p and Qi

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25]

So far, that is as I understand the situation.

But is not the experimenter controlling the magnitude of the

disturbing influence rather than the perceived value of the
hypothetical variable being controlled that is being disturbed by
the experimenter’s influence? The experimenter has no reference
value for the value of the hypothesised variable, but wants to
observe what happens when a particular disturbance is applied to it.
Indeed, the point of the Test is to determine whether that is really
the variable being controlled, isn’t it?

If something similar to the hypothesized variable is being

controlled, the controller will push back, but the disturber should
not resist that push back by changing the applied (controlled)
disturbing influence. If the hypothesised variable is very close to
the one actually being controlled AND the controller is controlling
well, the experimenter will observe the variable returning to a
value very near where it was before the applied disturbing
influence.

Isn't that the way you see the TCV-type experiment? In your

following text, you say it isn’t, because “They are controlling the
same variable with different reference values.” But why? When Bill P
tested whether his driver friend was controlling the angle of the
steering wheel by applying a force to change the steering wheel
angle, he was not controlling for the wheel to be at a different
angle that would cause a crash, was he?

Martin
···

[Bruce Nevin (20170331.17:56 ET)]

          HB : Why should be there always a

gentle conflict ?

        Because in the TCV the tester applies

a disturbance to what she or he believes is being
controlled, pushing it one way, and if indeed it is being
controlled the subject pushes the other way, resisting the
disturbance.

[Bruce Nevin (20170401.16:06 ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25

When Bill P tested whether his driver friend was controlling the angle of the steering wheel by applying a force to change the steering wheel angle, he was not controlling for the wheel to be at a different angle that would cause a crash, was he?

I would have to read the anecdote for his statement of what he was controlling. I would say he was controlling a pressure against his friend’s control of the steering wheel. I am sure that he knew from experience that doing so would make the car approach the edge of its driving lane an
d that he assumed from his experience that the driver is controlling to avoid the edges of the lane. “To cause a crash” is a needless and distracting overstatement. But he introduced the disturbance at a lower level of the hierarchy. The driver is controlling avoidance of lane edges by means of lateral pressure on the steering wheel. He applied lateral pressure to the steering wheel. The driver pushed back. They were in conflict until he stopped applying pressure to turn the wheel.

···

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25]

So far, that is as I understand the situation.



But is not the experimenter controlling the magnitude of the

disturbing influence rather than the perceived value of the
hypothetical variable being controlled that is being disturbed by
the experimenter’s influence? The experimenter has no reference
value for the value of the hypothesised variable, but wants to
observe what happens when a particular disturbance is applied to it.
Indeed, the point of the Test is to determine whether that is really
the variable being controlled, isn’t it?

If something similar to the hypothesized variable is being

controlled, the controller will push back, but the disturber should
not resist that push back by changing the applied (controlled)
disturbing influence. If the hypothesised variable is very close to
the one actually being controlled AND the controller is controlling
well, the experimenter will observe the variable returning to a
value very near where it was before the applied disturbing
influence.

Isn't that the way you see the TCV-type experiment? In your

following text, you say it isn’t, because “They are controlling the
same variable with different reference values.” But why? When Bill P
tested whether his driver friend was controlling the angle of the
steering wheel by applying a force to change the steering wheel
angle, he was not controlling for the wheel to be at a different
angle that would cause a crash, was he?

Martin

[Bruce Nevin (20170331.17:56 ET)]

          HB : Why should be there always a

gentle conflict ?

        Because in the TCV the tester applies

a disturbance to what she or he believes is being
controlled, pushing it one way, and if indeed it is being
controlled the subject pushes the other way, resisting the
disturbance.

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.17.01]

        [Bruce Nevin (20170401.16:06

ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25

          When Bill P tested whether

his driver friend was controlling the angle of the
steering wheel by applying a force to change the steering
wheel angle, he was not controlling for the wheel to be at
a different angle that would cause a crash, was he?

        I would have to read the

anecdote for his statement of what he was controlling. I
would say he was controlling a pressure against his friend’s
control of the steering wheel.

