My research on controlled variables

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
21

[From Bruce Abbott (980317.1155 EST)]

Bill Powers (980317.0239 MST) --

Bruce Abbott (980316.1245 EST)

The number, intensity, duration, and distribution of shocks was identical in
the two conditions. The apparatus programmed the shocks independently of
conditions.

Does that mean the number, intensity, etc. of _experienced_ shocks, or of
_programmed_ shocks? If the signal made no ultimate difference in the rat's
experience of the shocks, it's difficult to understand why where was a
preference for the signaled condition. The rat must have been able to do
something different in the signaled condition that reduced the unwanted
effects of the shocks, whatever they were -- at least if we assume that the
point of pressing the lever was to reduce some sort of error.

I believe that the point of pressing the lever was to reduce some sort of
error, but not necessarily error in the perceived intensity of the shock.
You assert that "the rat must have been able to do something .... that
reduced the unwanted effects of the shocks," and I agree, but this not
necessarily mean that these actions reduced anything perceived about the
shocks themselves (e.g., intensity, duration).

There's a bit of technical information missing here. Did you in fact verify
that in the signaled condition, the duration and magnitude of the current
passing through the rat was identical to that in the unsignaled condition?
Or did you record just the turning on of the apparatus as if a shock were
being administered? I suspect the latter, since your "preparation"
hypothesis implies that being prepared could have some effect on the
experienced shock, but that you couldn't directly verify this. If you could
directly verify that the rat's behavior reduced the effect of the shock on
the animal (as with the rat that flipped over on its back after the
signal), you wouldn't have to hypothesize about it. When you turned the
current-limiting up to three times its previous value, were you able to
determine that in fact three times the current flowed through the rat for
the same length of time under both conditions? Or did the rat's
"preparation" (or whatever) succeed in reducing the
intensity-times-duration of the current flow through the animal in the
signaled condition?

The apparatus I constructed produced an oscilloscope trace of the times when
current was flowing through the rat (the traces were photographed) and also
yielded the total duration of shock flow for each individual shock (output
to punch-tape). The pattern of shock flow observed was irregular and
intermittant during a shock delivery (i.e., when the shocker was turned on);
visual observation of the rats during shocks revealed that this pattern was
due to the make-and-break pattern of contact with the grid produced as the
rats ran across the grid during the shocks. The only difference in this
pattern between signaled and unsignaled shocks was that the rats took
slightly longer to begin running when the shocks were signaled, apparently
because they froze during the signal.

Shortly after our study was published, researchers in Japan reported on the
results of a similar study that measured actual current flow during the
shocks. They also found that rats received more total shock in the signaled
than in the unsignaled shock condition, and the difference was essentially
the same as the difference we found in shock contact. A reasonable
conclusion is that the difference in total current flow per shock that these
researchers found was due mainly to differences in contact time with the
grid. (The shockers employed strongly regulate the current flow during grid
contact.)

Another study eliminated the possibility of the rats altering the current
flow. In this case the shocks were delivered to electrodes affixed to the
tail. Preference for signaled over unsignaled shock developed in this study
just as in the studies using gridshock.

We could easily explain the preference for the signaled condition in the
case of the rat that flipped over on its back. In the signaled condition,
that rat would receive no shocks. That rat was able to control its
experience of the shocks, first by causing the signaled condition to occur,
and then by controlling the sequence (signal, shock) (at zero) through some
learned action. But after you shaved its back to prevent this mode of
control, I suppose its preference persisted, implying perhaps that it had
found some _other_ way to affect the duration and intensity of the
experienced shock in the signaled condition.

This is something of a misdescription. The few rats that learned to avoid
the shocks by lying on their backs (using their fur as an insulator) just
lay on their backs throughout the experimental session. They did not switch
to the signaled condition, and they did not flip on their backs only during
the warning tones.

That hypothesis could easily
be disproven by measuring the intensity and duration of the current flowing
through the rat.

And was.

The crux of the matter here, as far as the Test is concerned, is whether
the signal enabled the rat to alter what it experienced when the shock
occurred. If it did, we can hypothesis a two-level control system; one
level would reduce the shock experience when possible, and the other would
try to make it possible.

No one can get into the rat's mind, of course, and experience what the rat
experienced under these conditions. The best we can do is to use the
experimental observations to infer what might (or might not) be going on.
But I wonder why you focus only on what the rat experienced _when the shock
occurred_. Perhaps it is more important to focus on what the rat may have
experienced during other parts of the session, between shocks.

You say that you were trying to eliminate the preference by eliminating
supposed differences between the two conditions. That is a valid aspect of
the Test.

Rick please note.

However, I am asking whether you were really instrumented to

determine what the rat's experience (probably) was. The nature of the
guesses you were making suggests that this instrumentation was lacking.

I hope I have been able to correct that impression.

Regards,

Bruce

22

[From Bruce Abbott (980317.1540 EST)]

Bill Powers (980317.04023 MST) --

I think it's more pertinent to start by admitting that Bruce A. was,
indeed, trying to find out what it was about the signaled condition that
was preferred. One way to do this is to try to eliminate the hypothesized
feature of the signaled condition to see if the attempts to re-establish it
will eventually disappear. Unfortunately, that approach considers only the
reorganizing aspects of the situation. Under the control hypothesis, if you
make it harder to achieve the desired condition, the organism should at
first produce _more_ behavior, not less. If the behavior is already at its
maximum, you should see no change.

In these experiments, each rat was tested under the same conditions until
the percentage of time spent in the alternate (usually the signaled)
condition stabilized within 10% across three consecutive 6-hr sessions, with
no trend evident. There was plenty of time for reorganization, and in fact
there were many variants in which changing over to the signaled condition
did extinguish.

The real criticism here is that Bruce's strategy assumes that behavior is
controlled by its consequences. Under that assumption, if you make it
impossible for the consequence to appear, the behavior should disappear. In
the long run, PCT would predict the same thing, because eventually
reorganization will kick in, but in the short run, PCT would say that
behavior should increase, not decrease. However, when the behavior involved
is binary, so it can only occur or not occur, and when its effects are also
binary (signaled condition or not), it's impossible to measure quantitative
changes in it: it's on or it's off.

Not so: one can easily measure the frequency of responding, which is a
continuous, quantitative measure, or if you prefer, the percentage of
session time spent in the alternative (changeover) condition, also a
continuous quantitative measure. In fact, we did use the latter measure.

So the strategy of tripling the programmed shock current in the signaled
condition to see if it affects the preference doesn't really test anything
relating to PCT. Doing so increases the error in the shocked condition, but
that would only serve to increase the behavior that is already in place to
counteract the error. Since the behaviors available are very limited --
turn on the signaled condition, flip over on your back, jump up in the air,
etc. -- there isn't any obvious way to increase the attempt to correct the
error.

