Motor programs/schemata specify outcomes, not outputs

From Greg Williams (931028)

Quoted from Christopher D. Wickens, ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE, Second Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1992,
page 451:

  "A motor program is assumed to generate very consistent space-time
trajectories from one replication to another. A number of
investigators have pointed out that what is consistent is not the
PROCESS of muscular innervation (and therefore the specific pattern of
neural commands) but the PRODUCT of the response (Pew, 1974; Schmidt,
1975, 1988; Shapiro & Schmidt, 1982; Summers, 1989). Thus the
signature of one's name meets the criteria of a motor program. Yet the
signature may vary drastically in the actual muscular commands used
(or even total muscle groups), depending on the context in which one's
name is signed -- whether, for example, on a small horizontal piece of
paper or on a large vertical blackboard. Bartlett (1932) pointed out
that the specific muscular patterns involved in a tennis player's
swing were quite different in the different circumstances. MacNeilage
(1970) argued that the articulation of familiar words is an example of
motor programs. The product of an articulation is roughly the same
whether the speaker speaks normally or through clenched teeth. Yet the
process of muscular innervation is totally changed between these two
conditions.
  "In both of these examples, drastic changes in motor patterns have
occurred. Yet certain characteristics of the time-space trajectory
have remained invariant across the modification. Thus whatever is
learned and stored in long-term memory cannot be a specific set of
muscle commands but must represent a more generic or general set of
specifications of how to reach the desired goal. These specifications
were labeled by Bartlett (1932) and Schmidt (1975) as a MOTOR SCHEMA."

REFERENCES:

R.W. Pew, "Human Perceptual-Motor Performance," in B. Kantowitz, ed.,
HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1974

R.A. Schmidt, "A Schema Theory of Discrete Motor-Skill Learning,"
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 82, 1975, 225-260

--, MOTOR CONTROL AND LEARNING: A BEHAVIORAL EMPHASIS, Second Edition,
Human Kinetics, Champaign, IL, 1988

D.C. Shapiro and R.A. Schmidt, "The Schema Theory: Recent Evidence and
Development of Implications," in J.A.S. Kelso and J.E. Clark, eds.,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOVEMENT CONTROL AND COORDINATION, Wiley, Norwich,
England, 1982

J.J. Summers, "Motor Programs," in D.H. Holding, ed., HUMAN SKILLS,
Second Edition, Wiley, New York, 1989

F.C. Bartlett, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
Cambridge University Press, London, 1932

P.F. MacNielage, "Motor Control of Serial Ordering of Speech,"
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 77, 182-196

From Tom Bourbon [931028.1412]

From Greg Williams (931028)

Quoted from Christopher D. Wickens, ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE, Second Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1992,
page 451:

Greg,

You didn't include your comments about the material you quoted. I conclude
you are running a "test," in the form of a Williams Post, like the famous
Rorschah Inkblots. By analogy to the Rorschach, a recipient (the testee) is
assumed to "project" personal biases, qualities, traits and the like into
the Post, to be interpreted by the testor.

"A motor program is assumed to generate very consistent space-time
trajectories from one replication to another. A number of
investigators have pointed out that what is consistent is not the
PROCESS of muscular innervation (and therefore the specific pattern of
neural commands) but the PRODUCT of the response (Pew, 1974; Schmidt,
1975, 1988; Shapiro & Schmidt, 1982; Summers, 1989).

. . .

. . . drastic changes in motor patterns have
occurred. Yet certain characteristics of the time-space trajectory
have remained invariant across the modification.

OK, like a fool, I'll interpret the inkblot.

No problem there. Varying means to unvarying ends. Someone was looking
carefully at what happens when people act.

Thus whatever is
learned and stored in long-term memory cannot be a specific set of
muscle commands but must represent a more generic or general set of
specifications of how to reach the desired goal. These specifications
were labeled by Bartlett (1932) and Schmidt (1975) as a MOTOR SCHEMA."

Say what? This is a nonsequitur. After reading that people use variyng
means to reach unvarying ends, we see that they do so by learning and
storing specifications for how to reach a desired goal. I assume they
must then extract just the right specifications to use under just the right
(variable) conditions. That still sounds pretty lineal to me, and not at
all like PCT. I would need to see some better evidence than this, before
concluding any of the authors Wickens cited had identified and understood
the phenomenon of perceptual control. (Nothing personal, mind you. I'm
just finicky about what I accept as evidence.)

OK, doc Williams, what's my score? Do I qualify for a DSM-III-R
psychiatric diagnostic label?

Until later,

Tom