Other minds, other perceptions

[From Oded Maler (980226)]

Rick Marken (980225.1030)]

As I said, I have been doing the test reasonably systematically
on Bruce, Martin and Jeff for the last several years. It's pretty
clear that these fellows only "correct" comments (from me, Bill
or anyone else) that specifically pit PCT against conventional
psychology in some way.

For a neutral observer like myself (with even a slight emotional
tendency to believe that most of psychology is junk) it looks the
other way around: it seems that you are controlling for the perception
that "conventional psychology" (a strange term btw, which is supposed
to denote everything which is not PCT) is completely uselss. While
trying to control this perception of yours, and the "collective"
perception of this group, you find yourself saying what others might
perceive as nonsense and react to it. I am not saying this is the only
"right" interpretation but it is not less plausible than yours (and it
looks more plausible to me).

I agree that it is very difficult to
determine _exactly_ what higher level perceptions are being
controlled by each of these fellows. Actually, one of the
interesting problems with doing the test for higher level controlled
variables like these is that the only system that can monitor
the state of these variables is a human brain. This, for me, is
the main difference between testing for control of variables like
"lateral velocity of ball on retina" and "merits of conventional
psychology". Machines (like computers) can be designed to monitor
the state of variables like lateral velocity while disturbances
are being applied. But no machine (yet) can monitor the state

                                    ^^^^

of a variable like "merits of conventional psychology" while
disturbances (like posts from Bill and myself) are being applied.
Such a machine would have to continuously transform collections
of verbal statements from both the tester (the disturbance
statements) and testee (the output statements) into a numerical
measure of "merits of conventional psychology". If such a
machine existed, I am sure that it would read a continuous
1 (on a 1 to 10 scale) for Bill and me and an 8 or 9 for Bruce,
Martin and Jeff

I think this reflects some philosophical laziness on your part and
refusal to think seriously about the implications of HPCT on questions
of meaning and existence of complex entities. You seem to think that
the passage from defining and measuring cursor position to defining
and measuring "behavior", "conventional psychology" and similar
concepts is smooth, just requiring some more MHz on machines, more
sophisticated sensors, or a modest amount of more research.

One of the interesting questions for PCT research is how one
tests for control of variables that can't be measured by machine.
This is the problem faced by those who want to study control of
what you call "human level" perceptions. The problem is not
that these perceptions are particularly difficult to study -- if
they are perceptions that one person (the testee) can have then
they are perceptions that the tester can have as well;

This seems to be one of the most non-PCT statements I have ever
encountered on this list (unless the meaning of "can" is some kind
of "possible world" stuff, which is irrelevant to experimental
settings here and now).

so the
tester can, in principle, monitor his own perceptions to see
if the testee is protecting these perceptions from disturbance.
This is what I am doing when I test to determine that Bruce et al
are controlling for a high level of "merit of conventional
psychology".

Rather, the problem with the study of these "human level"
variables is making the study _objective_, in the sense that
all obervers would agree that some perception is, indeed,
under control. Having a machine measure the purported controlled
variable solves this objectivity problem for variables like
"lateral velocity".

I don't really know a good way to solve
this problem (to my satisfaction yet) for your "human level"
perceptions.

Well, in this case you are in a good company with most of
humanity and its philosophers.

It's easy to see that Bruce et al are controlling for a particular
perception of the merits of conventional psychology. When
statements critical of conventional psychology are made (by
Bill, Richard Kennaway, myself, etc) there is a big effort to
"correct" these statements. When statements that are not critical
or are supportive of conventional psychology are made there is no
effort to "correct" them (witness the mutual agreement between
Bruce and Martin on the "proof" that disturbances cause output).

As I mentioned at the beginning, it is very easy to see the things
the other way around (and in thoushands of other ways), and since
you agree that this is not an objective thing, maybe it will be
more productive (but less amusing) if you restrict your arguments
with them to the subject matter itself, rather than to unprovable
speculations concerning their motives (a recommendation I find hard
to implement myself, btw :wink:

Regards,

--Oded

[from Jeff Vancouver 980225.0922 EST]

[From Oded Maler (980226)] to Rick Marken (980225.1030)]

Nice post, Oded.

Sincerely,

Jeff

[From Rick Marken (980226.0930)]

Oded Maler (980226) --

Boy, I sure am a big disturbance to some of the perceptions
you're controlling;-)

it seems that you are controlling for the perception that
"conventional psychology"...is completely uselss.

Yes. Of course I am. I say it over and over again. Actually,
a better way to describe what I am controlling for is
"conventional psychology is invalid becuase it is based on
the wrong model -- the lineal causal model".

While trying to control this perception of yours...you find
yourself saying what others might perceive as nonsense and
react to it.

But why do they find statements like "the lineal causal basis
of conventional psychology is wrong" to be nonsense? Just because
it is? I believe they think it is "nonsense" becuase it is a
disturbance to a perception they are controlling (indeed, your
use of the judgmental term "nonsense" to describe my statements
is, in itself, an attempt on your part to dismiss those statements
en mass; it's pretty easy to tell what you are controlling for).