Actually this stragegy worked very well. In PCT terms, it places two
control systems in direct conflict: one attempting to minimize perceived
shock intensity and one attempting to obtain whatever it is rats get from
having the shocks come with as opposed to without warning. As the intensity
of the signaled shocks was increased, preference for the signaled (over the
unsignaled) shock condition was being titrated against preference for weaker
over stronger shock. It's really quite simple to understand from a PCT
perspective, Bill. I don't know why you are going to such extremes to argue
that it doesn't

What this variant on the experiment does show is that the consequence is
not controlling the behavior. Even though turning on the signaled condition
triples the programmed shock current, the animal continues to prefer the
signaled condition. Under PCT, this implies that in the signaled condition,
the animal does NOT experience three times the shock current; in fact, it
still probably experiences less shock than in the unsignaled conditionl
although not as much less as when the programmed shock currents are equal.

You have no evidence for this position, and substantial evidence makes it
highly doubtful that the rats experience (perceive) less shock in the
signaled condition than in the unsignaled condition. For example, the rats
squeal and run as much during shocks that were signaled as during shocks
that were unsignaled. This strongly implies that signaled shocks are
perceived as being as intense as unsignaled shocks, when physical
intensities are actually the same.

Remember that in EAB, when it is said that an animal "prefers" some
condition, this does not mean that the animal has a desire or intention
relating to that condition, and acts purposively so as to bring it about.
It means that the condition in question, when it happens to occur, alters
the animal's behavior to make that condition occur more frequently. Thus in
EAB, if we artifially prevent the "preferred" condition from occurring, the
result should be a decrease in the behavior being maintained by that
condition. In PCT, of course, we would predict an immediate _increase_ in
the behavior as the error increases.

I don't know about you, but if I discovered that pressing the power button
on my TV not only turned on the TV, but delivered an unpleasant shock to my
finger, I would not immediately begin to press the button more often. Rats
respond to increased shock intensity in the signaled condition as common
sense would suggest, by becoming somewhat less willing to change to the
signaled condition. This experiment pitted two preferences against one
another, a classic conflict situation. It should be analyzed as such.

Regards,

Bruce

23

[From Rick Marken (980217.1310)]

Bruce Abbott (980317.1155 EST)

No one can get into the rat's mind, of course, and experience
what the rat experienced under these conditions.

People who know how to do The Test can get pretty close, though.
They can determine which of their own perceptions corresponds to
the perception(s) controlled by the rat. See my Mind Reading demo

You say that you were trying to eliminate the preference by
eliminating supposed differences between the two conditions.
That is a valid aspect of the Test.

Bruce said:

Rick please note.

Yes. Bill said it's a valid _aspect_ of the Test. And it is.
But it is just one _aspect_. One aspect of the Test is to
introduce disturbances that we know will _not_ require
corrective action. That is, we demonstrate our knowledge of
qi by producing disturbances to the state of qi that make a
difference (and require corrective action) and that make
_no difference_ (and require no correction). Doing this only makes
sense if you have a hypothesis about what qi is. This is the
aspect of the Test that you missed; you did not systematically
Test alternative definitions of qi by applying disturbances
to determine which did and which did not have an effect on qi.
You may have _eliminated_ one definition of qi -- shock. But
you certainly didn't determine what qi _is_. You didn't even come
close to discovering an approximation to qi. This is because
you did not Test to determine the controlled variable.

If you read Bill Powers' (980317.04023 MST) reply to me you will
see that he doesn't agree with the logic of your version of the
Test either. You were not systematically Testing for controlled
variables. Conventional methodology includes _aspects_ of the
Test but it is _not_ the Test. In order to do the Test properly
you have to know what a controlled variable (qi) _is_ and how to
Test to determine what variables an organism is controlling.
Conventional psychologists don't know what a controlled variable
_is_ -- or that they even _exist_. That's why they don't (and
_can't_) do the Test.

I wish Bill would just come out and say that you're _wrong_ when
you say that you were Testing for Controlled Variables when
you were doing your shock experiments. He's just too nice and too
opposed to "balck and white" thinking. But I think it's unfortunate
that he hasn't said this because it allows you (and, more important,
other readers on the net who may actually be willing to learn PCT)
to cling to the idea that you were actually doing The Test. Well,
you weren't; you're wrong when you say you were; and your attitude
(that things like The Test and controlled variable are already
known by different names) hows precisely why PCT has had no
influence on conventional psychology for the last 40+ years. You,
Bruce A., are the "nothing but" head par excelance!

Best;-)

Rick

···

at http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ControlDemo/ThreeTrack.html It might help you understand how even a computer that knows the Test can learn what another organism is trying to experience. Bill Powers said:
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

24

[From Bill Powers (980317 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980317.1047 EST)--

I am surprised to learn that PCT has something to say about
the magnitude of shock experienced by the animal.

I should have said that I'm not quite willing to give up the idea that the
magnitude of shock experienced by the animal is a controlled variable. PCT
doesn't say anything about anything: it just sits there.

I would have
thought that the PCT explanation would suggest that the animal
is controlling for something other than minimizing the perceived
shock.

I don't know what you have in mind. If you were being shocked, wouldn't you
be trying to minimize the sensations of being shocked? It hurts!

Best,

Bill P.

25

[From Bill Powers (980317.1642 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (980317.1155 EST)--

I believe that the point of pressing the lever was to reduce some sort of
error, but not necessarily error in the perceived intensity of the shock.
You assert that "the rat must have been able to do something .... that
reduced the unwanted effects of the shocks," and I agree, but this not
necessarily mean that these actions reduced anything perceived about the
shocks themselves (e.g., intensity, duration).

OK, this is ambiguous. The shock itself is an electric current, for which
we have no specialized receptors. However, shocks induce changes in many
perceptual signals, some by acting on sensory receptors and pathways and
some through acting directly on the muscles. If any of those perceptual
signals is under control, the organism will try to counteract the resulting
perturbations.

There's a bit of technical information missing here. Did you in fact verify
that in the signaled condition, the duration and magnitude of the current
passing through the rat was identical to that in the unsignaled condition?

The apparatus I constructed produced an oscilloscope trace of the times when
current was flowing through the rat (the traces were photographed) and also
yielded the total duration of shock flow for each individual shock (output
to punch-tape).

This doesn't quite do it, because the _amount_ of current also has to be
recorded. Then, to judge the physical effect on the rat, you have to
integrate the product of current and time (at least if the periods of
current flow are short).

