# Musings

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/musings/7427>\
**Category:** CSG1995\
**Created:** [October 27, 1995, 2:55am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/musings/7427 "1995-10-27T02:55:38Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Leach1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/848f3c/32.png) [@Bill\_Leach1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Leach1)\
**Post date:** [October 27, 1995, 2:55am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/musings/7427/1 "1995-10-27T02:55:38Z")

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\<[Bill Leach 951026.22:22 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

> NET

Much of the discussion of late reminds me of a conclusion that I arrived  
at close to two years ago and was "validated" by Bill Power's with  
something akin to a chuckle combined with a bit of amusement...

The major idea that PCT offers to the world is that for the most part we  
have been asking the wrong questions. Much of what we as individuals  
have considered to be "trivial matters" are of major import and most of  
what we have considered to be "questions of profound importance" are  
irrelevant \_as far as understanding\_ how and why living systems do what  
they are observed to do.

A problem in the "debate" is that not all research into human behaviour  
is actually directed at understanding how and why people do things. Much  
of it is just plain directed at determining what effects people have on  
their environment with little real regard as to why or how (especially  
internally) they "do what they do".

This latter approach to research is more like engineering that occurs  
when basic theory is inadequate to the task. It is not however, science  
which must concerning itself with underlying and invariant principles.

Much has been "made" of the paradigm shift in celestial mechanics and the  
great advances achieved in both understanding and predictive capability.  
However, an interesting fundamental principle of profound import is still  
not understood sufficiently for rigorous mathematical expression and that  
is Newton's famous 3 body problem.

Scientists and engineers that deal with celestial problems involving 3 or  
more gravitational masses do so using rough approximation methods based  
upon empirical data. These people are not scorned or considered to be  
fools though it \_is\_ probably important in the respect that such people  
are themselves aware of and publicly admit that they do their work with  
the "handicap" of a fundamental theory that fails to explain a rather  
obvious observational fact.

I would suggest that again, what Bruce has tried so valiantly to express  
is at least somewhat similar even if most often the questions being asked  
are often irrelevant. There are aspects of behaviour that are worth  
investigating for reason other than understanding the how and why of  
behaviour. That is, the what can have value on its own.

If "so called" conventional researchers admitted that their research  
(that is not PCT like research) was being done for reasons other than  
understanding the how and why of behaviour there would probably be much  
less contention with PCTers.

Even thinking about this in this manner does not alter my own belief that  
an understanding of basic control theory can not but help any research of  
any form for any purpose if it deals with one or more control systems  
(and my understanding of Bruce's position on this is that it is the same).

-bill

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 26, 1996, 8:19pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/musings/7427/2 "1996-10-26T20:19:30Z")

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[From Bill Powers (961025.0830 MDT) --

Bruce Gregory (961023.1015 EDT) --

> Try this. Suppose I lay out a rectangle of land and measure two  
> sides of the plot. I now say, "I can tell you what the diagonal  
> must be by applying the Pythagorean theorem." Would you accuse me  
> of Pythagorean mysticism because I think that there is some  
> natural principle that "governs" this relationship in some  
> trans-physical way?

Well, I don't think I'd accuse \_you\_ of Pythagorean mysticism, but I  
would suggest that your prediction would be in error. Suppose one side  
is laid out as 120.834 meters, and the other as 350.924 meters. If you  
measured the diagonal, do you think you would measure it as  
371.144863001 meters (approximately)?

