# PCT & interactionism

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115>\
**Category:** CSG1992\
**Created:** [August 19, 1992, 3:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115 "1992-08-19T15:44:32Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 4\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [August 19, 1992, 3:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115/1 "1992-08-19T15:44:32Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (920819.0900)]

Penni Sibun (920818, 920819) --

Here is one of our problems:

> when i am driving, snow on the road or rain on the windscreen is  
> extremely immediate and concrete.

Here is another:

> i don't have any particular emotional investment in what people  
> are made of. i was the one who suggested it's all physics at the  
> bottom.

A third:

> you really think that how much work a process takes is determinable by  
> introspection? that doesn't sound very scientific to me.

A fourth:

> i was using very gross examples, where i thought the work involved  
> would be obvious, that is, it involves muscles, rather than primarily  
> neurons.

> From my standpoint, these are the same views of behavior that led to

behaviorism. It's assumed, I believe, that the Observer can see real  
"immediate and concrete" reality itself, without interpretation -- just the  
facts. It's assumed that the world is as it is, and that all you need to  
know about people is what happens to them and what they do. How they are  
constructed inside in order that they can behave in that environment as  
they do is of no interest (and makes no difference). The fact that all  
motor behavior and all sensory experience is created by neurons is of no  
importance. In principle, we can understand everything about behavior by  
watching the interaction of environmental things, events, processes, and  
situations with organismic activities -- behaviors. Behavior -- what  
organisms DO -- is to be explained in terms of observable interactions  
only. It's assumed that the mechanics of behavior will be explained, in the  
end, by physics and chemistry; there's no need to ask WHAT physics and WHAT  
chemistry. That is the scientific way of dealing with behavior. If these  
are really the tenets of interactionism, then interactionism is little  
different from behaviorism.

Control theory is based on an approach that is basically different from the  
ground up. It's assumed that perception results from neural activity based  
on sensory inputs -- that there is no other way to know what is going on  
outside the organism (and that applies to the scientist as well as to the  
subjects under study). It's assumed that all Observers must see the world  
this way, as neural signals standing for a world of which they know nothing  
directly -- but experienced, of course, as a real concrete external world  
and a body living in it. It's assumed that all observers act by producing  
neural signals that activate muscles, and know of their own actions only  
through sensing of muscle efforts and sensing of the effects on other  
perceptions. If Observers aren't brains, then at least they get all their  
experiences and produce all their actions via brains; there's no channel  
linking awareness to the outside world that bypasses the neural processes  
of perception. There's no way for them to act other than by sending neural  
signals to muscles and glands. The entire experienced world, from the most  
concrete and simple aspects to the most abstract thoughts about them,  
exists as patterns of neural firing in the brain.

That, of course, is a model. It's a model featuring a device called "the  
brain," whose internal activities are experienced by a propertyless  
Observer. It's consistent with our models of physics and chemistry, applied  
either to the internal parts of the model or to the hypothetical reality  
outside it. It's consistent with what is known about the physical structure  
of the body -- biochemistry and neurology. Control theory brings all these  
models together into a single consistent framework, without claiming any  
property for a scientist that the subjects don't also have, without  
claiming that the scientist has any way of acting or knowing the truth that  
others don't also have. And control theory goes further -- it proposes an  
internal organization that can account for the way we really observe  
behavior to work instead of just how it has been imagined to work.

There are, of course, more questions unanswered than answered by HPCT. Many  
people on this net are trying to answer them, trying out various  
possibilities, rejecting some and carrying others forward. But behind all  
these conjectures is a common understanding of the nature of the problem,  
which is very different from yours. Most of the people who are looking for  
answers are convinced that just taking appearances for granted and trying  
to find the rules is futile. They are trying to find a model for the  
organization of the system that is responsible for both experience and  
behavior, so that when it is placed in any environment it will behave as  
real organisms do -- and experience it as at least human organisms do.

There are a few phenomena that PCT has uncovered which are easy to see and  
which no other theory can yet explain. The main one is that what people do  
with their muscles is variable, yet the outcomes of the muscle activity are  
repeatable and resistant to disturbance. From any existing scientific point  
of view, this phenomenon is counterintuitive and inexplicable.

In the kind of explanatory system you're presenting, this fundamental  
phenomenon doesn't even appear, because all of your descriptions are cast  
in terms of the outcomes produced by motor activities -- moving the car  
here and there on the road, for example. In looking for an explanation of  
such outcomes, this explanatory system doesn't ask how the behaving system  
can produce such repeatable outcomes by such variable means. It looks to  
other aspects of the apparent world for explanations -- those outcomes are  
just the "easiest" ones that the environment makes possible, elicits,  
encourages, or whatever. The fact that those outcomes are continuously  
being disturbed, not aided, by the environment is overlooked: if the  
outcome is stable, the environment must have made that stability possible.

