[New post] Translating Predictive Coding Into Perceptual Control

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.27.23.03]

···

This is getting almost as weird as the
curvature discussion. I don’t know who is on which side of Alice’s
Looking Glass any more. I asked why it is that whenever I say I
agree with you, you insist that I don’t, and you tun that around
into my getting upset when you say you don’t agree with me. Anyone
who read the thread so far will understand the difference between
those two concepts.

  As for this "disturbance causes output" and Bill's message, Bill

mistakenly thought that by “disturbance” I meant "causes of
disturbance, which are permanently unknowable and irrelevant.

  Can you seriously contend that when a disturbance changes the

variable you call the controlled environmental variable, the
output does not change to compensate? That seems to be what you
are insisting today. What you will insist tomorrow is anyone’s
guess, but I really wonder what kind of control would happen if
the output did not change to compensate for changes in the
disturbance.

  Finally, about "information from the disturbance", you have never

understood that information analysis is a generalization of
variance analysis, which you have no qualms about using. For my
part, I have never understood what so horrifies you about that
simple mathematical fact. The point is and always was very simple.
The disturbance and the output are highly correlated negatively,
the disturbance and the perception have a very small correlation.
The reference and the perception are highly correlated. Those are
fine statements when the variables have a Gaussian probability
distribution, not when their distributions are far from Gaussian.
They don’t work very well, for example, when the disturbance or
the reference makes irregular step changes among a small number of
possibilities.

  All of those statements have precise equivalent in

informational/uncertainty terms: The disturbance and the output
have low mutual uncertainty (high mutual information relative to
their individual uncertainties), the disturbance and the
perception have low mutual information, and the reference and
perception have low mutual uncertainty. When all the variables
have a Gaussian (Normal) distribution, the variance and
informational ways of reporting the relationships are exact
synonyms. Numerically they differ by a single fixed constant whose
value I am not bothering to look up right now. The
information.uncertainty statements remain valid no matter whatever
the distributions of the variables.

  What's so hard about that? It seems to me preferable to use

statements and mathematics that remain valid over statements that
are their direct equivalents but that are restricted to one kind
of probability distribution.

  But I don't suppose you have any better answer than you had at the

time, just to repeat over and over that “there is no information
from the disturbance in the output”, in the same way as in the
curvature discussion you insisted that because the velocity
formula was the same in two equations, the velocity value is also
identical in the two equations, when ANY velocity could be plugged
into one of the equations leaving the equation still true. You
never once made any apparent effort to show how your many critic
were wrong in their demonstrations and analyses. All you did was
repeat “I’m right and you are wrong, and moreover you don’t
understand PCT.”

  Maths was never your strong point, which is no problem, until you

persist in asserting the truth of some idea that got into your
head based on a faulty mathematical analysis, long after the error
has been demonstrated to you in a variety of ways.

  As I said up front, I have lost interest in this thread because of

the way meanings have been weirdly twisted and distorted into
unrecognizable forms recently. If you wish to comment seriously on
the relationship or lack thereof between PCT and Free
Energy/Predictive Coding, and I find your comment sensible, I may
contribute further to the thread, but I am not prepared to
continue trying to follow the tortuous and tortured ways you find
to prove that I disagree with you when I say that I agree with
what you write.

  Martin

[Rick Marken 2019-03-27_15:19:12]

[Martin Taylor 2019 03 26.22 55]

          MT: Second: What makes you think I control a perception of

my level of agreement with you?

        RM: Because when I didn't agree with you you got very

upset; my lack of agreement was clearly a disturbance to a
perception you were controlling that could be called “Rick’s
level of agreement with me”.Â

          MT: I don't. I do control for

supporting what I consider to be correctly stated,

        RM: If that were true then you wouldn't care whether or

not I agreed with you.

          MT: I have no idea why or when you got into your head the

idea that i think or ever thought that “the disturbance
causes the output”…

        RM: From all the "information in the disturbance is the

basis of output" discussions on CSGNet. And just recently
you said that a change in the disturbance leads to a change
in output.

          MT: So far as I can remember, the

first time I heard this idea “disturbance causes the
output” applied to me (and to Bruce Abbott) was when we
showed you the glaring error in your mathematical argument
in your curvature analysis.

        RM: You'e been consistently arguing that the disturbance

causes output from the time you got on the net. I have
copied to the end of this message a post from Bill Powers to
you from 1996. It’s worth reading the whole thing since it
not only shows what Bill thought of your ideas about the
role of the disturbance relative to that of the output of a
control system but it also shows what Bill thought of your
style of argument.

Â

          MT: Why did I call you "an enemy of

PCT"? By not withdrawing that curvature paper, you laid
open to a wider audience the suspicion that PCT research
is done by people not long out of mathematical
kindergarten, a situation not likely to induce people to
learn more about its power and beauty.

        RM: Well, of course, I should have withdrawn my

published, peer reviewed paper when you told me too and when
I didn’t the only appropriate thing to do was to call me the
“enemy of PCT”.Â

Â

          MT: By allowing the paper to stand

and neither withdrawing it before publication nor
retracting it afterwards, and even continuing later to
claim that the paper presented a PCT explanation of the
curvature power-law effect, you did act like an enemy of
PCT.

        RM: Funny, I thought it was your mathematical

“explanation” (or justification) of the power law was
completely irrelevant to a PCT explanation of the power
law. Â

        RM: But enough of this. Here's Bill's post. Knowing you,

I’m sure you will be able to spin it as the highest of
praise for your genius. God I wish he were still here.

Best

Rick

 =========

        Date:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â  Tue, 18 Jun

1996 01:01:43 -0600

                  Reply-To: "Control

Systems Group Network (CSGnet)"

        Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â  <CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU>

                  Sender: "Control

Systems Group Network (CSGnet)"

        Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â  <CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU>

                  From: "William T.

Powers" POWERS_W@FORTLEWIS.EDU

                  Subject:Â Â Â Â Â  Re:

information blah blah perception blah blah disturbance
blah…

                  To: Multiple

recipients of list CSGNET

        Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â  <CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU>

[From Bill Powers (960617.1500 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 960617 15:45 –

          What was said in 1992 seems to be mostly a matter of

what you now think

          were your most important points then, and thus what you

select from the

          stream of communications to show that you were right

all along. One

          great difficulty is that your arguments then did not

impress me any more

          than they do now, yet you cite them as if they settled

the matter once

          and for all -- and as if I had agreed that they did.

Let’s just look at

a few of them.

          Â Â Â Â  In fact, [the discussion] arose out of my 921218

analysis of the

    informational basis of PCT:

          Â Â Â Â  "The central theme of PCT is that a perception in

an ECS should be

          Â Â Â Â  maintained as close as possible to a reference

value. In other

          Â Â Â Â  words, the information provided by the perception,

given knowledge

    of the reference, should be as low as possible."

          This is not and never was the central theme of PCT as I

see it. The

          central theme of PCT is that organisms control their

perceptions by

          acting on the environment. How well they control them

depends on the

          parameters of the control system. There is no "should"

involved.

          Organisms control as well as they control, neither

better nor worse.

          I have no idea what you mean by saying "the information

provided by the

          perception, given knowledge of the reference".

Information and knowledge

          are not the same thing, and anyway what is there in a

control system

          that can evaluate the information in a perception, with

or without

          "knowledge" of the reference? You're talking

gobbledygook.

          Â Â Â Â  Later, dogmatic assertions were made that there is

no information

          Â Â Â Â  about the disturbance in the perceptual signal,

assertions that we

          Â Â Â Â  proved false, using experimental simulations

agreed to be effective

    for the purpose.

          They were not adequate for the purpose except in your

own mind. You and

          Randall agreed they were effective; Rick and I did not.

In fact there is

          no way to tell what the disturbing variable is from

knowledge of the

          variables in the control loop (perception, reference,

error, output) or

          from the forms of the functions in the loop

(perceptual, comparison,

          output, feedback). The reason is very simple: exactly

the same

          perturbation of the loop can arise from an infinity of

different

          disturbing variables acting (singly or together)

through an infinity of

different disturbance functions.

          In your first demonstration, you employed a

step-disturbance acting

          through a unity disturbance function. This led to a

step-change in the

          perceptual signal, which you then assumed represented

the true

          disturbance. But it did not. The same step-change in

the perceptual

          signal could have been created by an infinity of

different disturbances

          acting through different disturbance functions. There

is no possibility

          that one could work backward from knowledge of the

perceptual signal to

          deduce the nature of an unknown disturbing variable or

variables acting

          via unknown functions. There is simply no information

(in any sense of

          the word) about the disturbing variables in the

perceptual signal.

          Every now and then you seem to wake up and say "Oh, OF

COURSE there is

          no information about the CAUSE of a perturbation in the

perceptual

          signal. How could you ever have thought I would suggest

such a silly

          thing? Please read what I say and you will not

attribute such foolish

          ideas to me." And then you turn right back to the same

theme and claim,

          as above, that there really is information in the

perceptual signal

about the disturbance, and that you proved it.

          I can't account for this except by guessing that you

are shifting

          meanings of "disturbance" between one set of statements

and the other.

          One sense refers to the proximal perturbation of the

input to the

          perceptual function that results from whatever distal

disturbing

          variables happen to be acting. The other sense (which I

always mean by

          "the disturbance") refers to the changes in the distal

disturbing

          variables themselves. Your statement about information

in the perceptual

          signal about "the disturbance" cannot apply to the

distal disturbing

          variable. It applies trivially to the proximal

variable, because the

          proximal variable is exactly what we mean by a CEV. To

say that the

          perceptual signal contains information about the state

of the CEV is a

          tautology, because that relationship defines the nature

of the

          perceptual input function.  As I tried to point out

four years ago, if y

          is the sum of a, b, c ... d, then there is no way to

work backward from

          knowledge of y to the state of a, b, c, and so on. You

could have

          exactly the same value of y arising from an infinity of

combinations of

          a, b .. d. A control system can control y if it can

vary one of the

          variables on which y depends. To do so, it does not

need to know

          anything about the states of the other variables on

which y depends.

Nothing. NADA.

          Â Â Â Â  At least, they were agreed to be effective until

the results showed

          Â Â Â Â  the dogma to be false. Then, and only then, were

irrelevant

    objections raised.

          This somewhat scurrilous allegation rests on our

initial difference in

          conceiving the conditions of the "challenge." Rick and

I were assuming

          that you would be given only the state of the

perceptual signal. You

          then proceeded to use your own assumptions about the

forms of all the

          functions, including the disturbing function, and the

values of all the

          variables and signals, including the reference signal,

to deduce the

only remaining unknown, the disturbing variable.

          Rick sent you some lists of numbers on several

occasions, representing

          the state of the perceptual signal in a working control

model, and

          challenged you to deduce the behavior of the disturbing

variable from

          knowledge of the behavior of the perceptual signal (I

see that he is

          offering to do this again). If the perceptual signal

had contained

          information about the disturbance, you should have been

able to use that

          information to deduce the behavior of the disturbance.

Obviously, you

          could not do this. Rick's challenge should have been

completely

          sufficient to show you how we conceived of the

challenge in general.

          What you did was to permit yourself to use all kinds of

knowledge that

          Rick and I were ruling out. Our objections were quite

relevant to our

          understanding of the phrase "information in the

perceptual signal about

the disturbance."

You citing you:

          Â Â Â Â  The fact that the fixed functions were the output

function and the

          Â Â Â Â  feedback function of the control loop is neither

here nor there.

          Â Â Â Â  The fact that they don't vary as a function of the

waveform of the

          Â Â Â Â  disturbance is what matters. The only varying item

used was the

    perceptual signal.

You citing me:

          >>You forgot to mention the form of the input

function, the function

          >>relating the disturbing variable to the

controlled variable, and the

          >>setting of the reference signal, all of which

you must also know.

You now:

          Â Â Â Â  And could you now, after three years of

consideration, tell me

          Â Â Â Â  which of these varies in a manner coordinated with

variations in

          Â Â Â Â  the disturbing influence on the CEV? If you can

correctly assert

          Â Â Â Â  that any one of these contains information about

the fluctuations

          Â Â Â Â  of the disturbance, then and only then can you

criticize the

          Â Â Â Â  demonstration experiment and the derived

conclusion.

          Wait a minute. You're saying that I can't criticize

your experiment and

          its conclusion if I can't correctly assert that any

variable or function

          in the control loop but the perceptual signal "varies

in a manner

          coordinated with variations in the disturbing influence

on the CEV." If

          I've untangled this set of nested negatives correctly,

you’re saying

          that the perceptual signal _does_ vary in a

“coordinated” way (whatever

that means) with the disturbing influence.

          But this is exactly what I am trying to tell you is

your primary

          mistake. The perceptual signal does NOT vary in a way

that correlates

          with any particular disturbing variable. At one moment

there might be a

          single disturbing variable acting through a simple

linear function; at

          the next there might be twelve disturbing variables

acting through a set

          of functions ranging from square to square root to

exponential. The

          control system will behave no differently in any case.

It simply senses

          the controlled variable and acts according to

deviations of its

          perception from the momentary setting of the reference

signal.