> **···**
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Bruce Abbott (961023.0900 EST) --  
> RE: method of levels
> 
> > Bill Powers, meet Carl Rogers. Rogers called this approach "person-  
> > centered therapy." Not surprisingly, you find it listed under  
> > "humanistic therapies" in most psychology texts.
> 
> Already have. When I met Mary, she was an intern in his client-  
> centered therapy program (and Dick Robertson was there, too). See  
> Rogers' blurb on the back jacket of B:CP.  
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> -  
> Hans Blom, 961023 --  
> RE: method of levels
> 
> > This is also called the Socratic method, that all philosophy depends  
> > on. It consists of two parts: 1) mapping someone's belief system, and  
> > 2) finding inconsistencies in it. Then you point out to the speaker  
> > that he simultaneously believes X and not-X.
> 
> OK, so the method of levels is nothing but client-centered therapy,  
> and it's nothing but the Socratic method. Any more nothing-buts out  
> there?
> 
> Re your nothing-but Hans, you seemed to change your mind a paragraph  
> or so later:
> 
> Bill:
> 
> > > It's very tempting to start giving advice or pointing out what the  
> > > conflict is, but I don't think that helps.
> 
> Hans:
> 
> > I agree.
> 
> Hans:
> 
> > This method is fun, isn't it?
> 
> Sure didn't take you long to learn it.  
> -------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Martin Taylor 961023 11:55 --
> 
> > > And if there are time lags in the reorganizing process, it can end  
> > > up cyclic can't it?
> 
> > I don't think so, in this case. Cyclic behaviour always implies  
> > memory somewhere in a system.
> 
> All it takes is for reorganization to persist for a time after the  
> error goes to zero. I suppose you could, loosely speaking, call that a  
> "memory" effect.  
> --------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Clark McPhail --
> 
> Thought this post was from Tim Carey, since his name appeared first in  
> the post. But fortunately I glanced at the header before deleting it,  
> and saw Clark's name in the From field...  
> -------------------------
> 
> > What about our experience and display of emotion when we witness the  
> > success or failure of another person or group of persons for whom we  
> > wish the best possible outcome. For example, fans who identify with  
> > a team can do little or nothing to affect the actual play of the team  
> > or the final score of a game. But is it not possible that fans  
> > control for the perception of similar outcomes as those of the team  
> > members themselves, even though the fans cannot directly affect the  
> > outcome or the team member's perceptions?
> 
> The general principle that negative emotions are concurrent results of  
> error signals isn't changed by this. However, the good feelings in  
> this case may sometimes be related to another idea about emotions.  
> Some good feelings may simply be bad feelings going away. When you're  
> anxious about the team's winning, and they do win, you feel more  
> jubilant than you would if the game were a walkover from the start.  
> Relief from a bad emotion, even if it simply restores the status quo,  
> is often viewed as a positive emotion in itself. The suggestion is  
> that the first time derivative of a feeling-signal can be viewed as an  
> emotion independently of the actual state of feeling. Perhaps more  
> commonly, the feeling is simply "edge-enhanced", with changes being  
> exaggerated. So being plunged into gloom feels worse that just  
> becoming gloomy, and an unexpectedly fast recovery from illness feels  
> better than just an ordinary recovery.
> 
> Your main point was about vicarious feelings that arise as if you were  
> controlling something that someone else is actually controlling --  
> "body english" is an example. I think this may come from imagining  
> yourself in the other person's role, so you are doing everything but  
> actually producing outputs. When the other person's actions keep the  
> variable you'd like to control near your reference level for it, you  
> experience no error, but when there's a difference, your own error  
> signal makes you try to take some action (in vain, of course, since  
> you aren't actually controlling). This may be why, when being a  
> passenger in a car with someone whose driving you don't trust, you jam  
> your foot into the floorboards when the driver is late (as you see it)  
> in applying the brakes. And of course the emotion you feel is the  
> result of the uncorrected error.  
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Hans Blom, 961024e --
> 
> > I've always thought of the "intrinsic reference levels" at the top of  
> > the HPCT hierarchy as being the common physiological homeostatic  
> > variables such as the oxygen en carbon dioxide partial pressures in  
> > the cells, the pH, Na, K and Ca concentrations in cells, etc., rather  
> > than something as magical/mystical as a "feeling of unity" that Bill  
> > Powers thinks of as the top.
> 
> I presume this little sneer refers to the experience I and others have  
> reported as one of the end-points of a session with the method of  
> levels. Actually, the HPCT model says nothing about that phenomenon,  
> nor have I ever tried to account for it with the model. It's just an  
> observation without, so far, any explanation. Also, if you were to review my  
> writings, I think you would find that I have NEVER referred to a "feeling of  
> unity." All you're doing here is revealing the sterotyped category into  
> which you've put me. Saves thinking.
> 
> I see the top of the hierarchy as being concerned with what I call  
> "system concepts," which are such things as a perception of organized  
> systems like control systems or baseball teams or governments or  
> religions or selves. A system concept like physics is composed of a  
> set of principles, which are generalizations about nature.
> 
> I do not see the intrinsic variables as being part of this hierarchy  
> at all. They exist outside it, and the reorganizing processes  
> associated with them can act on the hierarchy at any level, from the  
> lowest to the highest. Furthermore, in my scheme there is no direct  
> relationship between intrinsic error and the effects on the hierarchy  
> of learned systems: if there is, for example, an intrinsic error  
> having to do with blood pH, the result is not a command at the highest  
> level of the hierarchy to "do something about blood pH." But I've been  
> over than aspect of reorganization theory often enough that you don't  
> need me to explain it again. If you didn't get it the third or fourth time,  
> I don't expect that a sixth or seventh time will make much difference.
> 
> > Anyway, this prompts the questions: What are the intrinsic reference  
> > levels that determine all else? Why those? What do they need to  
> > achieve through their use of the lower levels of the hierarchy? When  
> > are they satisfied, if ever?
> 
> Since these questions are based on the mistaken idea that I consider  
> intrinsic variables to be at the top of the hierarchy of learned  
> systems, they aren't relevant to HPCT. However, putting that aside,  
> the question of what the intrinsic reference levels are concerned with  
> is valid. They specify, in general, the states of certain variables  
> intrinsic to the system that must be maintained in certain states for  
> proper functioning of the system. As I said a few posts ago, most of  
> the variables have a certain range of values under normal conditions,  
> so the intrinsic reference signals (whether real signals or virtual)  
> would probably be concerned with upper or lower limits for these  
> variables.
> 
> What might these variables be? I think we can make some good guesses.  
> The intrinsic reference level for pain is probably naturally set to  
> zero. The intrinsic reference temperature for blood going to the brain  
> is somewhere around 37 degrees c. There is something about lack of  
> nutrition that can lead to reorganization, and so on. Apparently there  
> are some signals relating to pleasure that serve as intrinsic  
> reference signals, so when the state of the body fails to reach the  
> specified levels, there is error, and when those levels are reached,  
> we describe the result is pleasant, or at least neutral. There are  
> many candidates, but I don't know them all, nor do I have any  
> definitive list in mind.
> 
> As to "what they need to achieve," a reference signal is by itself a  
> definition of what is to be achieved. A certain level of glucose in  
> the bloodstream is a possible example. The reference signal could  
> specify a certain concentration of circulating glucose, or perhaps a  
> minimum concentration. And what happens when they are satisfied? The  
> error goes to zero, and any reorganization that was being driven by  
> that error stops. When the error occurs again, reorganization starts  
> again (assuming the error is large enough to produce reorganization  
> instead of being taken care of by some existing control system,  
> inherited or learned).
> 
> I presume that you're thinking in terms of a single highest goal for  
> the whole system, but that concept doesn't apply in HPCT, where there  
> is no single highest goal. And goals, in HPCT, are not simply  
> "achieved" once and for all. They are simply states that are preferred  
> by one control system or another; when error occurs, the control  
> systems always act to keep whatever variables are involved near their  
> reference states, if they can.  
> --------------------------------------  
> Somehow I find myself embroiled with a community of philosophers, with  
> 200K of philosophical musings in the past two days to contend with.  
> That's not what I want to be doing with the rest of my life. I'm going  
> to have to give some serious thought to what I do want to be doing;  
> this, clearly, isn't it. Suggestions from PCTers welcome.  
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best to all,
> 
> Bill P.