Yes, that's what I suggested. He was demonstrating that the driver

was controlling the angle of the wheel.

I am sure that he knew from
experience that doing so would make the car approach the
edge of its driving lane an d that he assumed from his
experience that the driver is controlling to avoid the edges
of the lane. “To cause a crash” is a needless and
distracting overstatement.

No it's not. If Bill had been in conflict with the driver over the

variable Bill said he was testing, the result would have been a
crash, and Bill knew it.

But he introduced the
disturbance at a lower level of the hierarchy. The driver is
controlling avoidance of lane edges by means of lateral
pressure on the steering wheel. He applied lateral pressure
to the steering wheel. The driver pushed back. They were in
conflict until he stopped applying pressure to turn the
wheel.

Why conflict? Would Bill have increased his pressure on the wheel as

a consequence of the driver’s change of pressure on the wheel?
Bill’s reference was to perceive himself as applying a certain
amount of pressure to the wheel. He would not have been disturbed by
the driver’s change of the pressure he was applying to the wheel.

I don't see a conflict at either level of the hierarchy, or at any

other level, except possibly much higher, at some level relating to
social relationship. It’s the same in most, if not all, instances of
the TCV. For the experimenter to try to control the tested
variable would make the test harder to complete. The experimenter
wants to influence the hypothesized controlled variable, and see
whether and how accurately the influence is countered. The
experimenter generally has no skin in the game as to what value the
hypothesized controlled variable actually has. The question is
whether the experimental subject has.

Martin
···

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Martin
Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25]

           So far, that is as I understand the situation.



          But is not the experimenter controlling the magnitude of

the disturbing influence rather than the perceived value
of the hypothetical variable being controlled that is
being disturbed by the experimenter’s influence? The
experimenter has no reference value for the value of the
hypothesised variable, but wants to observe what happens
when a particular disturbance is applied to it. Indeed,
the point of the Test is to determine whether that is
really the variable being controlled, isn’t it?

          If something similar to the hypothesized variable is being

controlled, the controller will push back, but the
disturber should not resist that push back by changing the
applied (controlled) disturbing influence. If the
hypothesised variable is very close to the one actually
being controlled AND the controller is controlling well,
the experimenter will observe the variable returning to a
value very near where it was before the applied disturbing
influence.

          Isn't that the way you see the TCV-type experiment? In

your following text, you say it isn’t, because “They are
controlling the same variable with different reference
values.” But why? When Bill P tested whether his driver
friend was controlling the angle of the steering wheel by
applying a force to change the steering wheel angle, he
was not controlling for the wheel to be at a different
angle that would cause a crash, was he?

              Martin
                  [Bruce Nevin

(20170331.17:56 ET)]

                      HB : Why should be

there always a gentle conflict ?

                    Because in the TCV the

tester applies a disturbance to what she or he
believes is being controlled, pushing it one
way, and if indeed it is being controlled the
subject pushes the other way, resisting the
disturbance.

A conflict can be transitory, as I hope this one is now proved to be.

···

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 5:15 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.17.01]

        [Bruce Nevin (20170401.16:06

ET)]

Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25

          When Bill P tested whether

his driver friend was controlling the angle of the
steering wheel by applying a force to change the steering
wheel angle, he was not controlling for the wheel to be at
a different angle that would cause a crash, was he?

        I would have to read the

anecdote for his statement of what he was controlling. I
would say he was controlling a pressure against his friend’s
control of the steering wheel.

Yes, that's what I suggested. He was demonstrating that the driver

was controlling the angle of the wheel.

I am sure that he knew from
experience that doing so would make the car approach the
edge of its driving lane an d that he assumed from his
experience that the driver is controlling to avoid the edges
of the lane. “To cause a crash” is a needless and
distracting overstatement.

No it's not. If Bill had been in conflict with the driver over the

variable Bill said he was testing, the result would have been a
crash, and Bill knew it.

But he introduced the
disturbance at a lower level of the hierarchy. The driver is
controlling avoidance of lane edges by means of lateral
pressure on the steering wheel. He applied lateral pressure
to the steering wheel. The driver pushed back. They were in
conflict until he stopped applying pressure to turn the
wheel.

