···
From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 2:19 AM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi
[From Bruce Nevin (20170322.21:00 ET)]
Rick Marken (2017.03.22.1525)–
I’m certainly willing to let this go, if it’s important to you, but just to be clear, the reason for distinguishing p.o and q.i is that in many cases the controlled variable is not easily specified as a quantity, and until it has been so specified by some kind of quantitative measurement it seems to me that it oughtn’t to be called a quantity. I suppose you could call it q.i on the optimistic assumption that you will obtain a quantitative measure of it, as indeed you must eventually in order to create a generative computer simulation. The “observation that the distance from knot to dot remains nearly constant despite disturbances” In the rubber-band demonstration permits you to say that the quantity is “nearly zero” and to extrapolate that the reference is in fact zero. If the reference is not zero but the drawing of a geometric shape around the dot with the knot, the lack of quantification becomes obvious. Control of the geometric shape at the Configuration level is achieved by varying the relationship of dot to knot. This can be quantified–that is, specified in terms that can be executed by a computer simulation–but at the point in the TCV process where you recognize the shape and further disturbances verify it there is no quantification yet. The distinction becomes more obvious the higher the controlled perception is in the hierarchy.
HB : O.K. Rick. You done many simple experiments behind your computer, and now you could make some experiments with sleeping, sunshining, saying hello to people on street, when they are looking arround, when they are walking to somewhere… and so on. This all are legitimate behaviors of people. We need general theory which could explain all behaviors. Make also experiments with usual everyday people life activities and then show your findings how precise you can determine what they are controlling ? After these experiments your RCT theory could explain TCV more generally. TCV is not a general method for identifying what people are really controlling. You already wrote :
RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the control of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables….
BN : But really, this is not so important a distinction. The more interesting points include:
-
The perceptual variables p.s and p.o/q.i are both controlled variables. Both parties are controlling.
-
The TCV demonstrates that these two perceptual variables both refer to the same whatsis in the environment.
HB : If the perceptual signals would refer to the same »whatsis« than both perceptual variable should be at least aproximatelly the same. Otherwise its unlikely that we could conclude on the »same whatsis« if perceptual signals are different. On which bases you concluded that we are generally observing the same »whatsis« in the environment ? On the bases of hundreds observations or one (your) is enough ?
I think that »equality« of perceptual signals depends whether both perceive the same physical variables (whatsis) from the environment and from the differences in sensor aparratus that transform physical variables into afferent neural impulses, and so on. Whatever is formed in percpetual hierarchy is not »representation of reality« but a model.
Bill P :
….he has seen a hierarchy off perceptions that somehow represents an external world, and a large collection of Complex Environmental Variables (as Martin Taylor calls them) that is mirrored inside the brain in the form of perceptions.
Briefly, then: what I call the hierarchy of perceptions is the model. When you open your eyes and look around, what you see – and feel, smell, hear, and taste – is the model. In fact we never experience anything but the model. The model is composed of perceptions of all kinds from intensities on up.
That is all we need to do to build up a model of the external world. It’s not even that; it’s just a model of the world. The idea that there’s also an external world that we don’t experience takes a while to develop. At first it’s just the only world there is.
HB : So it’s good to have in mind that we don’t perceive representation of the world, but we form a model. That was also Maturana’s conclussions. Perception is to obscure to »represent« the world outside. But it’s still enough that we can control better or worse.
Bruce, you said it for yourself. Nobody perceive from environment the same p. Genetic structure, firing rate, angle of perceciving… Also people sometimes perceive what others don’t. Diifferent focus of attention. In the same environment people usually perceive differently so it’s hard to say what is the same »whatsis«.
BN earlier : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina.
HB : Different firing rate in perceptual organs and nerve fibres could also mean that different physical variables outside are producing different »stimulus« for firing rates. So both »parties« are not perceiving the same »whatsis«. How could we conclude from different perceptual signals on the same »whatsis« ? What is really the same »whatsis« ? Can you describe me ? It can be just your hypothesis deriving from your specific perception.
- The TCV, which is a gentle conflict, which is a form of collective control, thereby also demonstrates the existence of that whatsis.
HB : Why should be there always a gentle conflict ?
BN : This environmental whatsis therefore also is a controlled variable. To deny this is to deny (3).
HB : Just like that because Bruce Nevin said so. I think you are on the wrong way. How control came to environment so that you got »controlled variables« in environment ? You are changing PCT in accordance with RCT and your BNCT. To deny (3) means denying that there is »commonly controlled variable« in environment. Where did you mention in (3) that there is controlled variable in environment ?