You seem to think that the passage from defining and measuring
cursor position to defining and measuring "behavior",
"conventional psychology" and similar concepts is smooth, just
requiring some more MHz on machines, more sophisticated sensors,
or a modest amount of more research.

No. Not more MHz; different kinds of perceptual functions. Read
B:CP to see how the HPCT model handles the percpetion of "higher
level" variables like events, programs, principles and system
concepts. Basically, my "philosophy" of perception is that each
one of my perceptions, from my perception of the color of the
leaves on the trees outside to my perception of the incompatibility
of control and lineal causality, exists as a signal in my brain.
These signals exist as the result of neural processes that turn
lower level perceptual signals into the perceptual signals that
I experience as "green" and "PCT".

I know a lot more about how the brain produces the perceptual
signal that corresponds to "green" than I do about how the brain
produces the perceptual signal that corresponds to "PCT". But
I believe that the brain, a kind of machine, produces both
perceptions. We have developed machines that can produce a
perceptual signal that corresponds to the perception of degree
of "greenness"; we have not come close to developing a machine
that can produce a perceptual signal that corresponds to
a perception of "degree of PCTness". But god (or evolution) did:
the brain.

Me:

The problem is not that these perceptions are particularly
difficult to study -- if they are perceptions that one person
(the testee) can have then they are perceptions that the tester
can have as well;

Oded:

This seems to be one of the most non-PCT statements I have ever
encountered on this list (unless the meaning of "can" is some kind
of "possible world" stuff, which is irrelevant to experimental
settings here and now).

Could you please explain what is so "non-PCT about it.

By the way, note that you are able to perceive "non PCTness" in
this statement. This suggests to me that your brain is able to
perceive PCTness just as mine is. According to HPCT, there is a
signal in your brain whose magnitude corresponds to the experience
of "degree of PCTness" in lower level perceptions (like words).
Apparently, what you describe verbally as "nonPCT" is what I would
describe as "PCT" so our perceptual functions at that level are
apparently quite different. But the important thing is that you
_can_ perceive "degree of PCTness". So your brain (like mine) can
apparently "compute" these kinds of complex perceptions.

Jeff Vancouver (980225.0930 EST) --

Bill goes on to make the point that the veracity of "conventional
psychology" is not at issue when conducting the TEST. This is
absolutely true.

Yes! And a very important point. When I say that conventional
psychology is invalid, that is a disturbance to your perception
of the merits of conventional psychology, whether conventional
psychology is valid or not! Similarly, when you correct that
disturbance by saying that there are some valid aspects to
conventional psychology, you are correcting your perception of
the validity of conventional psychology, whether conventional
psychology is valid or not.

When I say that you are controlling for the merits of conventional
psychology, that's all I'm saying; you are controlling for that
perception. Whether conventional psychology realy has any merit
is quite another issue. The same applies to me; I am controlling
for a perception of the fundamental invalidity of conventional
psychology. Whether conventional psychology _really is_ invalid
is another issue.

I think it's interesting that you and Bruce and Oded and Martin
and all the others who are controlling for a perception that I
would call "conventional psychology is not invalid" deny so
adamently that you are controlling this perception. This suggests
te me that you are also ontrolling for a perception of "I'm on
board with PCT". Part of being on board with PCT must include being
on board with Bill Powers. So we get statements like this from Jeff:

Nice post, Oded.

in reply to Oded's (980226) spirited attack on my post
[Rick Marken (980225.1030)] discussing ways to use PCT methods
to study control of higher level perceptions and his:

This is a nice post also

in reply to Bill Powers (980225.1233 MST) complimentary
discussion of the same post, in which Bill outline's some of
his ideas about how to study control of these same variables.

The game here is the one Martin and Bruce A. play with exceptional
skill (I mentioned it in an earlier post). The game is to make it
seem like I am a PCT extremist while Bill is the reasonable
advocate of PCT who is willing to consider alternatives.

Well here's a way to find out how much difference there really
is between the perceptions Bill and I are controlling. If there
is much difference, the following statement will be a big
disturbance to Bill's perception of "the merits of conventional
psychology" and he will respond appropriately (correcting my
disturbance). Here we go:

Like me, Bill Powers believes that conventional psychology
is horseshit (has no merit) because it is based on a model of
behavior -- the lineal causal model -- that is flat out wrong.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Rick Marken (980226.1840)]

Well, no response yet from Bill to my little disturbance:

Like me, Bill Powers believes that conventional psychology
is horseshit (has no merit) because it is based on a model of
behavior -- the lineal causal model -- that is flat out wrong.

Maybe he's not paying attention. Let's try another

Bill Powers believes that it is foolish to assert that the
behavioral illusion creates any significant problems for
the foundations of "conventional" psychology. He believes
that such assertions about the behavioral illusion are not
only a _gross_ exageration (making the person asserting this
nonsense look foolish) but that it also alienates psychologists
who might otherwise become fans of PCT.

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Oded Maler (980227) --

Rick Marken (980226.0930)

Oded Maler (980226) --

Boy, I sure am a big disturbance to some of the perceptions
you're controlling;-)

Perhaps, but surely we have different names for this perception.

