# Neurological research

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/neurological-research/7561>\
**Category:** CSG1992\
**Created:** [December 15, 1992, 3:31am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/neurological-research/7561 "1992-12-15T03:31:04Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_John\_Gabriel](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/5f8ce5/32.png) [@\_John\_Gabriel](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_John_Gabriel)\
**Post date:** [December 15, 1992, 3:31am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/neurological-research/7561/1 "1992-12-15T03:31:04Z")

</div>

[Gabriel 921214 20:55 CST]  
(Powers same date)

> Remember, mainframe software was not  
> made to serve people; people were made to serve mainframe  
> software.

Agreed. Missing feedback 3 terminal controller some place. Gang of  
3 busy in search of same. Finding an awful lot of lesions in  
corporate consciousness. Seriously Bill, you and I agree too often for  
it to be possible for us to disagree on fundamentals. Small  
unweighted Hamming Distance. But weights are perhaps large for  
Aristotelian attributes where we disagree. Seems to me this should  
be called strong but isolated disagreement. Delta functions at  
a few isolated bits integrate up to significant heat at times,  
but not large distance all the same.

> Your point about using information about the brain is a good one.  
> I did a good deal of that in writing BCP. In fact when I went to  
> work at the VA Research Hospital in Chicago, I was full of  
> ambitions, with the Northwestern University Medical School (and  
> library) right across the street. I thought good, I can just go  
> through all the neurological literature and look up what the  
> various parts of the brain do, and build the model around that. I  
> was soon disillusioned.

Perhaps it really is true that the real world is just very complicated  
and the great simplifying principles only go so far in the face of  
a channel where we still have less than perhaps 1 millionth or one  
billionth of the complete system specification. But that in no way  
diminishes the significance of the simplifying principles. Without  
them, we would even more badly drowned in data we don't understand.

> As you say, brain researchers have found a good deal of  
> interesting material without using PCT, more in recent years with  
> improvements of technology. The problem is not with the  
> technology, however. It's with the concepts of behavior against  
> which neurological findings are compared.

Fundamental truth. Without a good abstraction, you just have a  
pile of unorganised data. Without a taxonomy you can't even  
begin to communicate about the attempt to abstract. Linnaeus  
done good!! Hugh Dingle, who taught my wife her courses in  
ecology and animal behaviour used to talk about the field  
naturalist phase of scientific theories.

> When you stop to think about it, neurological findings are ALWAYS  
> based on SOME theory of behavior. Without any theory of behavior,  
> all you have is a record of lesions in various parts of the brain  
> and some recordings of spikes and potentials from electrodes in  
> anatomically, but not functionally, known areas. You see the  
> theory of behavior not in the findings about the brain, but in  
> the descriptions of external correlates of brain activity.

This is what I might call the "Symmetry Theory" that we don't  
have yet. The meta-Gestalt of neuroanatomy.

> "Naturally, the lesion method can only be as good as the finest  
> level of cognitive characterization and anatomical resolution it  
> uses. In other words, the method's yield is limited by:  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;1. The sophistication of the neurophysiological testing or  
> experimentation with which anatomical lesions are correlated.  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;2. The sophistication of the theoretical constructs and  
> hypotheses being tested by the lesion probes.  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;3. The degree of sophistication with which the nervous tissue  
> is conceptualized ... 4. The anatomical resolution of the methods used." (p.  
> 9)

At risk of igniting burned out flames, some place in the first few  
pages of one or another of H. Weyl's books on Group Theory he says  
"All the real work is down in the mud and the blood."

> From a modeler's point of view, the sophistication of  
> neurophysiological testing and experimentation is not very high.  
> In fact, evaluations of what is wrong with the behavior of a  
> person with a brain lesion tends to rely on subjective and rather  
> crude classification of symptoms rather than models of brain  
> function.

A rather good description of the work of a field natural historian.  
The fact that clinical medicine a) can sometimes fix what hurts,  
and b) probably has the world's biggest collection of incompletely  
correlated facts within its' collective perspective, does not  
make it a mature science. I suppose I'm both fortunate and unfortunate  
in being inclined towards mathematics and physics. The physics at  
least is perhaps closer to being a worked out vein of gold. The  
mathematicians can take comfort however in being always incomplete.

