# PCT aspirin (down the group behavior path)

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371>\
**Category:** CSG2008\
**Created:** [February 2, 2008, 11:45pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371 "2008-02-02T23:45:27Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 10\
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**Author:** ![Fred\_Nickols1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/f/ad7895/32.png) [@Fred\_Nickols1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Fred_Nickols1)\
**Post date:** [February 2, 2008, 11:45pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/1 "2008-02-02T23:45:27Z")

</div>

[From Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1632 MT)]

> [From Rick Marken (2008.02.02.1140)]
> 
> \> Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1144 MT)--
> 
> \> Would you please give an example of group behavior?
> 
> Actually, I already gave one: Music created by a group of individuals.

I'm going to get a little picky here. Not because I'm trying to be a p---k or pick a fight. I'm really puzzled by "group behavior" and I'm trying to clarify it for myself.

> A symphony results from the combined efforts of several individuals.

If by "symphony" you mean the sound we hear if we were in the audience at a concert, I agree. The sound (whatever it is we hear) is the product of the presumably coordinated efforts of the individual members of the orchestra. That said, it seems to me that there is still no "group" behaving per se, just the individual orchestra members.

> No group, no symphony. This is an example of group behavior where the  
> result (symphony) is probably intended by each individual and can only  
> occur if everyone acts in concert. So the symphony -- the combination  
> of all the orchestral parts -- is a controlled result of the group.

Here again, I'm going to get picky. I agree that the individual members are no doubt controlling for some reference signal that amounts to them playing their part correctly. However, I don't see any "group" behaving or controlling. To me, your statement implies a group or collective awareness, including intention and feedback and all that stuff and I don't see it. All I see are the orchestra members, including the conductor, doing their thing.

> Other examples of this kind of group behavior, which I would call  
> "cooperative control", are buildings, roads, universities, square  
> dances, etc.

Huh? How are buildings, roads, and universities group behavior? And I view square dances much the same as I view the symphony or concert. There is indeed a "group" (i.e., some collection or set of individuals or pairs) but there is no central intelligence, no group awareness, only the intelligence and awareness and behavior of the individuals who comprise the group.

> Another kind of group behavior occurs when the group result is not  
> intended but is directly related to the fact that individuals are  
> controlling particular variables. I call this "collective control". An  
> example of this kind of group behavior is GDP, which is a result of  
> individuals or smaller groups of individuals controlling for producing  
> the stuff they want. Unlike the case of an orchestra, where the  
> symphony is the intended result, GDP is not an intended result but is,  
> nevertheless, a direct result of individuals producing particular  
> intended results -- the production of goods and services for  
> themselves and or in order to get money to purchase the goods and  
> services of others.

GDP is indeed a measurable (and measured) product or result and it stems from the behavior of some identifiable group of individuals (and presumably they are controlling for something or other). However, there is no group producing the GDP. There are individuals doing this or that and controlling for this or that and whatever variables comprises the GDP are affected by those individuals (and the organizations being governed/manipulated by some small subset of all individuals). So, I don't see GDP as group behavior (besides, it's a result, not behavior).

> A third kind of group behavior occurs when the group result is a side  
> effect of the controlling done by a group of individuals Perhaps this  
> kind of group behavior could be called "side effect of collective  
> control". An example is carbon dioxide emission levels, which is a  
> side effect of people controlling, not for the production of C02, but  
> for keeping warm or running the stuff they are controlling.

How does the example above differ from the GDP example. Looks the same to me.

Bear with me, Rick.

Regards.

> **···**
>
> --  
> Fred Nickols  
> Toolmaker to Knowledge Workers  
> www.skullworks.com  
> nickols@att.net

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 12:45am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/2 "2008-02-03T00:45:45Z")

</div>

> If by “symphony” you  
> mean the sound we hear if we were in the audience at a concert, I  
> agree. The sound (whatever it is we hear) is the product of the  
> presumably coordinated efforts of the individual members of the  
> orchestra. That said, it seems to me that there is still no  
> “group” behaving per se, just the individual orchestra  
> members.  
> [From Bill Powers (2008.02.02.1705 MST)]

Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1632 MT) –

> [Marken] A symphony results from the combined efforts of several  
> individuals.

