p and Qi

[Bruce Nevin 20170314.19:48 ET]

The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model.

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.

This projection is something like Qi.

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

···

/Bruce Nevin

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.14.1900)]

···

Bruce Nevin (20170314.19:48 ET)_-

BN: The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

RM: This sounds to me like a nice, clear description of the relationship between Qi and p. It is certainly consistent with the way I see things.Â

RM: Oh, and happy pi day.

Best

Rick

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.Â

This projection is something like Qi.

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.Â

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

/Bruce Nevin


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 3:00 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.14.1900)]

Bruce Nevin (20170314.19:48 ET)_-

BN: The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

RM: This sounds to me like a nice, clear description of the relationship between Qi and p. It is certainly consistent with the way I see things.

HB : This seem to be another »geniuos« idea. What is what here ? What is »p« and what is »q.i.« ? »p« and »q.i.« are different variables ???

So if I understand right observer perceives q.i. as p and some extra »p« ??? Is that what is meant ?

I can understand that If »p« is some transformation (some function) of variables outside the organism than q.i. is some kind of perception (some function of q.i.). But than what is extra variable »p« ?

RM: Oh, and happy pi day.

Best

Rick

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.

This projection is something like Qi.

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

/Bruce Nevin

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Bruce Nevin 2017.03.17.1250 ET]

Boris, the second p is in the observer. There are two living control systems observing the same environment.Â

···

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 3:47 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Down…

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 3:00 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
Subject: Re: p and Qi

Â

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.14.1900)]

Â

Bruce Nevin (20170314.19:48 ET)_-

Â

BN: The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

Â

RM: This sounds to me like a nice, clear description of the relationship between Qi and p. It is certainly consistent with the way I see things.Â

Â

HB : This seem to be another »geniuos« idea. What is what here ? What is »p« and what is »q.i.« ? »p« and »q.i.« are different variables ???

So if I understand right observer perceives q.i. as p and some extra »p« ??? Is that what is meant ?

Â

I can understand that If »p« is some transformation (some function) of variables outside the organism than q.i. is some kind of perception (some function of q.i.). But than what is extra variable »p« ?

Â

Â

RM: Oh, and happy pi day.

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.Â

Â

This projection is something like Qi.

Â

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

Â

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.Â

Â

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

Â

/Bruce Nevin

Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Hi Bruce…

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 5:52 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Bruce Nevin 2017.03.17.1250 ET]

BN : Boris, the second p is in the observer. There are two living control systems observing the same environment.

HB : So if I understand right … there are two LCS observing the same environment and have the same »p« and q.i. for both ?

BN earlier : The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

HB : So If I understand right :

p = perception in the controller

p = perception in the observer

q.i.= perception in the controller

q.i. = perception in the observer

Is this what you meant ? I don’t understand what you meant by »second p is in an observer«. Does this mean that there is also the same »p« in the controller ? Does this mean that »p« is the same for an observer and controller ?

Best,

Boris

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 3:47 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Down…

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 3:00 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.14.1900)]

Bruce Nevin (20170314.19:48 ET)_-

BN: The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

RM: This sounds to me like a nice, clear description of the relationship between Qi and p. It is certainly consistent with the way I see things.

HB : This seem to be another »geniuos« idea. What is what here ? What is »p« and what is »q.i.« ? »p« and »q.i.« are different variables ???

So if I understand right observer perceives q.i. as p and some extra »p« ??? Is that what is meant ?

I can understand that If »p« is some transformation (some function) of variables outside the organism than q.i. is some kind of perception (some function of q.i.). But than what is extra variable »p« ?

RM: Oh, and happy pi day.

Best

Rick

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.

This projection is something like Qi.

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

/Bruce Nevin

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin 20170320.1560 ET]

Boris,

Yes, there are two living control systems (LCSs) observing and controlling in the same environment. One is the observer-experimenter performing the TCV and the other is the subject. (You have referred to the subject as “the controller”, but of course they are both controllers.)Â

They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life.Â

One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina. None of this matters to the modeler because a control system controls a measurable input by means of a measurable output.

The variable q.i represents a measurement of something in the environment. The measurement is made by the observer-experimenter because he or she needs quantitative data in order to create a computer model of what the subject is doing. A measurement is a perception controlled by the observer-experimenter. Therefore, q.i is another name for that particular perception, and in the diagram below that is why q.i replaces p inside the ellipse representing the observer-experimenter.

TCV.jpg

Notice that disturbances D, outputs O, and sensory input S are all measurable quantities in the environment. The observer-experimenter may measure all of them, but at the moment represented in this diagram is only controlling q.i. When sure of what variable is being controlled, the observer-experimenter will also measure his or her own output O which is a disturbance affecting the subject’s controlled perception.

The green rectangle represents whatever it is in the environment that is being measured. It has been called an Environmental Variable (EV) or a Complex Environmental Variable (CEV). All that the subject knows about it is the perception p, so that determines what the subject calls it; and all that the observer-experimenter knows about it is the perception q.i, so that determines what he or she calls it.

The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

The observed subject is very unlikely to have any awareness of a perception of a quantitative measurement. Here, we rely upon measurements of outputs (O from the Subject in the diagram) as well as measurements of sensory inputs (q.i). The diagram does not represent the observer-experimenter’s measurements of the subject’s behavioral outputs. From these two kinds of measurements, a control-system model can be constructed. If this model, given numerical input equivalent to the measured inputs, produces with 95%+ accuracy numerical output equivalent to the measured outputs, over diverse measurement occasions, then we’re justified that the subject’s brain is performing numerical operations that are  exactly proportional to those of the model. Proportional because of the transformations involved in input functions and output functions throughout the hierarchy as well as at the periphery.

For example, if a model that controls two variables, optical velocity and lateral optical displacement, produces numerical outputs that correspond very closely to the measured limb positions of people when they are controlling perceptions of tracking a flying helicopter, then we are warrented in saying that the brain has functional structures corresponding to those in the model, and that the firing rates in neural bundles at the corresponding places are proportional to the numerical values calculated at those places in the model.Â

The subject, of course, is only aware of the helicopter and the task of tracking it. But that has to do with the difference between a perception p and the experience of it, which we also call a perception. Losing awareness of that distinction can cause confusion too.

We commonly apply PCT to behavioral actions and perceptual inputs that are not quantified. When we do, we are no longer talking about q.i, and we say “perception” Â in the sense of subjective experience rather than rates of neural firing. The extrapolation is tempting and exciting and often illuminating but we need to bear in mind that words and labels that have a very precise meaning within a quantitative model may be being misused.

···

On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Hi Bruce…

Â

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 5:52 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

Â

[From Bruce Nevin 2017.03.17.1250 ET]

Â

BN : Boris, the second p is in the observer. There are two living control systems observing the same environment.Â

Â

HB : So if I understand right … there are two LCS observing the same eenvironment and have the same »p« and q.i. for both ?

BN earlier : The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

HB : So If I understand right :

Â

p = perception in the controller

p = perception in the observer

q.i.= perception in the controller

q.i. = perception in the observer

Â

Is this what you meant ? I don’t understand what you meant by »second p is in an observer«. Does this mean that there is also the same »p« in the controller ? Does this mean that »p« is the same for an observer and controller ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 3:47 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Down…

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 3:00 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
Subject: Re: p and Qi

Â

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.14.1900)]

Â

Bruce Nevin (20170314.19:48 ET)_-

Â

BN: The variables p and Qi are both perceptions in an observer, as is everything else in the PCT model…

Â

RM: This sounds to me like a nice, clear description of the relationship between Qi and p. It is certainly consistent with the way I see things.Â

Â

HB : This seem to be another »geniuos« idea. What is what here ? What is »p« and what is »q.i.« ? »p« and »q.i.« are different variables ???

So if I understand right observer perceives q.i. as p and some extra »p« ??? Is that what is meant ?

Â

I can understand that If »p« is some transformation (some function) of variables outside the organism than q.i. is some kind of perception (some function of q.i.). But than what is extra variable »p« ?

Â

Â

RM: Oh, and happy pi day.

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Assuming that the subject that is modeled is like myself (for any given ‘myself’ who is reading this), the subject projects p as a real object or attribute of the environment. We all talk and otherwise behave as if the projection of each p really does exist in the environment.Â

Â

This projection is something like Qi.