          Furthermore, given complete knowledge of everything in

the control loop,

          but not of the environment beyond the input quantities

themselves, you

          could certainly deduce the state of a hypothetical

disturbing variable

          based on assuming a hypothetical disturbance function.

But this would be

          a complete fiction; it would not be a "reconstruction"

of the true

          disturbing variable. Your chances of guessing correctly

what the actual

          number of disturbances is, and what their individual

waveforms are, and

          how each one is linked to have an effect on the

controlled variable, are

          essentially zero. And the control system can't do this,

either.

          Â Â Â Â  But (as I said those long years ago as well), is

it not absurd to

          Â Â Â Â  ask the control system, which has but a single

scalar value for its

          Â Â Â Â  perceptual signal, to _know_ (perceive,

understand,…) anything

          Â Â Â Â  other than the value of the CEV. Is it not a red

herring to suggest

          Â Â Â Â  that anything in the discussion hinges on this

absurdity?

          I use "know" in a loose way, to be sure. I say that a

system “knows”

          about something outside it if there is a variable

inside the system that

          covaries with the external something. A photocell

“knows” about light

          intensity, but not about color. In a simple control

system, the only

          "knowledge" that exists is the perceptual signal. And

it is “knowledge”

          only in the sense that it represents the value of a

function of some set

of input quantities.

          Since this is the only knowledge that the system itself

has, it is

          absurd to say (as you have said) that the system "uses

information" that

          is "contained in" the perceptual signal. All the

control system needs is

          the perceptual signal itself. It does not have to

perform any operations

          to detect or manipulate measures of information. So who

is being absurd

here?

          Â Â Â Â  You should be stating that "as the precision of

opposition to the

          Â Â Â Â  disturbance increases, so the information about

the disturbance

          Â Â Â Â  remaining in the perceptual signal decreases" and

then you would

          Â Â Â Â  see it as a perfectly straightforward,

self-evident proposition, in

    place of a paradox contrary to reason.

          But that is contrary to the idea that the control

system uses the

          information in the perceptual signal to construct an

output that

          precisely opposes the effects of the disturbance on the

input quantity.

          The paradox lies in claiming that control -- the

precise opposition to

          the effects of an unknown disturbing variable or

variables – relies on

          information in the perceptual signal, and also to say

that the better

          the control, the less information there is in the

perceptual signal. In

          the limit, according to this way of looking at the

system, control would

          be perfect if there were NO information in the

perceptual signal. But in

          that case, what would be the basis for constructing the

output?

---

Well, let’s move on.

               Firstly, consider a predictable world.  PCT is not

necessary,

          Â Â Â Â  because the desired effects can be achieved by

executing a

    prespecified series of actions.

          I thought this was silly in 1992 and I still do. If the

world is

          predictable, this does not mean that any organism is

capable of

          predicting it. Furthermore, as I pointed out back then,

even if the

          world is predictable, a control system is still the

fastest and least

          complex way to control it. Suppose the muscles were

calibrated perfectly

          and the organism somehow could carry out the

calculations necessary to

          generate the muscle tensions required to produce any

position of the

          limbs. Yes, in principle one could do an open-loop

calculation involving

          all the inverse kinematics and dynamics, but at what

cost? Probably a

          large portion of the brain would have to be devoted to

performing this

          calculation over and over in real time. But the same

result can be

          achieved, for all practical purposes, using a few very

simple negative

          feedback control systems which do only a few elementary

calculations. So

          even in a perfectly predictable world, the control

system is still the

          system of choice. To say that the world is predictable

is not to say

          that it is simple or that a given organism is capable

of predicting it.

          Your assumption is not tenable. Unfortunately, you

insist that it is

correct, and go on from there.

          Â Â Â Â  At the other extreme, consider a random world, in

which the state

               at t+delta is unpredictable from the state at t. 

PCT is not

               possible.  There is no set of actions in the world

that will change

    the information at the sensors.

          There is no information at the sensors. Information, as

you have said a

          number of times, depends on the nature of the receiver.

It does not

          exist independently in the environment. If the receiver

is monitoring

          the mean noise level of the sensor signals, acting at

random can raise

          or lower that noise level, since random acts imposed on

a random world

          will add in quadrature to the net effect. Control would

still be

possible, if not very useful.

    Now consider a realistic (i.e. chaotic) world.

          Fine. But you are assuming at this point that PCT would

not be necessary

          in a predictable world, which is false. That vitiates

the strength of

          this orderly argument. You are equating "predictable"

with “simple” or

          "understandable." In fact, you are attributing

predictableness to the

          environment, as if it were a property of the

environment and not a

function of the organism’s capacities to predict.

          Â Â Â Â  At time t one looks at the state of the world, and

the

          Â Â Â Â  probabilities of the various possible states at

t+delta are thereby

          Â Â Â Â  made different from what they would have been had

you not looked at

               time t.  If one makes an action A at time t, the

probability

          Â Â Â Â  distributions of states at time t+delta are

different from what

          Â Â Â Â  they would have been if action A had not occurred,

and moreover,

          Â Â Â Â  that difference is reflected in the probabilities

of states of the

               sensor systems observing the state of the world. 

Action A can

    inform the sensors. PCT is possible.

          When you start talking like a quantum physicist you

lose me. This whole

          way of dealing with phenomena strikes me as awkward and

ugly. And

          anyway, I don't have to follow your arguments any

further, since you

          have made a basic mistake in saying that in a

predictable world, PCT

would not be necessary.

---

          Â Â Â Â  Things become more interesting when we go up a

level in the

          Â Â Â Â  hierarchy. Now we have to consider the source of

information as

          Â Â Â Â  being the error signals of the lower ECSs, given

that the higher

    level has no direct sensory access to the world

          Not the error signals: the perceptual signals. These

are not the same

thing, even though you try to make them the same:

          Â Â Â Â  Even though the higher ECSs may well take as

sensory input the

          Â Â Â Â  perceptual signals of the lower ECSs, nevertheless

the information

          Â Â Â Â  content (unpredictability) of those perceptual

signals is that of

          Â Â Â Â  the error, since the higher ECSs have information

about their

          Â Â Â Â  Actions (the references supplied to the lower

ECSs) just as the

          Â Â Â Â  lower ones have information about their Actions in

the world.

          This is patching up your argument as you go. The error

is the difference

          between the reference signal and the perceptual signal.

If the higher

          system is in the imagination mode, it is not receiving

the perceptual

          signal. If it is in the action mode, it is not

receiving a copy of its

          own output. When you try to design a system can can

operate in both

          modes at once, you run into all sorts of problems. But

I don’t expect

that such niggling details will deflect you.

          Â Â Â Â  (Unexpected events provide moments of high

information content, but

          Â Â Â Â  they can't happen often, or we are back in the

uncontrollable

    world.)

          So you are still assuming that disturbances have to be

predictable for

control to work?

          Â Â Â Â  What does this mean? Firstly, the higher ECSs do

not need one or

               both of high speed or high precision.  The lower

ECSs can take care

          Â Â Â Â  of things at high information rates, leaving to

the higher ECSs

          Â Â Â Â  precisely those things that are not predicted by

them–complexities

          Â Â Â Â  of the world, and specifically things of a KIND

that they do not

               incorporate in their predictions.  In other words,

the information

          Â Â Â Â  argument does not specify what Bill's eleven

levels are, but it

          Â Â Â Â  does make it clear why there should BE level of

the hierarchy that

          Â Â Â Â  have quite different characteristics in their

perceptual input

    functions.

          If information theory could really, out of its own

premises, come up

          with these predictions, that would be impressive. But

it can’t because

          it didn't. You're solving a problem to which you

already know the

          answer, and throwing in all the assumptions needed to

make your

          "prediction" come out right. Those assumptions are not

contained in

          information theory. What does information theory have

to say about

“kinds” of perceptions? Nothing.

---

Another item

          Â Â Â Â  In your comment, you take it to refer to how a

functioning ECS is

          Â Â Â Â  to be designed, and that the perceptual bandwidth

should be low.

          Â Â Â Â  If the perceptual bandwidth is low, then the ECS

will have

          Â Â Â Â  difficulty matching the perceptual signal to the

reference signal,

          Â Â Â Â  and thus the error signal will have high

information content.

          First I have never said that the perceptual bandwidth

should be low.

          They are what they are. And second, if the perceptual

bandwidth is low,

          the ECS will have an easier time in matching the

perceptual signal to

          the reference signal, and the error signal, in your

parlance, will have

          a low information content. Your deduction here is

exactly the opposite

          of what would happen. Of course if the reference signal

varied rapidly,

          the error signal would also vary rapidly and contain

more information –

          but why would a reference signal from a higher, slower

system vary more

          rapidly than the perceptual signal of a lower, faster

system?

          Â Â Â Â  Now it is true that if the perceptual signal has

lower bandwidth

          Â Â Â Â  than the reference signal and the same resolution,

then the error

          Â Â Â Â  signal will in part be predictable, thus having

lower information

               content than would appear on the surface.  But I

had the

          Â Â Â Â  presumption that we are always dealing with an

organism with high

          Â Â Â Â  bandwidth perceptual pathways, so I forgot to

insert that caveat.

          By your argument, a completely random error signal

would have the lowest

          predictability of all, and thus contain the most

information. But so

          what? The control system would not work with a random

error signal.

          Â Â Â Â  Well, given last year's experience, I didn't

expect my information-

          Â Â Â Â  theory posting to be understood, and I wasn't

disappointed in my

    expectation. Is it worth trying some more?

          No, it is not. You don't have a clear and rigorous

argument that can be

          built up from basic principles without any outside

assumptions to carry

          you across the rough spots. If you knew what you were

talking about, you

would be able to explain it clearly.

---

Lastly:

          Â Â Â Â  The situation is different if we take a

full-blooded outside view

               of the action of a CEV.  It is from this kind of

view that we argue

          Â Â Â Â  that the disturbance provides information that

passes through the

               perceptual signal to the output signal.  From the

outside we can

          Â Â Â Â  see the disturbing variable do whatever it does to

affect the CEV,

          Â Â Â Â  and we can see the ECS modifying its output to

bring the perceptual

          Â Â Â Â  signal back to its controlled value. From outside

we can see the

          Â Â Â Â  reference signal of the ECS changing, and the

ouput changing to

          Â Â Â Â  move the CEV so that the perceptual signal comes

to its new

               controlled value.  From outside, the arguments

about there being no

          Â Â Â Â  information from the disturbance in the perceptual

signal lose

    their force.

          So from the outside view, it is the information from

the disturbance

          that passes through the perceptual signal to the output

signal, with the

          result of modifying the output to bring the perceptual

signal back to

          its controlled value? This takes us back to the

original information-in-

          perception argument. If the information in the

perception decreases as

          the output comes to oppose the effects of the

disturbance more

          precisely, how can it be the information passing

through the perception

          to the output that is responsible for the increase in

precision? Does

          precision improve as the amount of information on which

it is based

          decreases? What you are saying may make perfect sense

to you, but to me

is is nonsense.

---

One more peanut:

    [Allan Randall 930325 12:40] to Rick Marken

          Â Â Â Â  > >Are we also agreed that this disturbance,

while defined in this

          Â Â Â Â  > >external point of view, is nonetheless

defined in terms of the

          Â Â Â Â  > >CEV, which is defined according to the

internal point of view?

    >

          Â Â Â Â  > Say what? Why not just say CEV(t) = d(t) +

o(t). If that’s what

          Â Â Â Â  > the above sentence means then I agree with

it.

          Â Â Â Â  The point is that the disturbance d(t), if

separated out from o(t),

          Â Â Â Â  is not a meaningful quantity to the ECS. It is

meaningful only to

          Â Â Â Â  the external observer. By drawing an arrow marked

d(t) you are

          Â Â Â Â  talking about something the ECS has no direct

access to. From the

          Â Â Â Â  perspective of the ECS, only the variation in the

CEV matters. It

          Â Â Â Â  cannot separate out its own output from the

disturbance. On the

          Â Â Â Â  other hand, this disturbance is defined in terms

of the CEV, since

          Â Â Â Â  only things in the world that affect the CEV can

be said to be

    disturbance.

          It is not the disturbance that is defined in terms of

the CEV, but the

          effect of the disturbance. As you say, all that matters

is the value of

          the CEV itself. Words like "meaningful" are just

noises. Talking about

          the ECS "having access to" something is just a noise.

My whole point is

          that the ECS does NOT have "access" to the disturbance

d(t). Nor does it

          have "access" to the form of the function relating d(t)

to its effect on

          the CEV. Nor is the linking function or the nature and

number of d(t)

          variables necessarily the same from one moment to the

next.

---

          The basic problem in the "information about

disturbance" argument is

          that you keep forgetting that a given fluctuation of

the CEV can be

          produced by many different independent variables in the

environment,

          acting through many different paths, even from one

moment to the next.

          All your arguments are based on the (often apparently

unconscious)

          assumption that there is a _single_ disturbing variable

acting through a

          _known and invariant_ disturbance function on the CEV.