I think I’m generally with you on this, Fred, but there may still be some  
legitimate examples of group control behavior – that is, actions that  
are varied by all the people in a group in such a way as to control a  
social variable that requires all of the individuals in order to exist.  
If a “group variable” is under control, a disturbance tending  
to alter it will be counteracted by a change in the actions of the  
control systems. Maybe a symphony orchestra would fit that  
description.

I’m thinking of a simpler example, a “conversation.” If both of  
us intend to be in a conversation together, both of us will act in such a  
way as to maintain the conversation, and if external influences disturb  
the conversation we will both adjust our actions to nullify the effects  
of the disturbance. The conversation can’t exist without both of us  
present.

Another example may be when two people move something that neither one  
alone could move. Each person individually is trying to move the object  
(say, to an agreed-on place), and each contributes part of the output  
needed to move it. Without both people there would be no control. You  
could argue that this is just parallel control, of course, with the two  
people not forming any new kind of entity.

Martin Taylor commented about control systems being made up of a  
collection of S-R systems, with the implication that a collection of  
control systems connected together in certain ways might form some new  
kind of higher-order system. But here I think the key phrase is  
“connected in certain ways”. Just interacting, with each  
control system controlling its own variable and adjusting to disturbances  
from the others, doesn’t form any particular kind of organized system. I  
think we have to look for controlled perceptions that are specifically  
about the group or that can’t exist unless there is a group. The S-R  
systems that form a control system can’t just be thrown together any old  
way. If there is to be anything organized about a group’s behavior, the  
interactions can’t just be any old interactions.

The members of a symphony orchestra can sit down in their places and  
start playing the music on the sheets in front of them, but that does not  
produce the results that people pay to hear. There must be variables that  
they all control which are specifically about the orchestra and the sound  
it makes, rather than about an individual and the sound the individual  
makes. I leave it to better musicians than I to fill in the details, but  
clearly each musician is listening to all the musicians, not just his own  
sounds, and adjusts his timing and expression so the collective sound is  
pleasing (especially to the conductor).

This requires that the individuals learn “social perceptions”  
that extend beyond their individual concerns. Maybe that is part of what  
we should mean by “system concepts.”

Best,

Bill P.

---

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**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 3:00am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/3 "2008-02-03T03:00:33Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2008.02.02.1900)]

> Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1632 MT)

> If by "symphony" you mean the sound we hear if we were in the audience at a concert, I  
> agree. The sound (whatever it is we hear) is the product of the presumably coordinated  
> efforts of the individual members of the orchestra. That said, it seems to me that there is  
> still no "group" behaving per se, just the individual orchestra members.

I think I see your point. When I say "group control" it sounds like I  
am talking about the controlling done by an agent called a "group". In  
this sense I agree that there is no "group" producing results like a  
symphony (or a building -- a lot of individuals get together and  
control for things that eventually becomes a building but there is no  
"group" that produces a building).

In my writings on economics I have talked as though there were groups  
that act as agents: the aggregate consumer and producer, for example.  
I'm still willing to deal with these groups are "virtual" agents. I  
think it's as legitimate to deal with q groups of people as a virtual  
agent called an orchestra as it is to deal with collections of  
positive and negative ions as a virtual voltage generating "agent"  
called a battery.

I agree that to understand how a group, like an orchestra or a  
battery, actually works we have to understand how the individual  
components of the group work -- how the players control or how the  
atoms attract -- but I think it's also legitimate to study things like  
orchestras and batteries at the group level. The group level study of  
batteries is electrical circuit analysis -- the study of how group  
level variables, like resistance and capacitance, relate to other  
group level variables, like voltage and current. The group level study  
of orchestras might be policy analysis -- the study of how other group  
level variables, like practice schedules and type of composition  
played (Beethoven vs Stravinsky), affect other group level variables,  
like the quality of the symphony or the size of the audiences. If a  
group level analysis of an orchestra (or better, an economy) can be  
done as precisely as a group level analysis of a circuit, I think the  
analysis could certainly be useful.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

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**Author:** ![Kenneth\_Kitzke\_Value](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/k/bc79bd/32.png) [@Kenneth\_Kitzke\_Value](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Kenneth_Kitzke_Value)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 3:08am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/4 "2008-02-03T03:08:50Z")

</div>

[From Kenny Kitzke (2008.02.02)]

\<Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1632 MT)\>

\<There is indeed a “group” (i.e., some collection or set of individuals or pairs) but there is no central intelligence, no group awareness, only the intelligence and awareness and behavior of the individuals who comprise the group.\>

I deal a lot with “groups” at clients. And, it is a continual concern that individual employees belonging to a group do not have common goals (references in PCT terms). It is so common that groups are often called “teams” as if that would have them act as a “like-minded” entity.