Â

The TCV is a method of estimating the subject’s projection of p into the environment and making that estimate as accurate as possible. By virtue of the TCV we are justified as taking the perception called Qi to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

Â

I think the main reason discussion of this is fraught is that it covertly entails the difference between a rate of neural firing p and the experience that we call a perception, which is what we project into the environment and also what we estimate as Qi. We are not aware of equivocating between these two related but very different senses of the word “perception”.Â

Â

Everything in the PCT model is a perception. PCT is a science because we test it. Insofar as we test it, we are justified in taking it to be viridical, that is, a true representation of something real.

Â

/Bruce Nevin

Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Â

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

···

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship  between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.Â

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

BestÂ

Rick

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin 20170321.19:45 ET]

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable.Â

You are right, I have conflated two stages of the investigation. The TCV identifies the controlled variable. Experimental measurements subsequently specify values of that variable correlated with values of O (from the subject) and D (which is O from the observer-experimenter), after which the observer-experimenter’s perception of the controlled variable can be called q.i.

We now approach the vexed question of whether the controlled variable is the controlled perception p in the subject, or that which is perceived in the environment.

We must not omit q.i from this question; q.i is definitely a perception in the observer that the observer is controlling, and that was my reason for including the observer in an expansion of Martin’s nice diagram. However, at the preliminary stage of performing the TCV, before these quantitative measurements, this controlled perception is only a perception p within the observer. We can’t yet call it q.i. Call it p.o. The effect of the TCV is to justify the assertion that p.o is in some sense “the same as” the perception p within the subject; call that p.s.Â

TCV.so.jpg

This assertion that p.o is “the same as” p.s is inherently open to question because the sensory inputs of the two parties, S.s and S.o, are not identical (whence the importance of assuming as closely as possible the subject’s point of view), and because although we assume that any two humans are homologous in their organization they are very unlikely to be identical. The TCV circumvents this objection because it is a form of collective control; specifically, it is conflict in a very mild form. Any form of collective control affirms to the co-controllers the consensual reality of that in the environment which is controlled. We construct our perceptual reality by controlling, and we construct our consensual reality by controlling collectively. Not incidentally, collective control also affirms the consensual reality of the co-controller(s) to each other as agent(s), providing a way out of solipsism.

So the sense in which p.o is the same as p.e is that they are representations of the same whatchamacallit in the environment, as demonstrated by the gentle conflict (over the perceived condition of that whatchamacallit) which constitutes the TCV. All that we know about the whatchamacallit is our perception of it (either p.o or p.s), and now in addition the finding that p.o ≈ p.s.

I am not saying that the TCV, as an instance of collective control, in some sense creates that in the environment which both parties are controlling. The capacity to recognize and control that perception (the relevant perceptual functions) will have been established in each of them long prior. But it does establish that p.o and p.s are perceptions of the same whatever-it-Really-is. So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment. They may call it by different names. After some measurements the experimenter can label it q.i at last and may call it lateral optical velocity but the subject is more likely to call it something like tracking that damned helicopter when it goes sideways, if she bothers to go down a level to distinguish that variable from the other in the pair that the experimenter identified.

If this constructivism is a conceptual burden, referring the matter to the objects and relations of physics and chemistry is no relief, because they too are perceptions–made precise and validated by the experimental tests of the physical sciences, but perceptions still.

···

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship  between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.Â

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

I am enjoying this thread again now. Thanks Bruce!

···

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)]

···

Bruce Nevin (20170321.19:45 ET)–

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable.Â

BN: You are right, I have conflated two stages of the investigation. The TCV identifies the controlled variable.Â

RM:There are steps (actually, a network of contingencies) involved in carrying out the TCV and once these steps are complete you have identified the controlled variable, q.i. There is no second stage after the TCV has identified the controlled variable. The TCV is the whole megillah.Â

Â

BN: We now approach the vexed question of whether the controlled variable is the controlled perception p in the subject, or that which is perceived in the environment.

RM: This is not a vexed question at all. p is simply a theoretical variable that is part of the PCT model of the system controlling q.i. If, for example, we have discovered that a person is controlling the area of a rectangle, then we know for a fact that q.i = height x width. If we now want to build a model of the person controlling q.i we start by assuming that the model is controlling a perceptual variable, p = height x width. The rest of the model includes assumptions about the value of the person’s reference, r, for the state of p (which would correspond to the empirically observed reference state of q.i) and how the difference between r and p (error) is transformed into the output that is observed to affect q.i.Â

Â

BN: We can’t yet call it q.i. Call it p.o. The effect of the TCV is to justify the assertion that p.o is in some sense “the same as” the perception p within the subject; call that p.s.Â

RM: The TCV is used to test whether a particular variable is under control. Each hypothetical controlled variable is a perceptual variable, of course. We call the variable that passes the TCV the controlled variable q.i. That is the variable that will be called p if (or when) we build a model of a system controlling q.i.Â

BN: This assertion that p.o is “the same as” p.s is inherently open to question because the sensory inputs of the two parties, S.s and S.o, are not identical (whence the importance of assuming as closely as possible the subject’s point of view), and because although we assume that any two humans are homologous in their organization they are very unlikely to be identical.

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; Â q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.Â

RM: The answer to the question of whether q.i is the same as the perceptual variable, p, in a model of a system controlling q.i depends on whether the perceptual function that was selected to define p in the model of the system doing the controlling is a correct representation of q.i from the perspective of the actual control system. In most modeling situations this is done automatically, so to speak. For example, in my object interception models the hypothetical controlled variables – the functions of the optical angles of the object to be intercepted – are always represented from the pursuer’s perspective. But sometimes the modeler might forget to represent the controlled variable from the actual control system’s perspective, as I did when I built the model of the person controlling the position of the knot in the video of rubber band task. In that exercise I didn’t take into account the fact that the knot’s position relative to the target dot – the controlled variable, q.i – was being seen from the controller’s and not the observer’s (my) perspective. The result was that the model kept the controlled variable in a very different reference state than the one maintained by the controller. When I saw this I realized my mistake and corrected it.Â

BN: The TCV circumvents this objection because it is a form of collective control;

RM: What is the collectively controlled variable? It seems to me that the TCV is an example of two control systems controlling completely different perceptions. The subject is controlling q.i (from the subject’s perspective, of course, as p) and the experimenter is controlling for determining what q.i is. They are certainly not “collectively” controlling q.i.

BN:Â So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment.

RM: Then what is q.i? I think it’s easier to just say (as those of use doing PCT research have always said) that p (what you call p.s) is the controlled variable within the subject; q.i (what you call p.o) is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter and the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

They may call it by different names. After some measurements the experimenter can label it q.i at last and may call it lateral optical velocity but the subject is more likely to call it something like tracking that damned helicopter when it goes sideways, if she bothers to go down a level to distinguish that variable from the other in the pair that the experimenter identified.

If this constructivism is a conceptual burden, referring the matter to the objects and relations of physics and chemistry is no relief, because they too are perceptions–made precise and validated by the experimental tests of the physical sciences, but perceptions still.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship  between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.Â

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1530)]

Oops. Editing Error. The following paragraph:

···

Should read as follows:Â

 RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction;  q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations are perceptions so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.Â

BestÂ

Rick

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; Â q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET)]

Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)–

I’m certainly willing to let this go, if it’s important to you, but just to be clear, the reason for distinguishing p.o and q.i is that in many cases the controlled variable is not easily specified as a quantity, and until it has been so specified by some kind of quantitative measurement it seems to me that it oughtn’t to be called a quantity. I suppose you could call it q.i on the optimistic assumption that you will obtain a quantitative measure of it, as indeed you must eventually in order to create a generative computer simulation. The “observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances” In the rubber-band demonstration permits you to say that the quantity is “nearly zero” and to extrapolate that the reference is in fact zero. If the reference is not zero but the drawing of a geometric shape around the dot with the knot, the lack of quantification becomes obvious. Control of the geometric shape at the Configuration level is achieved by varying the relationship of dot to knot. This can be quantified–that is, specified in terms that can be executed by a computer simulation–but at the point in the TCV process where you recognize the shape and further disturbances verify it there is no quantification yet. The distinction becomes more obvious the higher the controlled perception is in the hierarchy.

But really, this is not so important a distinction. The more interesting points include:

  1. The perceptual variables p.s and p.o/q.i are both controlled variables. Both parties are controlling.
  2. The TCV demonstrates that these two perceptual variables both refer to the same whatsis in the environment.
  3. The TCV, which is a gentle conflict, which is a form of collective control, thereby also demonstrates the existence of that whatsis.
  4. This environmental whatsis therefore also is a controlled variable. To deny this is to deny (3).
  5. In contrast to the two perceptual variables, this whatsis is a variable in the environment, but all that we know about it is the perceptions p.s and p.o/q.i, respectively. (A third party observer could be brought in to corroborate the consensual reality.)
  6. We don’t notice the demonstration in (3) because we already assumed the existence of the whatsis in the environment, and we are also confident that we know its character, as given by the perception p.o/q.i if we’re the observer-experimenter, or the perception p.s if we’re the subject of the TCV.