> While trying to control this perception of yours...you find
> yourself saying what others might perceive as nonsense and
> react to it.

But why do they find statements like "the lineal causal basis
of conventional psychology is wrong" to be nonsense? Just because
it is? I believe they think it is "nonsense" becuase it is a
disturbance to a perception they are controlling (indeed, your
use of the judgmental term "nonsense" to describe my statements
is, in itself, an attempt on your part to dismiss those statements
en mass; it's pretty easy to tell what you are controlling for).

Suppose you were controlling for the correctness of the Christian
dogma, and you were repeating endlessly that at certain time some
piece of bread IS the flesh of christ. This might look nonsense
to me, and I will point it out. Then you would say that I am
controlling for the incorrectness of the Christian dogma, while
I might be completely indifferent to, or even unaware of, this
dogma.

> You seem to think that the passage from defining and measuring
> cursor position to defining and measuring "behavior",
> "conventional psychology" and similar concepts is smooth, just
> requiring some more MHz on machines, more sophisticated sensors,
> or a modest amount of more research.

No. Not more MHz; different kinds of perceptual functions. Read
B:CP to see how the HPCT model handles the percpetion of "higher
level" variables like events, programs, principles and system
concepts. Basically, my "philosophy" of perception is that each
one of my perceptions, from my perception of the color of the
leaves on the trees outside to my perception of the incompatibility
of control and lineal causality, exists as a signal in my brain.
These signals exist as the result of neural processes that turn
lower level perceptual signals into the perceptual signals that
I experience as "green" and "PCT".

The way HPCT "handles" higher level percpetions is much more in a
"descriptive" level than the lower-level ones. This is probably the
best one can do about it, especially because language and meaning are
involved. You seem to attack higer-level psychology because it speaks
in rough terms and non-operational models, and does not comply with
the high modeling standards of PCT, while you really cannot suggest
but a sketch of alternative.

I know a lot more about how the brain produces the perceptual
signal that corresponds to "green" than I do about how the brain
produces the perceptual signal that corresponds to "PCT". But
I believe that the brain, a kind of machine, produces both
perceptions. We have developed machines that can produce a
perceptual signal that corresponds to the perception of degree
of "greenness"; we have not come close to developing a machine
that can produce a perceptual signal that corresponds to
a perception of "degree of PCTness". But god (or evolution) did:
the brain.

What exactly does "correspond" mean in this context?

Me:

> The problem is not that these perceptions are particularly
> difficult to study -- if they are perceptions that one person
> (the testee) can have then they are perceptions that the tester
> can have as well;

Oded:

> This seems to be one of the most non-PCT statements I have ever
> encountered on this list (unless the meaning of "can" is some kind
> of "possible world" stuff, which is irrelevant to experimental
> settings here and now).

Could you please explain what is so "non-PCT about it.

What is the probability that two individuals with different physiology
and different history of re-organization, will develop a perceptual
hierarchy that whatever perception one has, the other will as well?

By the way, note that you are able to perceive "non PCTness" in
this statement. This suggests to me that your brain is able to
perceive PCTness just as mine is. According to HPCT, there is a
signal in your brain whose magnitude corresponds to the experience
of "degree of PCTness" in lower level perceptions (like words).
Apparently, what you describe verbally as "nonPCT" is what I would
describe as "PCT" so our perceptual functions at that level are
apparently quite different. But the important thing is that you
_can_ perceive "degree of PCTness". So your brain (like mine) can
apparently "compute" these kinds of complex perceptions.

According to you, the important thing is that we both can attach the
same *name* P to some perception of ours, although in certain situations
I will label the state-of-affairs as P and you as NOT(P). Is this what
you meant by saying "your brain is able to perceive PCTness just
as mine is"?

[...]

The same applies to me; I am controlling
for a perception of the fundamental invalidity of conventional
psychology. Whether conventional psychology _really is_ invalid
is another issue.

Why didn't you say it in the first place? Some people here
misinterpreted your posts over the years as being part of an attempt
to engage in some kind of scientific conversation :wink:

I think it's interesting that you and Bruce and Oded and Martin
and all the others who are controlling for a perception that I
would call "conventional psychology is not invalid" deny so
adamently that you are controlling this perception. This suggests
te me that you are also ontrolling for a perception of "I'm on
board with PCT". Part of being on board with PCT must include being
on board with Bill Powers.

Once again you extrapolate from your private perceptual hierarchy
to that of others.

--Oded

[From Bill Powers (980227.0801 MST)]

Rick Marken (980226.1840)--

Well, no response yet from Bill to my little disturbance:

Like me, Bill Powers believes that conventional psychology
is horseshit (has no merit) because it is based on a model of
behavior -- the lineal causal model -- that is flat out wrong.

Maybe he's not paying attention. Let's try another

Bill Powers believes that it is foolish to assert that the
behavioral illusion creates any significant problems for
the foundations of "conventional" psychology.

etc..