Shortly after our study was published, researchers in Japan reported on the
results of a similar study that measured actual current flow during the
shocks. They also found that rats received more total shock in the signaled
than in the unsignaled shock condition, and the difference was essentially
the same as the difference we found in shock contact.

So I take it that you didn't actually measure total shock as they did.

A reasonable
conclusion is that the difference in total current flow per shock that these
researchers found was due mainly to differences in contact time with the
grid. (The shockers employed strongly regulate the current flow during grid
contact.)

Was "total shock" the integrated product of current magnitude times flow
time? That would answer my question.

Another study eliminated the possibility of the rats altering the current
flow. In this case the shocks were delivered to electrodes affixed to the
tail. Preference for signaled over unsignaled shock developed in this study
just as in the studies using gridshock.

This is the final coupe de grace to my hypothesis that the rats were
affecting the experienced amount of shock by their behavior -- at least in
the last study cited. When there is shock via grid, it takes considerably
more instrumentation to establish that behavior had no effect on
experienced shock.

The few rats that learned to avoid
the shocks by lying on their backs (using their fur as an insulator) just
lay on their backs throughout the experimental session. They did not switch
to the signaled condition, and they did not flip on their backs only during
the warning tones.

Ah, of course. They would not, obviously, experience shock in _either_
condition if they could do something to prevent it.

That hypothesis could easily
be disproven by measuring the intensity and duration of the current flowing
through the rat.

And was.

Yes, I now know that.

No one can get into the rat's mind, of course, and experience what the rat
experienced under these conditions. The best we can do is to use the
experimental observations to infer what might (or might not) be going on.
But I wonder why you focus only on what the rat experienced _when the shock
occurred_. Perhaps it is more important to focus on what the rat may have
experienced during other parts of the session, between shocks.

My guess would be that the immediate effects of the shock would be what the
rats would like to avoid, if possible. I know I would. However, it now
seems clear, with all the added information you've provided, that the rats
have no way of changing the immediate effects of the shock. We don't know
if the rats would control those effects given the means to do so. The
conditions don't allow for doing the Test on that variable.

However, I am asking whether you were really instrumented to
determine what the rat's experience (probably) was. The nature of the
guesses you were making suggests that this instrumentation was lacking.

I hope I have been able to correct that impression.

Yes, you have. It would have been helpful to know in the beginning of all
the pertinent conditions that were explored.

So as far as the Test is concerned, all we have now is that the rats prefer
and act to maintain the signalled condition. What it is about this
condition that they prefer is unknown. One can of course hypothesize that
the rats cognitively grasp what we humans mean by "signaled condition" and
are actually controlling for that abstraction. Perhaps my estimate of the
cognitive abilities of a rat does not do the rats justice. However, I am
still reluctant to imagine that rats have such mental abilities, and would
still like to look for a simpler explanation. In fact, if I thought rats
could conceptualize to that degree, I would be even more reluctant to do
experiments on them that involve deliberately causing them discomfort.

Unfortunately for my preferences, the experiments were all designed to
_prevent_ the rats from having any effect on the most obvious potential
controlled variable, the state of experiencing shocks. Since the Test can
be done only when successful control is occurring, we simply don't know
whether the animals would have controlled the duration or intensity of the
shocks had the means been available. I suppose we could infer that they
would, from experiments like Sidman's. But that is a different experiment
under different conditions.

There is one exception to this picture, which occurred when the shock
intensity was increased for the signaled condition. The rats could have
reduced total experienced shock by changing their preference to the
unsignaled condition. However, as you pointed out, this is apparently a
conflict situation, where any desire to reduce the experienced shock is
counteracted by some advantage to the rat of having warning signals before
the shocks. The rats maintained their preference for the signaled condition
and did not reduce the total experienced shock as they might have done.

We might guess that the rats simply were unable to work out the fact that
giving up on the signalling would actually reduce their overall discomfort
from the shocks. That would be a conclusion requiring fairly sophisticated
reasoning. Their actual performance is consistent with my impression that
rats are not actually very smart. Perhaps if they had had some prior
experience in switching between the two conditions _without_ the signalling
in one of them, they would then not prefer the signaled condition over
reduction in shocks, in subsequent tests. If they had actually experienced
the ability to reduce total shock by switching conditions, they might have
developed a means for controlling total shock. But since they had evidently
learned that controlling for the signaled condition reduced some sort of
error, they were unable to allow that error to increase as a means of
reducing another and possibly more important error. This suggests the
absence of the kind of higher-level system that would exist in a human being.

Best,

Bill P.

26

[From Bruce Abbott (980318.0955 EST)]

Bill Powers (980317.1642 MST) --

Bruce Abbott (980317.1155 EST)

There's a bit of technical information missing here. Did you in fact verify
that in the signaled condition, the duration and magnitude of the current
passing through the rat was identical to that in the unsignaled condition?

The apparatus I constructed produced an oscilloscope trace of the times when
current was flowing through the rat (the traces were photographed) and also
yielded the total duration of shock flow for each individual shock (output
to punch-tape).

This doesn't quite do it, because the _amount_ of current also has to be
recorded. Then, to judge the physical effect on the rat, you have to
integrate the product of current and time (at least if the periods of
current flow are short).

For reasons I'll skip over, it was technically quite difficult to measure
variations in current with the shocker I was using, so I settled for a
measure of time during which current was flowing. Because of the current
regulation built into the shocker, the integral of the product of current
and time would have been directly proportional to current flow time.

Shortly after our study was published, researchers in Japan reported on the
results of a similar study that measured actual current flow during the
shocks. They also found that rats received more total shock in the signaled
than in the unsignaled shock condition, and the difference was essentially
the same as the difference we found in shock contact.

So I take it that you didn't actually measure total shock as they did.

No, but see above.

A reasonable
conclusion is that the difference in total current flow per shock that these
researchers found was due mainly to differences in contact time with the
grid. (The shockers employed strongly regulate the current flow during grid
contact.)

Was "total shock" the integrated product of current magnitude times flow
time? That would answer my question.

In their study, yes.

No one can get into the rat's mind, of course, and experience what the rat
experienced under these conditions. The best we can do is to use the
experimental observations to infer what might (or might not) be going on.
But I wonder why you focus only on what the rat experienced _when the shock
occurred_. Perhaps it is more important to focus on what the rat may have
experienced during other parts of the session, between shocks.

My guess would be that the immediate effects of the shock would be what the
rats would like to avoid, if possible. I know I would. However, it now
seems clear, with all the added information you've provided, that the rats
have no way of changing the immediate effects of the shock. We don't know
if the rats would control those effects given the means to do so. The
conditions don't allow for doing the Test on that variable.