The “vexed question” was not about the definition and role of p. It was the question what is controlled. This refers to disputes that have recurred for years whether the “CV” is the controlled perception p or the controlled environmental variable “CEV” or “CCEV”. To my recollection, the controlled perception p.o or q.i of the person carrying out the TCV has not been included in these discussions. When we include the experimenter in the same environment with the subject it becomes clear that the answer is that all three variables are controlled during the TCV:

  • The subject’s perception.
  • The experimenter’s perception.
  • That in the environment which they perceive and collectively control. Whatever it Really is.

RM: “the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function”

These physical variables are also perceptions. Their environmental correlates have been demonstrated to exist by collective control exerted by physical scientists, but all we know about them (whatever they Really are) is those perceptions, which, as we know, are subject to change as scientists refine their consensus.

All of this ignores the distinction between perception as a quantity (rate of firing) and perception as an experience. We live in the latter, and I bet the TCV is usually carried out in the latter; we model the former. The distinction between p.o and q.i (which I am willing to drop) is related if what we mean by p.o as well as p.e is perception as experience.

···

On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)]

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable.Â

Bruce Nevin (20170321.19:45 ET)–
BN: You are right, I have conflated two stages of the investigation. The TCV identifies the controlled variable.Â

RM:There are steps (actually, a network of contingencies) involved in carrying out the TCV and once these steps are complete you have identified the controlled variable, q.i. There is no second stage after the TCV has identified the controlled variable. The TCV is the whole megillah.Â

Â

BN: We now approach the vexed question of whether the controlled variable is the controlled perception p in the subject, or that which is perceived in the environment.

RM: This is not a vexed question at all. p is simply a theoretical variable that is part of the PCT model of the system controlling q.i. If, for example, we have discovered that a person is controlling the area of a rectangle, then we know for a fact that q.i = height x width. If we now want to build a model of the person controlling q.i we start by assuming that the model is controlling a perceptual variable, p = height x width. The rest of the model includes assumptions about the value of the person’s reference, r, for the state of p (which would correspond to the empirically observed reference state of q.i) and how the difference between r and p (error) is transformed into the output that is observed to affect q.i.Â

Â

BN: We can’t yet call it q.i. Call it p.o. The effect of the TCV is to justify the assertion that p.o is in some sense “the same as” the perception p within the subject; call that p.s.Â

RM: The TCV is used to test whether a particular variable is under control. Each hypothetical controlled variable is a perceptual variable, of course. We call the variable that passes the TCV the controlled variable q.i. That is the variable that will be called p if (or when) we build a model of a system controlling q.i.Â

BN: This assertion that p.o is “the same as” p.s is inherently open to question because the sensory inputs of the two parties, S.s and S.o, are not identical (whence the importance of assuming as closely as possible the subject’s point of view), and because although we assume that any two humans are homologous in their organization they are very unlikely to be identical.

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; Â q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.Â

RM: The answer to the question of whether q.i is the same as the perceptual variable, p, in a model of a system controlling q.i depends on whether the perceptual function that was selected to define p in the model of the system doing the controlling is a correct representation of q.i from the perspective of the actual control system. In most modeling situations this is done automatically, so to speak. For example, in my object interception models the hypothetical controlled variables – the functions of the optical angles of the object to be intercepted – are always represented from the pursuer’s perspective. But sometimes the modeler might forget to represent the controlled variable from the actual control system’s perspective, as I did when I built the model of the person controlling the position of the knot in the video of rubber band task. In that exercise I didn’t take into account the fact that the knot’s position relative to the target dot – the controlled variable, q.i – was being seen from the controller’s and not the observer’s (my) perspective. The result was that the model kept the controlled variable in a very different reference state than the one maintained by the controller. When I saw this I realized my mistake and corrected it.Â

BN: The TCV circumvents this objection because it is a form of collective control;

RM: What is the collectively controlled variable? It seems to me that the TCV is an example of two control systems controlling completely different perceptions. The subject is controlling q.i (from the subject’s perspective, of course, as p) and the experimenter is controlling for determining what q.i is. They are certainly not “collectively” controlling q.i.

BN:Â So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment.

RM: Then what is q.i? I think it’s easier to just say (as those of use doing PCT research have always said) that p (what you call p.s) is the controlled variable within the subject; q.i (what you call p.o) is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter and the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

They may call it by different names. After some measurements the experimenter can label it q.i at last and may call it lateral optical velocity but the subject is more likely to call it something like tracking that damned helicopter when it goes sideways, if she bothers to go down a level to distinguish that variable from the other in the pair that the experimenter identified.

If this constructivism is a conceptual burden, referring the matter to the objects and relations of physics and chemistry is no relief, because they too are perceptions–made precise and validated by the experimental tests of the physical sciences, but perceptions still.

/Bruce


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship  between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.Â

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Erling Jorgensen (2017.03.23 08:50 EDT)]

Hi Bruce,

Thank you for your clear exposition of these matters, both in your former post (Bruce Nevin 20170321.19:45 ET) and in this current one (Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET). To my way of thinking, you rightfully distinguish the subject’s perception from the observer’s perception, and the interactive way in which they determine what in the environment is being stabilized (I’ll use my own word for it) by their acts of control. That is how a consensual understanding of reality is built up, again to my way of thinking.

All the best,

Erling

Bruce Nevin bnhpct@gmail.com 3/22/2017 9:19 PM >>>
[From Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET)]

Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)–

I’m certainly willing to let this go, if it’s important to you, but just to be clear, the reason for distinguishing p.o and q.i is that in many cases the controlled variable is not easily specified as a quantity, and until it has been so specified by some kind of quantitative measurement it seems to me that it oughtn’t to be called a quantity. I suppose you could call it q.i on the optimistic assumption that you will obtain a quantitative measure of it, as indeed you must eventually in order to create a generative computer simulation. The “observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances” In the rubber-band demonstration permits you to say that the quantity is “nearly zero” and to extrapolate that the reference is in fact zero. If the reference is not zero but the drawing of a geometric shape around the dot with the knot, the lack of quantification becomes obvious. Control of the geometric shape at the Configuration level is achieved by varying the relationship of dot to knot. This can be quantified–that is, specified in terms that can be executed by a computer simulation–but at the point in the TCV process where you recognize the shape and further disturbances verify it there is no quantification yet. The distinction becomes more obvious the higher the controlled perception is in the hierarchy.

But really, this is not so important a distinction. The more interesting points include:

  1. The perceptual variables p.s and p.o/q.i are both controlled variables. Both parties are controlling.
  2. The TCV demonstrates that these two perceptual variables both refer to the same whatsis in the environment.
  3. The TCV, which is a gentle conflict, which is a form of collective control, thereby also demonstrates the existence of that whatsis.
  4. This environmental whatsis therefore also is a controlled variable. To deny this is to deny (3).
  5. In contrast to the two perceptual variables, this whatsis is a variable in the environment, but all that we know about it is the perceptions p.s and p.o/q.i, respectively. (A third party observer could be brought in to corroborate the consensual reality.)
  6. We don’t notice the demonstration in (3) because we already assumed the existence of the whatsis in the environment, and we are also confident that we know its character, as given by the perception p.o/q.i if we’re the observer-experimenter, or the perception p.s if we’re the subject of the TCV.

The “vexed question” was not about the definition and role of p. It was the question what is controlled. This refers to disputes that have recurred for years whether the “CV” is the controlled perception p or the controlled environmental variable “CEV” or “CCEV”. To my recollection, the controlled perception p.o or q.i of the person carrying out the TCV has not been included in these discussions. When we include the experimenter in the same environment with the subject it becomes clear that the answer is that all three variables are controlled during the TCV:

  • The subject’s perception.
  • The experimenter’s perception.
  • That in the environment which they perceive and collectively control. Whatever it Really is.

RM: “the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function”

These physical variables are also perceptions. Their environmental correlates have been demonstrated to exist by collective control exerted by physical scientists, but all we know about them (whatever they Really are) is those perceptions, which, as we know, are subject to change as scientists refine their consensus.