Why conflict? Would Bill have increased his pressure on the wheel as

a consequence of the driver’s change of pressure on the wheel?
Bill’s reference was to perceive himself as applying a certain
amount of pressure to the wheel. He would not have been disturbed by
the driver’s change of the pressure he was applying to the wheel.

I don't see a conflict at either level of the hierarchy, or at any

other level, except possibly much higher, at some level relating to
social relationship. It’s the same in most, if not all, instances of
the TCV. For the experimenter to try to control the tested
variable would make the test harder to complete. The experimenter
wants to influence the hypothesized controlled variable, and see
whether and how accurately the influence is countered. The
experimenter generally has no skin in the game as to what value the
hypothesized controlled variable actually has. The question is
whether the experimental subject has.

Martin
      On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2017.04.01.14.25]

           So far, that is as I understand the situation.



          But is not the experimenter controlling the magnitude of

the disturbing influence rather than the perceived value
of the hypothetical variable being controlled that is
being disturbed by the experimenter’s influence? The
experimenter has no reference value for the value of the
hypothesised variable, but wants to observe what happens
when a particular disturbance is applied to it. Indeed,
the point of the Test is to determine whether that is
really the variable being controlled, isn’t it?

          If something similar to the hypothesized variable is being

controlled, the controller will push back, but the
disturber should not resist that push back by changing the
applied (controlled) disturbing influence. If the
hypothesised variable is very close to the one actually
being controlled AND the controller is controlling well,
the experimenter will observe the variable returning to a
value very near where it was before the applied disturbing
influence.

          Isn't that the way you see the TCV-type experiment? In

your following text, you say it isn’t, because “They are
controlling the same variable with different reference
values.” But why? When Bill P tested whether his driver
friend was controlling the angle of the steering wheel by
applying a force to change the steering wheel angle, he
was not controlling for the wheel to be at a different
angle that would cause a crash, was he?

              Martin
                  [Bruce Nevin

(20170331.17:56 ET)]

                      HB : Why should be

there always a gentle conflict ?

                    Because in the TCV the

tester applies a disturbance to what she or he
believes is being controlled, pushing it one
way, and if indeed it is being controlled the
subject pushes the other way, resisting the
disturbance.

Bruce and Rick,

I waited qiute sometime to see whether something will change in PCT. At least I expected that diagram will be changed in accordance to your and Ricks’ »discoveries«. Well nothing happened.

You and Rick are for a long time openning very serious questions about future of PCT and for bonus you are trying to change it with your imagination constructs. Rick was even implaying that Bill was wrong. And you Bruce implyed that you have your diagram which probably differs from Bills’.

BN : A simple case of perceptual control in a social situation is two autonomous control systems, where one is controlling a perception and the other is testing to determine what variable is being controlled. Diagram that, please. Let’s see how your diagram differs from mine.

HB : There is the same problem all the time. You and Rick are producing different diagrams for individual LCS and »interaction« between LCS, contrary to Bill. You are not doing PCT analysis as you should on the CSGnet forum. You are doing your own imagined analysis, which mostly has no sense.Â

You are saying that you have your own diagram and how it defers from mine. Do we all have on PCT forum our own diagrams that we should compare ???

And why should I have my own diagram if I’m all the time promoting PCT diagram (LCS III). That is the only diagram that should be used in any PCT analysis on CSGnet in the sense of analysing LCS or two or hundred LCS. It always works the same. If you have your own diagram you should have your own theory and you should open your forum.Â

There is no such a statement in PCT : ….one is controlling a perception and the other is testing to determine what variable is being controlled. As you said. Both are contolers in PCT diagram sense and they both just control perception whether they test or are being tested or they walk or they talk, or they sleep or they sunshine…. They alwayys function in the same manner in accordance to PCT diagram (LCS III). Bill made a general diagram for all behaviors not some of them as you are doing.

So in PCT there is not one diagram for one who is controlling perception and another diagram for the one who is testing the subject who control perception ???

