PCT & Educ.

{from Joel Judd 950224.1100 CST}

Richard:

After weeks of spotty service, a two-hour turnaround on a posting is
pretty good!

Could you (or anyone else) elaborate on what their "views" are from a
PCT standpoint? Are there references...?

So as not to mislead you, from the three names I mentioned only Petrie
subscribes to PCT. Bickhard had some correspondance with Bill and Gary
Cziko has met and spoken with him, but he has some fundamental
differences with HPCT. I don't know how much Perkinson knows. With
Perkinson and Bickhard I read PCT into many of their ideas, but they
don't cite it.

Campbell, R., & Bickhard, M. (1986). _Knowing levels and developmental
stages_. NY: Karger.

Bickhard, M. (1992). How does the environment affect the person? in L.
Winegar & J. Valsiner (eds.), _Children's development within social
contexts: Metatheoretical, theoretical, and methodological issues.
NY: Erlbaum.

Perkinson, H. (1984). _Learning from our mistakes_. Westport, CN:
Greenwood Press.

_____. (1993). _Teachers without goals, students without purposes_. NY:
McGraw Hill.

Petrie, H. (1981). _The dilemma of inquiry and learning_. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Petrie and Perkinson speak as educators; Bickhard approaches knowledge
(and in an earlier book, language) from a philosophical standpoint.
Rather than speaking as an authority on PCT, I'll summarize what I find
in their writings that seems to me to fit in with PCT. Some or all of
these are overly simplistic and have been the cause for furious polemic
at one time or another on the net (such as the "kinds of learning"
problem), but I tend to reduce things to simple statements after
studying them, then elaborate when questioned (as you did). Here goes:

1) There seem to be two "kinds" learning that occur, one the result of
reorganization in the hierarchy (as when one must learn
"multiplication") and the other a sort of fine tuning of reorganized
levels (as in learning to multiply more quickly or efficiently). Petrie
uses the terms "assimilation" and "accomodation," though more recently
has expressed preference for other terms, as these two carry unwanted
(Piagetian) connotations. Basically, you either deal with the
environment with the hierarchical configuration currently in place, or
you have to reorganize it because of persistent intrinsic error. For

me, "learning" covers all changes in the hierarchy, not just the
discrete bits of information formally given to you as part of a school
curriculum.

We are constantly learning. Which leads to the implication that:

2) Knowledge is not a static entity. Knowledge is an emergent property
of control systems. What one "knows" changes from moment to moment as a
result of one's interaction with the environment. Said another way, we
know things without being taught them.

Since this is an internal process:

3) We cannot "teach" knowledge in the sense that we can transmit what we
know to a learner, or get a learner to "discover" what's out there in
the environment. Learning comes about because the learner actively
interacts with the environment, controlling perceptions. If you read
the Bickhard refs, he terms the results of learning "knowing levels." I
would say efficient learning means being adept at controlling.

Because knowledge emerges from the control of perception:

4) Encoding (or soemthing like it) is a fallacious metaphor for
learning.

Bickhard's two main arguments against encodingism can be summarized
thusly:

a) If what we know is encoded in the brain, then we do not derive
original perceptions from our experiences, we import them from the
environment (or from genes). All we can do then is manipulate encoding
elements in different--perhaps novel--ways. This leads to the logical
argument that "nothing interesting can be learned or developed," and a
problem differentiating between development and learning.

b) More problematic is that one ends up in an infinite regression when
trying to determine the basis, or phylogeny, of encodings. If there is
to be no infinite regression, then there has to be "foundational
encodings" somewhere. But then we're stuck with asking where THOSE come
from. Bickhard's problem (well, one of them) with Chomsky's views
is that by invoking innate language structures, he sets himself up for
this regression problem. Also, if learning and development can't create
foundational encodings, evolution can't either, because evolution can't
solve the infinite regress.

Finally:

6) Mistakes are an inherent, indeed necessary, part of learning. The
blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) concept from Don Campbell
and Karl Popper that Gary has elaborated on a number of times (and in
his forthcoming book) dovetails nicely with this claim. We make
mistakes not because we're not paying attention or because we're just
plain stupid, but because we DON'T KNOW if this next iteration of the
control system will provide the desired perception.

Finally:

7) Knowledge per se has little value; it is what we can do with it that
counts.
In Perkinson's most recent book he discusses one of my pet peeves: the
attempt by every special interest group under the sun to get their
version of history, science, etc. in school curricula. His point is
that it doesn't matter so much WHAT kids learn, but HOW they learn to
deal with it. With more information available to us each day, there is
simply NO WAY that every single viewpoint and tidbit of information can
get into school curricula. We need to be concerned with HOW students
are learning to grapple with so much information, and if they are
learning how to respect themselves and others as controllers of
perceptions. With the emphasis nowadays on performance-based and
outcomes-based education, this ideal can be a hard-sell.