Whatever it is you're trying to disturb here, I don't seem to be
controlling for it.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (980227.0815)]

Oded Maler (980227) --

Suppose you were controlling for the correctness of the Christian
dogma, and you were repeating endlessly that at certain time some
piece of bread IS the flesh of christ. This might look nonsense
to me, and I will point it out. Then you would say that I am
controlling for the incorrectness of the Christian dogma, while
I might be completely indifferent to, or even unaware of, this
dogma.

Not at all. I would try to figure out what you are controlling for
that makes my saying that some "piece of bread IS the flesh of
christ" a disturbance. It is clearly a disturbance because you are
trying to correct for it by saying it's nonsense. Suppose, in my
efforts to test what you are controlling, I said "Israel is a land
for Jews only". Would you say that that statement is nonsense?
I would bet large sums of shekels that you would _not_ say that
that's " nonsense". How about "The Palestinian people have a
better claim to the land of Israel that the Jews"? Now that's
"nonsense", right.

You can't hide what you are controlling for by calling some
disturbances (the one's that are disturbing) "nonsense"; at least,
you can't hide it from people who know how to Test for controlled
variables.

You seem to attack higer-level psychology because it speaks
in rough terms and non-operational models, and does not comply with
the high modeling standards of PCT, while you really cannot suggest
but a sketch of alternative.

I don't "attack higher-level psychology"; I have said that
"conventional psychology" is based on the wrong model (lineal
causal) so the results obtained in the context of that model are
suspect and must be re-evaluated using methods based on an
understanding of closed loop control. I suppose this would sound
like an "attack" to people who are controlling for perceiving
either wisdom in the status quo or stupidity in the source of the
statement.

Me:

I know a lot more about how the brain produces the perceptual
signal that corresponds to "green" than I do about how the brain
produces the perceptual signal that corresponds to "PCT".

Oded:

What exactly does "correspond" mean in this context?

Variations in the (observed) perceptual signal covary with
variations in the (experienced) perception.

Me:

The problem is not that these perceptions are particularly
difficult to study -- if they are perceptions that one person
(the testee) can have then they are perceptions that the tester
can have as well;

Oded:

This seems to be one of the most non-PCT statements I have ever
encountered on this list

Me:

Could you please explain what is so "non-PCT about it.

Oded:

What is the probability that two individuals with different
physiology and different history of re-organization, will develop
a perceptual hierarchy that whatever perception one has, the other
will as well?

I don't know. Actually, there is evidence that there is a very
high probability that people share a relatively common perceptual
hierarchy. If people didn't perceive the world in terms of nearly
the same kinds of perceptual dimensions I think communication would
be impossible. Yet we communicate rather well. I agree that we might
not "experience" these perceptions in the same way -- my experience
of "green" or "love" may be the same as yours. But we would both
agree that the leaves are "green" and that there is no "love"
lost between us;-)

According to you, the important thing is that we both can attach
the same *name* P to some perception of ours, although in certain
situations I will label the state-of-affairs as P and you as NOT(P).
Is this what you meant by saying "your brain is able to perceive
PCTness just as mine is"?

Yes. What you call it doesn't matter. As long as you know which
disturbances will be corrected and which will not, and you can
see what happens to the hypothetical controlled perception after
each disturbance, then you know what the person is controlling.
The section on "The coin game" in B:CP mentions this problem.
A person might be controlling for what they call an "N" pattern;
you determine that it is "Z". You might argue over what you want
to call the controlled perception but it is clear that the Tester
knows what is being controlled becuase he knows what disturbances
will be corrected and which will not.

Me:

The same applies to me; I am controlling for a perception of the
fundamental invalidity of conventional psychology. Whether
conventional psychology _really is_ invalid is another issue.

Oded:

Why didn't you say it in the first place? Some people here
misinterpreted your posts over the years as being part of an
attempt to engage in some kind of scientific conversation :wink:

They are. The fact that these arguments are a disturbance to
controlled variables doesn't make them less of a scientific
argument. What you say here is just more evidence that you
are controlling for something to which my scientific arguments
are a disturbance; dismissing them as "unscientific" is a nice,
verbal way of handling that disturbance. Since you never "correct"
my arguments by dealing with their substance (you never show,
experimentally or mathematically, why the behavioral illusion is
_not_ a problem, why lineal cause-effect models are OK, why
there is information about disturbances in perception, why a
model-based control model is needed to explain any observations,
etc etc) it looks to me like you are controlling (among other
things) for a perception of me as a fire-brand fool. As you note
above, the fact that you are controlling for that perception
has nothing to do with whether I really am a fire brand fool.
Maybe I am. But whatever I am, it's sure nice not to be you;-)

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[from Jeff Vancouver 980227.11:30 EST]

[From Bill Powers (980227.0801 MST)]

Rick Marken (980226.1840)--

Well, no response yet from Bill to my little disturbance:

Like me, Bill Powers believes that conventional psychology
is horseshit (has no merit) because it is based on a model of
behavior -- the lineal causal model -- that is flat out wrong.

Maybe he's not paying attention. Let's try another

Bill Powers believes that it is foolish to assert that the
behavioral illusion creates any significant problems for
the foundations of "conventional" psychology.

etc..

