail the credibility test here, who will listen further?
Please give an example of something credible that we can say about how to study
living control systems? Would we be credible if we said the right way to
study them is the way they have always been studied?
It's not what you say, but what you demonstrate, and you haven't done enough
of that--yet. Just don't start out by telling researchers in the field that
everything they have done and are doing is crap. After you say that, nobody
is listening.
There are many questions in this post. I hope you will answer them --
and one more that is relevant to the question of what conventional
methods can tell us about the nature of the system under study. The
final question is:
Do you agree that variations in what you experience (p) are at all times
a joint result of variations in what the world is doing (d) and in what
you are doing (o)? That is, do you agree that p = o + d ?
No. I experience (p) a lot of things that appear to have no direct
relationship to what the world is currently doing (d) and what I am
currently doing (o). [For example, I perceive that Bill Clinton is
President, and there doesn't seem to be anything I do that changes that.]
On the other hand, I do agree that what I am doing (o) and what the world is
doing (d) combine to produce my perception (p) of the variations in the
perceptions I am controlling, and of those which may be altered as a
side-effect of my actions. To that extent, I agree that p = o + d.
Regards,
Bruce