That rats will act so as to minimize shock intensity, duration, or frequency
is well established. Also, of direct relevance here, I evaluated whether
rats would change over from a schedule of higher shock frequency to one of
lower shock frequency (all shocks being unsignaled); they do. They will
also change from a schedule of longer-duration shocks to an otherwise
identical schedule of shorter-duration shocks.

However, I am asking whether you were really instrumented to
determine what the rat's experience (probably) was. The nature of the
guesses you were making suggests that this instrumentation was lacking.

I hope I have been able to correct that impression.

Yes, you have. It would have been helpful to know in the beginning of all
the pertinent conditions that were explored.

You have a habit of reading and responding to each paragraph as you read it.
If you had taken the small trouble to read the whole post first, you could
have saved yourself some effort. I find it helpful to hear the whole
argument first before attempting to respond to it, rather than doing so
piecemeal.

So as far as the Test is concerned, all we have now is that the rats prefer
and act to maintain the signalled condition. What it is about this
condition that they prefer is unknown. One can of course hypothesize that
the rats cognitively grasp what we humans mean by "signaled condition" and
are actually controlling for that abstraction. Perhaps my estimate of the
cognitive abilities of a rat does not do the rats justice. However, I am
still reluctant to imagine that rats have such mental abilities, and would
still like to look for a simpler explanation. In fact, if I thought rats
could conceptualize to that degree, I would be even more reluctant to do
experiments on them that involve deliberately causing them discomfort.

When I introduced the couple of experiments we've been discussing, I noted
that there was quite a bit more, which I would be happy to present if anyone
were interested. This series of studies began in the late 60s and continued
into the early 80s, in the course of which many implications of the various
hypotheses were experimentally evaluated. The proposal that repeatedly
stood up to test was the safety analysis. According to this view, rats
maintain themselves in the signaled condition because it is only in the
signaled condition that they receive discriminable periods during which
shock will not occur (i.e., periods of safety). Because shocks occurred at
random, the rat in the unsignaled condition could receive a shock at any
moment, or in other words, there were no discriminable periods of safety.
In contrast, in the signaled condition, periods of time when the tone was
absent were discriminable safe periods.

Unfortunately for my preferences, the experiments were all designed to
_prevent_ the rats from having any effect on the most obvious potential
controlled variable, the state of experiencing shocks. Since the Test can
be done only when successful control is occurring, we simply don't know
whether the animals would have controlled the duration or intensity of the
shocks had the means been available. I suppose we could infer that they
would, from experiments like Sidman's. But that is a different experiment
under different conditions.

See above. When rats can control the duration or intensity of the shocks,
they do, and they control them down to minimal levels. But this research
was not designed to evaluate that question, which by this time had already
been answered. It was designed first to evaluate whether rats would prefer
signaled over unsignaled shock, and in the first study, this evaluation was
done using both escapable shock (rats could immediately terminate shocks
when they occurred, in both the signaled and unsignaled conditions) and, in
a separate experiment, inescapable shock. When it was found that rats
preferred signaled shock even when the shock was unavoidable and
inescapable, a program of research was developed to identify what factor or
factors were responsible.

We might guess that the rats simply were unable to work out the fact that
giving up on the signalling would actually reduce their overall discomfort
from the shocks. That would be a conclusion requiring fairly sophisticated
reasoning. Their actual performance is consistent with my impression that
rats are not actually very smart.

Your analysis is inconsistent with the fact that the time spent in the
signaled condition decreased as the intensity of signaled shocks was
increased over that of unsignaled shocks. Preference for the signaled
condition declined as shocks there became relatively more intense.

Regards,

Bruce

27

[From Bruce Abbott (980318.1445 EST)]

Rick Marken (980316..2025) --

Bruce Abbott (980316.1955)

First, we already know that the rat is controlling for being in
the signaled rather than the unsignaled condition, because the
Test tells us that.

That's a pretty vague conclusion. Think about this in terms of
the coin game. What you have shown is equivalent to showing that
the subject in the coin game will repeatedly return the same
coins to their original position (the "signaled" condition) each
time they are moved to the same new position (the "unsignaled"
condition). . So you know that the subject is controlling
_something_ about the coins, just as you know that the rats are
controlling _something_ about the "unsignaled/signaled" condition.
This is better than knowing _nothing_ about what the subject is
controlling, but not much. This is where The Test really begins.

I agree, but you are overlooking practical matters. Let's say that I do as
you suggested in an earlier post, and disturb the relationship between the
signals and shocks. Disturbances move the position of the signal with
respect to shock, and I provide some means by which the rat can compensate,
bringing the signal to the rat's preferred relationship between signal and
shock. This is a great idea, except for the fact that the rat experiences
signals only briefly (5 seconds each). How does the rat connect with the
fact that its behavior is having an effect on the relationship between
signal and shock? Any influence its behavior is having would become
apparent only when signals and shocks occur, on average once every two
minutes. That's a long time for a rat to remember what it has done, and to
associate that doing with a change in relationship between signal and shock.

A much more practical approach is to have the rat repeatedly acting to
maintain itself in the signaled condition against disturbances, and then
parametrically vary the relationship between shock and signal. Less
preferred relationships will produce lower rates of changing into the
signaled condition following disturbances. I maintain that this approach
yields essentially the same information as the approach you suggested would
yield if the latter could be made to work.

For example, in you original experiment you found that rats
would press to get pattern 1 back to pattern 2.

1 (unsignaled) 2 (signaled)

* * * *
      * *

Now you try to find a new pattern 2 that rats will _not_ work
to change pattern 1 into. Lets say you find it's this:

                    2' (altered signaled)
                 * * *

Have you learned what it is about pattern 2 that the subject
was controlling? That's how much your procedure tells you
about what the rat was controlling for in the signaled condition.

How does this differ from what you would learn by vertically disturbing the
position of point 2 and finding that the participant always returned it to
its original position?

Regards,

Bruce

28

[From Bill Powers (980318.1043 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (980318.0955 EST)--

That rats will act so as to minimize shock intensity, duration, or frequency
is well established. Also, of direct relevance here, I evaluated whether
rats would change over from a schedule of higher shock frequency to one of
lower shock frequency (all shocks being unsignaled); they do. They will
also change from a schedule of longer-duration shocks to an otherwise
identical schedule of shorter-duration shocks.

And I suppose, from a schedule of higher-current shocks to one of
lower-current shocks.

You have a habit of reading and responding to each paragraph as you read it.
If you had taken the small trouble to read the whole post first, you could
have saved yourself some effort. I find it helpful to hear the whole
argument first before attempting to respond to it, rather than doing so
piecemeal.

Sorry, I probably need to be reminded more often than you do.

