PCT Lament

Hi Bill,

It seems that question of observing and awarness is top problem question…

BP:

The point here is that what you are doing is called “observing.” It’s fairly easy to show that what you are observing is not the reality itself, directly, but some sensory representation of it.

HB : Some sensory “representation” ?

BP :

All you have to do is close your eyes, and all those visual experiences are replaced by darkness or emptiness with some suggestions of brighter places and perhaps some colors – a background of stray visual signals near the lower threshold of detection. You can still feel your hands but their visual representation is gone. Your breathing continues, as does pressure from the seat you are in.

BP :

If you are following me, you can also observe what you are thinking about this experience (for example, an image, feeling, or statement like “Oh, but all those things are really there”). Those neural signals are being manufactured inside your brain, or so our theories of neurology and physiology tell us. You can imagine things that your senses are not detecting, such as a small orange tiger sitting on the desk beside the keyboard. That experience, too, is a set of neural signals being generated by your brain.

BP :

Maybe we do need an explanation, but the fact is that we don’t have one. I certainly don’t, and I’ve been looking for one for over 50 years. Nobody else has suggested one that I can believe, either.

BP :

I have mentioned the theories I use in explaining the signaling and the generation of the signals. In the context of neurology and physiology I can imagine acceptable organizations of matter that could probably work. What I can’t explain is the fact that we can observe them.

BP :

What I can’t find a way to model is the entity that is aware of the result: aware of the neural signals from which we obtain experiences.

BP :

And something ELSE observes them. I observe mine, you observe yours. It’s the observer, not the signals, that are missing from the PCT model.

HB :

You put my initials on your thoughts in the beginning. I hope that everybody noticed that I’m not so clever J. Seems that we both write in a hurry.

You would do me a favour if you use initials HB as Rick was “playing” with Bob Heinz initials as BH with no explanation. Knowing him, I had a “feeling” that there was something behind. You know his sense of humor. So I’d rather be HB.

Are you trying to say that there is less awarness if we close our eyes ? Are we “playing” with the amount of awarness to see what’s left when there is no actually controlled perceptual signals ? And if I understood right we are looking for “something” in our brain, for the observer, who is “shifting” our attention, is aware of thinking, talking and so on ?

Do I understand right ?

Can we say that awarness exist on every level of hierarchy ? So in the evolution every organism on some lower levels of controlled perceptual organization has some awarness (consciousness) : dogs, cats, mice… worms, maybe even bacteria has some kind of awarness of gradients. I’m guessing. But why not guessing in the course of your hypothesis, that every organism consist of some limited number of organized control units on different levels, which probably exhibit some level of awarness. And the final “observer” in human could be maybe integration of all “lower level awarness”.

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP AND CONFLICT

BP: So telling me I am going in circles is not a criticism? Should I then understand that you approve of my going in circles?

HB :

I don’t see it as criticism. I was trying to tell you that you could reconsider some basics of PCT. So you see, I’m not approving you “going in circles”.

BP :

I have been trying here to describe my views on consciousness, awareness, and experience as a first step toward resolving any conflicts that exist. This should make it easier to see if there are any actual conflicts with other points of view, and if there are some, exactly what they are about. There’s nothing I’m trying to conceal so there is no need on my side for privacy.
Most objections to what I say turn out, fortunately, to be aimed at misunderstandings of what I mean. When the misunderstandings are corrected, the objections, too, seem to be withdrawn in most cases. I blame the misunderstandings on my imperfect ability to explain clearly, as much as on the recipient’s jumping to conclusions. That’s all right – it’s the best we can do with language.

HB:

Maybe we can really call it misunderstandings. So maybe it’s the best to start where misunderstandings appear. When we were privately talking about connection between genetic control and “essential variables”, you stopped answering at my last question. Two month later you started the thread on CSGnet, so we never finished our conversation.