Whatever it is you're trying to disturb here, I don't seem to be
controlling for it.

Nor does it get a response for me. I know Bill dislikes conventional
psychology. Rick, you will need to keep trying. You have not yet found
the perceptions that we are controlling (to no avail) that you are disturbing.

Sincerely,

Jeff

[From Rick Marken (980227.0840)]

Martin Taylor (980227 03:45) --

On Tuesday Rick accepts that p is a function of d, given that the
loop functions and the reference level don't change, and on Wednesday
he returns to his old position that it isn't.

Bill Powers (980227.0814 MST)

Neither Rick nor I accepts that p is a function of d. P is a
function of d and o, where o is a function of r and p

Sorry, Bill. But Martin is right. Just because p is a function
of d and o doesn't mean it's not a function of d. p is a
function of d and o is a function of p. It's cause-effect
right around the causal loop.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

Bet I got you this time;-)

[From Rick Marken (980227.0900)]

Bill Powers (980227.0801 MST) --

Whatever it is you're trying to disturb here, I don't seem to be
controlling for it.

Jeff Vancouver (980227.11:30 EST) --

Nor does it get a response for me...Rick, you will need to keep
trying.

That's the way the Test works. You have to keep trying. And I
will.

Part of the problem is that contrived verbal disturbances can
be seen (by the Testee) as contrived, especially by people who
know the Tester well. I think I will have to embed my
(intentional) disturbances more seamlessly into the context
of my posts. I will also have to tell a neutral observer when I
am Testing, who I am Testing and what variable I am Testing for.
That way we'll have some validation of the results of the Test.

I think Phil Runkel would be a good person for this moderator role.
What do you think, Phil? If you are willing, let me know by personal
email (my e-mail address is given below) and I'll try to cook up
some Tests for the net and send them for you to hold in "escrow".

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bill Powers (980227.1144 MST)]

Rick Marken (980227.0840)--

Sorry, Bill. But Martin is right. Just because p is a function
of d and o doesn't mean it's not a function of d. p is a
function of d and o is a function of p. It's cause-effect
right around the causal loop.

OK, if you say so. I am controlling for not being part of this boring
argument about who understands PCT and who doesn't.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (980227.1148 MST)]

Rick Marken (980227.0900)--

That's the way the Test works. You have to keep trying. And I
will.

If you want me to play you have to convince me that it's worth the effort.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (980227.1409 EST)]

Bill Powers (980227.1144 MST)

Rick Marken (980227.0840)--

>Sorry, Bill. But Martin is right. Just because p is a function
>of d and o doesn't mean it's not a function of d. p is a
>function of d and o is a function of p. It's cause-effect
>right around the causal loop.

OK, if you say so. I am controlling for not being part of this boring
argument about who understands PCT and who doesn't.

Thank goodness I am not alone.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (980227.1300)]

Me:

That's the way the Test works. You have to keep trying. And I
will.

Bill Powers (980227.1148 MST) --

If you want me to play you have to convince me that it's worth
the effort.

You're playing whether you want to or not. Just as I am. If
you're controlling, you're playing;-)

Bill Powers (980227.1144 MST) --

OK, if you say so. I am controlling for not being part of this
boring argument about who understands PCT and who doesn't.

Ok. So you are controlling for "not being the arbiter of PCT
understanding". I wasn't really testing to see if you were
controlling for that variable but I can see how what I said
would be a disturbance to it.

My original intent was to demonstrate to Jeff et al, via the Test,
the you and I are controlling for similar perceptions related to
PCT. My goal was not to get your imprimatur on my views; it was
simply to show that my PCT-based conclusions about the merits of
conventional psychology, right or wrong, are not wildly different
from those of others who understand PCT.
.
But I can see that trying to do this by showing that you and I
are controlling for similar perceptions was probably not a
good approach. I didn't need to implicitly recruit you to my
side of the fray. I think I can handle the problem just fine on
my own.

Still, I will try to develop some examples of net-based
Tests for control of "higher level" variables. I think such an
exercise could teach us alot about how to test for control of
"non-machine measurable" variables.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[from Jeff Vancouver 980227.1710 EST]

[From Rick Marken (980227.1300)]

Still, I will try to develop some examples of net-based
Tests for control of "higher level" variables. I think such an
exercise could teach us alot about how to test for control of
"non-machine measurable" variables.

Interesting potential. But shall we do this scientifically? THat is,
systematic observation. First note:

[From Rick Marken (980227.0900)]

Part of the problem is that contrived verbal disturbances can
be seen (by the Testee) as contrived, especially by people who
know the Tester well. I think I will have to embed my
(intentional) disturbances more seamlessly into the context
of my posts. I will also have to tell a neutral observer when I
am Testing, who I am Testing and what variable I am Testing for.
That way we'll have some validation of the results of the Test.

Messy point #1

Bye, I am leaving for the weekend. Oh, make that messy point #2. A lack
of response may be due to the system being off-line not that the system is
not controlling a perception for which statement is somehow a disturbance.