All of this ignores the distinction between perception as a quantity (rate of firing) and perception as an experience. We live in the latter, and I bet the TCV is usually carried out in the latter; we model the former. The distinction between p.o and q.i (which I am willing to drop) is related if what we mean by p.o as well as p.e is perception as experience.

···

On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)]

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable.

Bruce Nevin (20170321.19:45 ET)–
BN: You are right, I have conflated two stages of the investigation. The TCV identifies the controlled variable.

RM:There are steps (actually, a network of contingencies) involved in carrying out the TCV and once these steps are complete you have identified the controlled variable, q.i. There is no second stage after the TCV has identified the controlled variable. The TCV is the whole megillah.

BN: We now approach the vexed question of whether the controlled variable is the controlled perception p in the subject, or that which is perceived in the environment.

RM: This is not a vexed question at all. p is simply a theoretical variable that is part of the PCT model of the system controlling q.i. If, for example, we have discovered that a person is controlling the area of a rectangle, then we know for a fact that q.i = height x width. If we now want to build a model of the person controlling q.i we start by assuming that the model is controlling a perceptual variable, p = height x width. The rest of the model includes assumptions about the value of the person’s reference, r, for the state of p (which would correspond to the empirically observed reference state of q.i) and how the difference between r and p (error) is transformed into the output that is observed to affect q.i.

BN: We can’t yet call it q.i. Call it p.o. The effect of the TCV is to justify the assertion that p.o is in some sense “the same as” the perception p within the subject; call that p.s.

RM: The TCV is used to test whether a particular variable is under control. Each hypothetical controlled variable is a perceptual variable, of course. We call the variable that passes the TCV the controlled variable q.i. That is the variable that will be called p if (or when) we build a model of a system controlling q.i.

BN: This assertion that p.o is “the same as” p.s is inherently open to question because the sensory inputs of the two parties, S.s and S.o, are not identical (whence the importance of assuming as closely as possible the subject’s point of view), and because although we assume that any two humans are homologous in their organization they are very unlikely to be identical.

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.

RM: The answer to the question of whether q.i is the same as the perceptual variable, p, in a model of a system controlling q.i depends on whether the perceptual function that was selected to define p in the model of the system doing the controlling is a correct representation of q.i from the perspective of the actual control system. In most modeling situations this is done automatically, so to speak. For example, in my object interception models the hypothetical controlled variables – the functions of the optical angles of the object to be intercepted – are always represented from the pursuer’s perspective. But sometimes the modeler might forget to represent the controlled variable from the actual control system’s perspective, as I did when I built the model of the person controlling the position of the knot in the video of rubber band task. In that exercise I didn’t take into account the fact that the knot’s position relative to the target dot – the controlled variable, q.i – was being seen from the controller’s and not the observer’s (my) perspective. The result was that the model kept the controlled variable in a very different reference state than the one maintained by the controller. When I saw this I realized my mistake and corrected it.

BN: The TCV circumvents this objection because it is a form of collective control;

RM: What is the collectively controlled variable? It seems to me that the TCV is an example of two control systems controlling completely different perceptions. The subject is controlling q.i (from the subject’s perspective, of course, as p) and the experimenter is controlling for determining what q.i is. They are certainly not “collectively” controlling q.i.

BN: So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment.

RM: Then what is q.i? I think it’s easier to just say (as those of use doing PCT research have always said) that p (what you call p.s) is the controlled variable within the subject; q.i (what you call p.o) is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter and the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function.

Best

Rick

They may call it by different names. After some measurements the experimenter can label it q.i at last and may call it lateral optical velocity but the subject is more likely to call it something like tracking that damned helicopter when it goes sideways, if she bothers to go down a level to distinguish that variable from the other in the pair that the experimenter identified.

If this constructivism is a conceptual burden, referring the matter to the objects and relations of physics and chemistry is no relief, because they too are perceptions–made precise and validated by the experimental tests of the physical sciences, but perceptions still.

/Bruce


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.23.1130)]

···

Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET) re Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)–

BN: I’m certainly willing to let this go, if it’s important to you, but just to be clear, the reason for distinguishing p.o and q.i is that in many cases the controlled variable is not easily specified as a quantity, and until it has been so specified by some kind of quantitative measurement it seems to me that it oughtn’t to be called a quantity.

RM: This is a good point. I have been talking about the TCV as though the main goal of the test were to find a quantitative representation of q.i. But in fact this is only true if you want to build a working model of control of q.i. I suspect that it is highly unlikely that it will be possible, in the near future, to develop perceptual functions that produce perceptual variables that can be used in models of control of high level controlled variables such as principles and system concepts. Therefore, I believe that for the foreseeable future the study of control of higher level variables will use a version of the TCV like that described in B:CP as “The Coin Game”.Â

RM: The goal of the coin game is for the experimenter, E, to determine which of her own perceptions corresponds to what PCT tells us is the perception controlled by the subject, S. So E comes up with various hypotheses about which of her own perceptions corresponds to the perception S is controlling. For example, one hypothesis might be that S is controlling for a particular arrangement of heads and tails; another might be that R is controlling for a particular pattern of sizes of the coins; etc. Of course, she doesn’t necessarily think of these hypotheses as being guesses about which of her own perceptions corresponds to what is controlled by the subject. E probably thinks of these as hypotheses about states of the world that S is controlling. But making that explicit is not crucial to doing the TCV successfully.Â

RM: To carry out the test, all E has to know how to do is apply disturbances to the hypothetical perception (or aspect of the world) that S is controlling to see if those disturbances are resisted; if they are, then it is evidence that E’s perception (say it’s a perception of the relative size of the coins) corresponds to the perception S is controlling.

RM: In this “coin game” version of the TCV, q.i corresponds to E’s perception of the variable that S is controlling. So if it turns out (as in the example in B:CP) that E determines that S is controlling for a “zig zag” configuration of the coins, then this perception of E’s – the configuration of the coins –  is the controlled variable, q.i, and “zig zag” is the reference state of q.i. The end result of this TCV is the finding that S can control the configuration of the coins. If one wanted to build a model of S controlling the configuration of the coins one would have to figure out how to turn the spatial locations of the coins (the environmental variables) into a perceptual variable that corresponds to their configuration, not an easy task.Â

RM: But I don’t think Bill envisioned PCT research as always involving the building of a model that could control the variables that were found to be controlled by the TCV. I think what Bill envisioned was a research program where researchers would demonstrate how all kinds of different variables could be identified as controlled variables using the TCV. These variables would be described as precisely as possible and placed in a database where eventually an attempt would be made to see if there was any correspondence between the types of variables identified using the TCV and the types of variables proposed in the hierarchical model proposed in B:CP.Â

BN: But really, this is not so important a distinction. The more interesting points include:

  1. The perceptual variables p.s and p.o/q.i are both controlled variables. Both parties are controlling.

RM: E is not controlling q.i (p.o) in the TCV. E is controlling for perceiving a lack of effect of her disturbance to what she hypothesizes to be a perception of hers (which, again, if she is anything like me, she thinks of as reality) that is being controlled by S.Â

BN: 2. The TCV demonstrates that these two perceptual variables both refer to the same whatsis in the environment.

RM: Not that they both refer to the same "whatsis"but that they are the same function of that “whatsis”. Â

BN: 3. The TCV, which is a gentle conflict, which is a form of collective control, thereby also demonstrates the existence of that whatsis.

RM: There is no conflict because, even when E correctly identifies q.i, the variable S is controlling, E doesn’t have a different reference for the state of that variable. E is just applying an arbitrary disturbance to q.i and is only interested in whether the disturbance has the expected effect on q.i; E is not trying to get q.i to be in a particular state.Â

BN: 4. This environmental whatsis therefore also is a controlled variable. To deny this is to deny (3).

RM:  The controlled variable, q.i, is a function of the “whatsis”. q.i is a perception, like the perception of the configuration of the coins, which is, by definition, a function of the “whatsis”, which is whatever it is that makes up the environment.

Â

BN: The “vexed question” was not about the definition and role of p. It was the question what is controlled. This refers to disputes that have recurred for years whether the “CV” is the controlled perception p or the controlled environmental variable “CEV” or “CCEV”. To my recollection, the controlled perception p.o or q.i of the person carrying out the TCV has not been included in these discussions.

RM: Hopefully you can tell from my discussion of the coin game above that the controlled perception from the point of view of the person carrying out the TCV has always been part of discussions of the TCV; it’s q.i. In the coin game as described in B:CP it’s E’s perception of the configuration of the coins.Â

BN: All of this ignores the distinction between perception as a quantity (rate of firing) and perception as an experience. We live in the latter, and I bet the TCV is usually carried out in the latter; we model the former. The distinction between p.o and q.i (which I am willing to drop) is related if what we mean by p.o as well as p.e is perception as experience.