---

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**Author:** ![HANS\_BLOM2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/h/f17d59/32.png) [@HANS\_BLOM2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/HANS_BLOM2)\
**Post date:** [October 28, 1996, 12:12pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/musings/7427/3 "1996-10-28T12:12:59Z")

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[Hans Blom, 961028]

(Bill Powers (961025.0830 MDT))

> > This is also called the Socratic method, that all philosophy  
> > depends on. It consists of two parts: 1) mapping someone's belief  
> > system, and 2) finding inconsistencies in it. Then you point out  
> > to the speaker that he simultaneously believes X and not-X.

> OK, so the method of levels is nothing but client-centered therapy,  
> and it's nothing but the Socratic method. Any more nothing-buts out  
> there?

Ouch. Read again, Bill: I said ALSO, not NOTHING BUT. I present a  
different, additional perspective on one and the same thing, which  
shows that this problem is age-old and has ALSO been considered by  
others, as early as two and a half millennea ago. The answers that  
were offered then are still valid, I think. Socrates wasn't stupid,  
you know. Anyway, his remarks have had a tremendous impact (on some).  
PCT offers an ADDITIONAL perspective, which I do not devalue at all.  
Why do you read me that way? Because you think that only one  
perspective can be valid?

> Re your nothing-but Hans, you seemed to change your mind a paragraph  
> or so later:

So you discovered for yourself that it was not a NOTHING BUT. Great.  
So you seem to assume that I am inconsistent and drastically change  
my mind within one short post. Did you consider the possibility that  
the inconsistency could also mean that you might read me incorrectly?

> > I've always thought of the "intrinsic reference levels" at the top  
> > of the HPCT hierarchy as being the common physiological homeostatic  
> > variables such as the oxygen en carbon dioxide partial pressures in  
> > the cells, the pH, Na, K and Ca concentrations in cells, etc.,  
> > rather than something as magical/mystical as a "feeling of unity"  
> > that Bill Powers thinks of as the top.

> I presume this little sneer ...

Touchy, eh? I didn't mean a sneer and you (ought to) know it.

> I see the top of the hierarchy as being concerned with what I call  
> "system concepts," which are such things as a perception of  
> organized systems like control systems or baseball teams or  
> governments or religions or selves. A system concept like physics  
> is composed of a set of principles, which are generalizations about  
> nature.

So there is nothing above -- or connecting -- the various system  
concepts? All our systems concepts form a disjointed (at the top  
level) bunch? This is not a sneer either, Bill, although you can read  
it that way (you can read \_anything\_ that way...). It is me trying to  
model you and your beliefs ;-).

> I do not see the intrinsic variables as being part of this hierarchy  
> at all. They exist outside it, and the reorganizing processes  
> associated with them can act on the hierarchy at any level, from the  
> lowest to the highest.

Now this is really puzzling. I read "the intrinsic variables are not  
part of the hierarchy" as: they have no connection to the hierarchy.  
Yet they are associated with reorganizing processes that act on the  
hierarchy, anywhere, at any level. How? Can you give me a circuit  
diagram -- or another (more exact) form of description than these  
words? That would allow me to better "compute" you.

Greetings,

Hans