I tend to agree with you that groups simply are not control systems subject to the mechanisms of PCT.

Yet, groups and teams can have many characteristics that make them seem like an individual control system. They can agree on wants/references and experience the essentially the same input perceptions and act to try to reduce any error. But, the loops of the CNS are not the same. The hierarchy of remembered and automatic actions at the lower levels of perception are not the same and can’t be.

About the closest you can get it to try to go up individual levels to a shared higher group goal and see if the individuals can still act individually to achieve that higher group goal. HPCT still has valuable lessons for groups to achieve shared goals as if they were one control system and understand that they still are individual control systems.

> **···**
>
> * * *
> 
> Who’s never won? [Biggest Grammy Award surprises of all time on AOL Music.](http://music.aol.com/grammys/pictures/never-won-a-grammy?NCID=aolcmp00300000002548)

---

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**Author:** ![BUSINESS\_GAVIN\_HERMA](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/2acd7d/32.png) [@BUSINESS\_GAVIN\_HERMA](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 5:59am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/5 "2008-02-03T05:59:56Z")

</div>

(Gavin Ritz 2008.02.03.18.48NZT)

Group behaviour is a very difficult thing to define; it's like the concept  
of power. Groups behave very differently when they are organised. (in the  
sense they have an agreed power structure (accountability structure or  
fields of responsibility) have a common goal (ideology) these types of  
groups have power and behave like they do.

E.g. The Catholic Church, Governments, business organisations, clubs,  
institutions.

A symphony is surely a group but the only power they have is to move you to  
tears. Groups like this are:

E.g., shoals of fish, group of friends, and people at a football match,  
religions. (Except the Catholic Church).

And the behaviour here is quite different more like PCT.