RM: Yes, this could be a difficult distinction to keep in mind. Here’s the way I deal with it. Whenever I talk about q.i I am always talking about the perception of the controlled variable as an experience. In the coin game, for example, q.i is clearly E’s experience of the configuration of coins. When I am talking about p in a model I have both the experiential and rate of firing concepts in mind at the same time, so to speak. I think of the variations in the rate of firing of the p variable as corresponding to variations in the experience to which p corresponds. The experience to which p corresponds is defined by the perceptual function that produces p. So if p = height * width then I think of quantitative variations in p as corresponding to experiential variations in area.Â

Best

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Down…

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 2:19 AM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET)]

Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)–

I’m certainly willing to let this go, if it’s important to you, but just to be clear, the reason for distinguishing p.o and q.i is that in many cases the controlled variable is not easily specified as a quantity, and until it has been so specified by some kind of quantitative measurement it seems to me that it oughtn’t to be called a quantity. I suppose you could call it q.i on the optimistic assumption that you will obtain a quantitative measure of it, as indeed you must eventually in order to create a generative computer simulation. The “observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances” In the rubber-band demonstration permits you to say that the quantity is “nearly zero” and to extrapolate that the reference is in fact zero. If the reference is not zero but the drawing of a geometric shape around the dot with the knot, the lack of quantification becomes obvious. Control of the geometric shape at the Configuration level is achieved by varying the relationship of dot to knot. This can be quantified–that is, specified in terms that can be executed by a computer simulation–but at the point in the TCV process where you recognize the shape and further disturbances verify it there is no quantification yet. The distinction becomes more obvious the higher the controlled perception is in the hierarchy.

HB : O.K. Rick. You done many simple experiments behind your computer, and now you could make some experiments with sleeping, sunshining, saying hello to people on street, when they are looking arround, when they are walking to somewhere… and so on. This all are legitimate behaviors of people. We need general theory which could explain all behaviors. Make also experiments with usual everyday people life activities and then show your findings how precise you can determine what they are controlling ? After these experiments your RCT theory could explain TCV more generally. TCV is not a general method for identifying what people are really controlling. You already wrote :

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables….

BN : But really, this is not so important a distinction. The more interesting points include:

  1. The perceptual variables p.s and p.o/q.i are both controlled variables. Both parties are controlling.

  2. The TCV demonstrates that these two perceptual variables both refer to the same whatsis in the environment.

HB : If the perceptual signals would refer to the same »whatsis« than both perceptual variable should be at least aproximatelly the same. Otherwise its unlikely that we could conclude on the »same whatsis« if perceptual signals are different. On which bases you concluded that we are generally observing the same »whatsis« in the environment ? On the bases of hundreds observations or one (your) is enough ?

I think that »equality« of perceptual signals depends whether both perceive the same physical variables (whatsis) from the environment and from the differences in sensor aparratus that transform physical variables into afferent neural impulses, and so on. Whatever is formed in percpetual hierarchy is not »representation of reality« but a model.

Bill P :

….he has seen a hierarchy off perceptions that somehow represents an external world, and a large collection of Complex Environmental Variables (as Martin Taylor calls them) that is mirrored inside the brain in the form of perceptions.

Briefly, then: what I call the hierarchy of perceptions is the model. When you open your eyes and look around, what you see – and feel, smell, hear, and taste – is the model. In fact we never experience anything but the model. The model is composed of perceptions of all kinds from intensities on up.

That is all we need to do to build up a model of the external world. It’s not even that; it’s just a model of the world. The idea that there’s also an external world that we don’t experience takes a while to develop. At first it’s just the only world there is.

HB : So it’s good to have in mind that we don’t perceive representation of the world, but we form a model. That was also Maturana’s conclussions. Perception is to obscure to »represent« the world outside. But it’s still enough that we can control better or worse.

Bruce, you said it for yourself. Nobody perceive from environment the same p. Genetic structure, firing rate, angle of perceciving… Also people sometimes perceive what others don’t. Diifferent focus of attention. In the same environment people usually perceive differently so it’s hard to say what is the same »whatsis«.

BN earlier : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina.

HB : Different firing rate in perceptual organs and nerve fibres could also mean that different physical variables outside are producing different »stimulus« for firing rates. So both »parties« are not perceiving the same »whatsis«. How could we conclude from different perceptual signals on the same »whatsis« ? What is really the same »whatsis« ? Can you describe me ? It can be just your hypothesis deriving from your specific perception.

  1. The TCV, which is a gentle conflict, which is a form of collective control, thereby also demonstrates the existence of that whatsis.

HB : Why should be there always a gentle conflict ?

BN : This environmental whatsis therefore also is a controlled variable. To deny this is to deny (3).

HB : Just like that because Bruce Nevin said so. I think you are on the wrong way. How control came to environment so that you got »controlled variables« in environment ? You are changing PCT in accordance with RCT and your BNCT. To deny (3) means denying that there is »commonly controlled variable« in environment. Where did you mention in (3) that there is controlled variable in environment ?

Every individual has it’s own perceptual control which is disturbed by control of others and other environmental disturbances. What is here controlled in common environment ? But effects of internal control of all involved LCS can be seen in environment. Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

  1. In contrast to the two perceptual variables, this whatsis is a variable in the environment, but all that we know about it is the perceptions p.s and p.o/q.i, respectively. (A third party observer could be brought in to corroborate the consensual reality.)

HB : What is p.s. and what p.o./q.i. ??? It would be enough just p.s. and p.o.

It would be nice if you find out what do you want and that finally RCT and BNCT and PCT get into some synchronized form otherwise this conflict between differences in RCT and PCT will continue. I think that you and Rick should except PCT explanation of control loop.

I tried to summerize »definitions« of RCT control loop which seems to be in agreement with both of you :

So if I compare the fundamentals of your theories with PCT I got differences in control loop.

RCT (BNCT) control loop :

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  2.   OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
    
  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

This seems to be the RCT and BNCT »Control loop« »definitions« you are trying to sell instead of PCT definitions. Now we have to go through PCT definitions of control loop. Why do I have to do it so many times ?

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…

&nbssp;

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box representss the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

HB : If I’m wrong something please correct me. This different presentation of elements in »control loop« has to stop.

I’d like some evidences that your and Ricks’ control loop is valid or that is close to PCT. Let us do it once for all. I have slowly enough of lecturing your imagination constructs. Could somebody overtake this duty and defend PCT. Barb ?

  1. We don’t notice the demonstration in (3) because we already assumed the existence of the whatsis in the environment, and we are also confident that we know its character, as given by the perception p.o/q.i if we’re the observer-experimenter, or the perception p.s if we’re the subject of the TCV.

The “vexed question” was not about the definition and role of p.

BN in other post :The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject.

BN : It was the question what is controlled.

HB : Exactly. In PCT seems important what people control inside not what kind of »controlled variable« they perceive from outside in p.

BN : This refers to disputes that have recurred for years whether the “CV” is the controlled perception p or the controlled environmental variable “CEV” or “CCEV”. To my recollection, the controlled perception p.o or q.i of the person carrying out the TCV has not been included in these discussions.

HB : The controlled perception p.o. or q.i. were probably not included in these discussions because it’s nonsense. What is »controlled perception« p (CV) or »controlled environmental variable« (CEV) or »controlled perception« q.i. and how they are controlled ???

When we include the experimenter in the same environment with the subject it becomes clear that the answer is that all three variables are controlled during the TCV:

  • The subject’s perception.

  • The experimenter’s perception.

  • That in the environment which they perceive and collectively control. Whatever it Really is.

HB : What did you mean with third one. That external environment is collectivelly controlled ?

RM: “the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function”

These physical variables are also perceptions. Their environmental correlates have been demonstrated to exist by collective control exerted by physical scientists, but all we know about them (whatever they Really are) is those perceptions, which, as we know, are subject to change as scientists refine their consensus.

HB : At last one good thinking.

All of this ignores the distinction between perception as a quantity (rate of firing) and perception as an experience. We live in the latter, and I bet the TCV is usually carried out in the latter; we model the former. The distinction between p.o and q.i (which I am willing to drop) is related if what we mean by p.o as well as p.e is perception as experience.

HB : . Depends what you meant with experience ?