The fact is that the environment is always working to disrupt that  
stability. What you describe as an explanation of behavior seems to me more  
like presenting a series of problems calling for an explanation. The  
statements you offer as explanations seem to involve more than a bit of  
magic, and more than a modicum of arm-waving. The arm-waving isn't evident  
from within the framework you're describing, because there is one question  
that simply doesn't arise: HOW CAN THAT POSSIBLY WORK? But to anyone who  
actually tries to make working models of any proposed explanation, the  
question of HOW is the crux of the matter. If the explanation entails a HOW  
that is impossible, or that flatly contradicts our other models of reality  
such as physics and chemistry, that alone is enough grounds to reject the  
explanation. If the explanation doesn't even consider the question of HOW,  
then it's not an explanation at all. It's just a description.

You're under a misapprehension about PCT, as Mary pointed out. This model  
began as a model of human behavior, based on a study not only of real  
people doing real things, but of physiology and neurology. The clever  
machine to which the model was first applied was the real thing, a human  
being. Predictions of human behavior were the first ones made on the basis  
of the model. The Little Man arm program, the crowd program, the beginning  
of models of the Beerbug, the interest in Pengi and Sonja, came up only as  
a way of making the model more detailed, or illustrating the principles of  
the model in other settings in ways that might communicate to people in  
other fields.

Whether this communication succeeds or fails depends in large part on  
whether the recipient of these arguments considers the basic phenomena of  
control worth some attention, and whether he or she is willing to consider  
the world as consisting of perceptions rather than an objective world and a  
perceiver of that world.

Have you tried out the rubber-band demo? I should think that it would offer  
an excellent comparison of the interactionist kinds of explanation and the  
control-theoretic kind.

> **···**
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best,
> 
> Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [August 19, 1992, 8:09pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115/2 "1992-08-19T20:09:37Z")

</div>

[From Mary Powers 9208.19]  
(Penni Sibun 9208.18)

> the road ... is constantly changing ...

yes. But it is your perception of the changes that matter to you.  
A foot of snow on it is a big disturbance, and you alter your  
driving actions accordingly. A freshly painted yellow stripe may  
be noticed, but it's not a disturbance.

> it's an artifact--somebody designed and built it--and these are

important things to know about it.

Important to who? It sounds like you are controlling for - have a  
high reference signal for - being aware of these things. I'll bet  
99% of the people who drive down the road don't give a damn. This  
tells me something about you, not about any intrinsic importance.

> I am deeply suspicious of hierarchical organization.

So am I. Word/sentence/paragraph is as pseudo-hierarchical as  
cell/organ/organism/group. They are all at the category level.

> I really can't imagine how a custom can be a program ...

I misspoke somewhat. I mentioned rules of the road as principles.  
Stop at red lights is a sub-principle. This sets the reference  
signal for the following program: If red, then stop. This sets  
the reference signal for the sequence: take right foot off  
accelerator, put on brake and push. Each part of this sequence is  
accomplished by reference signals to lower and yet lower levels,  
the last one being the actual effort of the muscles. All this  
brought on by noticing a brightness, which is processed as red,  
which is observed as being part of a traffic signal, which is in  
my lane, which I am approaching ... which I compare with what I  
want to be doing when I see a red light, conclude that I am not  
doing it, and proceed to initiate the program above.

> how does an individual introspect about it?

I think you introspect by running it through imagination (see  
Behavior: the Control of Perception - by the way, if you're  
trying to get all this through the net without reading the basic  
texts you're asking people to repeat an awful lot of work that's  
already been done)

> how are customs passed on and maintained?

Ask a PCT anthropologist. I wish there was one. Children don't  
come equipped with the full hierarchy. As it develops they try  
setting reference signals similar to the ones around them. They  
get love and approval for this, which satisfies inborn reference  
signals for being loved and approved of.

> how are they recorded?

ex  
In memory, whatever that is. Ask a neuro-chemico-physio-  
psychologist. He probably doesn't know either.

> how are they incorporated into things like building (better)

roads?

Somebody in the highway department gets a lot of complaints about  
a dangerous intersection. He is controlling for minimizing  
traffic accidents. From his experience he knows that adding a  
traffic light and some left turn lanes will do this, so he orders  
it done (budget permitting).

It's important to realize that his order is not setting a  
reference level for the people doing the job. For them his order  
is a perception, and is processed through the nervous system of a  
subordinate like any other perception, where it is compared with  
reference perceptions already there. It is likely that the  
subordinate will have a reference signal for the order that  
matches it - this is what I get paid to do - and an error - it  
isn't done yet - and do what has to be done. There's a half-baked  
idea floating around that organizations are super-organisms, with  
the guy at the top setting reference signals and the people below  
him being inputters and outputters. Not PCT, for sure.

Mary P.