When I introduced the couple of experiments we've been discussing, I noted
that there was quite a bit more, which I would be happy to present if anyone
were interested. This series of studies began in the late 60s and continued
into the early 80s, in the course of which many implications of the various
hypotheses were experimentally evaluated. The proposal that repeatedly
stood up to test was the safety analysis. According to this view, rats
maintain themselves in the signaled condition because it is only in the
signaled condition that they receive discriminable periods during which
shock will not occur (i.e., periods of safety). Because shocks occurred at
random, the rat in the unsignaled condition could receive a shock at any
moment, or in other words, there were no discriminable periods of safety.
In contrast, in the signaled condition, periods of time when the tone was
absent were discriminable safe periods.

At the moment, you have me backed into a corner -- I can't find any further
grounds for disagreeing with your conclusions about "safety." Of course I
don't think that rats think in terms of such principles, but I can agree
that they appear to control for periods during which shocks are known not
to occur. This would appear to be a level of perception higher than that of
perceiving the shocks.

I guess I really do need to see reprints of your papers on this series of
experiments. I still have questions, but it would be better for me to do as
you say: read the whole thing before publishing my comments.

Best,

Bill P.

29

[From Chris Cherpas (980318.1317 PT)]

Bill Powers (980318.1043 MST) -- (replying to Bruce Abbott)

At the moment, you have me backed into a corner -- I can't find any further
grounds for disagreeing with your conclusions about "safety." Of course I
don't think that rats think in terms of such principles, but I can agree
that they appear to control for periods during which shocks are known not
to occur. This would appear to be a level of perception higher than that of
perceiving the shocks.

Compare driving down the average highway with being in a high-speed
chase -- obstacles frequently popping out of nowhere that you smash into and
which you can't ever learn to totally avoid. My point is that the Test has not
generally been conducted with organisms experiencing instrinsic error that is
so high, and stays so high, as in these operant arrangements. I don't think
you'll ever see that good of control in these later kinds of studies, because
you are always working against a background of unresolved intrinsic error.

Thus, you'll be lucky to get very finely tuned Testing here -- you'll see
groups of controlled perceptions that will vary together enough to see the
type of order evident in operant experiments, but with limited differentiation
out of the mix of controlled variables. The kind of stability seen in
these studies is still full of variabilty that would be expected from
unresolved instrinsic error. Pressing a bar is, in fact, something you can
manage to do in a chamber of shocks and food deprivation (up to a point),
but the basic operandum/measure doesn't provide a way to Test with the
sensitivity of a continuous tracking device. You can call the rate of
lever-pressing continuous, but the individual presses are not truly
exchangeable, as is evident in the many studies of inter-response time
distributions. Time is not a continuous measure of anything, it's a parameter.
There is a small set of studies in the operant literature on "continuous
repertoires," but these inspired little followed up.

Of course, we still don't have the "high stress" PCT studies that would
tell us about how organisms control perceptions under shock and high
deprivation, so it's not as if PCT gets off the hook here either.

Regards,
Ratso Rizo

30

[From Bruce Abbott (980318.2020 EST)]

Bill Powers (980318.1028 MST) --

I seem to have three Bruces and a Gregory mad at me. Must be some cultural
thing.

I certainly don't perceive myself to be mad at anyone, certainly not that
big huggy-bear that calls itself Bill Powers. Why do you think that when
somone disagrees with you, they are "mad at you"?

Bill Powers (980318.1043 MST) --

At the moment, you have me backed into a corner -- I can't find any further
grounds for disagreeing with your conclusions about "safety." Of course I
don't think that rats think in terms of such principles, but I can agree
that they appear to control for periods during which shocks are known not
to occur. This would appear to be a level of perception higher than that of
perceiving the shocks.

I don't think rats think in terms of principles like "safety" either. What
I think they do is associate a perception of a state of the apparatus (e.g.,
houselight on and no tone) with an absence of shock, and another perception
of a state of the apparatus (e.g., houselight off) with the possible
presence of shock, and choose the former over the latter.

But at this point I am more concerned about the adversarial tone of this
discussion. Do you really have to find something wrong with this technique
for determining what the rat is controlling for? That is how I read your
motivation. Is it not possible that it is a perfectly valid (if somewhat
indirect) way to accomplish what a direct application of the Test
accomplishes? As things have been going, it sound to me more like you
started with a negative conclusion and are now looking for ways to support
that view -- the Oxbridge Method, wasn't it?

Regards,

Bruce

31

Hi Bruce,

Consider carefully what you have said in your last two sentences. It sounds
like you are saying that a difference in the environment causes a
difference in preference.

You're right, I was being sloppy. Let me try again. A difference in
environment produces a difference in perceptions. However, the preference
for one perception over another is a property of the rat, not the
environment. But what is it the signaled condition offers, which the
unsignaled condition does not, that the rat controls for by changing to the
signaled condition? That is what the research was aimed toward identifying.

There are not too many differences in what you have observed. However,
since you haven't determined what the rat is perceiving that makes a
difference to it, you don't know how those observed differences make a
difference to the rat.

This is where we disagree. I (and my colleagues) have done quite a bit of
work to determine what the rat is perceiving that makes a difference to it.
As I noted in my response to Rick, there are practical matters that preclude
a straightforward application of the Test in this situation. The procedure
I used is less direct, but it does allow one to home in on the controlled
variable(s) through a process of elimination. We are still not all the way
there, but important possibilities have been ruled out, including the notion
that the rats are using the signal to do something to minimize their
perception of the shock's intensity.

Regards,

Bruce

32

[From Bill Powers (980319.0654 MST)]

Chris Cherpas (980318.1317 PT)--

My point is that the Test has not
generally been conducted with organisms experiencing instrinsic error

that is

so high, and stays so high, as in these operant arrangements. I don't think
you'll ever see that good of control in these later kinds of studies,

because

you are always working against a background of unresolved intrinsic error.

Good point about the reorganizing. The problem with experiments in which
chronic error is maintained is that reorganization may never stop. Based on
your comment, I would expect to see a large amount of scatter in Bruce A's
data.

Best,

Bill P.

33

[From Bill Powers (980319.0703 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (980318.2020 EST)--

I don't think rats think in terms of principles like "safety" either. What
I think they do is associate a perception of a state of the apparatus (e.g.,
houselight on and no tone) with an absence of shock, and another perception
of a state of the apparatus (e.g., houselight off) with the possible
presence of shock, and choose the former over the latter.

I don't know how you would establish "association" as real.

But at this point I am more concerned about the adversarial tone of this
discussion. Do you really have to find something wrong with this technique
for determining what the rat is controlling for? That is how I read your
motivation.