Boris

/Bruce

Down…

image00265.jpg

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 11:32 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1530)]

Oops. Editing Error. The following paragraph:

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; q.i is an observed controlled variable,

HB : In PCT q.i. is not »observed controlled variable«, because there is no »variable being controlled in environment of the controlled system. You can observe it. Shor me in Bills’ diagram where you can see »observed controlled variable q.i.«

cid:image003.jpg@01D23694.7341FD90

You can see in the Bills’ diagram that q.i (input quantity) is just added effects on input. But in RCT it could be whatever you say. But stop using PCT as cover for your RCT.

If you use terms from PCT then you should use them as Bill did. If you use Bills’ terms in different way then you should use your own definitions and your own name of theory. Anyway this is a discussion for NON-PCT forum. So I’ll go on with PCT discussion.

Bill P (B:CP) : Consider once again the meaning of the term controlled quantity. A controlled quantity is controlled only because it is detected by a control system, compared with a reference, and affected by outputs based on the error thus detected. The controlled quantity is defined strictly by the behaving system’s perceptual computers; it may or may not be identifiable as an objective (need I put in quotes?) property of, or entity in, the physical environment. In general an observer will not, therefore, be able to see what a control system is controlling.Â

HB : Control happens in the controlling system not outside (controlled quantity). So most probably observer will have to make a worse or better guess on what other people are controlling, because it can or can be identified in »objective« world. So RCT theory based on two or three simple experiments can’t give the answer whether the RCT theory is general or not. You’ll have to make .also complex experiments to prove that RCT is right.Â

RM : …like the observation of the distance betweenn the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.

HB : Whatever is outside is affected by output. It’s not controlled. It’s your illusion that what you are observing outside is being controlled. It’s controlled inside the controlling system. And the control can not be transported to outside. With what ? Telekinesis. Could you answer omce straight how control come outside the controlling system. Even if that would be true in simple experiments, how will you prove it complex experiments in people relationship. How will you prove it generally that every behavior is controlling some »q.i.« in environment so that there is »controlled q.i.«. For the start you could show us how people in sleeping »control q.i.« so that it becomes »controlled variable q.i.«. Or you can try with sunshining. Would they adjust the temperature of the sun if there is always some »controlled q.i«.in environment that has to be »controlled« so that the wished reference state is achieved ?

When you’ll try to analyze everyday behavior of people you’ll come to such an absurd situations with your RCT that you’ll see the nonsense you are selling here on CSGnet for years including your the most nonsense statement that »people control people all the time«. So start with anaylyzing everyday behavior and when you’ll analyze hudrends of them I’m sure you’ll get the answer that Bills’ general diagram and his definitions of control are right and yours are wrong.

RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) defitnitions of control loop :

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected from disturbances.
    
  2.   OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
    
  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

This seems to be the RCT »Control loop« »definitions« you are trying to sell instead of PCT definitions. PCT definitions of control loop are obviously different :

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…

<

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

RM : Should read as follows:

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i.

HB : Everything in your RCT is confusssion including relation between p and q.i.

RM : There really is no distinction; q.i is an observed controlled variable,

HB :

In your imagination and your RCT there is no distinction. Otherwise there is no »observed controlled variable« in the outer enviroment. See Bills’ diagram above. Will you finally show us how »q.i.« as »controlled variable« is controlled ? With what ? »Control of Behavior« or Telekinesis. When this Occultism and Parapsychology will end on CSGnet forum.

RM : …like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations are perceptions so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.

HB : It remains constant only in your head where it is controlled. Bruce and Huddy showed you that q.i. is not perceptual variable in the observer, but »p« is some function (transformation) of q.i. in any Living being not just observer. PCT doesn’t work differently in speacial cases. Whether it works for all cases the same or it doesn’t work. It can’t partly work as Rick needs it in his nonsense experiments and demos. Show us that you are right in any people behavior so that your RCT is general theory about human behavior.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

HB : This is becoming a farse. Who will persuade Rick to stop selling his RCT (Ricks Control Tehory)

RM: What is the collectively controlled variable? It seems to me that the TCV is an example of two control systems controlling completely different perceptions. The subject is controlling q.i (from the subject’s perspective, of course, as p) and the experimenter is controlling for determining what q.i is. They are certainly not “collectively” controlling q.i.

HB : Well what a confusion….As I said before. NON-PCT posts should be hold differently as PCT posts

BN: So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment.

HB : Everything is O.K. (both subjects have p). Except that there is no percpetual correlate of »controlled variable in environment«. You have to show how this »correlate« is controlled in the environment ? With what you are controlling »controlled correlate« in environment if it’s not with behavior ? With Telekinesis ?

RM: Then what is q.i? I think it’s easier to just say (as those of use doing PCT research have always said) that p (what you call p.s) is the controlled variable within the subject; q.i (what you call p.o) is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter and the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function.

HB : Yes what is really q.i. ??? You just have to look into Bills’ diagram and you would know what is q.i. (Iput quantity).

What a mess and confussion you have in your head ???  Why don’t you just folow PCT diagram and you wouldn’t have any problems.

image001155.jpg

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 11:26 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)]

Bruce Nevin (20170321.19:45 ET)–

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable.

BN: You are right, I have conflated two stages of the investigation. The TCV identifies the controlled variable.

RM:There are steps (actually, a network of contingencies) involved in carrying out the TCV and once these steps are complete you have identified the controlled variable, q.i. There is no second stage after the TCV has identified the controlled variable. The TCV is the whole megillah.

BN: We now approach the vexed question of whether the controlled variable is the controlled perception p in the subject, or that which is perceived in the environment.

RM: This is not a vexed question at all. p is simply a theoretical variable that is part of the PCT model of the system controlling q.i. If, for example, we have discovered that a person is controlling the area of a rectangle, then we know for a fact that q.i = height x width. If we now want to build a model of the person controlling q.i we start by assuming that the model is controlling a perceptual variable, p = height x width. The rest of the model includes assumptions about the value of the person’s reference, r, for the state of p (which would correspond to the empirically observed reference state of q.i) and how the difference between r and p (error) is transformed into the output that is observed to affect q.i.

BN: We can’t yet call it q.i. Call it p.o. The effect of the TCV is to justify the assertion that p.o is in some sense “the same as” the perception p within the subject; call that p.s.

RM: The TCV is used to test whether a particular variable is under control. Each hypothetical controlled variable is a perceptual variable, of course. We call the variable that passes the TCV the controlled variable q.i. That is the variable that will be called p if (or when) we build a model of a system controlling q.i.

BN: This assertion that p.o is “the same as” p.s is inherently open to question because the sensory inputs of the two parties, S.s and S.o, are not identical (whence the importance of assuming as closely as possible the subject’s point of view), and because although we assume that any two humans are homologous in their organization they are very unlikely to be identical.

RM: I think it is just confusing to make a distinction between p.o and q.i. There really is no distinction; q.i is an observed controlled variable, like the observation of the distance between the knot and the dot in the rubber band demo. All observations so the observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances – that is, that this distance is a controlled variable, q.i – is a perceptual variable in the observer.

RM: The answer to the question of whether q.i is the same as the perceptual variable, p, in a model of a system controlling q.i depends on whether the perceptual function that was selected to define p in the model of the system doing the controlling is a correct representation of q.i from the perspective of the actual control system. In most modeling situations this is done automatically, so to speak. For example, in my object interception models the hypothetical controlled variables – the functions of the optical angles of the object to be intercepted – are always represented from the pursuer’s perspective. But sometimes the modeler might forget to represent the controlled variable from the actual control system’s perspective, as I did when I built the model of the person controlling the position of the knot in the video of rubber band task. In that exercise I didn’t take into account the fact that the knot’s position relative to the target dot – the controlled variable, q.i – was being seen from the controller’s and not the observer’s (my) perspective. The result was that the model kept the controlled variable in a very different reference state than the one maintained by the controller. When I saw this I realized my mistake and corrected it.

BN: The TCV circumvents this objection because it is a form of collective control;

RM: What is the collectively controlled variable? It seems to me that the TCV is an example of two control systems controlling completely different perceptions. The subject is controlling q.i (from the subject’s perspective, of course, as p) and the experimenter is controlling for determining what q.i is. They are certainly not “collectively” controlling q.i.

BN: So we can say that p.s is the controlled variable within the subject; that p.o is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter; that the whatchamacallit of which they both are perceptual correlates is the controlled variable in the environment.

RM: Then what is q.i? I think it’s easier to just say (as those of use doing PCT research have always said) that p (what you call p.s) is the controlled variable within the subject; q.i (what you call p.o) is the controlled variable within the observer-experimenter and the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function.