When that

          assumption is true, your conclusions follow trivially,

but you are

          dealing only with a special case set up to MAKE your

arguments true. In

          general, a control system _however intelligent and

complex_ cannot know

          what is causing a CEV to vary at any given time. All it

can know – that

          is, all that can be represented by its perceptual

signal – is the

          current state of the CEV. And that is all that it needs

to know.

---

          Â Â Â Â  If Signal X matches the disturbance, the

perceptual signal must be

          Â Â Â Â  the route from which the mystery function M(r, p)

gets the

    information about the disturbance. Right?

               Now let the function M be indentical to O(R-P). 

Signal X will then

          Â Â Â Â  be the negative of the output signal, which is the

disturbance.

          Â Â Â Â  The only question here is whether O(error) is a

function or a

               magical mystery tourgoodie.  I prefer to think we

are dealing with

          Â Â Â Â  physical systems, and that O is a function.

Therefore, information

          Â Â Â Â  about the disturbance is in the perceptual signal,

and moreover, it

    is there in extractable form.

    QED.

          See what I mean? This sloppy analysis omits two things:

the form of the

          function through which even a single disturbance acts

on the CEV, and

          the number of such functions with disturbing quantities

operating

          simultaneously. What you have shown is that if you

assume a single

          disturbance acting through a unity transfer function,

you can deduce its

          value from knowledge of all other signals and functions

in the system.

          Big surprise! But you have not shown that there is only

one disturbance,

          or that the form of the disturbance function is a

simple multiplier of

          1. You're in such a hurry to get to your triumphant

“QED” that you

          overlook an elementary omission in setting up your

imaginary experiment.

          Enough. I'm just not up to following through all these

arguments which

          are made up on the spur of the moment to meet a

particular case and then

          forgotten about when the same principle comes up in a

different context.

          What I am hearing are arguments for the sake of

arguing, for the sake of

          appearing to win an argument. I've been picking holes

in your arguments

          for a good four years now, with no discernible effect.

I know when I am

          trying to alter a controlled variable that is being

maintained by a

          strong and active system, although I may be somewhat

slow to admit that

I can’t budge it.

          This time I am going to stick to my oft-broken

resolution: no more

participation in this line of discussion.

---

Best,

Bill P.

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

[_Boris_Hartman]

Martin, Rick

I know Rick that I’m the last person you wanted to answer your insinuations, but here it is.

I think I understand why Martin doesn’ want to tlak with you on matter of accusing each other who understand PCT and who does not.

I know you both for quite a long time, and I got some “picture” what your limits are. You both understand PCT and non PCT theories. The difference which I noticed is in time you need to change your mind.

Martin can change his mind very quickly in day or two or in one year, whille I haven’t seen you change your mind for at least 10 years. You stick to your RCT and you don’t want to accept Bills’ diagram LCS III and Bills definitions of control (B:CP) which are necesary for PCT basic understanding, so that we could speak “the same” language. That’s at least my wish.

By not recognizing LCS III diagram and definitions of control loop (B:CP) it could mean that you don’t accept PCT. I don’t have other explanation.

And remember I was criticizing your approcah even when Bill was present.

And there is by my oppinion another very big difference between you and Martin. When Martin decides that he will speak in PCT language, then there is quite hard to distinguish what is his thought and what is Bills thought. His PCT original thinking is so clear, that I can give my hand in fire for him, that he perfectly understands PCT. Of course if he wants. He showed that many times. So whatever Martin was talking to Bill in 90’s I think that it doesn’t matter any more, becasue Martin changed in this time his mind. But we have to be clear about his changing mind. If he wants he will show us pure PCT including his math analysis. Bill also changed his mind sometimes.

With you Rick I think that the problem is of another kind. You too can speak very clear PCT language (if you want). We saw that clear in our PCT conversations in 2007. I’ll probably never forget analysis of rocketball game if I remember right the name of the game. Asking which perception we have to control can be used in any sport. You can trust me on this one. I’m professional on this field. We’ve talked also about school system and your conclussions were right about Ed Fords’ analysis of school system that he was obviously wrong from PCT view.

But the problem I see is that you will not stop “chewing” few laboratory experiments and make conclussions out of them even if you see that many more other life examples significantly deviate from your conclussions you got from those few laboratory experiments. You are sticking to them although probably all others on CSGnet realized in these years after Bill passed away, that something is wrong with interpretation of your tests and experiments.

So I don’t understand why are you “protecting” your theory and try to prove that others are wrong and you are right. You even went so far that you “accused” Bill being more S-R than you or you less S-R than he. What’s the real purpose why are you doing this ? Why don’t you start simply again with PCT languaging ? We are on CSGnet forum.

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 11:21 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: [New post] Translating Predictive Coding Into Perceptual Control

[Rick Marken 2019-03-27_15:19:12]

[Martin Taylor 2019 03 26.22 55]

MT: Second: What makes you think I control a perception of my level of agreement with you?

RM: Because when I didn’t agree with you you got very upset; my lack of agreement was clearly a disturbance to a perception you were controlling that could be called “Rick’s level of agreement with me”.

MT: I don’t. I do control for supporting what I consider to be correctly stated,

RM: If that were true then you wouldn’t care whether or not I agreed with you.

MT: I have no idea why or when you got into your head the idea that i think or ever thought that “the disturbance causes the output”…

RM: From all the “information in the disturbance is the basis of output” discussions on CSGNet. And just recently you said that a change in the disturbance leads to a change in output.

MT: So far as I can remember, the first time I heard this idea “disturbance causes the output” applied to me (and to Bruce Abbott) was when we showed you the glaring error in your mathematical argument in your curvature analysis.

RM: You’e been consistently arguing that the disturbance causes output from the time you got on the net. I have copied to the end of this message a post from Bill Powers to you from 1996. It’s worth reading the whole thing since it not only shows what Bill thought of your ideas about the role of the disturbance relative to that of the output of a control system but it also shows what Bill thought of your style of argument.

MT: Why did I call you “an enemy of PCT”? By not withdrawing that curvature paper, you laid open to a wider audience the suspicion that PCT research is done by people not long out of mathematical kindergarten, a situation not likely to induce people to learn more about its power and beauty.

RM: Well, of course, I should have withdrawn my published, peer reviewed paper when you told me too and when I didn’t the only appropriate thing to do was to call me the “enemy of PCT”.

MT: By allowing the paper to stand and neither withdrawing it before publication nor retracting it afterwards, and even continuing later to claim that the paper presented a PCT explanation of the curvature power-law effect, you did act like an enemy of PCT.

RM: Funny, I thought it was your mathematical “explanation” (or justification) of the power law was completely irrelevant to a PCT explanation of the power law.

RM: But enough of this. Here’s Bill’s post. Knowing you, I’m sure you will be able to spin it as the highest of praise for your genius. God I wish he were still here.

Best

Rick

=========

Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 01:01:43 -0600
Reply-To: “Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)”
CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU
Sender: “Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)”
CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU
From: “William T. Powers” POWERS_W@FORTLEWIS.EDU
Subject: Re: information blah blah perception blah blah disturbance blah…
To: Multiple recipients of list CSGNET
CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU

[From Bill Powers (960617.1500 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 960617 15:45 –

What was said in 1992 seems to be mostly a matter of what you now think

were your most important points then, and thus what you select from the

stream of communications to show that you were right all along. One

great difficulty is that your arguments then did not impress me any more

than they do now, yet you cite them as if they settled the matter once

and for all – and as if I had agreed that they did. Let’s just look at

a few of them.

In fact, [the discussion] arose out of my 921218 analysis of the

informational basis of PCT:

"The central theme of PCT is that a perception in an ECS should be

maintained as close as possible to a reference value. In other

words, the information provided by the perception, given knowledge

of the reference, should be as low as possible."

This is not and never was the central theme of PCT as I see it. The

central theme of PCT is that organisms control their perceptions by

acting on the environment. How well they control them depends on the

parameters of the control system. There is no “should” involved.

Organisms control as well as they control, neither better nor worse.

I have no idea what you mean by saying "the information provided by the

perception, given knowledge of the reference". Information and knowledge

are not the same thing, and anyway what is there in a control system

that can evaluate the information in a perception, with or without

“knowledge” of the reference? You’re talking gobbledygook.

Later, dogmatic assertions were made that there is no information

about the disturbance in the perceptual signal, assertions that we

proved false, using experimental simulations agreed to be effective

for the purpose.

They were not adequate for the purpose except in your own mind. You and

Randall agreed they were effective; Rick and I did not. In fact there is

no way to tell what the disturbing variable is from knowledge of the

variables in the control loop (perception, reference, error, output) or

from the forms of the functions in the loop (perceptual, comparison,

output, feedback). The reason is very simple: exactly the same

perturbation of the loop can arise from an infinity of different

disturbing variables acting (singly or together) through an infinity of

different disturbance functions.

In your first demonstration, you employed a step-disturbance acting

through a unity disturbance function. This led to a step-change in the

perceptual signal, which you then assumed represented the true

disturbance. But it did not. The same step-change in the perceptual

signal could have been created by an infinity of different disturbances

acting through different disturbance functions. There is no possibility

that one could work backward from knowledge of the perceptual signal to

deduce the nature of an unknown disturbing variable or variables acting

via unknown functions. There is simply no information (in any sense of

the word) about the disturbing variables in the perceptual signal.

Every now and then you seem to wake up and say "Oh, OF COURSE there is

no information about the CAUSE of a perturbation in the perceptual

signal. How could you ever have thought I would suggest such a silly

thing? Please read what I say and you will not attribute such foolish

ideas to me." And then you turn right back to the same theme and claim,

as above, that there really is information in the perceptual signal

about the disturbance, and that you proved it.

I can’t account for this except by guessing that you are shifting

meanings of “disturbance” between one set of statements and the other.

One sense refers to the proximal perturbation of the input to the

perceptual function that results from whatever distal disturbing

variables happen to be acting. The other sense (which I always mean by

“the disturbance”) refers to the changes in the distal disturbing

variables themselves. Your statement about information in the perceptual

signal about “the disturbance” cannot apply to the distal disturbing

variable. It applies trivially to the proximal variable, because the

proximal variable is exactly what we mean by a CEV. To say that the

perceptual signal contains information about the state of the CEV is a

tautology, because that relationship defines the nature of the

perceptual input function. As I tried to point out four years ago, if y

is the sum of a, b, c … d, then there is no way to work backward from

knowledge of y to the state of a, b, c, and so on. You could have

exactly the same value of y arising from an infinity of combinations of

a, b … d. A control system can control y if it can vary one of the

variables on which y depends. To do so, it does not need to know

anything about the states of the other variables on which y depends.

Nothing. NADA.

At least, they were agreed to be effective until the results showed

the dogma to be false. Then, and only then, were irrelevant

objections raised.

This somewhat scurrilous allegation rests on our initial difference in

conceiving the conditions of the “challenge.” Rick and I were assuming

that you would be given only the state of the perceptual signal. You

then proceeded to use your own assumptions about the forms of all the

functions, including the disturbing function, and the values of all the

variables and signals, including the reference signal, to deduce the

only remaining unknown, the disturbing variable.

Rick sent you some lists of numbers on several occasions, representing

the state of the perceptual signal in a working control model, and

challenged you to deduce the behavior of the disturbing variable from

knowledge of the behavior of the perceptual signal (I see that he is

offering to do this again). If the perceptual signal had contained

information about the disturbance, you should have been able to use that

information to deduce the behavior of the disturbance. Obviously, you

could not do this. Rick’s challenge should have been completely

sufficient to show you how we conceived of the challenge in general.

What you did was to permit yourself to use all kinds of knowledge that

Rick and I were ruling out. Our objections were quite relevant to our

understanding of the phrase "information in the perceptual signal about

the disturbance."

You citing you:

The fact that the fixed functions were the output function and the

feedback function of the control loop is neither here nor there.

The fact that they don’t vary as a function of the waveform of the

disturbance is what matters. The only varying item used was the

perceptual signal.

You citing me:

You forgot to mention the form of the input function, the function

relating the disturbing variable to the controlled variable, and the

setting of the reference signal, all of which you must also know.

You now:

And could you now, after three years of consideration, tell me

which of these varies in a manner coordinated with variations in

the disturbing influence on the CEV? If you can correctly assert

that any one of these contains information about the fluctuations

of the disturbance, then and only then can you criticize the

demonstration experiment and the derived conclusion.

Wait a minute. You’re saying that I can’t criticize your experiment and

its conclusion if I can’t correctly assert that any variable or function

in the control loop but the perceptual signal "varies in a manner

coordinated with variations in the disturbing influence on the CEV." If

I’ve untangled this set of nested negatives correctly, you’re saying

that the perceptual signal does vary in a “coordinated” way (whatever

that means) with the disturbing influence.

But this is exactly what I am trying to tell you is your primary

mistake. The perceptual signal does NOT vary in a way that correlates

with any particular disturbing variable. At one moment there might be a

single disturbing variable acting through a simple linear function; at

the next there might be twelve disturbing variables acting through a set

of functions ranging from square to square root to exponential. The

control system will behave no differently in any case. It simply senses

the controlled variable and acts according to deviations of its

perception from the momentary setting of the reference signal.