> 

................................

> And so on and so on. What's going on is nothing more than an  
> informal assessment of superficial aspects of behavior to see if  
> the patient can do all the things that normal people do, and in  
> the familiar way. An atmosphere of formality is generated by  
> using Latin terms -- alexia for inability to read, prosopagnosia  
> say that the person "has" alexia, "has" prosopagnosia, etc.  
> ..........................

But professional jargon has a useful place besides telling those  
who don't have union cards to stay out of the discussion - an  
instruction eliciting hostility from all of us factual omnivores.  
It conjures up to those "in the know" a very large card index of  
shared experience. And when a really neat theory like PCT  
satisfactorily abstracts part, but not all of that card index,  
the owners of the card index find their livelihoods threatened.  
If you can abstract all of the index then you win the pot, and  
the previous owners of the intellectual territory are eventually  
unemployed. But, as the historians of science point out, only  
after the generation holding both the card index and the levers  
of power have all died or retired. The ecological purpose of  
intellectual warfare. Some time appropriate around April 1st,  
I'll publish on the net a taxonomy of academia invented by an old  
friend whom I have not seen for almost 40 years - Margaret di Menna,  
who originated the classification the day after the party to celebrate  
her Ph. D. If there are any readers out there in Kiwiland who know  
her, please say the taxonomy is still in use.

> ..........................  
> Such reports of what's wrong are analogous to the report a  
> technologically naive person makes to an auto mechanic: "it makes  
> a funny noise sometimes; it pulls to the left; the acceleration  
> is sluggish above 30 miles per hour; the steering wheel shakes."  
> When the mechanic sets out to fix the problem, he doesn't look  
> for a funny noise or a pull to the left or a center of  
> sluggishness or a steering-wheel shake. Those are just the  
> symptoms, outcomes, consequences. The mechanic understands how  
> the car works, so he looks for a hole in the exhaust pipe, a  
> tight wheel bearing, a malfunctioning carburetor, or anunbalanced tire. He  
> doesn't say, "Oh, you car has odd-noisia, or  
> dextromobilia, or accelerotardia, or manipulo-oscillia" and go  
> look up the recommended treatment in a big thick book. He reasons  
> out what might underlie the symptoms on the basis of the theory  
> of operation of an automobile, and that theory tells him what is  
> REALLY wrong with the car. That's what a good theory of behavior  
> does for you, when it's tied to the actual functions of the  
> device. It lets you reason your way to the layers of organization  
> that underly superficial symptoms.

Bill, I think it's sometimes hard to distinguish between a malfunctioning  
carburettor, and accelerotardia if you don't know what a carburettor  
is. And the problem is very difficult when the mechanic is still  
trying to articulate what a carburettor is, but in trade school jargon,  
not neurophysiological jargon.

Your previous paragraph is going to come back to haunt you the next time  
you complain about triangulation in Kanerva spaces.

Bill, I think I've pulled your leg hard enough so I should stop before  
exceeding the elastic limit so far that a perceptual feedback circuit  
causes you to seize a 2x4 and beat me around the head.

But all in fun, and I hope in a good cause. Perhaps I should publish  
the taxonomy on Jan 1st. CSGNET is the most wonderful colony of  
boffins I've ever had the privelege of associating with, and between  
us perhaps one day we'll predate on the buzzards who review papers  
submitted to the trade union journals.