Best

Rick

They may call it by different names. After some measurements the experimenter can label it q.i at last and may call it lateral optical velocity but the subject is more likely to call it something like tracking that damned helicopter when it goes sideways, if she bothers to go down a level to distinguish that variable from the other in the pair that the experimenter identified.

If this constructivism is a conceptual burden, referring the matter to the objects and relations of physics and chemistry is no relief, because they too are perceptions–made precise and validated by the experimental tests of the physical sciences, but perceptions still.

/Bruce

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.03.21.0915)]

Bruce Nevin (20170320.1560 ET)–

RM: This is an excellent description of the relationship between q.i and p. I just have one little quibble. You say:

BN: The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject. The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured, but the TCV enables us to approximate it very closely with a high degree of confidence.

RM: I would say that the purpose of the TCV is to determine whether q.i, our perception of a possibly controlled variable, is, indeed, a controlled variable. For example, in my Mind Reading demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Mindread.html) once you (actually the computer) have determined which avatar is being moved intentionally (the position of that avatar that is the controlled variable) then you know what perception the person moving the avatars is controlling. You could then build a control model of this behavior by making the perception controlled by the model be a function of the changing position of that avatar.

RM: What you know when you have discovered the controlled variable, q.i, is the perceptual function that produces your perception of that variable and, thus, the perceptual function that should be used to produce p in the model. This is based on the assumption that q.i “looks the way it does” (for example, it looks like an avatar moving around the screen) because of the nature of the perceptual function that produces the perception of q.i.

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin (20170331.17:56 ET)]

HB : Why should be there always a gentle conflict ?

Because in the TCV the tester applies a disturbance to what she or he believes is being controlled, pushing it one way, and if indeed it is being controlled the subject pushes the other way, resisting the disturbance. They are controlling the same variable with different reference values. This is the definition of conflict. It is a gentle conflict because part of the definition of the TCV is to make the disturbance gentle enough not to overwhelm the subject's ability to control.

HB: Where did you mention in (3) that there is controlled variable in environment ?

The entirety of my statement (3) is a 'mention' of this. But to say it is really in the environment is an assumption. See below.

HB: Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

Yes, it is a conceptual problem for PCT. It's necessary to work through this conceptual problem in order to avoid solipsism. Otherwise, there's no reason to believe that other beings exist. There's no reason to believe that anything in the environment really exists.
We have agreed (I think all of us) that there must be a Real reality in the environment, and that our knowledge of that is limited to our perceptions. We all assume that our perceptions are viridical. This assumption is so strong and uncompromising that, outside of philosophical speculations, we take our perceptions to be the reality that we perceive. Our success at controlling our perceptions validates this assumption; we survive, as have countless generations of our biological ancestors, in the environment we happen to be in, whatever it Really is. Our failures at controlling our perceptions validate this assumption even more strongly, and the efforts, the trial-and-error of different means of control, the regaining and improvement of control, the learning, these experiences validate even more strongly our assumption that our perceptions are reality--a reality that pushes back and has its own recalcitrant properties independent of our memory and imagination.
And when two or more of us control collectively, we may perceive the control actions of the others as disturbances and assistances in our own control, and when we do that experience validates our assumption that my perception of that whatsis is not only real, but that it is the same whatsis that you are perceiving and controlling. Language greatly facilitates this, of course, when we use the same words to talk about the whatsis and about our collective control of it, and affirm to each other in various ways that we are indeed perceiving and effecting control over the same thing in our shared environment. So collective control is the strongest validation of our ineluctable assumption that our perceptions are real. Ineluctable (a delicious word that means "cannot be wrestled away from") because our perceptions are all that we have in an environment that repeatedly and unexpectedly demonstrates itself to be independent of our control of remembered perceptions in imagination.
Yes, to say that the whatsis in the environment is also controlled, when perceptions of it are controlled, is an assumption. It is no more and no less than that same ineluctable assumption that our tested and validated perceptions are 'real'. This is also the fundamental assumption of science. If you've got something better, tell us about it. If you're uninterested in this, then PCT is an abstract game with no application.
You are right, you don't need this assumption inside the model. You only need it if you want to apply the model to your own experience. Or if you are concerned to model perceptual control in social situations.
A simple case of perceptual control in a social situation is two autonomous control systems, where one is controlling a perception and the other is testing to determine what variable is being controlled. Diagram that, please. Let's see how your diagram differs from mine.

···

/Bruce

[Bruce Nevin (20170331.17:56 ET)]

HB : Why should be there always a gentle conflict ?

Because in the TCV the tester applies a disturbance to what she or he believes is being controlled, pushing it one way, and if indeed it is being controlled the subject pushes the other way, resisting the disturbance. They are controlling the same variable with different reference values. This is the definition of conflict. It is a gentle conflict because part of the definition of the TCV is to make the disturbance gentle enough not to overwhelm the subject’s ability to control.

HB : I didn’t ask you about defitnion of conflict. Do you know to read ? The question was clearr. Why you have to start with your phylosophy ???

Everyone who is trying to make some TCV (what is just optional) will choose the way he’ll make a disturbance. But even if you make gentle disturbance people will react differently. They could even take a gun and shoot you if you’ll try with »gentle distrubance« in real life.  Go into real life and try to make gentle disturbances and tell us what about your findings, if you’ll survive of course.  As I said many times to Rick. Science is not for comfotable researching behind the computer. You’ll have to go to real life and obtain evidences for your imagination constructs.

HB: Where did you mention in (3) that there is controlled variable in environment ?

The entirety of my statement (3) is a ‘mention’ of this. But to say it is really in the environment is an assumption. See below.

HB : It’s yours assumption from the model you created in your head. You started with your phylosophy. This is the end of this part of  conversation. Now we talk just about PCT.

HB: Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

BN : Yes, it is a conceptual problem for PCT.

HB : It’s not conceptual problem in PCT but in your head where is so much confussion that I don’t know why I’m talking to you.

BN : Â It’s necessary to work through this conceptual problem in order to avoid solipsism.

HB : The only two who has to work through these problem is you and Rick. There is no solipsism in PCT. It’s assumed environment to which we apply effects. The problem is that you have to prove that you can control environment. Do you understand what is the your and Ricks’Â problem. If you don’t know to read don’t write back. Read what was the problem again.

HB: Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

HB : Shall I copy paste once again. So where is the answer.

The rest of your useless phylosophy will solve later. Now I want a direct answer. The control system affects the outer environment in PCT. What effects of output do in RCT and BNCT ???

There is nothing to solve about outer environment in PCT. It’s perfectly clear. But your confussion in your head needs »sweeping«. So how you will control something in outer environment ? That’s the answer to PCT statement above. PCT definitions is about »controlling« in the system, not outside. So you have to prove that you can control something outside. Do it without phylosophy.

Bill supported his work with evidences that means with perception of many other experts. But you didn’t offer anything to prove your statement that something is controlled outside. No phylosophy anymore. Just proves. The best would be physiological because Bill gave them a lot. If you will not answer to this question than don’t answer at all. How you control outer environment ??? And don’t use Telekinesis as Rick did.

And beside that you could answer also to other Bills’ defitnion. I want to know whether you agree wtih them or you don’t. It’s enough of bullshitting. If you don’t agree with PCT definitions than you are taliking about some other theory. In this case RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) and BNCT (Bruce Nevin Control Theory).

RCT (BNCT) control loop :

  1.   CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
    
  2.   OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
    
  3.   FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
    
  4.   INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
    
  5.   COMPARATOR : ????
    

PCT definitions of control loop. Why do I have to do it so many times ?

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…

<

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box represents thee means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

HB : I want from you take a side. Whether you agree with PCT (Bills’) defitnintions about control loop or you don’t. Prove that he was wrong. If you don’t I’ll understand that you are trying to change PCT into RCT (BNCT) with no evidences. AS I said before. This bullshitt has to stop.

STRATE ANSWERS NO BULLSHITTING.

I want some evidences that you and Rick are talking about PCT.

DO WE UNDERSTAND. OR I HAD TO COPY PASTE IT MANY TIMES. I told you Bruce Nevin that I read you through and through. And that I’ll always be in defending position against your bullshitting.

So what’s it gone be. PCT or RCT (BNCT) ???

Boris

Otherwise, there’s no reason to believe that other beings exist. There’s no reason to believe that anything in the environment really exists.