Furthermore, given complete knowledge of everything in the control loop,

but not of the environment beyond the input quantities themselves, you

could certainly deduce the state of a hypothetical disturbing variable

based on assuming a hypothetical disturbance function. But this would be

a complete fiction; it would not be a “reconstruction” of the true

disturbing variable. Your chances of guessing correctly what the actual

number of disturbances is, and what their individual waveforms are, and

how each one is linked to have an effect on the controlled variable, are

essentially zero. And the control system can’t do this, either.

But (as I said those long years ago as well), is it not absurd to

ask the control system, which has but a single scalar value for its

perceptual signal, to know (perceive, understand,…) anything

other than the value of the CEV. Is it not a red herring to suggest

that anything in the discussion hinges on this absurdity?

I use “know” in a loose way, to be sure. I say that a system “knows”

about something outside it if there is a variable inside the system that

covaries with the external something. A photocell “knows” about light

intensity, but not about color. In a simple control system, the only

“knowledge” that exists is the perceptual signal. And it is “knowledge”

only in the sense that it represents the value of a function of some set

of input quantities.

Since this is the only knowledge that the system itself has, it is

absurd to say (as you have said) that the system “uses information” that

is “contained in” the perceptual signal. All the control system needs is

the perceptual signal itself. It does not have to perform any operations

to detect or manipulate measures of information. So who is being absurd

here?

You should be stating that "as the precision of opposition to the

disturbance increases, so the information about the disturbance

remaining in the perceptual signal decreases" and then you would

see it as a perfectly straightforward, self-evident proposition, in

place of a paradox contrary to reason.

But that is contrary to the idea that the control system uses the

information in the perceptual signal to construct an output that

precisely opposes the effects of the disturbance on the input quantity.

The paradox lies in claiming that control – the precise opposition to

the effects of an unknown disturbing variable or variables – relies on

information in the perceptual signal, and also to say that the better

the control, the less information there is in the perceptual signal. In

the limit, according to this way of looking at the system, control would

be perfect if there were NO information in the perceptual signal. But in

that case, what would be the basis for constructing the output?

---

Well, let’s move on.

Firstly, consider a predictable world. PCT is not necessary,

because the desired effects can be achieved by executing a

prespecified series of actions.

I thought this was silly in 1992 and I still do. If the world is

predictable, this does not mean that any organism is capable of

predicting it. Furthermore, as I pointed out back then, even if the

world is predictable, a control system is still the fastest and least

complex way to control it. Suppose the muscles were calibrated perfectly

and the organism somehow could carry out the calculations necessary to

generate the muscle tensions required to produce any position of the

limbs. Yes, in principle one could do an open-loop calculation involving

all the inverse kinematics and dynamics, but at what cost? Probably a

large portion of the brain would have to be devoted to performing this

calculation over and over in real time. But the same result can be

achieved, for all practical purposes, using a few very simple negative

feedback control systems which do only a few elementary calculations. So

even in a perfectly predictable world, the control system is still the

system of choice. To say that the world is predictable is not to say

that it is simple or that a given organism is capable of predicting it.

Your assumption is not tenable. Unfortunately, you insist that it is

correct, and go on from there.

At the other extreme, consider a random world, in which the state

at t+delta is unpredictable from the state at t. PCT is not

possible. There is no set of actions in the world that will change

the information at the sensors.

There is no information at the sensors. Information, as you have said a

number of times, depends on the nature of the receiver. It does not

exist independently in the environment. If the receiver is monitoring

the mean noise level of the sensor signals, acting at random can raise

or lower that noise level, since random acts imposed on a random world

will add in quadrature to the net effect. Control would still be

possible, if not very useful.

Now consider a realistic (i.e. chaotic) world.

Fine. But you are assuming at this point that PCT would not be necessary

in a predictable world, which is false. That vitiates the strength of

this orderly argument. You are equating “predictable” with “simple” or

“understandable.” In fact, you are attributing predictableness to the

environment, as if it were a property of the environment and not a

function of the organism’s capacities to predict.

At time t one looks at the state of the world, and the

probabilities of the various possible states at t+delta are thereby

made different from what they would have been had you not looked at

time t. If one makes an action A at time t, the probability

distributions of states at time t+delta are different from what

they would have been if action A had not occurred, and moreover,

that difference is reflected in the probabilities of states of the

sensor systems observing the state of the world. Action A can

inform the sensors. PCT is possible.

When you start talking like a quantum physicist you lose me. This whole

way of dealing with phenomena strikes me as awkward and ugly. And

anyway, I don’t have to follow your arguments any further, since you

have made a basic mistake in saying that in a predictable world, PCT

would not be necessary.

---

Things become more interesting when we go up a level in the

hierarchy. Now we have to consider the source of information as

being the error signals of the lower ECSs, given that the higher

level has no direct sensory access to the world

Not the error signals: the perceptual signals. These are not the same

thing, even though you try to make them the same:

Even though the higher ECSs may well take as sensory input the

perceptual signals of the lower ECSs, nevertheless the information

content (unpredictability) of those perceptual signals is that of

the error, since the higher ECSs have information about their

Actions (the references supplied to the lower ECSs) just as the

lower ones have information about their Actions in the world.

This is patching up your argument as you go. The error is the difference

between the reference signal and the perceptual signal. If the higher

system is in the imagination mode, it is not receiving the perceptual

signal. If it is in the action mode, it is not receiving a copy of its

own output. When you try to design a system can can operate in both

modes at once, you run into all sorts of problems. But I don’t expect

that such niggling details will deflect you.

(Unexpected events provide moments of high information content, but

they can’t happen often, or we are back in the uncontrollable

world.)

So you are still assuming that disturbances have to be predictable for

control to work?

What does this mean? Firstly, the higher ECSs do not need one or

both of high speed or high precision. The lower ECSs can take care

of things at high information rates, leaving to the higher ECSs

precisely those things that are not predicted by them–complexities

of the world, and specifically things of a KIND that they do not

incorporate in their predictions. In other words, the information

argument does not specify what Bill’s eleven levels are, but it

does make it clear why there should BE level of the hierarchy that

have quite different characteristics in their perceptual input

functions.

If information theory could really, out of its own premises, come up

with these predictions, that would be impressive. But it can’t because

it didn’t. You’re solving a problem to which you already know the

answer, and throwing in all the assumptions needed to make your

“prediction” come out right. Those assumptions are not contained in

information theory. What does information theory have to say about

“kinds” of perceptions? Nothing.

---

Another item

In your comment, you take it to refer to how a functioning ECS is

to be designed, and that the perceptual bandwidth should be low.

If the perceptual bandwidth is low, then the ECS will have

difficulty matching the perceptual signal to the reference signal,

and thus the error signal will have high information content.

First I have never said that the perceptual bandwidth should be low.

They are what they are. And second, if the perceptual bandwidth is low,

the ECS will have an easier time in matching the perceptual signal to

the reference signal, and the error signal, in your parlance, will have

a low information content. Your deduction here is exactly the opposite

of what would happen. Of course if the reference signal varied rapidly,

the error signal would also vary rapidly and contain more information –

but why would a reference signal from a higher, slower system vary more

rapidly than the perceptual signal of a lower, faster system?

Now it is true that if the perceptual signal has lower bandwidth

than the reference signal and the same resolution, then the error

signal will in part be predictable, thus having lower information

content than would appear on the surface. But I had the

presumption that we are always dealing with an organism with high

bandwidth perceptual pathways, so I forgot to insert that caveat.

By your argument, a completely random error signal would have the lowest

predictability of all, and thus contain the most information. But so

what? The control system would not work with a random error signal.

Well, given last year’s experience, I didn’t expect my information-

theory posting to be understood, and I wasn’t disappointed in my

expectation. Is it worth trying some more?

No, it is not. You don’t have a clear and rigorous argument that can be

built up from basic principles without any outside assumptions to carry

you across the rough spots. If you knew what you were talking about, you

would be able to explain it clearly.

---

Lastly:

The situation is different if we take a full-blooded outside view

of the action of a CEV. It is from this kind of view that we argue

that the disturbance provides information that passes through the

perceptual signal to the output signal. From the outside we can

see the disturbing variable do whatever it does to affect the CEV,

and we can see the ECS modifying its output to bring the perceptual

signal back to its controlled value. From outside we can see the

reference signal of the ECS changing, and the ouput changing to

move the CEV so that the perceptual signal comes to its new

controlled value. From outside, the arguments about there being no

information from the disturbance in the perceptual signal lose

their force.

So from the outside view, it is the information from the disturbance

that passes through the perceptual signal to the output signal, with the

result of modifying the output to bring the perceptual signal back to

its controlled value? This takes us back to the original information-in-

perception argument. If the information in the perception decreases as

the output comes to oppose the effects of the disturbance more

precisely, how can it be the information passing through the perception

to the output that is responsible for the increase in precision? Does

precision improve as the amount of information on which it is based

decreases? What you are saying may make perfect sense to you, but to me

is is nonsense.

---

One more peanut:

[Allan Randall 930325 12:40] to Rick Marken

Are we also agreed that this disturbance, while defined in this

external point of view, is nonetheless defined in terms of the

CEV, which is defined according to the internal point of view?

Say what? Why not just say CEV(t) = d(t) + o(t). If that’s what

the above sentence means then I agree with it.

The point is that the disturbance d(t), if separated out from o(t),

is not a meaningful quantity to the ECS. It is meaningful only to

the external observer. By drawing an arrow marked d(t) you are

talking about something the ECS has no direct access to. From the

perspective of the ECS, only the variation in the CEV matters. It

cannot separate out its own output from the disturbance. On the

other hand, this disturbance is defined in terms of the CEV, since

only things in the world that affect the CEV can be said to be

disturbance.

It is not the disturbance that is defined in terms of the CEV, but the

effect of the disturbance. As you say, all that matters is the value of

the CEV itself. Words like “meaningful” are just noises. Talking about

the ECS “having access to” something is just a noise. My whole point is

that the ECS does NOT have “access” to the disturbance d(t). Nor does it

have “access” to the form of the function relating d(t) to its effect on

the CEV. Nor is the linking function or the nature and number of d(t)

variables necessarily the same from one moment to the next.

---

The basic problem in the “information about disturbance” argument is

that you keep forgetting that a given fluctuation of the CEV can be

produced by many different independent variables in the environment,

acting through many different paths, even from one moment to the next.

All your arguments are based on the (often apparently unconscious)

assumption that there is a single disturbing variable acting through a

known and invariant disturbance function on the CEV. When that

assumption is true, your conclusions follow trivially, but you are

dealing only with a special case set up to MAKE your arguments true. In

general, a control system however intelligent and complex cannot know

what is causing a CEV to vary at any given time. All it can know – that

is, all that can be represented by its perceptual signal – is the

current state of the CEV. And that is all that it needs to know.

---

If Signal X matches the disturbance, the perceptual signal must be

the route from which the mystery function M(r, p) gets the

information about the disturbance. Right?

Now let the function M be indentical to O(R-P). Signal X will then

be the negative of the output signal, which is the disturbance.

The only question here is whether O(error) is a function or a

magical mystery tourgoodie. I prefer to think we are dealing with

physical systems, and that O is a function. Therefore, information

about the disturbance is in the perceptual signal, and moreover, it

is there in extractable form.

QED.

See what I mean? This sloppy analysis omits two things: the form of the

function through which even a single disturbance acts on the CEV, and

the number of such functions with disturbing quantities operating

simultaneously. What you have shown is that if you assume a single

disturbance acting through a unity transfer function, you can deduce its

value from knowledge of all other signals and functions in the system.

Big surprise! But you have not shown that there is only one disturbance,

or that the form of the disturbance function is a simple multiplier of

1. You’re in such a hurry to get to your triumphant “QED” that you

overlook an elementary omission in setting up your imaginary experiment.

Enough. I’m just not up to following through all these arguments which

are made up on the spur of the moment to meet a particular case and then

forgotten about when the same principle comes up in a different context.

What I am hearing are arguments for the sake of arguing, for the sake of

appearing to win an argument. I’ve been picking holes in your arguments

for a good four years now, with no discernible effect. I know when I am

trying to alter a controlled variable that is being maintained by a

strong and active system, although I may be somewhat slow to admit that

I can’t budge it.

This time I am going to stick to my oft-broken resolution: no more

participation in this line of discussion.

---

Best,

Bill P.

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_11:28:13]

Martin Taylor (2019.03.27.23.03)

  MT: This is getting almost as weird as the

curvature discussion. Â

RM: And for the same reason. The reason is to be found in the last paragraph of Bill’s post:

BP: What I am hearing are arguments for the sake of arguing, for the sake of

appearing to win an argument. I’ve been picking holes in your arguments

for a good four years now, with no discernible effect. I know when I am

trying to alter a controlled variable that is being maintained by a

**strong and active system, although I may be somewhat slow to admit that **

I can’t budge it. [emphasis mine]

RM: The variable you are controlling that Bill knows he can’t budge is “information theory is compatible with PCT”. As long as you control for this variable you will not be able to understand some of the most important aspects of PCT. And it is clear that you are still controlling for this variable as evidenced by the things you have said about PCT over the last few years that are simply not true. For example, we had a long discussion on CSGNet about whether a controlled environmental variable, a CEV, is an entity separate from the perception of that variable. You (and everyone else) said it was; I said it wasn’t. But in one elegant sentence in his reply to you that I posted, Bill confirms my position and shows how your position is a consequence of your controlling for information theory being compatible with PCT:

BP: **To say that the perceptual signal contains information about **

the state of the CEV is a tautology, because that relationshipÂ

defines the nature of the perceptual input function. ** **[emphasis mine]

RM: That is, the perceptual signal is the CEV; the CEV exists only as a perceptual variable defined by the perceptual function. The CEV is a function of “real” environmental variables but that function exists only if there system that is able to compute it – a perciving system, such as a living organism.