Yes, of course. When one proposes an explanation, using the Test or any
other method, the first step after that is to apply all that one knows or
can guess to show that the explanation is wrong. If one can't find anything
to contradict the explanation, even trying one's best, then the only choice
left is to accept it for the time being. That's how we arrive at
trustworthy data.

Is it not possible that it is a perfectly valid (if somewhat
indirect) way to accomplish what a direct application of the Test
accomplishes?

Certainly it's _possible_. Is "possibly valid" all you want out of a
scientific proposition? I prefer to be backed into a corner from which the
only exit I can see is to accept the proposition.

As things have been going, it sound to me more like you

started with a negative conclusion and are now looking for ways to support
that view -- the Oxbridge Method, wasn't it?

No, the Oxbridge method is, among other tactics, to make a proposal and
then try to prove it is right.

Best,

Bill P.

34

[From Bruce Abbott (980319.1220 EST)]

Bill Powers (980319.0703 MST) --

Bruce Abbott (980318.2020 EST)

I don't think rats think in terms of principles like "safety" either. What
I think they do is associate a perception of a state of the apparatus (e.g.,
houselight on and no tone) with an absence of shock, and another perception
of a state of the apparatus (e.g., houselight off) with the possible
presence of shock, and choose the former over the latter.

I don't know how you would establish "association" as real.

What comes to mind when I say "PCT"?

But at this point I am more concerned about the adversarial tone of this
discussion. Do you really have to find something wrong with this technique
for determining what the rat is controlling for? That is how I read your
motivation.

Yes, of course. When one proposes an explanation, using the Test or any
other method, the first step after that is to apply all that one knows or
can guess to show that the explanation is wrong. If one can't find anything
to contradict the explanation, even trying one's best, then the only choice
left is to accept it for the time being. That's how we arrive at
trustworthy data.

That sounds good on paper, but in practice it can become what you complain
so bitterly about when others (e.g., reviewers) do it to you. If one does
not wish to believe something, one can always find some reason to discount
it. But let some finding be announced that is exactly what one would expect
and hope to see, and it will be accepted without hesitation as solid proof.

Is it not possible that it is a perfectly valid (if somewhat
indirect) way to accomplish what a direct application of the Test
accomplishes?

Certainly it's _possible_. Is "possibly valid" all you want out of a
scientific proposition? I prefer to be backed into a corner from which the
only exit I can see is to accept the proposition.

That's not what I'm complaining about. As already noted, it is possible to
be so hostile to an idea that no evidence will be counted as satisfactory.
The problem is that we base our conclusions on data _and_ inference, and
with inference, we can never be completely sure of our conclusions. These
conclusions are simply our best guess given the available facts. In other
contexts (reviewers again) I have seen excellent studies picked apart, with
objection after objection being raised to show why the obvious simply can't
be concluded from the evidence, when in fact the objections were trivial and
easily handled by reference to internal controls or previous findings. The
problem was that the reviewer did not want to believe the data.

A problem with the present discussion is that its focus seems to have
shifted from an evaluation of the method to an evaluation of the
conclusions. I introduced this thread because in my opinion the method used
in this line of research, while not explicitly designed with PCT in mind,
can in fact be seen as employing the Test (the subjects were shown to
maintain themselves in the signaled condition against disturbances), but
using a somewhat different method from the standard one to evaluate
hypotheses as to what the rats were controlling for when changing from the
unsignaled to the signaled condition. I have a feeling that the current
diversion into conclusions represents an attempt to demonstrate that the
method does not achieve this end, by showing that certain alternatives have
not yet been ruled out. If so, it is an inappropriate mode of attack. One
should be able to evaluate the method logically, independently of any data
produced or conclusions drawn from its use. Rick uses an analogy to the
"coin game" (which I believe is a false analogy) to argue that the method
tells us essentially nothing about controlled variables. He also tells me
that you are just being polite by not coming right out and saying the same.
At present I just don't know what your real position is, or what your
arguments would be in this regard, but suspect that you are looking for
reasons to reject.

On the other hand, if you are really interested in evaluating the evidence
as to what rats are controlling for when they choose signaled over
unsignaled shock (and not just in "proving" that the data tell you nothing),
I'm certainly willing to provide whatever you need. From that perspective,
your questions and remarks about the evidence with respect to preparatory
responses have been excellent, and I think you've seen from my replies that
these issues have been thought about and experimental tests conducted to
resolve them.

Regards,

Bruce

35

[From Bruce Abbott (9803.1330 EST)]

Bill Powers (980319.0654 MST) to Chris Cherpas:

Good point about the reorganizing. The problem with experiments in which
chronic error is maintained is that reorganization may never stop. Based on
your comment, I would expect to see a large amount of scatter in Bruce A's
data.

The rats remained in each training or test phase until the time spent in the
alternate condition (or in the case of training, would have been spent
there) stabilized. Stability was considered achieved when the percent of
session time spent fell within a 10% range across three consecutive
sessions, and there was no strong trend evident in the points. Each phase
was replicated within-subjects at least once, and the replicated points
generally fell within the same range as those observed originally.

Observed behavioral output may fluctuate (sometimes dramatically) in these
tests, but I rather doubt that reorganization is the explanation. There are
many factors internal to the rat, not under the experimenter's control,
which may vary over sessions and affect the observed level of performance.
Given this, it is somewhat amazing that the observed performance is as
stable as it is.

By the way, this might be a good time to point out (for those who may not
know) that this is single-subject research; I am reporting the data for
individual subjects, not group means.

Regards,

Bruce

36

[From Bill Powers (980320,0237 MST)]

Spring!

Bruce Abbott (980319.1220 EST)--

I don't know how you would establish "association" as real.

What comes to mind when I say "PCT"?

That kind of "coming to mind" is a phenomenon that we _observe_. It's not
an explanation. Association is merely a name for it that adds no
understanding.

Yes, of course. When one proposes an explanation, using the Test or any
other method, the first step after that is to apply all that one knows or
can guess to show that the explanation is wrong. If one can't find anything
to contradict the explanation, even trying one's best, then the only choice
left is to accept it for the time being. That's how we arrive at
trustworthy data.

That sounds good on paper, but in practice it can become what you complain
so bitterly about when others (e.g., reviewers) do it to you. If one does
not wish to believe something, one can always find some reason to discount
it. But let some finding be announced that is exactly what one would expect
and hope to see, and it will be accepted without hesitation as solid proof.

It does sound good on paper, but I hope I actually practice this approach,
especially toward my own ideas, and that I don't base my acceptance or
rejection of an idea simply on whether I wish to believe it or not.
Sometimes I do, of course, but when I notice, or am notified, that I am
letting belief play too large a role, I try to reconsider and stop doing that.