There is no yours, Rick, and my diagram. It’s only one, PCT diagram until we prove that it is wrong. Are you trying to prove that Bills’ diagram in LCS III is wrong ??? I don’t understand why should you need you own diagram which is different from Bill’s diagram if PCT diagram is correct ???Â

By my oppinion your imagination construct are not good for PCT as everything concerning yours and Ricks’ phylosophical writings about PCT is sapping PCT. You two (including Warren) should do a serious thinking before you write something on CSGnet or to the public because you are seriously misleading with your private NON-PCT theories.

It would be good if you two would show some evidences for your »behavioristic control loop«. Whatever you were doing in your post bellow is mostly just usual »blind street« in relation to PCT.

So if you want to see my answer suit yourself. It’s bellow.

image00523.png

image001185.jpg

···

From: Bruce Nevin [mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 9:00 PM
To: CSG
Subject: Re: p and Qi

[Bruce Nevin 20170320.1560 ET]

Boris,

Yes, there are two living control systems (LCSs) observing and controlling in the same environment. One is the observer-experimenter performing the TCV and the other is the subject. (You have referred to the subject as “the controller”, but of course they are both controllers.)

HB : I didn’t, Rick did. You should explain this to Rick.

RM earlier :Â By the way, saying that Qi is equivalent to p is not the same as saying that Qi is p. Qi is the observer’s perception of the variable being controlled; p is the controller’s perception of the variable being controlled.

HB : I was just trying to use terminology you two used. If you don’t agree with Rick you should tell him before accusing me. I wrote many times that any LCS act or collective control should be in accordance with PCT model (LCS III). But Rick is dividing observer and controller. Can we assume that in his RCT theory, PCT diagram is not applied for both controllers in the same way ?

Anyway you can see that in Ricks’ case »observer and controller« are controlling something outside not inside. It’s RCT. And the problem is also whether Q.I. is really “equivalent” to p in his RCT ? Is it ? And there is also problematic that Rick is perceiving variable being controlled in environment. It is the perceptual signal that will be controlled in comparator. It is not perceived already controlled variable whatever it is called. It’s increadible confussion.

BN : They cannot have the same p because p represents a neural signal within each. Their genetic and personal histories will have endowed them differently. It is vanishingly unlikely that their respective perceptual organs and nervous systems are constructed so as to generate the same rate of firing. Each will have developed appropriate rates of firing for reference values r corresponding to their perceptual signals p so that they control satisfactorily and get along in life. One may be wearing sunglasses so a different quantity of photons reaches a different retina.

HB : Agree. Explain this to Rick. This seems to be PCT explanation exaptable for both of us. So in the continuation of the post you should stick to it.

If I understood right you wrote :

  1.   Both persons are equal controllers. I assume they function  in accordance with PCT model (LCS III)
    
  2.   They both have perceptual signals (p<sub>1</sub>, p<sub>2</sub>) and references (r<sub>1</sub>, r<sub>2</sub>)
    
  3.   They both control own perceptual signal
    

In accordance with your writings above you should use in both cases (experimenter and subject) PCT diagram. So make again your analysis in PCT manner and you’ll have no problem with me. But don’t make your own theory unless you want to prove that Bill was wrong with his PCT. Is there anything wrong with Bills’ diagram in LCS III ? So I want to know wheher you agree with diagram in LCS III or you don’t ? Straight answer, no phylosophy.

cid:image003.jpg@01D23694.7341FD90

My oppinon is that you made in your diagrma some crucial mistakes and that you didn’t make PCT analyses but some BNCT analyses which show :

  1.   Terminological and theoretical confussion
    
  2.   It seems that you are equating p=q.i. in the case of observer although it was explained that p=f(q.i.)
    
  3.   It seems that BNCT model is treating observer and subject as different »controllers« with different control loops which has a little to do with Bills' diagram. I think that PCT diagram was not  applyed in both cases the same. PCT is theory about how all Living Control System behave, not just some of them. So I think you should apply diagram for both in the same way. See Kents' work how he is doing it.
    