Sincerely,

Jeff

[Martin Taylor 980227 18:25]

Rick Marken (980226.1840)]

Well, no response yet from Bill to my little disturbance:

...

Maybe he's not paying attention. Let's try another

Let's try yet another: When Rick Marken says "p = o+d" it is not a
disturbance to any of Bill's controlled perceptions. When Martin Taylor
says "p = o+d" it is a major disturbance to one of Bill's controlled
perceptions.

Rick Marken (980226.1940)

+I personally don't mind verbal disturbances to controlled
+perceptions; heck, I get them daily from the likes of Bruce A.,
+Jeff, Oded, Martin, et al. I have a regular disturbance
+generating gallery out there. But they certainly don't
+hurt much and I figure that, if these guys are paying attention,
+these disturbances should help them figure out what variables
+I'm controlling for (of course, if they haven't figured it
+out by now they are _really_ not catching onto PCT at all;-)).

Oh, I think at least some of us have caught on to PCT well enough to
figure it out. But it will take going up a level or two for you yourself
to figure it out, I think. And I'm _not_ going to attempt to disturb your
controlled perceptions at any level other than those for which evidence
is publicly available.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (980227.1720)]

The club was closed for a city inspection so it looks
like I'll have to get my exercise via CSGNet rather than
racquetball this afternoon.

Me:

if these guys are paying attention, these disturbances should
help them figure out what variables I'm controlling for

Martin Taylor (980227 18:25) --

Oh, I think at least some of us have caught on to PCT well enough
to figure it out. But it will take going up a level or two for
you yourself to figure it out, I think.

Actually, it's rather easy to figure out what you, Jeff, Bruce A.,
Bill and I are controlling for: THE SAME THINGS! Remember,
we control perceptual VARIABLES. If we are pushing hard against
each others' disturbances, it's because we are all controlling
the same of similar perceptual _variables_; we are in conflict
becuase we want those variables at DIFFERENT REFERENCE VALUES.
There would be no conflict between us at all if we were controlling
different perceptual variables.

So the problem isn't one of figuring out what perceptions
we are controlling; the problem is _noticing_ that we are
controlling there variables relative to different reference
levels.

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[Oded Maler (980228)]

After some conflicts between not wanting to create more noise,
and not wanting to seem as not having anything to answer,
the bad habits won.

Rick Marken (980227.0815)

Oded Maler (980227) --

> Suppose you were controlling for the correctness of the Christian
> dogma, and you were repeating endlessly that at certain time some
> piece of bread IS the flesh of christ. This might look nonsense
> to me, and I will point it out. Then you would say that I am
> controlling for the incorrectness of the Christian dogma, while
> I might be completely indifferent to, or even unaware of, this
> dogma.

Not at all. I would try to figure out what you are controlling for
that makes my saying that some "piece of bread IS the flesh of
christ" a disturbance. It is clearly a disturbance because you are
trying to correct for it by saying it's nonsense.

First I apologize if this hypothetical example hurt your religious
feelings :wink: The statement "the bread IS" might disturb, for example,
my common-sense conception of existence, reality, etc. in the same
sense that the statement "my computer mouse is the kidney of Stalin"
will. I might be completely unaware of the existence of a system of
beliefs that puts this sentence as one of its foundations. I react
to the isolated statement, but someone from inside this system
might copnclude that I am controlling against the whole thing, for
which I might not have a perception at all.

Suppose, in my
efforts to test what you are controlling, I said "Israel is a land
for Jews only". Would you say that that statement is nonsense?
I would bet large sums of shekels that you would _not_ say that
that's " nonsense". How about "The Palestinian people have a
better claim to the land of Israel that the Jews"? Now that's
"nonsense", right.

Nice try but very unsuccessful. My reaction to the first statement
would be much more negative than my reaction to the second. If the bet
was serious, I could support my claim using newsgroups archives, but
this is not the issue. How much can someone from LA understand the
mentality of someone from another part of the world, about which
all his experience comes from media cliches? In order to really
test controlled variables of people from other cultures, one should
go beyond the verbal illusion caused by the fact that we might use
the same J-word -- it's meaning for you and for me is completely
different.

I don't "attack higher-level psychology"; I have said that
"conventional psychology" is based on the wrong model (lineal
causal) so the results obtained in the context of that model are
suspect and must be re-evaluated using methods based on an
understanding of closed loop control. I suppose this would sound
like an "attack" to people who are controlling for perceiving
either wisdom in the status quo or stupidity in the source of the
statement.

This sounds milder than your everyday statements. I would put it as:
"psychology is a very difficult pre-science due to the problem of
mind/body, other minds etc. which do not allow for really controlled
expreiments as the "objective" sciences (which nowdays seem less
objective than they used to be, btw). Some of the attempts to make it
an experimental and measurable science make the mistake of ignoring
the closed-loop aspects of human behavior, and hence lead to wrong
conclusions. In certain domains this point is very important, while in
others it is marginal compared to others inherent limitations."

Oded:

> What exactly does "correspond" mean in this context?