We have agreed (I think all of us) that there must be a Real reality in the environment, and that our knowledge of that is limited to our perceptions. We all assume that our perceptions are viridical. This assumption is so strong and uncompromising that, outside of philosophical speculations, we take our perceptions to be the reality that we perceive. Our success at controlling our perceptions validates this assumption; we survive, as have countless generations of our biological ancestors, in the environment we happen to be in, whatever it Really is. Our failures at controlling our perceptions validate this assumption even more strongly, and the efforts, the trial-and-error of different means of control, the regaining and improvement of control, the learning, these experiences validate even more strongly our assumption that our perceptions are reality–a reality that pushes back and has its own recalcitrant properties independent of our memory and imagination.

And when two or more of us control collectively, we may perceive the control actions of the others as disturbances and assistances in our own control, and when we do that experience validates our assumption that my perception of that whatsis is not only real, but that it is the same whatsis that you are perceiving and controlling. Language greatly facilitates this, of course, when we use the same words to talk about the whatsis and about our collective control of it, and affirm to each other in various ways that we are indeed perceiving and effecting control over the same thing in our shared environment. So collective control is the strongest validation of our ineluctable assumption that our perceptions are real. Ineluctable (a delicious word that means “cannot be wrestled away from”) because our perceptions are all that we have in an environment that repeatedly and unexpectedly demonstrates itself to be independent of our control of remembered perceptions in imagination.

Yes, to say that the whatsis in the environment is also controlled, when perceptions of it are controlled, is an assumption. It is no more and no less than that same ineluctable assumption that our tested and validated perceptions are ‘real’. This is also the fundamental assumption of science. If you’ve got something better, tell us about it. If you’re uninterested in this, then PCT is an abstract game with no application.

You are right, you don’t need this assumption inside the model. You only need it if you want to apply the model to your own experience. Or if you are concerned to model perceptual control in social situations.

A simple case of perceptual control in a social situation is two autonomous control systems, where one is controlling a perception and the other is testing to determine what variable is being controlled. Diagram that, please. Let’s see how your diagram differs from mine.

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 01, 2017 12:07 AM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

/Bruce

Boris,

This is the end of this conversation.

/Bruce
···

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 12:00 PM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

Â

Â

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 01, 2017 12:07 AM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

Â

[Bruce Nevin (20170331.17:56 ET)]

Â

HB : Why should be there always a gentle conflict ?

Â

Because in the TCV the tester applies a disturbance to what she or he believes is being controlled, pushing it one way, and if indeed it is being controlled the subject pushes the other way, resisting the disturbance. They are controlling the same variable with different reference values. This is the definition of conflict. It is a gentle conflict because part of the definition of the TCV is to make the disturbance gentle enough not to overwhelm the subject’s ability to control.

Â

HB : I didn’t ask you about defitnion of conflict. Do you know to read ? The question was clearr. Why you have to start with your phylosophy ???

Â

Everyone who is trying to make some TCV (what is just optional) will choose the way he’ll make a disturbance. But even if you make gentle disturbance people will react differently. They could even take a gun and shoot you if you’ll try with »gentle distrubance« in real life. Go into real life and try to make gentle disturbances and tell us what about your findings, if you’ll survive of course. As I said many times to Rick. Science is not for comfotable researching behind the computer. You’ll have to go to real life and obtain evidences for your imagination constructs.

Â

HB: Where did you mention in (3) that there is controlled variable in environment ?

Â

The entirety of my statement (3) is a ‘mention’ of this. But to say it is really in the environment is an assumption. See below.

Â

HB : It’s yours assumption from the model you created in your head. You started with your phylosophy. This is the end of this part of  conversation. Now we talk just about PCT.

Â

HB: Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

Â

BN : Yes, it is a conceptual problem for PCT.

Â

HB : It’s not conceptual problem in PCT but in your head where is so much confussion that I don’t know why I’m talking to you.

Â

BN : Â It’s necessary to work through this conceptual problem in order to avoid solipsism.

Â

HB : The only two who has to work through these problem is you and Rick. There is no solipsism in PCT. It’s assumed environment to which we apply effects. The problem is that you have to prove that you can control environment. Do you understand what is the your and Ricks’Â problem. If you don’t know to read don’t write back. Read what was the problem again.

Â

HB: Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.

Â

HB : Shall I copy paste once again. So where is the answer.

Â

The rest of your useless phylosophy will solve later. Now I want a direct answer. The control system affects the outer environment in PCT. What effects of output do in RCT and BNCT ???

Â

There is nothing to solve about outer environment in PCT. It’s perfectly clear. But your confussion in your head needs »sweeping«. So how you will control something in outer environment ? That’s the answer to PCT statement above. PCT definitions is about »controlling« in the system, not outside. So you have to prove that you can control something outside. Do it without phylosophy.

Â

Bill supported his work with evidences that means with perception of many other experts. But you didn’t offer anything to prove your statement that something is controlled outside. No phylosophy anymore. Just proves. The best would be physiological because Bill gave them a lot. If you will not answer to this question than don’t answer at all. How you control outer environment ??? And don’t use Telekinesis as Rick did.

Â

And beside that you could answer also to other Bills’ defitnion. I want to know whether you agree wtih them or you don’t. It’s enough of bullshitting. If you don’t agree with PCT definitions than you are taliking about some other theory. In this case RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory) and BNCT (Bruce Nevin Control Theory).

Â

RCT (BNCT) control loop :

Â

1.      CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.

2.      OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state

3.      FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.

4.      INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«

5.      COMPARATOR : ???

Â

PCT definitions of control loop. Why do I have to do it so many times ?

Â

Bill P (B:CP):

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Â

Bill P (B:CP):

OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…<

Â

Bill P (LCS III):

:…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the mmeans this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Â

Bill P (LCS III):

FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Â

Bill P (B:CP) :

INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives  signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Â

Bill P (B:CP) :

COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

HB : I want from you take a side. Whether you agree with PCT (Bills’) defitnintions about control loop or you don’t. Prove that he was wrong. If you don’t I’ll understand that you are trying to change PCT into RCT (BNCT) with no evidences. AS I said before. This bullshitt has to stop.

STRATE ANSWERS NO BULLSHITTING.

I want some evidences that you and Rick are talking about PCT.

DO WE UNDERSTAND. OR I HAD TO COPY PASTE IT MANY TIMES. I told you Bruce Nevin that I read you through and through. And that I’ll always be in defending position against your bullshitting.

Â

So what’s it gone be. PCT or RCT (BNCT) ???

Â

Boris

Â

Â

Â

Â

Otherwise, there’s no reason to believe that other beings exist. There’s no reason to believe that anything in the environment really exists.

Â

We have agreed (I think all of us) that there must be a Real reality in the environment, and that our knowledge of that is limited to our perceptions. We all assume that our perceptions are viridical. This assumption is so strong and uncompromising that, outside of philosophical speculations, we take our perceptions to be the reality that we perceive. Our success at controlling our perceptions validates this assumption; we survive, as have countless generations of our biological ancestors, in the environment we happen to be in, whatever it Really is. Our failures at controlling our perceptions validate this assumption even more strongly, and the efforts, the trial-and-error of different means of control, the regaining and improvement of control, the learning, these experiences validate even more strongly our assumption that our perceptions are reality–a reality that pushes back and has its own recalcitrant properties independent of our memory and imagination.Â

Â

And when two or more of us control collectively, we may perceive the control actions of the others as disturbances and assistances in our own control, and when we do that experience validates our assumption that my perception of that whatsis is not only real, but that it is the same whatsis that you are perceiving and controlling. Language greatly facilitates this, of course, when we use the same words to talk about the whatsis and about our collective control of it, and affirm to each other in various ways that we are indeed perceiving and effecting control over the same thing in our shared environment. So collective control is the strongest validation of our ineluctable assumption that our perceptions are real. Ineluctable (a delicious word that means “cannot be wrestled away from”) because our perceptions are all that we have in an environment that repeatedly and unexpectedly demonstrates itself to be independent of our control of remembered perceptions in imagination.

Â

Yes, to say that the whatsis in the environment is also controlled, when perceptions of it are controlled, is an assumption. It is no more and no less than that same ineluctable assumption that our tested and validated perceptions are ‘real’. This is also the fundamental assumption of science. If you’ve got something better, tell us about it. If you’re uninterested in this, then PCT is an abstract game with no application.

Â

You are right, you don’t need this assumption inside the model. You only need it if you want to apply the model to your own experience. Or if you are concerned to model perceptual control in social situations.

Â

A simple case of perceptual control in a social situation is two autonomous control systems, where one is controlling a perception and the other is testing to determine what variable is being controlled. Diagram that, please. Let’s see how your diagram differs from mine.

Â

/Bruce