Regards  
Gavin

> **···**
>
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)  
> [mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU] On Behalf Of nickols@att.net  
> Sent: Sunday, 3 February 2008 12:45 p.m.  
> To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU  
> Subject: Re: PCT aspirin (down the group behavior path)
> 
> [From Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1632 MT)]
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (2008.02.02.1140)]
> > 
> > \> Fred Nickols (2008.02.02.1144 MT)--
> > 
> > \> Would you please give an example of group behavior?
> > 
> > Actually, I already gave one: Music created by a group of individuals.
> 
> I'm going to get a little picky here. Not because I'm trying to be a p---k  
> or pick a fight. I'm really puzzled by "group behavior" and I'm trying to  
> clarify it for myself.
> 
> > A symphony results from the combined efforts of several individuals.
> 
> If by "symphony" you mean the sound we hear if we were in the audience at a  
> concert, I agree. The sound (whatever it is we hear) is the product of the  
> presumably coordinated efforts of the individual members of the orchestra.  
> That said, it seems to me that there is still no "group" behaving per se,  
> just the individual orchestra members.
> 
> > No group, no symphony. This is an example of group behavior where the  
> > result (symphony) is probably intended by each individual and can only  
> > occur if everyone acts in concert. So the symphony -- the combination  
> > of all the orchestral parts -- is a controlled result of the group.
> 
> Here again, I'm going to get picky. I agree that the individual members are  
> no doubt controlling for some reference signal that amounts to them playing  
> their part correctly. However, I don't see any "group" behaving or  
> controlling. To me, your statement implies a group or collective awareness,  
> including intention and feedback and all that stuff and I don't see it. All  
> I see are the orchestra members, including the conductor, doing their thing.
> 
> > Other examples of this kind of group behavior, which I would call  
> > "cooperative control", are buildings, roads, universities, square  
> > dances, etc.
> 
> Huh? How are buildings, roads, and universities group behavior? And I view  
> square dances much the same as I view the symphony or concert. There is  
> indeed a "group" (i.e., some collection or set of individuals or pairs) but  
> there is no central intelligence, no group awareness, only the intelligence  
> and awareness and behavior of the individuals who comprise the group.
> 
> > Another kind of group behavior occurs when the group result is not  
> > intended but is directly related to the fact that individuals are  
> > controlling particular variables. I call this "collective control". An  
> > example of this kind of group behavior is GDP, which is a result of  
> > individuals or smaller groups of individuals controlling for producing  
> > the stuff they want. Unlike the case of an orchestra, where the  
> > symphony is the intended result, GDP is not an intended result but is,  
> > nevertheless, a direct result of individuals producing particular  
> > intended results -- the production of goods and services for  
> > themselves and or in order to get money to purchase the goods and  
> > services of others.
> 
> GDP is indeed a measurable (and measured) product or result and it stems  
> from the behavior of some identifiable group of individuals (and presumably  
> they are controlling for something or other). However, there is no group  
> producing the GDP. There are individuals doing this or that and controlling  
> for this or that and whatever variables comprises the GDP are affected by  
> those individuals (and the organizations being governed/manipulated by some  
> small subset of all individuals). So, I don't see GDP as group behavior  
> (besides, it's a result, not behavior).
> 
> > A third kind of group behavior occurs when the group result is a side  
> > effect of the controlling done by a group of individuals Perhaps this  
> > kind of group behavior could be called "side effect of collective  
> > control". An example is carbon dioxide emission levels, which is a  
> > side effect of people controlling, not for the production of C02, but  
> > for keeping warm or running the stuff they are controlling.
> 
> How does the example above differ from the GDP example. Looks the same to  
> me.
> 
> Bear with me, Rick.
> 
> Regards.
> 
> --  
> Fred Nickols  
> Toolmaker to Knowledge Workers  
> www.skullworks.com  
> nickols@att.net

---

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 7:33am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/6 "2008-02-03T07:33:34Z")

</div>

> I agree that to understand how a  
> group, like an orchestra or a
> 
> battery, actually works we have to understand how the individual
> 
> components of the group work – how the players control or how the
> 
> atoms attract – but I think it’s also legitimate to study things  
> like
> 
> orchestras and batteries at the group level.  
> [From Bill Powers (2008.01.02.1159 MST)]

Rick Marken (2008.02.02.1900) –

Studying them at the group level means studying properties of the group,  
which may or may not be simply the average or sum of properties of  
individuals. When you look at the actual mathematical manipulations of  
group statistics, they all involve calculating means of individual  
measures and fitting lines or curves described by simple equations to all  
the measures over time and over individuals. Regression lines, for  
example, are described by two numbers, a slope and and intercept. These  
two numbers are not a measure of any individual, but only of the whole  
data set, the whole group. Yet they don’t necessarily describe anything  
new about the group.

The group behavior is explained by the individual behaviors, but not vice  
versa. This is because its possible to compute an average or a  
distribution from knowledge of individual data points, but there is no  
way to reconstruct an individual data point from knowledge of the average  
or the distribution.

> The group  
> level study of batteries is electrical circuit analysis – the study of  
> how group level variables, like resistance and capacitance, relate to  
> other
> 
> group level variables, like voltage and current.

Yes, and here the individual data points are not even of the same type as  
the group measures, as you pointed out previously. Individual charge  
movements and force vectors are not predictable from knowledge of  
currents and voltages, though the reverse is possible.

> The group level  
> study
> 
> of orchestras might be policy analysis – the study of how other  
> group
> 
> level variables, like practice schedules and type of composition
> 
> played (Beethoven vs Stravinsky), affect other group level  
> variables,
> 
> like the quality of the symphony or the size of the audiences. If a
> 
> group level analysis of an orchestra (or better, an economy) can be
> 
> done as precisely as a group level analysis of a circuit, I think  
> the
> 
> analysis could certainly be useful.

Yes. The point is to deal with variables appropriate to the level of  
perception.