My bitter complaint about reviewers is that they react to having their toes
stepped on instead of dealing with the propositions at hand, which by and
large they fail even to grasp.

Is it not possible that it is a perfectly valid (if somewhat
indirect) way to accomplish what a direct application of the Test
accomplishes?

Yes, and it's not the first time I have seen people unconsciously using the
Test. But I have to ask you -- at the time you did these experiments, from
the 60's to the 80's, how did you interpret your findings? Did you say to
yourself, "Ah, now we understand a little better what the rat is
controlling"? Did you tell yourself, and your colleagues, that your
experimental manipulations were disturbing perceptions that were important
to the rat, and that the rat's actions represented its attempt to
counteract the effects of these disturbances? Did you work out the
correspondence between the disturbances and the actions, so you could see
how the disturbance tended to alter the controlled variable, while the
action tended to oppose those alterations?

I introduced this thread because in my opinion the method used
in this line of research, while not explicitly designed with PCT in mind,
can in fact be seen as employing the Test (the subjects were shown to
maintain themselves in the signaled condition against disturbances), but
using a somewhat different method from the standard one to evaluate
hypotheses as to what the rats were controlling for when changing from the
unsignaled to the signaled condition. I have a feeling that the current
diversion into conclusions represents an attempt to demonstrate that the
method does not achieve this end, by showing that certain alternatives have
not yet been ruled out.

...

On the other hand, if you are really interested in evaluating the evidence
as to what rats are controlling for when they choose signaled over
unsignaled shock (and not just in "proving" that the data tell you nothing),
I'm certainly willing to provide whatever you need. From that perspective,
your questions and remarks about the evidence with respect to preparatory
responses have been excellent, and I think you've seen from my replies that
these issues have been thought about and experimental tests conducted to
resolve them.

What bothers me about this exchange is that to you, the whole point seems
to be whether you anticipated the Test and were using it. To me, the Test
is part and parcel of control theory, and without control theory it would
be nothing more than a ritual. The entire logic of the Test is based on
finding out whether the system you're looking at displays the properties of
a control system. Without that concept behind the procedures, doing the
Test would make no sense. It would be like dipping a piece of litmus paper
into a solution and writing down "blue" or "red", but without having any
conception of pH.

So unless you're telling me that you were exploring the properties of a rat
as an autonomous control system, I am not impressed by any resemblance of
your methods to the Test. And not being impressed by that, my attention
naturally turns to looking for loopholes in your explanations -- what you
call a "diversion into conclusions" is the only remaining relevant topic.

On the other hand, if you ARE telling me you had anticipated control theory
five or ten years after I had first published the bases of PCT, we can
discuss that. It would then be pertinent to ask what the underlying
theoretical structure was, in your mind, as you did those experiments. Did
you see the rat's actions as its means of controlling its experiences in
the experimental situation? Or were you thinking in terms of some other
explanatory scheme?

Best,

Bill P.

37

[From Bruce Abbott (980320.1530 EST)]

Bill Powers (980320,0237 MST) --

Spring!

Not here -- we've had warm weather all February and part of March, but now
the temp is dropping and it's getting ready to snow.

Bruce Abbott (980319.1220 EST)

I don't know how you would establish "association" as real.

What comes to mind when I say "PCT"?

That kind of "coming to mind" is a phenomenon that we _observe_. It's not
an explanation.

You didn't ask for an explanation. You asked how I would establish
"association" as real. So it's a phenomenon that we _observe_ (in our own
perceptions, no less) but that doesn't establish it as real. Just what
evidence would you require?

Association is merely a name for it that adds no understanding.

I wasn't asked for understanding, was asked for proof that it exists. The
name is merely a convenient handle by which to refer to this phenomenon we
are talking about. Control is also merely a name for a phenomenon and adds
no understanding. Perhaps we should stop using it, lest we fall into the
trap of reification.

That sounds good on paper, but in practice it can become what you complain
so bitterly about when others (e.g., reviewers) do it to you. If one does
not wish to believe something, one can always find some reason to discount
it. But let some finding be announced that is exactly what one would expect
and hope to see, and it will be accepted without hesitation as solid proof.

It does sound good on paper, but I hope I actually practice this approach,
especially toward my own ideas, and that I don't base my acceptance or
rejection of an idea simply on whether I wish to believe it or not.
Sometimes I do, of course, but when I notice, or am notified, that I am
letting belief play too large a role, I try to reconsider and stop doing that.

Consider yourself notified.

Is it not possible that it is a perfectly valid (if somewhat
indirect) way to accomplish what a direct application of the Test
accomplishes?

Yes, and it's not the first time I have seen people unconsciously using the
Test. But I have to ask you -- at the time you did these experiments, from
the 60's to the 80's, how did you interpret your findings? Did you say to
yourself, "Ah, now we understand a little better what the rat is
controlling"?

No, I said to myself, ah, now we understand a little better what it is about
the signaled (compared to the signaled condition) that the rat prefers.

Did you tell yourself, and your colleagues, that your
experimental manipulations were disturbing perceptions that were important
to the rat, and that the rat's actions represented its attempt to
counteract the effects of these disturbances? Did you work out the
correspondence between the disturbances and the actions, so you could see
how the disturbance tended to alter the controlled variable, while the
action tended to oppose those alterations?

As I noted in an earlier post to Rick, there are practical reasons why the
traditional Test procedure would be unlikely to work in this situation. The
procedure adopted provides a workable alternative.

What bothers me about this exchange is that to you, the whole point seems
to be whether you anticipated the Test and were using it. To me, the Test
is part and parcel of control theory, and without control theory it would
be nothing more than a ritual. The entire logic of the Test is based on
finding out whether the system you're looking at displays the properties of
a control system. Without that concept behind the procedures, doing the
Test would make no sense. It would be like dipping a piece of litmus paper
into a solution and writing down "blue" or "red", but without having any
conception of pH.

First, I should note that I did not develop the procedure, which was already
in use in Pete Badia's lab when I arrived there as a graduate student. And
Badia was simply adapting procedures already in use to measure preference.
To measure preference, you familiarize the subject with the options to be
presented and then give him or her or it control over which option will be
experienced. The options are chosen so as to allow the investigator to
deduce what differences between the options are the basis of the preference.

Of course, we were doing this investigation from a different perspective: we
were attempting to identify what the reinforcer(s) is/are for for changing
from the unsignaled to the signaled shock condition. But nevermind that;
the results can be _interpreted_ within the framework of control theory, and
made to yield significant evidence as to what the rats were actively
controlling. You say:

What bothers me about this exchange is that to you, the whole point seems
to be whether you anticipated the Test and were using it.