The topics seemed very important to me, as I thought that you theory is having a “bug”. If “essential variables” have genetically set reference levels, how is possible that there is no direct connection between genes and “essential variables” to set genetic reference levels ? Is this the case also today ?

GENES AND INHERITANCE OF BEHAVIOR

HB : Maybe I don’t understand you right. Are you saying that there is no
inherited particular behavior ? There is no inborn behaviors ?

BP: Yes, that is what I’m saying. What we commonly speak of as a behavior, however, is not a physical action by the brain on its environment at all, but only a sensory consequence of a physical action. Sensory consequences can be inherited if we inherit perceptual input functions and reference signals in inherited control systems.

HB :

If I understand right here you talk about “commonly speaking of behavior” not about all behaviors. But I asked you about inborn behaviors.

I suppose what you explained are “learned” behaviors in Ashby’s notation. Behaviors that are closing the control loop. And I already agreed with you about that

But for ex. Ashby is rather explicit that there are also other behaviors which are inborn. Can you explain “caughing”, newborn babys’ cry, … How can we explain other reflexes of newborn ? Can you explain “defending behaviors” of animals when stimulating centers of hypothalamus ?

I don’t doubt in your knowledge about perceptual control theory. But why inborn behaviors are there ? What is their function ?

Best,

Boris

[From Bill Powers (2012.09.25.2020 MDT)]

Hi Bill,

The point here is that what you are doing is called
“observing.” It’s fairly easy to show that what you are
observing is not the reality itself, directly, but some sensory
representation of it.

HB : Some sensory “representation” ?

BP: Yes, we call it a perceptual signal. Such signals are the first thing
that the brain can detect concerning any physical stimulus.

HB :

You put my initials on your thoughts in the beginning. I hope that
everybody noticed that I’m not so clever J. Seems that we both write in a
hurry.

You would do me a favour if you use initials HB as Rick was
“playing” with Bob Heinz initials as BH with no
explanation. Knowing him, I had a “feeling” that there
was something behind. You know his sense of humor. So I’d rather be
HB.

BP: OK.

HB: Are you trying to say that
there is less awarness if we close our eyes ?

BP:No, I am saying there is less to be aware of. This example is part of
the argument that what we experience consists of neural signals, not the
external reality itself. When you close your eyes you do not make the
visual scene invisible to anyone else, but you do cut off the signals in
your own brain that (we assume) depend on the world outside. Those
signals are what look to awareness like a real three-dimensional
universe.

HB: Are we
“playing” with the amount of awarness to see what’s left when
there is no actually controlled perceptual signals ? And if I understood
right we are looking for “something” in our brain, for the
observer, who is “shifting” our attention, is aware of
thinking, talking and so on ?

BP: We aren’t “looking for” the observer: we are the
observer. We are observers looking at neural signals. That’s the
proposal, anyway.

HB: Can we say that awarness exist on every level of hierarchy ? So in
the evolution every organism on some lower levels of controlled
perceptual organization has some awarness (consciousness) : dogs, cats,
mice… worms, maybe even bacteria has some kind of awarness of
gradients. I’m guessing. But why not guessing in the course of your
hypothesis, that every organism consist of some limited number of
organized control units on different levels, which probably exhibit some
level of awarness. And the final “observer” in human could be
maybe integration of all “lower level awarness”.

BP: That’s possible, but I see no way to verify it (or disprove it).
Knowing essentially nothing about the mechanism or nature of awareness, I
find it hard to guess which organisms have it (or are it) and which
don’t.

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP AND
CONFLICT

BP: So telling me I am going in circles is not a criticism? Should I then
understand that you approve of my going in circles?

HB :

I don’t see it as criticism. I was trying to tell you that you could
reconsider some basics of PCT. So you see, I’m not approving you
“going in circles”.

BP: I deduce, then, that you would like me not to go in circles.
Otherwise, why mention it?

HB:

Maybe we can really call it misunderstandings. So maybe it’s the best to
start where misunderstandings appear. When we were privately talking
about connection between genetic control and “essential
variables”, you stopped answering at my last question. Two month
later you started the thread on CSGnet, so we never finished our
conversation.