There are “social perceptions,” and when these are being  
controlled by a group of people, each one controlling an individual  
version of the perception, the result can be expressed statistically as  
mean values with variances, and also as regression lines (and other  
curves) from which can be computed virtual gains, phase shifts, actions,  
and even reference conditions. But the key word is “virtual”  
because now we’re averaging similar things together, not finding an  
emergent new property of the system. In a tug of war, the group is  
managing to control a movement of the center of the rope of an inch a  
minute or so. But this wouldn’t be considered as a new level of  
control.

Even when people cooperate to control something, the net result is simply  
a virtual control system controlling the same variable each person is  
trying to control. It’s not a new level of control as long as all the  
people are trying to control approximately the same perception.

So what does constitute group control that is not simply an average over  
a lot of individual control processes? We ought to be able to say what  
makes the difference.

Best,

Bill P.

---

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**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 4:49pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/7 "2008-02-03T16:49:45Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2008.02.03.11.30]

> [From Bill Powers (2008.01.02.1159 MST)]
> 
> So what does constitute group control that is not simply an average over a lot of individual control processes? We ought to be able to say what makes the difference.

This has to be quick -- too much else to do against deadlines.

At the very least, there is the possibility of there being in social interactions the same kind of homeostatic loops as are hypothesized to exist at the top level of the hierarchy within an individual -- negative feedback loops that maintain the level of their variables at some point around the loops, without necessarily having anything equivalent to a reference input to a comparator.

The existence of such homeostatic loops is almost inevitable in a large system of interacting elements, whether those elements be simple chemical reactions or complex control systems.

When you have stable negative feedback loops, and they pass through complex control systems such as humans or other pack animals, we could give them the name of "social feedback loops". It would be very strange if nowhere in any of these loops were any of the signal paths to include reference signals inside any of the individuals.

When you think of it this way, "group control" deson't necessarily mean anything to do with teams; it means the effect of the combined behaviour (control of perception) of more than one individual, behaviour that stabilizes some value of a signal somewhere in the social feeback loop.

Looking at it that way makes it easy to think of this kind of homeostatic social loop as equivalent to the top-level control in an individual, and almost demands that we look to see whether there might not also be social signal paths that are equivalent to the perceptual and output signals within an individual hierarchy.

Just as a neuran can't see its role in the larger control system of a person, maybe it's hard for us to see how our actions form parts of multiple interlocking social feedback loops that stabilize the social structure (or detabilize it if the gain goes positive and greater than 1.0).

It is this that makes the statistical exploration of the social environment valuable, not the possible reinterpretation of the social statistic as applicable to individuals (valuable though this latter may sometimes be). The statistical environment of a person has a huge differential effect on what kinds of feedback loops the person's actions may participate in. That matters.

Martin

---

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**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2008, 10:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/8 "2008-02-03T22:29:35Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2008.02.03.1430)]

> Bill Powers (2008.01.02.1159 MST)--

> Even when people cooperate to control something, the net result is simply a  
> virtual control system controlling the same variable each person is trying  
> to control. It's not a new level of control as long as all the people are  
> trying to control approximately the same perception.
> 
> So what does constitute group control that is not simply an average over a  
> lot of individual control processes? We ought to be able to say what makes  
> the difference.

You got me. I still think the closed loop approach to economics based  
on aggregate variables is reasonable. But I'm not highly motivated to  
continue it at the moment given the reception is got from you on the  
left and the apologists of conventional economics on the right.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

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**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [February 4, 2008, 5:03pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/9 "2008-02-04T17:03:36Z")

</div>

> At the very least, there is the  
> possibility of there being in social interactions the same kind of  
> homeostatic loops as are hypothesized to exist at the top level of the  
> hierarchy within an individual – negative feedback loops that maintain  
> the level of their variables at some point around the loops, without  
> necessarily having anything equivalent to a reference input to a  
> comparator.  
> [From Bill Powers (2008.02.04.0820 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2008.02.03.11.30 –

I defined “reference condition” in B:CP as “that state of  
a controlled quantity at which a control system’s output ceases to tend  
to alter the controlled quantity.” A reference level was then  
defined as the numerical measure of a reference condition. This means  
that all control systems (in fact, all feedback systems) exhibit  
reference conditions or reference levels. When the reference level proves  
to be variable, as it does in both behavioral and homeostatic systems  
(see Mrosovski’s “Rheostasis”), there is something playing the  
part of a variable reference signal that can be used to adjust the state  
of the controlled quantity. The definition says (deliberately) nothing  
about whether the reference condition is a stable or unstable equilibrium  
point.