Tom Baines has an interesting theory of the origins of revolutions  
- like the 1917 Soviet one, rather than the scientific variety. But I  
am inclined to think it holds for the scientific ones too. I don't  
remember whether my comment about the bloodless wars in academia was  
made on-line or off-line. But just like the chicken run, it's hell  
being at the bottom of the pecking order. Scientific territory is just  
as subject to ambition and militarism as any other kind. Only the  
dictators have no guns and no police force, just the threat of no  
tenure.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sincerely, and with affection for all my fellow boffins.  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sic Itur ad Astra, and nil Bastardio Carborundum.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;John Gabriel

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [December 14, 1992, 10:53pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/neurological-research/7561/2 "1992-12-14T22:53:32Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (921214.1045)]

Mark Olson (921214.1010) --

You may have less frustration in sending if you set your right  
margin to 65 and be sure you have a hard carriage return at the  
end of each line. If you send a long string without a return you  
can overrun a buffer in your mainframe, which will cause the  
transmission to be rejected. Remember, mainframe software was not  
made to serve people; people were made to serve mainframe  
software.

> **···**
>
> -------------------------------------------------------  
> Your point about using information about the brain is a good one.  
> I did a good deal of that in writing BCP. In fact when I went to  
> work at the VA Research Hospital in Chicago, I was full of  
> ambitions, with the Northwestern University Medical School (and  
> library) right across the street. I thought good, I can just go  
> through all the neurological literature and look up what the  
> various parts of the brain do, and build the model around that. I  
> was soon disillusioned. Maybe the information was there  
> somewhere, but if so it was like a card index that someone had  
> dumped on the floor, stirred, and put back at random. You'll find  
> some neurological references in BCP, but not nearly as many of  
> them as I had hoped to accumulate. I did make a note about Hubel  
> and Weisel. Basically, however, my ambitious neurological project  
> was a bust.
> 
> As you say, brain researchers have found a good deal of  
> interesting material without using PCT, more in recent years with  
> improvements of technology. The problem is not with the  
> technology, however. It's with the concepts of behavior against  
> which neurological findings are compared.
> 
> When you stop to think about it, neurological findings are ALWAYS  
> based on SOME theory of behavior. Without any theory of behavior,  
> all you have is a record of lesions in various parts of the brain  
> and some recordings of spikes and potentials from electrodes in  
> anatomically, but not functionally, known areas. You see the  
> theory of behavior not in the findings about the brain, but in  
> the descriptions of external correlates of brain activity.
> 
> This problem has not escaped brain researchers. Mary brought home  
> a book on lesion research recently: Damasio, H. & Damasio, A. R.;  
> \_Lesion Analysis in Neurophysiology\_ (New York: Oxford University  
> Press,1989). In the introduction, D&D say
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;"Naturally, the lesion method can only be as good as the finest  
> level of cognitive characterization and anatomical resolution it  
> uses. In other words, the method's yield is limited by:  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;1. The sophistication of the neurophysiological testing or  
> experimentation with which anatomical lesions are correlated.  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2. The sophistication of the theoretical constructs and  
> hypotheses being tested by the lesion probes.  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;3. The degree of sophistication with which the nervous tissue  
> is conceptualized ... 4. The anatomical resolution of the methods used." (p.  
> 9)
> 
> > From a modeler's point of view, the sophistication of
> 
> neurophysiological testing and experimentation is not very high.  
> In fact, evaluations of what is wrong with the behavior of a  
> person with a brain lesion tends to rely on subjective and rather  
> crude classification of symptoms rather than models of brain  
> function.
> 
> A large part of testing for neurological deficits consists of  
> presenting stimuli to patients and recording how they respond. If  
> you hold up a card with a picture, or point to an object, can the  
> subject utter its name? If you tell the subject to point to your  
> finger, then the subject's own nose, then the finger again and so  
> forth, do the movements seem normal, and are the end-points  
> accurately located? Do the movements seem retarded or uneven? Are  
> there tremors or oscillations? Can the patient repeat back a  
> spoken sentence, read a written sentence, follow spoken or  
> written directions to do something? Can the subject name colors  
> correctly, in all parts of the visual field? Can the patient  