RM: I believe the fact that you are controlling for information theory being compatible with PCT is also the reason why you objected so strenuously to my PCT explanation of the power law of movement as an example of a behavioral illusion. Information theory is basically an input-output model of behavior. And the power law looks like an input-output phenomenon: organisms seem to slow down (output) through curves (input). So my paper showing that this appearance is an illusion was a rather strong disturbance to the idea that information theory is compatible with PCT and it got the predictable reaction.Â

  MT: As for this "disturbance causes output" and Bill's message, Bill

mistakenly thought that by “disturbance” I meant "causes of
disturbance, which are permanently unknowable and irrelevant.

RM: If you read Bill’s post more carefully I think you’ll see that he also considered the possibility that by “disturbance” you also meant the effect of the disturbance on the controlled variable.

Â

  MT: Can you seriously contend that when a disturbance changes the

variable you call the controlled environmental variable, the
output does not change to compensate? Â

RM: Yes, I can contend it, as did Bill in his post. Right here:

BP:If I’ve untangled this set of nested negatives correctly, you’re saying

that the perceptual signal does vary in a “coordinated” way (whatever

that means) with the disturbing influence.

BP: But this is exactly what I am trying to tell you is your primary

mistake. The perceptual signal does NOT vary in a way that correlates

with any particular disturbing variable. [emphasis mine]

RM: I will add that it is also because the perceptual signal is a simultaneous result of disturbances and the system’s own outputs: that is, p = o + d. This kindergarten math is enough to prove that the output of a control system does not change to compensate for disturbance-caused changes in the controlled variable (p) because those changes are mixed with changes being produced by the output of the system itself.Â

  MT: Finally, about "information from the disturbance", you have never

understood that information analysis is a generalization of
variance analysis, which you have no qualms about using.

RM: That may be. But apparently you have never understood (or, more appropriately, you never wanted to understand) that information theory and control theory are incompatible. If Bill could’t budge you on that, I certainly can’t.Â

MT: Maths was never your strong point,

RM: I hear that Faraday wasn’t too good at it either. But he did OK. But I am good enough at math to understand it at the level you need to know it to understand PCT.Â

  MT: which is no problem, until you

persist in asserting the truth of some idea that got into your
head based on a faulty mathematical analysis, long after the error
has been demonstrated to you in a variety of ways.

RM: If you are referring to my power law analysis, I didn’t find you mathematical “proof” of my error to be convincing at all because it was simply irrelevant to my analysis. Â

Â

  MT: As I said up front, I have lost interest in this thread because of

the way meanings have been weirdly twisted and distorted into
unrecognizable forms recently.

RM: I would imagine that you would be quite tired of it. Although I am not nearly as strong a disturbance as Bill was to the “information theory is compatible with PCT” perception that you are controlling, it’s still got to be pretty exhausting to keep trying to come up with the tangle of ideas you come up with to protect it from my comments. But you certainly are controlling for it with high gain if you had to come up with me being the “enemy of PCT” in order to get that variable under control.Â

RM: By the way, do I get to call you the “enemy of PCT” if you don’t withdraw your papers from LCS IV at my request;-)

Best

Rick

···

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.15.02]

I guess you didn't read my post to which you are replying. What I

said there is that if variance analysis is compatible with PCT, then
so is information theory analysis. That’s just a mathematical fact.
not an opinion (Garner and McGill, Psychometrika, 21/3, Sept 1956)).
If Bill didn’t believe it, that’s not the only mathematical fact he
didn’t believe, which doesn’t make him correct. He also didn’t
believe in Laplace Transforms as they are used by the engineering
community. Unfortunately experience and analysis have showed them to
be correct, not Bill.
That’s your cogent comment, but the following “is a consequence”
line is not. It so happens that I now agree that you were correct
all along. I imagine you will find some way to show that I don’t
agree with you, but that’s your prerogative.
Here’s a Figure I made a while ago to illustrate the relationships
among the CEV, the perception, and real reality. It shows how the output affects real reality, which affects the
sensors and thus the perception, which defines the CEV, which
appears to be in the external environment. Only to the extent that
changes in the CEV/perception reflect changes in real reality is
control possible. When I was disagreeing with you for so long, I had
not realized this mistake and had conflated the CEV with something
that exists in real reality.
Agreed.
--------the rest violates my promise not to respond to weird
nonsense-------
Poppycock!
Information theory is not a model of behaviour at all. It can be
applied to any model of behaviour whatsoever. It would be nice if
you would learn just a little bit of the basics of things that you
criticise so severely. Information theory is about modelling
uncertainty and mutual relationships just like variance and
correlation, if it models anything. They are identical, as I pointed
out yesterday, except for a scale factor if the variation is
Gaussian. So you are saying variance analysis is an input-output
model of behaviour, and yet you use variance and correlation
analysis in treating your experiments. Square that circle!
Hogwash. The paper disturbed several perceptions, of which that was
one. If you remember my published review, I explicitly said that
your paper had no bearing on whether the effect was an illusion.
It’s beyond me how you manage to drag information theory into a
discussion of what went on during the year that several of us were
explaining where your maths went wrong, and demonstrating
experimentally (Alex) that what you said could not possibly be
right. Even in your published response, you corrected a few
statements that were never made in the comment papers to which you
purported to reply, but you never commented on the criticisms made
in the published comment papers. That indeed disturbed a perception
I control, that the accuracy of the science matters much more than
the ego of the scientist. You act as though you control for the
opposite relationship.
Yes, he complained, wrongly, that I used the word in both ways, as
source and as signal.
Did you read what you quoted? And what you said yesterday and above.
Bill said that the perceptual variable does not correlate with any
disturbing variable, just as I said in the message to which you
replied yesterday. So Bill is AGREEING with me, not contradicting me
in any way. You, however, insist that the output variation is
uncorrelated with the disturbance variation. I don’t think Bill
would agree with you.
I don’t remember anyone disagreeing with that. Do you?
You do if you can show that the likely effect of somebody who might
become interested in PCT would be put off learning more because he
would think PCT research is conducted by such incompetents. You
don’t if all you can say is that my chapter is wrong because you say
so. Any paper can be wrong. What is incompetent is to allow the
error to remain uncorrected in the literature once the error has
been pointed out.
Martin

···

OK. Rick makes a cogent comment, TO
WHICH O WILL REPLY.

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_11:28:13]

Martin Taylor (2019.03.27.23.03)

            MT:

This is getting almost as weird as the curvature
discussion.

        RM: And for the same reason. The reason is to be found in

the last paragraph of Bill’s post:

            BP: What I am hearing are arguments for the sake of

arguing, for the sake of

            appearing to win an argument. I've been picking holes

in your arguments

            for a good four years now, with no discernible

effect. I know when I am

** trying to alter a controlled variable that is
being maintained by a**

** strong and active system, although I may be
somewhat slow to admit that **

I can’t budge it. [emphasis mine]

        RM: The variable you are controlling that Bill knows he

can’t budge is “information theory is compatible with PCT”.
As long as you control for this variable you will not be
able to understand some of the most important aspects of
PCT.

        ... We had a long discussion on CSGNet about whether a

controlled environmental variable, a CEV, is an entity
separate from the perception of that variable. You (and
everyone else) said it was; I said it wasn’t. But in one
elegant sentence in his reply to you that I posted, Bill
confirms my position

        and shows how your position is a consequence of your

controlling for information theory being compatible with
PCT:

BP: ** To say that the perceptual signal contains
information about **

the state of the CEV is a tautology , because
that relationship

              defines the nature of the perceptual input

function. ****[emphasis mine]

RM: That is, the perceptual signal is the CEV;
the CEV exists only as a perceptual variable defined by the
perceptual function. The CEV is a function of “real”
environmental variables but that function exists only if
there system that is able to compute it – a perciving
system, such as a living organism.

        RM: I believe the fact that you are controlling for

information theory being compatible with PCT is also the
reason why you objected so strenuously to my PCT explanation
of the power law of movement as an example of a behavioral
illusion.

        Information theory is basically an input-output model of

behavior.

        And the power law looks like an input-output phenomenon:

organisms seem to slow down (output) through curves (input).
So my paper showing that this appearance is an illusion was
a rather strong disturbance to the idea that information
theory is compatible with PCT and it got the predictable
reaction.

            MT:

As for this “disturbance causes output” and Bill’s
message, Bill mistakenly thought that by “disturbance” I
meant "causes of disturbance, which are permanently
unknowable and irrelevant.

        RM: If you read Bill's post more carefully I think you'll

see that he also considered the possibility that by
“disturbance” you also meant the effect of the disturbance
on the controlled variable.

            MT:

Can you seriously contend that when a disturbance
changes the variable you call the controlled
environmental variable, the output does not change to
compensate?

        RM: Yes, I can contend it, as did Bill in his post. Right

here:

                  BP:If I've untangled this set of nested

negatives correctly, you’re saying

                  that the perceptual signal _does_ vary in a

“coordinated” way (whatever

that means) with the disturbing influence.

BP: ** But this is exactly what I am trying to
tell you is your primary**

mistake . The perceptual signal does NOT
vary in a way that correlates

                  with any particular disturbing variable.

[emphasis mine]

        RM: I will add that it is also because the perceptual

signal is a simultaneous result of disturbances and the
system’s own outputs: that is, p = o + d. This kindergarten
math is enough to prove that the output of a control system
does not change to compensate for disturbance-caused changes
in the controlled variable (p) because those changes are
mixed with changes being produced by the output of the
system itself.

…

        RM: By the way, do I get to call you the "enemy of PCT"

if you don’t withdraw your papers from LCS IV at my
request;-)

[FredNickols]

Fred Nickols 2019.03.28.1622 ET

I have a question about the diagram. I think I get the distinction between a cup of coffee (the RREV) and my perception of that RREV (the CEV).

My question is this: “Where is the feedback function?” Is it between Actions and the RREV or between the RREV and the CEV?

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Chief Toolmaker & Lead Solution Engineer

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

[FredNickols]

Fred Nickols 2019.03.28.1623 ET

P.S. Or does the feedback function run from Actions through the RREV to the CEV?

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Chief Toolmaker & Lead Solution Engineer

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.16.28]

···

The feedback loop from output around to
perception runs like this: output->reference values for
possibly many lower-level control loops->Actions->possibly
many environmental variables and interactions in real
reality->RREV->possibly many environmental variables and
interactions->sensory inputs->possibly many lower level
perceptual functions->perception/CEV. You could say there are
environmental feedback functions both between the Actions and the
RREV and between the RREV and the sensors, or you could say there
is one feedback function between output to the reference values of
the lower levels and the RREV and another between the RREV and the
perception.

  The term "feedback function" is pretty ill-defined, but if you

think or it hierarchically, as we do for perceptual input
functions, I think it makes sense to use the term for all these
various things, perhaps more so for the Actions-to-RREV part of
the path than for the other segments. The effects of variations of
the RREV on the CEV, which is perceived consciously as existing in
an apparently real environmental context (your “coffee cup”) are
the effects on the perception.

  We will never know what the RREV is. For all we know, there is a

huge army of little gnomes out there in real reality who sit at
desks like Scrooge’s unfortunate assistant, looking all day and
night at ticker-tape to see what actions we produce and what else
is happening that should influence what they compute in order to
know just how to tickle our sense organs and make us see "coffee
cup’. What matters is that what these gnomes do results in us
perceiving a coffee cup moving as we want it to move. The cup is
the CEV, not the RREV, The gnomes produce the RREV.

  On the other hand, there just might be a coffee cup in real

reality.

  Martin

Fred Nickols 2019.03.28.1623 ET

      P.S. Or does the feedback function run from Actions through

the RREV to the CEV?

Regards,

Fred Nickols

•                              Chief Toolmaker & Lead
  

Solution Engineer*

** Distance
Consulting LLC**

“Assistance at A Distance”

      On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 4:23

PM Fred Nickols fwnickols@gmail.com wrote:

Fred Nickols 2019.03.28.1622 ET

          I have a question about the diagram.  I think I get the

distinction between a cup of coffee (the RREV) and my
perception of that RREV (the CEV).

          My question is this:  "Where is the feedback

function?" Is it between Actions and the RREV or between
the RREV and the CEV?

Regards,

Fred Nickols

•                                  Chief Toolmaker & Lead
  

Solution Engineer*

** Distance
Consulting LLC**

“Assistance at A Distance”

          On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at

4:05 PM Martin Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.15.02]

              OK.