> The existence of  
> such homeostatic loops is almost inevitable in a large system of  
> interacting elements, whether those elements be simple chemical reactions  
> or complex control systems.

This is true if you interpret “homeostatic” loosely. But  
control requires more than just a negative feedback loop: it requires a  
significant amount of loop gain. Without a loop gain considerably more  
negative than -1, the ability to resist disturbances and keep a  
controlled variable near its reference condition is reduced to the point  
where the environment can be said to control the control system as much  
as the control system controls the environment. In systems without power  
gain, the control system merges into the environment, becoming  
indistinguishable from it. One could then draw the system-environment  
boundary anywhere with equal justification, or simply treat the aggregate  
as a single system.

While negative feedback exists in many physical systems, therefore, it  
does not automatically imply that there is a control system interacting  
with an environment. A marble in a bowl will, after a disturbance, return  
eventually to the bottom of the bowl; if there’s water in the bowl the  
released marble may not even overshoot the equilibrium position. But the  
loop power gain in such a system is 1 or less; the marble controls its  
relationship to the bowl and so does the bowl. We really have a single  
system that has no natural boundary between controller and controlled.  
Weiner, Rosenbleuth, and Bigelow didn’t think of this analysis when  
debating (about pendulums) with the philosopher Taylor about purposive  
systems.

In a collection of interacting human control systems, we have a somewhat  
different case but with a similar result, I think. Here each system has  
considerable loop gain in relation to its own controlled variables, but  
if we consider only the social variables, the environment of each system  
has about the same input-output gain as the average system we focus on.  
So again there is symmetry and it is difficult to separate the controller  
from the controlled. We have interactions, but not, automatically,  
control of one system by another.

> When you have  
> stable negative feedback loops, and they pass through complex control  
> systems such as humans or other pack animals, we could give them the name  
> of “social feedback loops”. It would be very strange if nowhere  
> in any of these loops were any of the signal paths to include reference  
> signals inside any of the individuals.

By what path would these social interactions be able to influence the  
top-level reference signals?

> When you think of  
> it this way, “group control” deson’t necessarily mean anything  
> to do with teams; it means the effect of the combined behaviour (control  
> of perception) of more than one individual, behaviour that stabilizes  
> some value of a signal somewhere in the social feeback  
> loop.

We can arbitrarily set the cutoff for using the term control at a loop  
gain of -1. At that point there is no control because the controlled  
controls the controller just as much as the other way around. In passive  
physical interactions input-output power gains are always 1 or less, so  
no system made only of interacting passive components can exhibit  
control. I’m no chemist, but it seems to me that this narrows the field  
of control pretty much to systems containing catalysts or sensors as well  
as large amounts of stored energy, so amplification can take  
place.

“Social feedback loops,” in the light of the preceding, are not  
necessarily the same things as “Social control systems.” In  
fact there is one class of social feedback loop that can be eliminated  
immediately: the loop that is generated when the actions of two negative  
feedback control systems disturb each other’s controlled variables with  
both disturbances being in the same sense (both aiding or both opposing).  
It can be shown that this results in a positive feedback loop, with  
instability resulting when the two-system loop gain exceeds +1. You get  
either a flip-flop relationship or oscillations, and certainly no  
control.

In looking for possible social control systems, therefore, we have to  
look for cases in which all loop gains are negative and there is an  
assymetry of effects such that a controlling system can be distinguished  
from a controlled system. This does not include the case of “ganging  
up”, in which one set of control systems combines forces to  
overwhelm a smaller set or an individual. That simply removes the  
unsuccessful system from the collection of control systems since it can  
no longer control (its “marginal loop gain,” to borrow a term,  
is zero). In fact, for a higher control system to exist, it must act  
strictly through adjusting the highest reference conditions or the input  
functions in the proposed “lower” systems, because acting  
arbitrarily to alter any other signal or function would simply arouse  
opposition from the highest level being controlled. I think there is  
probably a necessary principle to the effect that a lower system can’t  
resist control by a higher system, because it doesn’t even know it’s  
being used for higher-level control. It can’t perceive anything at a  
higher level.