---

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**Author:** ![Penni\_Sibun](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/e47c2d/32.png) [@Penni\_Sibun](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Penni_Sibun)\
**Post date:** [August 20, 1992, 3:36am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115/3 "1992-08-20T03:36:28Z")

</div>

(penni sibun 920819)

i think we've all gotten rather tired of this thread so i will  
summarize and i think drop it, unless someone has a specific question.  
another reason to drop it, as i've mentioned, is that i have  
repetitive motion injury troubles, and really oughtn't to be typing  
such screeds. (and since the problem is worst in my right pinkie,  
capitals are a luxury i can't afford, unfortunately--sorry!)

we started out by someone suggesting that interactionism is  
behaviorism. i objected, and said that pct sounded cognitivist to me.  
i think these two views are telling: they certainly tend to pit us  
against each other, because of the historical adversary bet. beh. and  
cog..

i'm sorry if it sounded as though i thought pct started out building  
creatures and generalizing to people: i meant that to \*me\* pct looks  
quite plausible for building creatures and rather less plausible for  
explaining non-built organisms.

i think the importance of the brain is pretty clear, but i don't think  
the brain is the be-all and end-all of organismhood. what about  
plants and bacteria and viruses and mitochondria? what about anthills  
and lichen? in creatures with a brain, what about the spinal chord  
and sensory organs and all the afferent and efferent neurons? as far  
as the brain itself goes, no one really knows how it works. what  
about hormones? what about recent research suggesting that the brain  
may communicate w/in itself via hormones?

i think it's inportant to try to model the brain; i think it's also  
important to be open to the idea that that might turn out not to be  
the best thing to model.

i don't think i can succintly explain active perception; i'm sorry  
about that. as i say, there's a literature; it's an active area of  
cognitive science these days.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[From Bill Powers (920819.0900)]

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Control theory brings all these  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;models together into a single consistent framework, without claiming any  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;property for a scientist that the subjects don't also have, without  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;claiming that the scientist has any way of acting or knowing the truth that  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;others don't also have.

i find this opposition odd (you've brought it up before), because i  
don't know anything i or agre or chapman or preston or whoever has  
said that has claimed there is a privileged Observer. rather the  
opposite: it seems that a point of view that suggests that organisms  
aren't privileged cannot coherently claim that a particular organism  
is privileged.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the kind of explanatory system you're presenting, this fundamental  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;phenomenon doesn't even appear, because all of your descriptions are cast  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;in terms of the outcomes produced by motor activities -- moving the car  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;here and there on the road, for example.

i \*thought\* all my descriptions were in terms of things like snow and  
road reflectors and what i've overheard people say. in my  
descriptions, motor activities played a very minor role. in fact, i  
don't believe i once mentioned moving anything anywhere.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Have you tried out the rubber-band demo? I should think that it would offer  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;an excellent comparison of the interactionist kinds of explanation and the  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;control-theoretic kind.

no; in what medium is it?

thanks, y'all, for the discussion.

cheers.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;--penni

---

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**Author:** ![\_Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/a9adbd/32.png) [@\_Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Martin_Taylor)\
**Post date:** [August 20, 1992, 2:49pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/pct-interactionism/8115/4 "1992-08-20T14:49:17Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 920820 10:30]  
(Penni Sibun 920819)

Sorry about your repetitive motion injury. I do hope you are getting medical  
attention for it and not just trying to cure it by yourself (end parental  
mode).

> i think the importance of the brain is pretty clear, but i don't think  
> the brain is the be-all and end-all of organismhood. what about  
> plants and bacteria and viruses and mitochondria? what about anthills  
> and lichen? in creatures with a brain, what about the spinal chord  
> and sensory organs and all the afferent and efferent neurons? as far  
> as the brain itself goes, no one really knows how it works. what  
> about hormones? what about recent research suggesting that the brain  
> may communicate w/in itself via hormones?

I can't speak for anyone else on CSG, but I have never thought of identifying  
the control hierarchy with what goes on in the brain alone. Bill has made  
it clear that other kinds of organisms can be control systems, although he  
sometimes seems to obscure the claim by saying that the hierarchy is  
implemented in the CNS. We have recently discussed the control system of  
Paramecium, a single-celled organism without a nervous system, which can  
move in a temperature gradient to control its temperature under hypoxic  
conditions. Any factor that can have an effect that can be sensed by the  
generator of the factor can be a component of a control system. One presumes  
that early almost-living things had control systems that were entirely  
chemical, and we know that cells in present living systems have many such  
control systems.

In CSG-L we usually talk about human sensory-motor control systems, and we  
presume (as much for convenience of discussion as for any other reason) that  
the communication among ECSs happens through the neural channels. But we  
have also discussed the possibility that a single neuron could implement  
several cooperating ECSs, based on the different functions of synaptic  
junctions near to and far from dendrite roots.

Trees affect the chemistry of the ground near them, altering their growth  
possibilities. They are control systems if the loop has negative feedback,  
so as to maintain an optimum local ecology for the treee. If it doesn't,  
they are not. There's no bias in the theory toward or away from any kind  
of life. We just are naturally more interested in human life and "intelligent"  
function than we are in the life of trees. Other scientists may have a  
different bias. But where control exists, it is important in stabilizing  
something important to the life of the organism, and should be considered  
in studying that organism. We deal in psychology, mainly. It's only a part  
of what PCT offers.

Martin