Rick makes a cogent comment, TO WHICH O WILL REPLY.

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_11:28:13]

                      Martin Taylor

(2019.03.27.23.03)

                        MT:

This is getting almost as weird as the
curvature discussion.

                    RM: And for the same reason. The reason is to

be found in the last paragraph of Bill’s post:

                        BP: What I am hearing are arguments for

the sake of arguing, for the sake of

                        appearing to win an argument. I've been

picking holes in your arguments

                        for a good four years now, with no

discernible effect. I know when I am

** trying to alter a controlled variable
that is being maintained by a**

** strong and active system, although I
may be somewhat slow to admit that **

I can’t budge it. [emphasis mine]

                    RM: The variable you are controlling that

Bill knows he can’t budge is “information theory
is compatible with PCT”. As long as you control
for this variable you will not be able to
understand some of the most important aspects of
PCT.

            I guess you didn't read my post to which you are

replying. What I said there is that if variance analysis
is compatible with PCT, then so is information theory
analysis. That’s just a mathematical fact. not an
opinion (Garner and McGill, Psychometrika, 21/3, Sept
1956)). If Bill didn’t believe it, that’s not the only
mathematical fact he didn’t believe, which doesn’t make
him correct. He also didn’t believe in Laplace
Transforms as they are used by the engineering
community. Unfortunately experience and analysis have
showed them to be correct, not Bill.

                    ... We had a long discussion on CSGNet about

whether a controlled environmental variable, a
CEV, is an entity separate from the perception
of that variable. You (and everyone else) said
it was; I said it wasn’t. But in one elegant
sentence in his reply to you that I posted, Bill
confirms my position

            That's your cogent comment, but the following "is a

consequence" line is not. It so happens that I now agree
that you were correct all along. I imagine you will find
some way to show that I don’t agree with you, but that’s
your prerogative.

            Here's a Figure I made a while ago to illustrate the

relationships among the CEV, the perception, and real
reality.

            It shows how the output affects real reality, which

affects the sensors and thus the perception, which
defines the CEV, which appears to be in the external
environment. Only to the extent that changes in the
CEV/perception reflect changes in real reality is
control possible. When I was disagreeing with you for so
long, I had not realized this mistake and had conflated
the CEV with something that exists in real reality.

                    and shows how your position is a consequence

of your controlling for information theory being
compatible with PCT:

BP: ** To say that the perceptual
signal contains information about **

the state of the CEV is a tautology ,
because that relationship

                          defines the nature of the perceptual

input function. ****[emphasis mine]

RM: That is, the perceptual signal is
the CEV; the CEV exists only as a perceptual
variable defined by the perceptual function. The
CEV is a function of “real” environmental
variables but that function exists only if there
system that is able to compute it – a perciving
system, such as a living organism.

            Agreed.



            --------the rest violates my promise not to respond to

weird nonsense-------

                    RM: I believe the fact that you are

controlling for information theory being
compatible with PCT is also the reason why you
objected so strenuously to my PCT explanation of
the power law of movement as an example of a
behavioral illusion.

            Poppycock!

                    Information theory is basically an

input-output model of behavior.

            Information theory is not a model of behaviour at all.

It can be applied to any model of behaviour whatsoever.
It would be nice if you would learn just a little bit of
the basics of things that you criticise so severely.
Information theory is about modelling uncertainty and
mutual relationships just like variance and correlation,
if it models anything. They are identical, as I pointed
out yesterday, except for a scale factor if the
variation is Gaussian. So you are saying variance
analysis is an input-output model of behaviour, and yet
you use variance and correlation analysis in treating
your experiments. Square that circle!

                    And the power law looks like an input-output

phenomenon: organisms seem to slow down (output)
through curves (input). So my paper showing that
this appearance is an illusion was a rather
strong disturbance to the idea that information
theory is compatible with PCT and it got the
predictable reaction.

            Hogwash. The  paper disturbed several perceptions, of

which that was one. If you remember my published review,
I explicitly said that your paper had no bearing on
whether the effect was an illusion. It’s beyond me how
you manage to drag information theory into a discussion
of what went on during the year that several of us were
explaining where your maths went wrong, and
demonstrating experimentally (Alex) that what you said
could not possibly be right. Even in your published
response, you corrected a few statements that were never
made in the comment papers to which you purported to
reply, but you never commented on the criticisms made in
the published comment papers. That indeed disturbed a
perception I control, that the accuracy of the science
matters much more than the ego of the scientist. You act
as though you control for the opposite relationship.

                        MT:

As for this “disturbance causes output” and
Bill’s message, Bill mistakenly thought that
by “disturbance” I meant "causes of
disturbance, which are permanently
unknowable and irrelevant.

                    RM: If you read Bill's post more carefully I

think you’ll see that he also considered the
possibility that by “disturbance” you also meant
the effect of the disturbance on the controlled
variable.

            Yes, he complained, wrongly, that I used the word in

both ways, as source and as signal.

                        MT:

Can you seriously contend that when a
disturbance changes the variable you call
the controlled environmental variable, the
output does not change to compensate?

                    RM: Yes, I can contend it, as did Bill in his

post. Right here:

                              BP:If I've untangled this set of

nested negatives correctly, you’re
saying

                              that the perceptual signal _does_

vary in a “coordinated” way (whatever

                              that means) with the disturbing

influence.

BP: ** But this is exactly what I
am trying to tell you is your
primary**

mistake . The perceptual
signal does NOT vary in a way that
correlates

                              with any particular disturbing

variable. [emphasis mine]

            Did you read what you quoted? And what you said

yesterday and above. Bill said that the perceptual
variable does not correlate with any disturbing
variable, just as I said in the message to which you
replied yesterday. So Bill is AGREEING with me, not
contradicting me in any way. You, however, insist that
the output variation is uncorrelated with the
disturbance variation. I don’t think Bill would agree
with you.

                    RM: I will add that it is also because the

perceptual signal is a simultaneous result of
disturbances and the system’s own outputs: that
is, p = o + d. This kindergarten math is enough
to prove that the output of a control system
does not change to compensate for
disturbance-caused changes in the controlled
variable (p) because those changes are mixed
with changes being produced by the output of the
system itself.

            I don't remember anyone disagreeing with that. Do you?

…

                    RM: By the way, do I get to call you the

“enemy of PCT” if you don’t withdraw your papers
from LCS IV at my request;-)

            You do if you can show that the likely effect of

somebody who might become interested in PCT would be put
off learning more because he would think PCT research is
conducted by such incompetents. You don’t if all you can
say is that my chapter is wrong because you say so. Any
paper can be wrong. What is incompetent is to allow the
error to remain uncorrected in the literature once the
error has been pointed out.

            Martin

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_14:43:48]

HB: But the problem I see is that you [Rick] will not stop “chewing” few laboratory experiments and make conclussions out of them even if you see that many more other life examples significantly deviate from your conclussions you got from those few laboratory experiments.

RM: Do you see the same problem with Bill Powers approach to PCT, which is a result of his “chewing” on a few laboratory experiments?

Â

You are sticking to them although probably all others on CSGnet realized in these years after Bill passed away, that something is wrong with interpretation of your tests and experiments.

RM: Since my experiments are of exactly the same type as Bill’s, being aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior, then the same things must be wrong with the interpretations of Bill’s experiments as are wrong with those of mine. So I would be interested in hearing what is wrong with the interpretations of our experiments. If, however, there is something wrong with the interpretations of my experiments but not Bill’s (which I presume is what you believe to be the case) then could you please describe what is wrong with the interpretations of my experiments and explain why the interpretations of Bill’s experiments are not wrong.Â

ThanksÂ

RickÂ

···

On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 10:30 AM “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_19:21:05]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.15.02]

        RM: The variable you are controlling that Bill knows he

can’t budge is “information theory is compatible with PCT”.
As long as you control for this variable you will not be
able to understand some of the most important aspects of
PCT.

MT: I guess you didn't read my post to which you are replying. What I

said there is that if variance analysis is compatible with PCT, then
so is information theory analysis. That’s just a mathematical fact.
not an opinion (Garner and McGill, Psychometrika, 21/3, Sept 1956)).
If Bill didn’t believe it, that’s not the only mathematical fact he
didn’t believe, which doesn’t make him correct. He also didn’t
believe in Laplace Transforms as they are used by the engineering
community. Unfortunately experience and analysis have showed them to
be correct, not Bill.

RM: Since PCT is Bill’s theory and Bill was quite adamant
about information theory not being compatible with PCT (indeed, as Bill alluded
to in his post, he and I demonstrated this to you over and over again using
experimental data and mathematical analysis) it seems to me that it would be
polite of you to call your theory something other than PCT. Maybe “Bizarro PCT”; it looks kind of like PCT, but isn’t.Â

        RM: ... We had a long discussion on CSGNet about whether a

controlled environmental variable, a CEV, is an entity
separate from the perception of that variable. You (and
everyone else) said it was; I said it wasn’t. But in one
elegant sentence in his reply to you that I posted, Bill
confirms my position

MT: That's your cogent comment, but the following "is a consequence"

line is not. It so happens that I now agree that you were correct
all along. I imagine you will find some way to show that I don’t
agree with you, but that’s your prerogative.

RM: I’m afraid I did find that you don’t appear to agree with me. You say:Â

Â

MT: Only to the extent that

changes in the CEV/perception reflect changes in real reality is
control possible.

RM: This makes no sense at all given the definition of the controlled variable in PCT. The controlled variable is a function of environmental variables. Environmental variables are what we take to be “real reality”. Changes in the controlled variable reflect changes in a function of variables in real reality. Therefore, changes in the controlled variable necessarily reflect changes in the function of variables in real reality that defines the controlled variable.Â

RM: That is, the perceptual signal is the CEV;
the CEV exists only as a perceptual variable defined by the
perceptual function. The CEV is a function of “real”
environmental variables but that function exists only if
there system that is able to compute it – a perciving
system, such as a living organism.

MT: Agreed.

RM: Great. But then I don’t understand why you said “Only to the extent that changes in the CEV/perception reflect changes in real reality is control possible”? Perhaps what you meant to say was “Only to the extent that the control system can affect the variables in real reality that are the basis of the controlled variable/perception is control possible”.Â

        RM: And the power law looks like an input-output phenomenon:

organisms seem to slow down (output) through curves (input).
So my paper showing that this appearance is an illusion was
a rather strong disturbance to the idea that information
theory is compatible with PCT and it got the predictable
reaction.Â

MT: Hogwash. The  paper disturbed several perceptions, of which that was

one. If you remember my published review, I explicitly said that
your paper had no bearing on whether the effect was an illusion.

It's beyond me how you manage to drag information theory into a

discussion of what went on during the year that several of us were
explaining where your maths went wrong, and demonstrating
experimentally (Alex) that what you said could not possibly be
right.

Â

RM: My “maths” were not wrong and no one demonstrated experimentally that what I said could not possibly be right. My “maths” were exactly the same as those used in all studies of the power law. And using those “maths” I showed what had already been found in two papers by power law researchers; that the power coefficient found by regressing log curvature on log velocity depends on the variance of a third variable that is typically left out of the regression – the log of a variable that we called “cross product” but which these other researchers called “affine velocity”. The fact that the power law is an example of a behavioral illusion was explained in the original paper and demonstrated experimentally in my reply to the replies: it’s because the varying position of the object moved is a controlled variable so that any observed property of this movement, such as the power law, tells you nothing about how the movement was produced. Your reply to our paper reflected a considerable lack of understanding of PCT; your saying that my paper demonstrated that I was the “enemy of PCT” – and an incompetent one at that – is irony on steroids.Â

            MT:

Can you seriously contend that when a disturbance
changes the variable you call the controlled
environmental variable, the output does not change to
compensate? Â

        RM: Yes, I can contend it, as did Bill in his post. Right

here:

                  BP:If I've untangled this set of nested

negatives correctly, you’re saying

                  that the perceptual signal _does_ vary in a

“coordinated” way (whatever

that means) with the disturbing influence.

BP: ** But this is exactly what I am trying to
tell you is your primary**

mistake . The perceptual signal does NOT
vary in a way that correlates

                  with any particular disturbing variable.

[emphasis mine]

MT: Did you read what you quoted? And what you said yesterday and above.

Bill said that the perceptual variable does not correlate with any
disturbing variable, just as I said in the message to which you
replied yesterday. So Bill is AGREEING with me, not contradicting me
in any way. You, however, insist that the output variation is
uncorrelated with the disturbance variation. I don’t think Bill
would agree with you.

RM: I don’t see how you could say that Bill was agreeing with you when he says “But this is exactly what I am trying to tell you is your primary mistake”. Actually, scratch that. I know very well how you could say that. Â

        RM: I will add that it is also because the perceptual

signal is a simultaneous result of disturbances and the
system’s own outputs: that is, p = o + d. This kindergarten
math is enough to prove that the output of a control system
does not change to compensate for disturbance-caused changes
in the controlled variable (p) because those changes are
mixed with changes being produced by the output of the
system itself.Â

MT: I don’t remember anyone disagreeing with that. Do you?