Variations in the (observed) perceptual signal covary with
variations in the (experienced) perception.

What is the observed perceptual signal in the case of "merits of
conventional psychology"? Observed by whom?

Oded:

> What is the probability that two individuals with different
> physiology and different history of re-organization, will develop
> a perceptual hierarchy that whatever perception one has, the other
> will as well?

I don't know. Actually, there is evidence that there is a very
high probability that people share a relatively common perceptual
hierarchy. If people didn't perceive the world in terms of nearly
the same kinds of perceptual dimensions I think communication would
be impossible. Yet we communicate rather well. I agree that we might
not "experience" these perceptions in the same way -- my experience
of "green" or "love" may be the same as yours. But we would both
agree that the leaves are "green" and that there is no "love"
lost between us;-)

Communication at the practical level is possible to a certain extent,
but I strongly disagree with the above claim. People might have
radically different perceptual variables both for low-level, and
certainly for the higher-levels. Even within your country, I am sure
you can find several sectors of the poulation whose higher level
perceptions are unrelated to yours. It is *not* the case that you have
the same hierarchy and all the difference between you and them is that
your reference values are opposite. This is a verbal illsuion caused
by the fact that sometime you have to answer "yes" or "no" to some
sentence. Your perceptions and their are uncomparable (I once new a
better fancy word for it, but I forgot).

Me:

> The same applies to me; I am controlling for a perception of the
> fundamental invalidity of conventional psychology. Whether
> conventional psychology _really is_ invalid is another issue.

Oded:

> Why didn't you say it in the first place? Some people here
> misinterpreted your posts over the years as being part of an
> attempt to engage in some kind of scientific conversation :wink:

They are. The fact that these arguments are a disturbance to
controlled variables doesn't make them less of a scientific
argument.

I meant the fact that these arguments are side-effects of an attempt
to control your variables.

What you say here is just more evidence that you
are controlling for something to which my scientific arguments
are a disturbance; dismissing them as "unscientific" is a nice,
verbal way of handling that disturbance.

In the context of your original statement, what I call scientific is
an attempt to communicate statements about what _really is_, as
compared to utterance which is intended to serve other goals, e.g.
breath air, excercise one's fingers or any other attempt to control
perception. Of course, PCT tells us that there is no real distinction
between the two, and that any scientific discourse between two living
systems is, in fact, control of some perceptions, yet, as in any other
communication we may pretend that we try to convey to each other
statements about what _really is_ and not only side-effects of our
personal control strucutres.

Since you never "correct"
my arguments by dealing with their substance (you never show,
experimentally or mathematically, why the behavioral illusion is
_not_ a problem, why lineal cause-effect models are OK, why
there is information about disturbances in perception, why a
model-based control model is needed to explain any observations,
etc etc) it looks to me like you are controlling (among other
things) for a perception of me as a fire-brand fool. As you note
above, the fact that you are controlling for that perception
has nothing to do with whether I really am a fire brand fool.
Maybe I am. But whatever I am, it's sure nice not to be you;-)

If only I knew what fire-brand is. I admit that I have not made the
effort to dwelve into your formulae and see what it is that makes you
be so picky about. I will try to find time to do it in the future. I
think we had enough of it, and we can log off this thread, in which I
hope, beyond what might be considered as somewhat insulting, we
learned a little bit more about ourselves.

Best regards,

--Oded

···

--

Oded Maler VERIMAG, Centre Equation, 2, av. de Vignate,
38610 Gieres, France. Phone: +33 (0) 476 63 48 41 Fax: 476 63 48 50
Oded.Maler@imag.fr http://www.imag.fr/VERIMAG/PEOPLE/Oded.Maler

[From Rick Marken (980228.1220)]

Oded Maler (980228) --

I might be completely unaware of the existence of a system of
beliefs that puts this sentence as one of its foundations. I react
to the isolated statement, but someone from inside this system
might copnclude that I am controlling against the whole thing, for
which I might not have a perception at all.

This doesn't mean that it is impossible, in principle, to determine
what perception you are controlling. The Test is an iterative
process; the fact that you are controlling for some philsophical
concept rather than Christian dogma would become clear as other
disturbances were applied and you failed (or did not fail) to
resist them.

You seem to be saying that it is impossible, in principle, to
determine what perceptions another person is controlling, particularly
if that person is controlling higher level perceptions. So far, I
am not convinced by your arguments. I am far more convinced by
clear, tangible demonstrations, like the "Coin Game" described in
B:CP, that it is possible, _in principle_ to determine what
perceptions a person is controlling. I am not saying it is easy
to do this Test; nor am I saying that success is guaranteed -- you
may never determine, to your own satisifaction, what variables
a person is controlling. But you have not convinced me (yet) that
determining controlled variables is impossible in principle.

Me:

Suppose, in my efforts to test what you are controlling, I said
"Israel is a land for Jews only". Would you say that that
statement is nonsense? I would bet large sums of shekels that
you would _not_ say that that's " nonsense". How about "The
Palestinian people have a better claim to the land of Israel
that the Jews"? Now that's "nonsense", right.

