[From: Dennis Delprato (930329)]
<Mary Powers 9303.28
movements are the ultimate
means by which control systems at every level control perception[.]
You said that you wonder if someone understands the above. I suspect
that your point is frequently overlooked,
both in and out of PCT literature and thinking. I'll leave it to
the reader to ponder some consequences of failing to take into
account your point.
[Martin Taylor 930330 16:15]
(Dennis Delprato 930329 to Mary Powers 9303.28)
movements are the ultimate
means by which control systems at every level control perception[.]You said that you wonder if someone understands the above. I suspect
that your point is frequently overlooked,
both in and out of PCT literature and thinking.
It tends to be ignored that we have other ways than movement of affecting
our environment, and that these ways can also be important in controlling
perception -- very, very important. Chemical output, which can be
terribly important in mate selection, for example. Other species
perhaps make more use of this than we do, but chemical outputs are by
no means negligible with ourselves. There may be others besides
movement, but I can't think of one for now. We shouldn't ignore the
possibility, though.
Martin
Only 50 more mail items from yesterday to go !!!
[FROM: Dennis Delprato (930331)]
Martin Taylor 930330 16:15
It tends to be ignored that we have other ways than movement of affecting
our environment, and that these ways can also be important in controlling
perception -- very, very important. Chemical output, which can be
terribly important in mate selection, for example. Other species
perhaps make more use of this than we do, but chemical outputs are by
no means negligible with ourselves. There may be others besides
movement, but I can't think of one for now. We shouldn't ignore the
possibility, though.
Point of clarification: My referent here is motor control of sensory
feedback as perhaps most vociferously, if unheard, expounded by
K. U. Smith. Thus, if we go and describe the details of chemoexcretions,
we find motorsensory feedback control systems. I do not mean movement
in only the sense of gross muscular activity. Taken this way, I find
Powers's and Smith's as perhaps the best examples of the outcome of
the historical behavioral movement. Motorsensory feedback control
theory is behavioral in the extreme. But now (a) physical and
biological behavior (events) are at the heart of all psychological
events and (b) psychological behavior is inseparable from perceptual
input. Of course, Smith and Powers are so far in advance of the
behavioral movement that virtually no one finds their views even
related to earlier versions of the behavioralization of
psychology in one or another form of behaviorism.
[Martin Taylor 930331 15:30]
(Dennis Delprato 930331)
Thus, if we go and describe the details of chemoexcretions,
we find motorsensory feedback control systems. I do not mean movement
in only the sense of gross muscular activity.
If that is so, then I retract in my differentiation of chemical from
mechanical control, and (for now) accept that all actual control is
by mechanical means.
----------------
Bill Powers also commented that he did not think we actually used chemical
output as the output mechanism in the main hierarchy, but that chemical
output was a kind of side effect (if I read him aright), much as the
behaviour of the main hierarchy is a side effect of the reorganizing
system. The result in each case is that intrinsic variables come to
desired states (i.e. are under control) even though they themselves are
not the percepts of any control system. I can accept this as a possibility.
But I can also accept the converse. How would you tell whether a chemical
output was the effector mechanism of a control system (desirable member
of opposite sex being in close proximity being the perceptual reference
of some such control system). How do you test whether any particular
muscle twitch is part of the effector system of any particular higher-level
control system? All you can do, as far as I can see, is determine whether
a putative CEV actually corresponds to a controlled perception, and the
effector mechanisms that influence that putative CEV may well not be
controlled. They may just be executed as outflow (especially if chemical!).
Even if they are controlled, how does one test whether their control is
related to the control of the putative CEV in question? The Test, as
such, seems not to apply.
Martin