Every individual has it’s own perceptual control which is disturbed by control of others and other environmental disturbances. What is here controlled in common environment ? But effects of internal control of all involved LCS can be seen in environment. Definition of PCT control talks just about »maintaining preselected state« in controlling system, not outside. But if you are inventing some other definitions then you should be calling them differently.
- In contrast to the two perceptual variables, this whatsis is a variable in the environment, but all that we know about it is the perceptions p.s and p.o/q.i, respectively. (A third party observer could be brought in to corroborate the consensual reality.)
HB : What is p.s. and what p.o./q.i. ??? It would be enough just p.s. and p.o.
It would be nice if you find out what do you want and that finally RCT and BNCT and PCT get into some synchronized form otherwise this conflict between differences in RCT and PCT will continue. I think that you and Rick should except PCT explanation of control loop.
I tried to summerize »definitions« of RCT control loop which seems to be in agreement with both of you :
So if I compare the fundamentals of your theories with PCT I got differences in control loop.
RCT (BNCT) control loop :
-
CONTROL : Keeping of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state, protected (defended) from disturbances.
-
OUTPUT FUNCTION : controlled effects (control of behavior) to outer environment so to keep some »controlled variable« in reference state
-
FEED-BACK FUNCTION : »Control« of some »aspect of outer environment« in reference state.
-
INPUT FUNCTION : produce »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or »Controlled Perception«, the perceptual correlate of »controlled q.i.«
-
COMPARATOR : ????
This seems to be the RCT and BNCT »Control loop« »definitions« you are trying to sell instead of PCT definitions. Now we have to go through PCT definitions of control loop. Why do I have to do it so many times ?
Bill P (B:CP):
CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.
Bill P (B:CP):
OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system…
&nbssp;
Bill P (LCS III):
:…the output function shown in it’s own box representss the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.
Bill P (LCS III):
FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
Bill P (B:CP) :
INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.
Bill P (B:CP) :
COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.
HB : If I’m wrong something please correct me. This different presentation of elements in »control loop« has to stop.
I’d like some evidences that your and Ricks’ control loop is valid or that is close to PCT. Let us do it once for all. I have slowly enough of lecturing your imagination constructs. Could somebody overtake this duty and defend PCT. Barb ?
- We don’t notice the demonstration in (3) because we already assumed the existence of the whatsis in the environment, and we are also confident that we know its character, as given by the perception p.o/q.i if we’re the observer-experimenter, or the perception p.s if we’re the subject of the TCV.
The “vexed question” was not about the definition and role of p.
BN in other post :The purpose and effect of the Test for the Controlled Variable (TCV) is to verify that q.i within the observer-experimenter corresponds as closely as possible to p within the subject.
BN : It was the question what is controlled.
HB : Exactly. In PCT seems important what people control inside not what kind of »controlled variable« they perceive from outside in p.
BN : This refers to disputes that have recurred for years whether the “CV” is the controlled perception p or the controlled environmental variable “CEV” or “CCEV”. To my recollection, the controlled perception p.o or q.i of the person carrying out the TCV has not been included in these discussions.
HB : The controlled perception p.o. or q.i. were probably not included in these discussions because it’s nonsense. What is »controlled perception« p (CV) or »controlled environmental variable« (CEV) or »controlled perception« q.i. and how they are controlled ???
When we include the experimenter in the same environment with the subject it becomes clear that the answer is that all three variables are controlled during the TCV:
-
The subject’s perception.
-
The experimenter’s perception.
-
That in the environment which they perceive and collectively control. Whatever it Really is.
HB : What did you mean with third one. That external environment is collectivelly controlled ?
RM: “the whatchamacallit consists of the physical variables (v.1,v.2…v.n) of which both p and q.i are the same function”
These physical variables are also perceptions. Their environmental correlates have been demonstrated to exist by collective control exerted by physical scientists, but all we know about them (whatever they Really are) is those perceptions, which, as we know, are subject to change as scientists refine their consensus.
HB : At last one good thinking.
All of this ignores the distinction between perception as a quantity (rate of firing) and perception as an experience. We live in the latter, and I bet the TCV is usually carried out in the latter; we model the former. The distinction between p.o and q.i (which I am willing to drop) is related if what we mean by p.o as well as p.e is perception as experience.
HB : . Depends what you meant with experience ?
Boris
/Bruce