> speak the correct name of a seen person? Can the patient sing  
> when so commanded? Is reading speed impaired? Is grammar correct?  
> Can the patient understand and/or generate sentences of normal  
> length? In general, is the response competent and appropriate to  
> the stimulus?
> 
> And so on and so on. What's going on is nothing more than an  
> informal assessment of superficial aspects of behavior to see if  
> the patient can do all the things that normal people do, and in  
> the familiar way. An atmosphere of formality is generated by  
> using Latin terms -- alexia for inability to read, prosopagnosia  
> for inability to recognize persons, constructional apraxia for  
> inability to make well-formed sentences (I think). If you strip  
> away the Latin, what you have left is just a subjective  
> description of what the person can't accomplish that normal  
> people can. The main thing the Latin terms do is to allow you to  
> say that the person "has" alexia, "has" prosopagnosia, etc.
> 
> These deficits give some clues as to what various parts of the  
> brain accomplish. But they don't tell us what those parts of the  
> brain DO -- that is, what functions are carried out in these  
> particular networks that normally result in the externally  
> visible consequences that we call reading, pointing, naming, and  
> so forth.
> 
> Such reports of what's wrong are analogous to the report a  
> technologically naive person makes to an auto mechanic: "it makes  
> a funny noise sometimes; it pulls to the left; the acceleration  
> is sluggish above 30 miles per hour; the steering wheel shakes."  
> When the mechanic sets out to fix the problem, he doesn't look  
> for a funny noise or a pull to the left or a center of  
> sluggishness or a steering-wheel shake. Those are just the  
> symptoms, outcomes, consequences. The mechanic understands how  
> the car works, so he looks for a hole in the exhaust pipe, a  
> tight wheel bearing, a malfunctioning carburetor, or anunbalanced tire. He  
> doesn't say, "Oh, you car has odd-noisia, or  
> dextromobilia, or accelerotardia, or manipulo-oscillia" and go  
> look up the recommended treatment in a big thick book. He reasons  
> out what might underlie the symptoms on the basis of the theory  
> of operation of an automobile, and that theory tells him what is  
> REALLY wrong with the car. That's what a good theory of behavior  
> does for you, when it's tied to the actual functions of the  
> device. It lets you reason your way to the layers of organization  
> that underly superficial symptoms.
> 
> Even the interpretation of neural connections themselves is  
> conditioned by the background theory:
> 
> "In the new approach, subjects' behavioral responses are not just  
> linked to the stimuli that eventually triggered them, but are  
> connected to mind processes and representations that handled the  
> stimulus and generated the responses according to some mechanism.  
> The investigations no longer shy away from formulating hypotheses  
> about those mechanisms and attempting to test their validity,  
> indirectly, by measuring external responses." (p. 14).
> 
> The brain is a maze of connections. If you are under the  
> impression that stimuli cause responses, you will select a path  
> through this maze that connects inputs to outputs, and ignore all  
> other connections (even while noting, in passing, that they  
> exist). You'll stick an electrode somewhere the in the middle of  
> this network and present a stimulus to the senses and look for a  
> response from the electrode. Then you'll try to stimulate that  
> spot and see what response results. If you get a response you'll  
> say that you've traced out an S-R path from input to output. If a  
> reference signal entered into this path somewhere, you'd never  
> find it.
> 
> There's no way NOT to apply a model when you're doing brain  
> research. The normal accepted model is an S-R model. This way of  
> thinking about behavior limits what brain research can discover  
> -- or at least which of its discoveries it can purport to make  
> some sense of.
> 
> A neurologist who understood PCT would do different kinds of  
> investigations and see different meanings in the findings. Most  
> certainly, such an investigator would use different methods of  
> assessing deficits. The investigator would be trying to find out  
> not just what this person can control and can't control, but how  
> the parameters of control have changed from those shown in normal  
> people. Quantitative experiments would replace informal  
> subjective classifications of symptoms. Perception and action  
> would not be considered separately, but as a closed-loop system.  
> The whole approach to diagnosis would change. Instead of just  
> going through lists of behaviors that a normal person should be  
> able to produce, the researcher would be building up a picture of  
> the functions that enable such superficially-observable behaviors  
> to be seen. The specific quantitative deficits would point to  
> specific underlying brain functions like perception, comparison,  
> and output that would produce such symptoms if operating in a  
> particular defective way.  
> I think that PCT would revolutionize neuropsychological research.  
> -----------------------------------------------  
> Best,
> 
> Bill P.