> Looking at it that  
> way makes it easy to think of this kind of homeostatic social loop as  
> equivalent to the top-level control in an individual, and almost demands  
> that we look to see whether there might not also be social signal paths  
> that are equivalent to the perceptual and output signals within an  
> individual hierarchy.

I really think we need at least one concrete example of this – and if  
such an example could be found, that alone would greatly weaken if not  
negate this proposal simply because we can comprehend it. That would say  
it is not at a higher level than exists in any individual.

> Just as a neuron  
> can’t see its role in the larger control system of a person, maybe it’s  
> hard for us to see how our actions form parts of multiple interlocking  
> social feedback loops that stabilize the social structure (or detabilize  
> it if the gain goes positive and greater than  
> 1.0).

When the proposal gets to this point, I think it reaches a dead end. It  
amounts to saying that we are all controlled by social systems of which  
we can know nothing. If we could know of them, they would be individual  
perceptions, not social systems. And if we can’t know of them, they can’t  
be shown to exist in any way that a human being could comprehend. What we  
are left with is The Boogie Man, the powerful invisible entity that  
governs our lives leaving us with only the (convincing) illusion of  
autonomy.

> It is this that  
> makes the statistical exploration of the social environment valuable, not  
> the possible reinterpretation of the social statistic as applicable to  
> individuals (valuable though this latter may sometimes be). The  
> statistical environment of a person has a huge differential effect on  
> what kinds of feedback loops the person’s actions may participate in.  
> That matters.

Again, this comes down to a self-defeating concrete demonstration. If you  
can statistically demonstrate a social control system that has a gain  
more negative than -1 and that operates without our knowlege, from then  
on it no longer can operate without our knowledge and we can decide for  
ourselves whether or not to be controlled by it (with the usual  
tradeoffs). That converts it merely to a social interaction, not a  
control system. If it doesn’t have a loop gain more negative than -1,  
it’s just an interaction anyway.

There are, I’m sure, many presently-unknown facets of social interactions  
that we can explore using PCT, but we will never know anything about  
social control systems of which we can know nothing. What’s the point of  
even discussing them?

This whole discussion is pertinent to previous discussions about  
influences over us which are inherently incomprehensible.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [February 6, 2008, 6:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-aspirin-down-the-group-behavior-path/8371/10 "2008-02-06T18:29:58Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2008.02.06.1030)]

> Bill Powers (2008.02.04.0820 MST)
> 
> While negative feedback exists in many physical systems, therefore, it does  
> not automatically imply that there is a control system interacting with an  
> environment. A marble in a bowl will, after a disturbance, return eventually  
> to the bottom of the bowl; if there's water in the bowl the released marble  
> may not even overshoot the equilibrium position. But the loop power gain in  
> such a system is 1 or less; the marble controls its relationship to the bowl  
> and so does the bowl. We really have a single system that has no natural  
> boundary between controller and controlled. Weiner, Rosenbleuth, and Bigelow  
> didn't think of this analysis when debating (about pendulums) with the  
> philosopher Taylor about purposive systems.

I wish I had this analysis at my fingertips when, during my talk at  
the Cognitive Forum at Ucla, someone suggested that Romeo going around  
obstacles to get to Juliet was equivalent to water poured down a sink  
going around obstacles to get to the drain. Of course, I would have  
had to give it in just two quick sentences. The best I could come up  
with (since this happened at the beginning of the talk) was to say  
that I will discuss methods for determining whether or not an apparent  
agent (like Romeo or the water) has the purpose of producing the  
intended result (getting to Juliet or getting down the drain). I  
guess I would have said that these methods (the "test") are basically  
a way of determining whether the agent has a loop gain that is \>\> 1  
with respect to the hypothetical controlled variable, but I hadn't  
gotten to that point in the talk yet. When I got to that point in the  
talk I should have explained how this applies to the proposed analogy  
between Romeo and the sink water but by then I was like a deer caught  
in the headlights; I forgot how much hostility this stuff arouses in  
"polite" conventional psychology circles;-)

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com