Â

RM: I believe you said that a change in the disturbance to a
controlled variable leads to a compensating change in the output of a control
system. If you think that that is the case then you disagree with what I said
above, since (as you seem to now agree) the controlled variable and the
perceptual signal are the same variable; since changes in the controlled variable are produced by a combination of disturbances and system outputs the same is true for changes in the perceptual signal that is an analog of the controlled variable.Â

        RM: By the way, do I get to call you the "enemy of PCT"

if you don’t withdraw your papers from LCS IV at my
request;-)

MT: You do if you can show that the likely effect of somebody who might

become interested in PCT would be put off learning more because he
would think PCT research is conducted by such incompetents.

RM: I’ll see what I can do;-)

Best

Rick

Â

···

You

don’t if all you can say is that my chapter is wrong because you say
so. Any paper can be wrong. What is incompetent is to allow the
error to remain uncorrected in the literature once the error has
been pointed out.

Martin

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.23.50]

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_19:21:05]

[Martin Taylor 2019.03.28.15.02]

                ,,,MT: That's your cogent comment, but the following

“is a consequence” line is not. It so happens that I
now agree that you were correct all along. I imagine
you will find some way to show that I don’t agree
with you, but that’s your prerogative.

        RM: I'm afraid I did find that you don't appear to agree

with me.

Spectacular! You had to look really hard to do it, and then you

restate as the truth the very thing with which you disagreed!

You say:

          MT: Only to the extent that changes

in the CEV/perception reflect changes in real reality is
control possible.

          RM: This makes

no sense at all given the definition of the controlled
variable in PCT. The controlled variable is a * function* of environmental variables. Environmental variables
are what we take to be “real reality”. Changes in the
controlled variable reflect changes in a function
of variables in real reality. Therefore, changes in the
controlled variable necessarily reflect changes in the
function of variables in real reality that defines the
controlled variable.

RM: That is, the perceptual signal is
the CEV; the CEV exists only as a perceptual
variable defined by the perceptual function. The
CEV is a function of “real” environmental
variables but that function exists only if there
system that is able to compute it – a perciving
system, such as a living organism.

MT: Agreed.

        RM: Great. But then I don't understand why you said "Only

to the extent that changes in the CEV/perception reflect
changes in real reality is control possible"? Perhaps what
you meant to say was “Only to the extent that the control
system can affect the variables in real reality that are the
basis of the controlled variable/perception is control
possible”.

OK. I guess you are asserting that when "the control system can

affect the variables in real reality that are the basis of the
controlled variable/perception" the they can affect the perception,
but this will not happen if changes in the CEV/Perception actually
reflect changes in real reality. Fantastic!

                  RM: And the power law looks like an

input-output phenomenon: organisms seem to slow
down (output) through curves (input). So my paper
showing that this appearance is an illusion was a
rather strong disturbance to the idea that
information theory is compatible with PCT and it
got the predictable reaction.

          MT: Hogwash. The  paper disturbed several perceptions, of

which that was one. If you remember my published review, I
explicitly said that your paper had no bearing on whether
the effect was an illusion.

          It's beyond me how you manage to

drag information theory into a discussion of what went on
during the year that several of us were explaining where
your maths went wrong, and demonstrating experimentally
(Alex) that what you said could not possibly be right.

          RM: My "maths"

were not wrong and no one demonstrated experimentally that
what I said could not possibly be right.

      Why you say either of

those things puts me in mind of Kelly Ann Conway’s “Alternate
reality”. That reality is perhaps what you truly believe to be
true. That’s OK, but you are in a very small minority on both
counts.

          My "maths" were

exactly the same as those used in all studies of the power
law. And using those “maths” I showed what had already
been found in two papers by power law researchers; that
the power coefficient found by regressing log curvature on
log velocity depends on the variance of a third variable
that is typically left out of the regression – the log of
a variable that we called “cross product” but which these
other researchers called “affine velocity”. The fact that
the power law is an example of a behavioral illusion was
explained in the original paper and demonstrated
experimentally in my reply to the replies: it’s because
the varying position of the object moved is a controlled
variable so that any observed property of this movement,
such as the power law, tells you nothing about how the
movement was produced. Your reply to our paper reflected a
considerable lack of understanding of PCT; your saying
that my paper demonstrated that I was the “enemy of PCT”
– and an incompetent one at that – is irony on
steroids.

                      MT:

Can you seriously contend that when a
disturbance changes the variable you call the
controlled environmental variable, the output
does not change to compensate?

                  RM: Yes, I can contend it, as did Bill in his

post. Right here:

                            BP:If I've untangled this set of

nested negatives correctly, you’re
saying

                            that the perceptual signal _does_

vary in a “coordinated” way (whatever

                            that means) with the disturbing

influence.

BP: ** But this is exactly what I am
trying to tell you is your primary**

mistake . The perceptual signal
does NOT vary in a way that correlates

                            with any particular disturbing

variable. [emphasis mine]

          MT: Did you read what you quoted? And what you said

yesterday and above. Bill said that the perceptual
variable does not correlate with any disturbing variable,
just as I said in the message to which you replied
yesterday. So Bill is AGREEING with me, not contradicting
me in any way. You, however, insist that the output
variation is uncorrelated with the disturbance variation.
I don’t think Bill would agree with you.

          RM:

I don’t see how you could say that Bill was agreeing with
you when he says “But this is exactly what I am trying to
tell you is your primary mistake”. Actually, scratch that.
I know very well how you could say that.

I did read through all of Bill's posting as you copied it. I was

interested to find that in what Bill quoted of my writing that even
as long ago as 1996 I had been toying with the connection circuit
between levels that I attributed more recently to Seth and Friston
(2016), in which a level N perceptual function has as inputs both
the reference value and the error value from a supporting level N-1
control loop, rather than just the perceptual value, incorporating
the Powers “imagination connection” permanently rather than just
switching it in under particular conditions. Maybe that’s why the
Seth-Friston circuit made so much sense to me 20 years later.

Bill said that the PERCEPTUAL signal does not correlate with the

disturbance, which is what I said in the first message nd repeated
in the second. You cited Bill’s “The perceptual signal does NOT vary
in a way that correlates with any particular disturbing variable” as
evidence that the OUTPUT signal does not correlate with the
disturbance, and doubled down on that in the current message, and
gong beyond that to insist that the OUTPUT variation does not change
to compensate for a change in the disturbance.

But Bill's quote starts by saying "If I have untangled...". Nowhere

in the tangled “set of nested negatives” is perception mentioned or
implied. The text that confused him says that only if the forms of
the functions relate in some way to the disturbance value can he
legitimately criticize the analysis and experiments he was
criticizing. Bill gratuitously inserted the perceptual signal into
his response to that. By inserting the perceptual signal he could
talk about my “primary mistake”, and dismiss what I actually had
said.

Incidentally, in Bill's message I see a couple of things that

suggest I have been remembering Bill as more clever than this
posting reveals. Maybe he was just having a bad day when he wrote
it. Firstly, he uses in almost all place where I use the word
“disturbance” an assertion that by “disturbance” I meant the sources
of the many external influences on the CEV, in order to discredit
arguments in which I used the varying value of the disturbing
signal. Secondly, when he sees something he doesn’t understand, he
says it is wrong or nonsense or gobbledegook. Neither of those are
techniques likely to lead to an increase in scientific
understanding. Nor is your taking Bill’s quote entirely out of
context likely to advance any part of the current thread.

I really am going to try not to reply to any more such nonsense in

this thread, considering the extreme lengths to which you find you
must go to prove that I still disagree with you even when I
acknowledge that you were correct all along when I previously
disagreed with you. You really are controlling with a very strong
gain for perceiving me to be wrong about even acknowledging my
mistake and your previous correctness.What higher-level perception
is brought closer to its reference when I am wrong about everything
than when I am right about anything at all? I’ve never encountered
this phenomenon anywhere else or with anyone else.

Martin

[_Boris_Hartman]

Well Rick,

It’s good that you start thinking on your problematic “chewing” the same laboratory experiments…

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2019 10:45 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: [New post] Translating Predictive Coding Into Perceptual Control

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_14:43:48]

On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 10:30 AM “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

HB: But the problem I see is that you [Rick] will not stop “chewing” few laboratory experiments and make conclussions out of them even if you see that many more other life examples significantly deviate from your conclussions you got from those few laboratory experiments.

RM: Do you see the same problem with Bill Powers approach to PCT, which is a result of his “chewing” on a few laboratory experiments?

HB : Of course I did. That was the cause of our conflict and proposal of “Arrow” in diagram p. 191 (B:CP) around avg. 2009. The problem stayed unsolved till today.

You are sticking to them although probably all others on CSGnet realized in these years after Bill passed away, that something is wrong with interpretation of your tests and experiments.

RM: Since my experiments are of exactly the same type as Bill’s, being aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior,

HB : The problem is not whether your experiments are the same as Bills, the problem is that your interpretation is not the same as Bills’. Your interprtation is RCT (Ricks Control Theory) and Bills’ interprtation is PCT (Perceptual Control Thaory). Do you want me to “copy-paste” the difference between theories (51x). I criticized your approach when he was present. And of course I offered him upgrade to PCT. He didn’t accept cooperation. He wanted full rights.

And PCT is not about modeling behavior. It’s General Theory about modeling how organisms function. Remember Anniversary. Shall I “copy-paste” for 51x.

RM : …then the same things must be wrong with the interpretatiions of Bill’s experiments as are wrong with those of mine.

HB : This is the problem. Your interpretation is so different from his that you should change it toward Bills interpretation. Shall I “copy-paste” for 51x.

RM : So I would be interested in hearing what is wrong with the interpretations of our experiments.

HB : Again. Your theory RCT is wrongly representing experiments. You see “differently” CEV as Bill did. Aagain (51x) your RCT theory :

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

1. CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

3. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.

4. INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

5. COMPARATOR : ???

6. ERROR SIGNAL : ???

HB : This is of course totaly wrong theory of human functioning.

And this is Bills’ PCT explanation of experiments, his interpretation of “CEV”

PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shhown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Bill P (B:CP)

1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.

HB : Your theory RCT is dispersed over CSGnet archives through all these years that Bill passed away. You can visit also our first conversation after he died. You obviously wanted to change PCT into RCT with adding “Controlled Variable” into external environment and so on. Go and read it. Â

HB : Do you understand where problem is ? If you compare your interpretation with life situations like : sunshining, sleeping, walking…. Your theory does not work. And Bills theory works. Do you understand where is the problem. When you affirmed at least on one occasion that your thinking is the same as Bills’ he answered that it isn’t. No thinking process and perception will be the same in any two persons you compare. There will be always individual construction of perceptions in the hierarchy. Do you understand the problem you have ?

RM : If, however, there is something wrong with the interpretations of my experiments but not Bill’s (which I presume is what you believe to be the case) then could you please describe what is wrong with the interpretations of my experiments and explain why the interpretations of Bill’s experiments are not wrong.

HB : As I said before and show you the difference with LCS III diagram and definitonjs of control loop it is more then obvious the difference in your and his thinking (constructions of perceptions). Bills’ theory is PCT and yours is RCT. Do you understand the difference ? You are differently perceiving and processing perceptions of CEV if I understood right what CEV is ?