  4.   There are contradictions in your phylosophical - logical thinking… (read carefully wwhat you wrote)
    
  5.   It's not clear what TCV is ? TCV seems to be very vague method. There are also other methods for guessing what people control (think, feel).
    
  6.   It seems that you are analyzing interaction from the view of the observer-experimenter
    
  7.   Your BNCT model is not general. You can't explain all everyday behaviors and interactions betwen people like PCT can. If you want model to be valid it has to describe how people are functioning (controlling) 24/7 not just how they hypothetically "function" in one or two simple experiments.
    

For now I’ll not argue in detail my findings although I made them.

But I’m more interested in clarifying what Rick was doing in his article and what your arguments are for supporting him. I can’t beleive what I saw. It is such a mess that I’m even not sure if I understood it well. So I’ll ask you first some questions and than I’ll write my final oppinion

BN : For example, if a model that controls two variables, optical velocity and lateral optical displacement, produces numerical outputs that correspond very closely to the measured limb positions of people when they are controlling perceptions of tracking a flying helicopter, then we are warrented in saying that the brain has functional structures corresponding to those in the model, and that the firing rates in neural bundles at the corresponding places are proportional to the numerical values calculated at those places in the model.

HB : this is about Ricks’ article isn’t it ?

  1.   Do I understand right that persuers brain consist of two control units representing independantly perceptual control of x and y dimenssions ??? If I understood right it's hard to imagine (at least for me) how every »optical sensory input« (for example each eye) can have it's own comparator and separate output. From Ricks diagram visual perceptual functions »(x,y)« seems to work independently ?  Are there any physiological evidences for such an assumption ? Afterall there are two different, inedependant control units in persuer and they should be also physiologically recognizable ???
    
  2.   Are you saying that persuer is controlling perceptions of tracking a flying helicopter so that persuer is moving along synchronicly with movements of helicopter  in 2-dimenssional space ? In other words, are persuers »actions«  synchronized along with helicopter movings along x- and y- dimenssions ??? I can't imagine how can two independent control units exist in human brain with their own or separate »motor« outputs, and can synchonicly »track« helicopter in 2-dimensional space if helicopter is moving by chance ??? From Ricks' diagram it's obviously that helicopter can move in 3-dmenssional space (x,y,z). How z-dimension is »represented« ?
    
  3.   And are you saying that the brain has functional structures corresponding to those in the model ??? So that brain has independent visual control units for controlling perception in x- and y-dimenssions and these two dimenssions are functioning through separate visual »input functions« and continue through separate comparators and separate outputs ??? If persuers' brains are controlling separatelly  2 dimenssions, can we assume that one control unit is starting perception in one eye (let us say x) and the other control unit in other eye (let us say y) ??? As the Ricks diagram is showing there are two separate inputs and two separate cmparators and outputs ?
    

So can we say that both control units for controlling perception in different dimenssions have it’s own »input quantity« in each eye for one dimenssion and they have separate independent comparator and output ???

  1.   How and where did you get the information that the firing rates in neural bundles at the corresponding places are proportional to the numerical values calculated at those places in the model ??? How did you measure the firing rates in neural bundles at the corresponding places so that you can be sure that they are proportional to the numerical values calculated at those places in the model ?Â
    

BN above : The perceptual signal p within the subject cannot be directly observed and measured,

If I remember right I already criticized similar Ricks’ model (it’s somewhere on CSGnet) as he was presenting two separated control units controlling two independent dimenssions. The only explanation was that one eye was »controlling x dimenssion« and the other »y dimenssion« because it’s the only way how we can explain existance of two separate input fuctions, two separate comapartors and two separate outputs. The question was also how do we know which eye is »observing« which dimenssion ?

The problem in Ricks’ article was also that helicopter movements are represented in x,y,z dimenssions. See the picture bellow :

cid:image005.png@01D2AE98.73971970

How Rick is imagining that he will explain movements of helicopter in real life (3-dimensionl space) and of course »normal« human brain acitivities and behavior upon his experiment ???