What bothers you about this exchange is that you think that this is the
point of it. But here is what I said:

I introduced this thread because in my opinion the method used
in this line of research, while not explicitly designed with PCT in mind,
can in fact be seen as employing the Test (the subjects were shown to
maintain themselves in the signaled condition against disturbances), but
using a somewhat different method from the standard one to evaluate
hypotheses as to what the rats were controlling for when changing from the
unsignaled to the signaled condition.

If you will read the above carefully, you will see that my claim is not that
I had anticipated the Test, but that it can be seen, in hindsight, that this
procedure did employ the Test, although in a somewhat different way than
usual, to discover what it is about the signaled versus unsignaled
conditions that the rats were controlling for. I think you'd have to be up
to your eyeballs in denial not to see the truth of that statement.

So unless you're telling me that you were exploring the properties of a rat
as an autonomous control system, I am not impressed by any resemblance of
your methods to the Test.

So, according to you, unless the study was explicitly designed with control
theory in mind, its methods are not worth examining, even though they
provide a perfectly valid way to identify what perceptions are under
control. Really, Bill, you're doing an absolutely convincing simulation of
closed-mindedness.

[Aside to Bruce Gregory: How's this one for smug pain-in-the-assesness?
Have I outdone myself?]

Regards,

Bruce

38

[From Bill Powers (980321.0220 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (980320.1530 EST)--

That kind of "coming to mind" is a phenomenon that we _observe_. It's not
an explanation.

You didn't ask for an explanation. You asked how I would establish
"association" as real. So it's a phenomenon that we _observe_ (in our own
perceptions, no less) but that doesn't establish it as real. Just what
evidence would you require?

When I say "real," I guess I automatically include some sort of explanation
in my expectations. In a description of what a control system does, we say
that output effects on some variable are equal and opposite to disturbance
effects on the same variable. That describes what we have to explain. The
theory of control, with its input, comparison, and output functions and all
that, is the explanation of what we observe. When all we have is the
description, there's no way to show that we're describing something real.
It's the theory that helps us believe that we're not dealing with an
illusion. For example, before Newton, the behavior of falling objects was
described as objects seeking the earth, rather than as a mutual
acceleration. All descriptions, in one way or another, imply some
underlying theory. What I mean by "real" is a description that implies
testable theories. "Association" doesn't yet have that meaning for me.

Association is merely a name for it that adds no understanding.

I wasn't asked for understanding, was asked for proof that it exists. The
name is merely a convenient handle by which to refer to this phenomenon we
are talking about. Control is also merely a name for a phenomenon and adds
no understanding. Perhaps we should stop using it, lest we fall into the
trap of reification.

If the term "control" did not have some sort of testable theory behind it,
I would agree with your recommendation.

It does sound good on paper, but I hope I actually practice this approach,
especially toward my own ideas, and that I don't base my acceptance or
rejection of an idea simply on whether I wish to believe it or not.
Sometimes I do, of course, but when I notice, or am notified, that I am
letting belief play too large a role, I try to reconsider and stop doing

that.

Consider yourself notified.

Be a little more specific, please.

Did you say to
yourself, "Ah, now we understand a little better what the rat is
controlling"?

No, I said to myself, ah, now we understand a little better what it is about
the signaled (compared to the signaled condition) that the rat prefers.

I don't understand (yet) how you tested your idea that "safety" was the
aspect of the signaled condition that the rat preferred. Would you explain
that?

First, I should note that I did not develop the procedure, which was already
in use in Pete Badia's lab when I arrived there as a graduate student. And
Badia was simply adapting procedures already in use to measure preference.
To measure preference, you familiarize the subject with the options to be
presented and then give him or her or it control over which option will be
experienced. The options are chosen so as to allow the investigator to
deduce what differences between the options are the basis of the preference.

I'm curious about how this kind of measurement was really described to the
young green Bruce Abbott by his mentor. Did Pete really say "the subject is
given control over which option will be experienced?" You seem to imply
otherwise:

Of course, we were doing this investigation from a different perspective: we
were attempting to identify what the reinforcer(s) is/are for for changing
from the unsignaled to the signaled shock condition. But nevermind that;
the results can be _interpreted_ within the framework of control theory, and
made to yield significant evidence as to what the rats were actively
controlling.

Maybe you shouldn't interpret the results within the framework of control
theory. Maybe the right interpretation is that the occurrance of the
reinforcers maintained the behavior that produced the signaled shock
condition. How could you choose which interpretation to use?

What bothers me about this exchange is that to you, the whole point seems
to be whether you anticipated the Test and were using it.

What bothers you about this exchange is that you think that this is the
point of it. But here is what I said:

I introduced this thread because in my opinion the method used
in this line of research, while not explicitly designed with PCT in mind,
can in fact be seen as employing the Test (the subjects were shown to
maintain themselves in the signaled condition against disturbances), but
using a somewhat different method from the standard one to evaluate
hypotheses as to what the rats were controlling for when changing from the
unsignaled to the signaled condition.

That's what I said: the point as you just described it is that the method
used could be seen as employing the Test. Why would you want to see it that
way, when the method of systematic disturbances and measurement of effects
on a hypothesized controlled variable was not used, and the conclusion was
clearly not that subjects maintained themselves in the signaled condition
against disturbances? I presume that Badia's conclusion was that the
signaled condition was a reinforcer that maintained the behavior that
produced it. That is not a conclusion that can be verified or refuted by
using the Test.

If you will read the above carefully, you will see that my claim is not that
I had anticipated the Test, but that it can be seen, in hindsight, that this
procedure did employ the Test, although in a somewhat different way than
usual, to discover what it is about the signaled versus unsignaled
conditions that the rats were controlling for. I think you'd have to be up
to your eyeballs in denial not to see the truth of that statement.

Is "being in denial" different from just "denying?"

But perhaps you can help me understand the truth of what you say. In the
Test, some of the main steps are:

1. Determine the effect of the disturbance on the proposed controlled
variable when the action of the system does not affect it

2. Determine the effect of the disturbance with the loop closed.

3. Compute the ratio of the two effects of the disturbance, 1 and 2 above.
Show that with the loop closed, the effect of the disturbance is
significantly less than it is with the loop open.

If Badia's procedure is equivalent to these steps, you should be able to
show me the parallels.

Best,

Bill P.

39

[From Rick Marken (980325.2230)]

Chris Cherpas (980320.1935 PT) to Bruce Abbott (980320.2005 EST)--

A great post, Chris! Bravo.

It's been a rough week, what with Bruce A.'s continuing chant of
"I've been doing the Test all along" and the unfortunate (but
hopefully brief) return of Hans Blom. But your post was a breath
of fresh air. Thanks!

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/