Boris

Thanks

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2019-03-29_12:23:30]

HB : Again. Your theory RCT is wrongly representing experiments. You see “differently” CEV 😊 as Bill did. Aagain (51x) your RCT theory :

RM: I believe that I see the CEV exactly the same way Bill did. CEV (controlled or “complex” environmental variable) is not a term that Bill cared for or used very much. The term was invented by Martin Taylor to refer to the variable in the environment that corresponds to the perception being controlled by a control system. It is basically equivalent to “controlled variable” (or “controlled quantity”, which was the term Bill preferred when he wrote B:CP). But the problem with the term (from Bill and my perspective) is that it implies that all perceptual variables correspond to environmental (physical) variables when, in fact, probably only some of the lowest level perceptual variables, intensity perceptions, correspond to actual physical variables, such as pressure on the skin. Most controlled variables are functions of physical environment variables, such the perception of honesty or community.Â

HB: And this is Bills’ PCT explanation of experiments, his interpretation of “CEV” 😊

Â

PCT Definitions of control loop :

RM: None of these are Bill’s definition of a CEV because Bill never defined a CEV. Bill did define a controlled quantity (later to be called a “controlled variable”) in B:CP as: “An environmental variable corresponding to the perceptual signal in a control system; a physical quantity (or a function of several physical quantities) that is affected and controlled by the outputs from a control system’s output function”. [emphasis mine] This is exactly the way I define controlled variable, though I would emphasize the fact that controlled variables are most often a function of physical quantities rather than being physical variables themselves.Â

RM: So why does this matter? Because understanding the behavior of organisms, from a PCT point of view, means determining what perceptual variables organisms are controlling when the behave. And determining the perceptual variables an organism is controlling is equivalent to finding the function of physical variables that define the controlled variable (or variables) the organism is controlling. A good example of what this means is described in Powers’ “Feedback model of behavior” paper (reprinted starting on p. 47 of LCS I) where Bill uses a mathematical version of a control model to show that the shock avoidance behavior of rats can be accurately modeled as the control of a perception. Two different hypotheses about the controlled variable were used as the perceptual variable in the model: probability of shock, p.s, and rate of shock, r.s. The model that was controlling p.s gave a slightly better fit to the data than the model that controlled r.s. Note that p.s and r.s are functions of physical variables – shock occurrence and time interval. The controlled variable that, when used as the perceptual variable in the model, gives the best fit to the data, is considered the best approximation to the perception being controlled in shock avoidance behavior. I’ve got a couple of papers myself demonstrating how to use this method to determine the variables people are controlling when they intercept moving objects: Â

• Shaffer, D. M., Marken, R. S., Dolgov, I. and Maynor, A. B. (2013) Chasin’ Choppers: Using Unpredictable Trajectories to Test Theories of Object Interception, Attention, Perception and Psychophysics, 75, 1496- 1506
• Shaffer, D. M., Marken, R. S., Dolgov, I. and Maynor, A. B. (2015) Catching objects thrown to oneself: Testing the generality of a control strategy for object interception, Perception,44, 400-409

RM: So it’s important, from a PCT research point of view, to understand that controlled variables are equivalent to perceptual variables in the sense that both are functions of physical variables in the environment. It’s important because the goal of PCT research is to determine the nature of this function in order to know what organisms are doing ; that is, to know what perceptual variables they are controlling.Â

Best

Rick

Â

···

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 12:06 AM “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

Bill P (B:CP):

1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.
   Bill P (B:CP):

1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system
   Bill P (LCS III):…the output functioon shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives  signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.
   Bill P (B:CP)

1.  ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.
   Â

Â

Â

HB : Your theory RCT is dispersed over CSGnet archives through all these years that Bill passed away. You can visit also our first conversation after he died. You obviously wanted to change PCT into RCT with adding “Controlled Variable” into external environment and so on. Go and read it. Â

Â

Â

HB : Do you understand where problem is ? If you compare your interpretation with life situations like : sunshining, sleeping, walking…. Your theory does not work. And Bills theory works. Do you understand where is the problem. When you affirmed at least on one occasion that your thinking is the same as Bills’ he answered that it isn’t. No thinking process and perception will be the same in any two persons you compare. There will be always individual construction of perceptions in the hierarchy. Do you understand the problem you have ?

Â

RM : If, however, there is something wrong with the interpretations of my experiments but not Bill’s (which I presume is what you believe to be the case) then could you please describe what is wrong with the interpretations of my experiments and explain why the interpretations of Bill’s experiments are not wrong.Â

Â

HB : As I said before and show you the difference with LCS III diagram and definitonjs of control loop it is more then obvious the difference in your and his thinking (constructions of perceptions). Bills’ theory is PCT and yours is RCT. Do you understand the difference ? You are differently perceiving and processing perceptions of CEV if I understood right what CEV is ?

Â

Boris

Â

Â

ThanksÂ

Â

RickÂ

Â

–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 12:06 AM “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

Well Rick,

Â

It’s good that you start thinking on your problematic “chewing” the same laboratory experiments…

Â

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2019 10:45 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: [New post] Translating Predictive Coding Into Perceptual Control

Â

Â

[Rick Marken 2019-03-28_14:43:48]

Â

On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 10:30 AM “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

Â

HB: But the problem I see is that you [Rick] will not stop “chewing” few laboratory experiments and make conclussions out of them even if you see that many more other life examples significantly deviate from your conclussions you got from those few laboratory experiments.

Â

RM: Do you see the same problem with Bill Powers approach to PCT, which is a result of his “chewing” on a few laboratory experiments?

Â

HB : Of course I did. That was the cause of our conflict and proposal of “Arrow” in diagram p. 191 (B:CP) around avg. 2009. The problem stayed unsolved till today.

Â

You are sticking to them although probably all others on CSGnet realized in these years after Bill passed away, that something is wrong with interpretation of your tests and experiments.

Â

RM: Since my experiments are of exactly the same type as Bill’s, being aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior,

Â

HB : The problem is not whether your experiments are the same as Bills, the problem is that your interpretation is not the same as Bills’. Your interprtation is RCT (Ricks Control Theory) and Bills’ interprtation is PCT (Perceptual Control Thaory). Do you want me to “copy-paste” the difference between theories (51x). I criticized your approach when he was present. And of course I offered him upgrade to PCT. He didn’t accept cooperation. He wanted full rights.

Â

And PCT is not about modeling behavior. It’s General Theory about modeling how organisms function. Remember Anniversary. Shall I “copy-paste” for 51x.

Â

Â

RM : …then the same things must be wrong with the interpretations of Bill’s experiments as are wrong with those of mine.

Â

HB : This is the problem. Your interpretation is so different from his that you should change it toward Bills interpretation. Shall I “copy-paste” for 51x.

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RM : So I would be interested in hearing what is wrong with the interpretations of our experiments.

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HB : Again. Your theory RCT is wrongly representing experiments. You see “differently” CEV 😊 as Bill did. Aagain (51x) your RCT theory :

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RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

1. CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
3. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
4. INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
5. COMPARATOR : ???
6. ERROR SIGNAL : ???
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HB : This is of course totaly wrong theory of human functioning.

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And this is Bills’ PCT explanation of experiments, his interpretation of “CEV” 😊

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PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.
   Bill P (B:CP):

1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system
   Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shown in it’s own box reppresents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives  signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.
   Bill P (B:CP)

1.  ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.
   Bill P (B:CP) :

1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.
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HB : Your theory RCT is dispersed over CSGnet archives through all these years that Bill passed away. You can visit also our first conversation after he died. You obviously wanted to change PCT into RCT with adding “Controlled Variable” into external environment and so on. Go and read it. Â

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HB : Do you understand where problem is ? If you compare your interpretation with life situations like : sunshining, sleeping, walking…. Your theory does not work. And Bills theory works. Do you understand where is the problem. When you affirmed at least on one occasion that your thinking is the same as Bills’ he answered that it isn’t. No thinking process and perception will be the same in any two persons you compare. There will be always individual construction of perceptions in the hierarchy. Do you understand the problem you have ?

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RM : If, however, there is something wrong with the interpretations of my experiments but not Bill’s (which I presume is what you believe to be the case) then could you please describe what is wrong with the interpretations of my experiments and explain why the interpretations of Bill’s experiments are not wrong.Â

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HB : As I said before and show you the difference with LCS III diagram and definitonjs of control loop it is more then obvious the difference in your and his thinking (constructions of perceptions). Bills’ theory is PCT and yours is RCT. Do you understand the difference ? You are differently perceiving and processing perceptions of CEV if I understood right what CEV is ?

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Boris

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–

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[_Boris_Hartman]

Rick, let us cut the bullshitting. If it’s obviously that two persons can’t have the same perceptions and same thoughts. If you have these characteristics then you must be a medicine phenomenon and spiritualist to think the same as Bill. I have enough of your manipulations. Enough is enough.

You can’t be that stupid that you think that two persons can have the same perception and the same control in hierarchy so that milions of nerv currents CNS would be the same. Do you read what you are writing ? You are bitting you personal record in talking nonsense on CSGnet.

Your perception and control of that perception is RCT and Bills’ is PCT. You just have to accept that differences and start thinking in PCT language like you showed that you can. Otherwise you’ll obviously keep PCT in “Dark Age” with your RCT.

Powers Ladies and some others think that friendship is on the first place and science on the second and so they can “look you through fingers” in your manipulations and spreading of RCT (Ricks Control Theory). It’s a disaster and total shame what is happening on CSGnet, just because of you. You are the central problem on forum which is dedicated to PCT and memory to Powers work. Not yours. Do you understand. I’ll start charging for giving you instructions about PCT. I have enough of your sneaky approcah.

You can’t change what you wrote though last five or six years. Or you can ? I’m not sure. But Dag seems to be good guardian.

HB : I’ll try to answer just in short although my answers to such your insinuations were written for over 50x. You can’t be that dumb.

Your central insinuation that definition of “control quantitty” in B:CP is the same as yours about “controlled variable” in external environment is nonsense. I explained to you and Fred and some other members that definiton significantly deviate from other Bills’ work.

Bill, B:CP : “An environmental variable corresponding to the perceptual signal in a control system; a physical quantity (or a function of several physical quantities) that is affected and controlled by the outputs from a control system’s output function”.

What’s wrong with this definition :

1. Output in other PCT work is not controllled. It’s PCT mantra. So external environment can’t be afected and controlled as in PCT “output can’t be controlled”. Organisms function in just one way, not in many ways. So output is functioning the same everytime as affecting environment (see other definitions), not once like RCT and once PCT.

2. There are many definitons of “Controlled quantitty” in B:CP. One goes like this :

Bill P (B:CP):

The controlled quantity is defined strictly by the behaving system’s perceptual computers; it may or may not be identifiable as an objective (need I put in quotes?) property of, or entity in, the physical environment. In general an observer will not, therefore, be able to see what a control system is controlling

HB : It’s obviously that "Controlled quantity is perceptual signal and is formed exclusively in controlling system. Also definition of “error” shows that “controlled quantity” is something that is constituting “mismatch” in comparator and produce “error”.

Bill P (B:CP)

ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

HB : The same thing for “controlled quantity” was described by Rupert :

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment.

HB : “Controlled Quantity” (perceptual signal) is inside the system and it’s not “equivalent” to anything outside (it’s analog), because observer can’t conclude (in general) what controlling system is controlling. It may or may not identifiable in external environment (it’s more like guessing).

1. If you’ll go through all the Glossary of B:CP you’ll not find any explanation or definition which will support the definition of “Controlled quantitty” in Glossary in the sense that it’s happening in external environment as in RCT. So it’s obviously that this could be one of places in Bills’s literature where he could change his mind “for a moment” as it’s maybe not clear enough. But if you understand that everything in definition is happening “in a controling system”, then definition might work as other definition of “Controlled Quantity” presented above.

But you have to understand “Controlled Quantity” at least in accordance to all other definitions of control loop. But you probably don’t understand as you don’t want to accept these definitions and you don’t accept diagram LCS III to be showing the bases of PCT. So you have a problem with understanding at least 90 % of Bills’ literature.

PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Bill P (B:CP)

1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

Bill P (B:CP) :

1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.

HB : So conclussion is that definition of “Control Quanitiy” in B:CP Glossary does not represent or it’s even the same as anything in RCT (Ricks Control Theory) because there is no “controlled variable” in PCT in the external environment – generally speaking, Generally speaking organisms are not functioning in RCT style :

RCT (Ricks Control Theory) definition of control loop

1. CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

3. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.

4. INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

5. COMPARATOR : ???

6. ERROR SIGNAL : ???

HB : If you think that RCT works with all behaviors like PCT, than explain to us how organisms are functioning in sleeping from RCT view :

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states

HB : This is explanation from PCT view, because organisms are obviously controlling inside. Let me see your RCT explanation how organism function with outside control in sleeping.

RM: So it’s important, from a PCT research point of view, to understand that controlled variables are equivalent to perceptual variables in the sense that both are functions of physical variables in the environment.

HB : What a nonsense. “Perceptual variable” is the only “Controlled Variable” in the whole control loop. There is no both of them, because they are representing the same thing in PCT : it’s only perceptual signal that is “controlled variable”.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

HB : But in RCT (Ricks Control Theory) it can mean anything. In imagination everything is possible.

RM : It’s important because the goal of PCT research is to determine the nature of this function in order to know what organisms are doing ; that is, to know what perceptual variables they are controlling.

HB : You are bullshitting Rick. For researching in PCT we use “Test for the controlled variable” or TCV (how nervous system function). That’s how we can try to find out what “perceptual variables” people are controlling. Since “Controlled quantiy” is quite hard to “understand” as “visible” in external environment…So again…

Bill P (B:CP):

The controlled quantity is defined strictly by the behaving system’s perceptual computers; it may or may not be identifiable as an objective (need I put in quotes?) property of, or entity in, the physical environment. In general an observer will not, therefore, be able to see what a control system is controlling

HB : …it’s veery hard to determine what people are really controlling, because as we said before “control” is internal process.

HB : If control would be external process you would have no problem in determining what people control because anybody could perceive it. But that is not so, because nothing is controlled in external environment. So in PCT everything is about controlling inside and RCT is about controlling outside what is wrong. So we use TCV for seraching for what is controlled.

Bill P (B:CP) :

The TCV is method for identifying control organization of nervous system……

There will be ambiguous cases : the disturbance may be only weakly opposed. That effect could be due not to poor control system but to a definition of actions that are only remotely linked to the actual controlled quantity.

For example : if when you open the window I sometimes get up and close it, you might conclude that I am controlling the position of the window when in fact I only shut it if the room gets too chilly to suit me. I could be controlling sensed temperature very precisely, when necesarry, but by a variety of means : shutting the window, turning up the termostat, putting on a sweater, or exercising. You are on the track of the right controlled quantity, but haven’t got the right definition yet. It is safest to assume that an ambiguous result from TCV is the fault of the hypotehsis and to continue looking for a better definition of the controlled quantity.

Boris

Boris

xupery