So how Rick is imagining that he’ll explain z-dimenssion ? is it to be transffered through another different »input function« and processed in different comparator and different output ? From the Rikcs’ model in article we can see that helicopter can move in x,y and z-dimenssion, but persuer is controlling only in two dimenssions. How these all is assumed to be perceived and controlled by persuer ??? Is there a »Third EYE« ? And does this mean that third »input quantity«, »input function«, and separate perceptual signal (p3 ) and »z-comparator« and z-output (Oz) have to be introduced.

I hope that observer (persuer) in Ricks’ experiment of »tracking helicopter« is observing helicopter in 3-D space what could be normal in real life situations ? But it seems that you say that persuer is moving synchronically with movings of helicopter just in two dimenssions in experiment ? How can that be transffered in real life situation ? If I understand right Rick is trying to get some experimental results which could explain usual everyday activities of human who set their own references. If I understood right he tryed to prove goal directed behavior of human and how goals are formed in organism ??? Or I’m wrong ? Is he doing the tests just because of tests ?

Something similar I saw also in Ricks’ baseball catch, which is by the way behavioristic study of fielders movements and it does not simulate generally right fielders real movements in the game. As I said before. Right model should explain every behavior not just some in special experiment if at all.

BN : The subject, of course, is only aware of the helicopter and the task of tracking it.

HB : How do you know what the subject is only aware of ? You must have some Telepathic abilities like Rick has if you know of course what people are aware of ??? How could you know that ???

I seriously doubt that in real life situation people will be »only aware« of the helicopter and the task of tracking it.That could probably happen just in some commedy films like Ricks’ experiment seems to be.

BN : We commonly apply PCT to behavioral actions and perceptual inputs that are not quantified.

HB : Even if »behavioral actions« and »perceptal inputs« are quantified it doesn’t mean that PCT is understood. Speccially not if we are just quantifying »input« of the experimenter and »output« of subject as effect on only experimenters input. PCT is also about how hierarchy works and how references are formed. All the hierarchy is functioning all the time and is present in any human activity and in any simple or complex experiment all the time. Control is about achieving and maintaining preselected state in the controlling system 24/7, not outside in some form of “controlled variable q.i.” which is specific for one situation.

BN : When we do, we are no longer talking about q.i, and we say “perception” in the sense of subjective experience rather than rates of neural firing. The extrapolation is tempting and exciting and often illuminating but we need to bear in mind that words and labels that have a very precise meaning within a quantitative model may be being misused.

HB :

I don’t understand what this have to do with what you were saying above as it seems to me that only you and Rick are misusing »that words and labels have a very precise meaning within a quantitative model…« in relation to PCT. it seems to me that most of your writings are a great confussion as Ricks’ is. You two are misusing PCT.

I would advise using PCT model in further experimental analyses which would support precise PCT terminology and findings. I personally think that you and Rick are using »own« models because you don’t clearly understand PCT. So you should do more on studying Bills’ literature and on »yourself improvement«.

All in all I think Bruce that you are too much under Ricks’ »control«. It seems that it’s not only because Rick wants so, but because primarily you want it so.

I still think Bruce that you and Rick need to understand how organisms function. The diagram on page 191, or Bills’ latest diagram presented by Dag has to be finished so that we’ll all understand how PCT organism function.

RF : After reading writings of PCT doubters accessed using links provided at the end of Section II of Scott Alexander’s blog (the titles of the links being thoroughly shot down and can predict some things but not much better than competing theories), my major take-away is that after 45 years, PCT does not have enough solid experimental research evidence to convince other professionals/doubters of PCT’s value as a paradigm worth taking seriously.

HB : I agree that upgrade to PCT is necesary. When I started discussion with Bill about necesity of more precise diagram on p. 191 (B:CP, 2005) Bill saw immediatelly what I’m talking about and he put the »arrow« into the diagram (latest verion – Dag). But that saved only the biggest problem PCT had. With »arrow« it did get credibilty how genetic references were present in »intrinsic« variables. Without that PCT would be a null theory of »error« driven control system. I had in mind more additions but we didin’t get that far.

Boris