Oded:

Nice try but very unsuccessful. My reaction to the first statement
would be much more negative than my reaction to the second.

Actually, it was quite successful; controlled variables are revealed
by both _lack_ of response and by response to disturbance. It's true
that your answers reveal that my hypothesis about one perception
you might be controlling (Israel as a homeland for Jews) is
apparently wrong. If I were really interested in determining
what you were controlling for I would now change my hypothesis
about your controlled perception and see if disturbances to this
perception are resisted.

But the point of my comments above was not to expose one of your
controlled variables; they were just aimed at showing that statements
are "nonsense" only to the extent that they are disturbances to
controlled perceptions. You keep trying to give the impression that
my statements are "inherently" nonsensical. In fact, they are
"nonsense" only to the extent that they disturb some perception
you are controlling, such as your perception of "logic" or "good
philosophy" or whatever.

If the bet was serious,

There was no bet. Just disturbances. If what I suggested was not
disturbing then apparently you (like me) would like to see Israel
become a country for everyone who wants to live there, regardless
of religious or ethnic background. Great.

How much can someone from LA understand the mentality of someone
from another part of the world

As much as they like, by using the Test for the controlled variable.

In order to really test controlled variables of people from other
cultures, one should go beyond the verbal illusion caused by the
fact that we might use the same J-word -- it's meaning for you
and for me is completely different.

You're absolutely right. And my proposed method for going beyond
the verbal illusion caused by the fact that we use the same J-word
(or any other starting letter word;-)) is The Test for the
Controlled Variable. In my last post I explained exactly how
The Test let's you go beyond words to the controlled perception.
What is your approach to getting beyond this illusion? Indeed, how
do you even know that it is an illusion? I know it from the results
of The Test.

Me:

I have said that "conventional psychology" is based on the
wrong model (lineal causal) so the results obtained in the
context of that model are suspect and must be re-evaluated
using methods based on an understanding of closed loop control.

Oded:

This sounds milder than your everyday statements.

Maybe that's because you paid attention this time. This is
all I have been saying, over and over again, for the last 7
years, using different tangible illustrations of the problems
(such as the behavioral illusion demo). All you have been doing
is rebutting what I say by saying it's "nonsense". That's really
getting pretty boring. How about trying to show what's wrong
with omy proposals using mathematical and/or obsevational data?

I would put it as: ... Some of the attempts to make it [psychology]
an experimental and measurable science make the mistake of ignoring
the closed-loop aspects of human behavior, and hence lead to wrong
conclusions. In certain domains this point is very important, while
in others it is marginal compared to others inherent limitations."

Ok. So apparently we differ only in terms of that last sentence.
You seem to think that the mistake of ignoring the closed loop
aspect of human behavior is important in "some domains" but not
in others. This is so vague that I could agree or disagree
depending on my interpretation. I have specifically said that
ignoring the closed loop aspect of human behavior is important
in one BIG domain with which I am familair -- the domain called
"experimental psychology"; the domain where behavior is studied
using the techniques described in textbooks on experimetal
methods in psychology. Do you disagree with me about this?

And what are these other 'inherent' limitations on scientific
psychology. Is your kvetch that there can't really be a scientific
psychology, even one based on a correct underdstanding of the
nature of control? If so, that would sure help explain a lot of
your behavior. Now that I think of it, that must, indeed, be one
of your controlled variables. I think you are controlling for
the idea that it is impossible to undertstand the human mind
scientifically. Is that it?

What is the observed perceptual signal in the case of "merits of
conventional psychology"? Observed by whom?

It's an afferent neural signal in the brain. It can be "observed" by
a neurologist; it is 'experienced" by the person in whose brain
that signal exists.

I am sure you can find several sectors of the poulation whose
higher level perceptions are unrelated to yours. It is *not* the
case that you have the same hierarchy and all the difference
between you and them is that your reference values are opposite.

I agree that there are people who perceive the world differently
that me. My point (which I didn't make clear) was that I think
it is possible for anyone to _learn_ to perceive the world as
anyone else does. I was not able to perceive the world of behavior
as Bill Powers did when I first discovered B:CP. Now I can perceive
it that way. But even if we couldn't learn to perceive as others
perceive (I'm sure I'll never be able to perceive music as Bach
did) we can still get a pretty good idea of what they are perceiving.
For example, we can't perceive the sonic world the way a dog does.
But we have machines that can tell us that the dog perceptions
are made out of sensations that we can't have.

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (980228.1634 EST)]

Rick Marken (980228.1220)

I agree that there are people who perceive the world differently
that me. My point (which I didn't make clear) was that I think
it is possible for anyone to _learn_ to perceive the world as
anyone else does. I was not able to perceive the world of behavior
as Bill Powers did when I first discovered B:CP. Now I can perceive
it that way. But even if we couldn't learn to perceive as others
perceive (I'm sure I'll never be able to perceive music as Bach
did) we can still get a pretty good idea of what they are perceiving.

Dag has been talking about the "many worlds" aspects of PCT for at least
several years. He has finally won me over (with your help)! I think this point
is very important in making sense of conflict.

Bruce