BP: Remind me of what we were talking about. Just give me the time and
date of that last post.

HB: The topics seemed very
important to me, as I thought that you theory is having a
“bug”. If “essential variables” have genetically set
reference levels, how is possible that there is no direct connection
between genes and “essential variables” to set genetic
reference levels ? Is this the case also today ?

BP: Perhaps that was when I decided you just weren’t paying attention.
Inheriting a reference level is not the same thing as inheriting a
behavior. In fact I assume that the bower bird inherits a set of
reference levels for the way a nest will appear (that is, for a few of
the perceptual features of the nest). It might even inherit some aspects
of perceptual input functions. This in no way specifies the behaviors
that a bower bird in modern New Guinea or Australia would have to
generate to make perceptions that match the reference
conditions.

GENES AND INHERITANCE OF
BEHAVIOR

HB : Maybe I don’t understand
you right. Are you saying that there is no

inherited particular behavior ? There is no inborn behaviors ?

BP: Yes, that is what I’m
saying. What we commonly speak of as a behavior, however, is not a
physical action by the brain on its environment at all, but only a
sensory consequence of a physical action. Sensory consequences can be
inherited if we inherit perceptual input functions and reference signals
in inherited control systems.

HB :

If I understand right here you
talk about “commonly speaking of behavior” not about all
behaviors. But I asked you about inborn behaviors.

I suppose what you explained
are “learned” behaviors in Ashby’s notation. Behaviors that are
closing the control loop. And I already agreed with you about that

But for ex. Ashby is rather
explicit that there are also other behaviors which are inborn. Can you
explain “caughing”, newborn babys’ cry, … How can we explain
other reflexes of newborn ? Can you
explain “defending behaviors” of animals when stimulating
centers of hypothalamus ?

I will grant you the simplest and clearly unlearned “inborn”
behaviors, like the ones you mention first, because they don’t seem to be
learned and they do involve specific muscles and muscle actions. It
doesn’t seem likely, however, that they are controlled variables in
themselves. If you give a baby cough medicine to stop the cough, does the
baby find some other way to cough? I don’t think so. However, the cough
could be the action of an inherited control system counteracting an
irritation in the throat.

I
don’t doubt in your knowledge about perceptual control theory. But why
inborn behaviors are there ? What is their function
?

BP: I think you will find them discussed mostly in terms of basic
reflexes. So far all of them I have seen can easily be interpreted as
inherited control systems with inherited (or adjustable) reference
levels.

Even a behavior as simple as coughing varies with circumstances, in its
timing, its intensity, the duration of coughing, and (speaking of my own
experiences) the location of the irritation in the throat. So the actual
pattern of coughing would not be inheritable as it would depend on what
is producing the irritation that the coughing counteracts. It’s even
possible that much of the coughing pattern is learned, though I know of
no data about that.

My point is that behavior, in a control system, does not have any fixed
pattern. The whole point of negative feedback control that makes it
unique among modes of behavior is that it is adjusted in present time so
as to produce a specific effect. Variations in the environment guarantee
that this can be done only through variations in behavior, not by
repetitions of the same behavior pattern.

My frequent explanations of this central feature of negative feedback
control systems make me wonder if this might be the one central point
about PCT that has to be fully communicated before any of the rest of it
can make sense. Almost everybody seems to assume that the way to repeat a
given result of action is to repeat the action. But that can work only in
protected and highly uniform environments, with constant properties
and freedom from unpredictable disturbances. I don’t think any such
environments exist naturally, or can be constructed. The common
assumption is that if the environment is allowed to vary, the result must
vary, too, and that is not true of negative feedback control, either. So
ordinary common sense tells everyone that the behavior of negative
feedback control systems is impossible!

Best,

Bill P.

···

At 09:40 PM 9/25/2012 +0200, Boris Hartman wrote: