[From: Bruce Nevin (Wed 920715 13:05:23)]
(Rick Marken (920715.0900) ) --
You are very close to a point that I was trying to communicate.
You claim that the relationship between adjacent orders of control
systems (such that CSs of order n are constituted of CSs of order n-1)
evidently must include the following:
Variables used to implement control for order n must not be
controlled variables for order n-1.
The level n variable is not controlled on level n-1, and it is a
cause-effect property of the cell's behavioral outputs on level n-1.
As you say, a neuron cell
generate[s] axon potentials (spikes) at a rate proportional to the
integrated (over time and number of dendritic inputs) electrical charge
at the cell body. This functional property of the neural cell ( rate of
spiking proportional to charge on cell body) is not "controlled" by the
neuron itself; it is a cause-effect property of the cell's activity.
The relationship of ECS function to intracellular control, you claim, is
an incidental byproduct. It is only the physics of the cell's body
(level n-1) that the ECS (level n) uses, cellular metabolism being only
used to maintain the viability of a segment of "wire" in place.
But it is a byproduct of behavioral outputs ("the cell's activity")
which presumably are variable means for achieving uniform results that
matter to the cell. A cell in a given state controls a disturbance of a
given sort reliably with behavioral outputs of a corresponding given
sort. These behavioral outputs (including internal changes) can have
cause-and-effect consequences remote from the controlled variable and
the disturbance, which are not themselves controlled. Thus, it is
possible that these changes in the cell's observed behavioral outputs
are cause-effect byproducts of controlling other internal variables
(such as Na concentrations) against disturbance. Exploring this
possibility might lead to some explanations of how learning and
reorganization work.
I am proposing (920709 09:13:52) that reorganization is carried out in
populations of entities of order n-1. If control of order n results in
chronic error in CSs of order n-1, then the CSs of order n-1 control to
correct the error, with behavioral outputs which for a nerve cell might
include growing new axons, detaching or moving or withdrawing
(atrophying?) existing ones, changing receptor sites around, etc. Local
error in a few order n-1 CSs results in learning. Error in many CSs
results in reorganization.
A neuron, as a cell, is probably busy controlling many variables -- such
as concentrations of K+ and Na- ions, etc. The systems controlling these
variables are made out of cell components (like RNA and DNA molecules)
that may be control systems themselves. But one thing a neuron cell does
That is, the variables involved in this functional relationship . . .
are not (as far as I know) perceived and controlled by the cell. For
example, the cell does not have a preferred (reference) spike rate that
it tries to maintain; it just fires at a rate dependent on the charge at
the cell body . . . . It is this input-output characteristic of the
cell's electrical behavior that makes it a useful component of a control
system. The cell responds to input cell body charge with a certain rate
of firing; this is a "dedicated" cause-effect characteristic of the
cell; the cell cannot change the way it responds (firing rate) to input
(cell body charge) -- there is no control involved in this functional
relationship; that is what I mean by functional specificity. In terms of
it's electrical response to electrical stimulation of the dendrites the
cell functions like a wire in a circuit ( with firing rate the analog of
current and cell body charge the analog of voltage). A control system
must be built out of such "functionally specific" components.
To this I would add that the cell does not *want* to change the way it
responds. The firing rate per se does not matter to the cell. Indeed,
it probably does not even "know" that it is changing its electrical
potentials, that these changes constitute "spikes," and that they are
occurring at a variable rate. All of that is invisible to the cell,
*and* *must* *remain* *so* for the higher-order function to maintain its
integrity, as you also point out.
Substitute humans for cells:
A person is busy controlling many variables. The systems controlling
these variables are made out of cells, neural structures, and organs of
perception and execution (probably there's a better word, but I'm in a
rush). But one thing a human does is change the color of its aura.
That is, the variables involved in this functional relationship . . .
are not (as far as I know) perceived and controlled by the human. It is
this input-output characteristic of the human's auric behavior that
makes it a useful component of a control system. The human responds to
changes in color of a neighboring human's aura by changes in its own
aura. This is a "dedicated" cause-effect characteristic of the human;
the human cannot change the way it responds (aura color) to input (aura
color) -- there is no control involved in this functional relationship;
that is what I mean by functional specificity. In terms of it's auric
response to auric stimulation of the etheric body the human functions
like a wire in a circuit ( with auric change rate the analog of current
and color the analog of voltage). A control system must be built out of
such "functionally specific" components.
Exploring this possibility might also suggest ways of explaining input
functions and output functions. Must these be separate multi-cellular
structures, or might the metabolism of a single ramified nerve cell be
such that it is not a simple cause-effect "wire" passing neural current
through, but is actually doing the weighting (and the changes of
weighting) of signals? In the case of an input function, the weighting
and changes in weighting of input signals that get combined in the
unified output signal; in the case of an output function, the weighting
and changes in weighting that get applied to the different copies of the
input signal in the process of making them into specific output signals.
In this case, the cell is controlling variables that matter to it, and
as a byproduct differentially weighting electrical potential, which does
not matter to it, in its several branches. The electrical potential in
the dendrite of another cell, on the other side of a synapse, does
matter to it and may disturb variables that it controls; the rate of
peaks "firing" in itself does not matter to it, and is a byproduct of
that control.
People can temporarily arrange themselves so that they function as a
control system -- this is true and I've seen it happen. So in this sense,
social control systems can exist; but these systems are quite transient.
Such things are not control systems of an order above that of humans,
for the simple reason that humans (level n-1) control for creating and
maintaining them (level n). If there are such supra-human organisms,
the variables that matter for them are incidental for us. It may be
that we have a craving to belong to groups and get off on group
participation that is working well (and are frustrated when it is not)
because some aspects of a transhuman organism's function require human
intercommunication as a vehicle. But human intercommunication itself
can be of no import to it, nor can its functioning have any import to
us. Except when it is experiencing error and conflict (chronic error).
That's when we reorganize. Maybe that's when we try to create or change
social institutions.
Bruce
bn@bbn.com