Hope that whets your appetite a little. Your questions gave me an
excuse to put off a little longer the catching up I have to do here
after being gone for two weeks. That's how I find the time to post!

Are there still plans to have a presentation on PCT at AERA?

Wow! Did someone get a session on the program? I'd like to know the
details!

Later
Joel

···

TO: CSG-L INTERNET Any user on the Internet, not at DESE Proj. Box

FROM: JUDDJ DESEINST Joel Judd - DESE - Division of Instruction

DATE: February 24, 1995
SUBJECT: Re: PCT & Educ.

[From Richard Thurman (950224.1630)]

Joel Judd (950224.1100 CST)

Your questions gave me an excuse to put off a little longer the
catching up I have to do here after being gone for two weeks.

Thanks for answering back so quickly. Glad I was able to keep you from
doing what you didn't want to!

Your PCT perspective on the nature of knowledge really threw me. I guess
I was not expecting the kind of response(s) you gave. I'm wondering if
others on the net view knowledge & PCT in the same way.

In a way I think that there must be many concepts from the 'old school'
way of thinking that are still part of the way I interpret PCT. Put
bluntly, I could see HPCT as a very elegant explanation for everything
but memory. For me, memory (and hence knowledge) were external to
control theory explanations.

1) There seem to be two "kinds" learning that occur, one the result of
reorganization in the hierarchy (as when one must learn

"multiplication") and the other a sort of fine tuning of reorganized

levels (as in learning to multiply more quickly or efficiently).

Yes this makes sense but I guess I really thought of learning as having
three "kinds". 1) Reorganization as in chapter 14 of B:CP, 2) improvement
within a control loop (increase or decrease gain, improved perceptual
functions, better synaptic connections to the neuron carrying the
reference signal, etc.), and 3) mental storage (memory).

2) Knowledge is not a static entity. Knowledge is an emergent property
of control systems. What one "knows" changes from moment to moment as a
result of one's interaction with the environment.

Wow! That one really threw me! Are you saying as well that memory is
an emergent property? That there is no explicit storage and retrieval
of information within the brain? B:CP chap 15 gives an explicit RNA
model of memory and says that memory is "the storage and retrieval of
information carried by neural signals." (p.205)

Since this is an internal process:
3) We cannot "teach" knowledge in the sense that we can transmit what we
know to a learner, or get a learner to "discover" what's out there in
the environment. Learning comes about because the learner actively
interacts with the environment, controlling perceptions.

But isn't the learner storing those perceptions in some way. I simply
can't get off this. If what you are saying is true (and if I am
interpreting what you are saying correctly) then a major part of my view
of PCT will need changing. This is very threatening to me -- meaning
that I am having a very visceral reaction to the implications that this
(your) view of PCT has.

Because knowledge emerges from the control of perception:
4) Encoding (or soemthing like it) is a fallacious metaphor for
learning.

This is very challenging. How could I have missed this? Why don't
I see this in PCT at all?

I am reminded of Bill's analogy about "impetus" and PCT he gave to
Allen Randal several years ago. In Newton+s day, scientists assumed
an object persisted in its motion after being thrown because the act
of starting it moving transmitted into it a quality called "impetus."
The impetus in an object carried it along and was used up by the
object+s motion. When impetus ran out, an object simply fell out of
the air. Newton, however, proposed that objects move via the sum of
forces acting on them, and that in the absence of such forces their
motion continued indefinitely in a straight line, unchanged. Newton+s
explanation of the flight of projectiles was totally different from
those who believed in impetus theory. Scientists, who had the
image of impetus firmly in mind, could not imagine how motion could
persist without any impetus at all-- after all, its+s impetus that
carries the motion forward, isn+t it? To imagine motion taking place
without any impetus whatsoever would be a contradiction, an absurdity.
The assumption of impetus on the part of those scientists was hard to
overcome.

I'm stuck just like they were. To me, memory and hence knowledge must
rest on some sort of storage and retrieval of information. To deny
that assumption would be a contradiction, an absurdity. How could
encoding (or soemthing like it) be a false metaphor for learning?

Joel, I'm not saying that this is wrong. I just don't understand how
your assertion could be right!

Unfortunately, I will have to wait until Monday to see any reply. But
I will be thinking about this during the weekend.

Rich

Dag Forssell (950302 1200)

{Joel Judd 950224.1100 CST}

Are there still plans to have a presentation on PCT at AERA?

Wow! Did someone get a session on the program? I'd like to know
the details!

Yes, Hugh Petrie has arranged a presentation in San Fransisco on
April 20, from 8:15 to 10:15 by Hugh, Bill, Ed, Gary and myself.

For details, send query to Gary or Hugh.

Best, Dag