[Martin Taylor 950213 16:15]
Bill Leach 950210.02:28 EST
PCT is
non-judgemental as far as morality or ethics is concerned (and I know
that you know that).
When I first read this comment, I said to myself "Yes, I know that." But
then on more reflection, I began to wonder, and finally to come to the
conclusion that I DON'T know that.
Consider: What is a system of ethics, or a set of moral principles (that
others in the SAME society would agree to be "moral"? Is it not a set of
reference levels for perceptions at the principles level? If that's
what is meant by a system of ethics, then PCT is by no means neutral
in respect of what is moral or ethical. Here's why I think that. It's
the same argument I used about the development and drift of linguistic
convention in Durango 93 (and by extension about other social convention).
One of the theoretical concepts underpinning PCT is the concept of
reorganization. When one's intrinsic variables cannot be kept within
a reasonable level of error, something changes in the perceptual control
hierarchy. Whether you think that the reorganization happens globally
or locally doesn't matter here--either way, the physiological intrinsic
variables will not be kept near their reference levels if the perceptual
control hierarchy is not usually successful in maintaining control of
its various controlled perceptions (aside: could this be why ill health
is strongly associated with relative poverty, regardless of whether
health sevices are privatized or public?).
All humans live in some kind of society, meaning that their perceptual
control success depends in large part on the actions of other people, and
vice-versa. If one kind of action often disturbs other people in such a
way as to reduce one's own control, that action will tend to disappear
during successful reorganization. Or else the perceptual function related
to that outut signal will change. Either way, something in the hierarchy
changes so as to reduce the persistence of error. This happens not only
in oneself, but also in other people in the same society. And the changes
continue to happen so long as the ways people interact fail to allow enough
people adequate control.
In reorganization, not all changes are for the better, but societies in which
most people do not find ways to control their perceptions effectively cannot
remain dynamically stable. If the various reorganizations of the individuals
DO result in a sufficient number of the people having adequate control, the
society will be reasonably stable (though of course not for an indefinite
time). Under these conditions, most people will, of necessity, be effectively
controlling their principles-level perceptions. I assert that the sets of
reference levels that are found in the population of any reasonably stable
society will be what that society finds to be "moral" and "ethical."
It is of course not true that everyone will have the same reference levels
for principles perceptions, even in a totally stable society. For example,
a feudal autocracy might be such a system, in which a serf controls for
satisfying the lord's wishes, and the king controls for directing his
nobles in such a way that they remain happy with him. There's a kind
of relational perception here, at the principles level--if such a thing
can be imagined: everyone controls for the perception that the king should
be obeyed by the noble, whether the perceiver is king, noble, or serf.
That set of relational perceptions is the underlying system of ethics for
the society. If the king started to be democratic, asking the nobles to
vote on policy matters, he would be seen to be an ineffective and
improper king, perhaps to be supplanted by a usurper after a revolution.
The revolution would be seen as ethical and moral. But if the reference
levels for principles, and the failure to control for those perceptions
was the cause of the revolution, the same social structure might well
be reconstituted after the revolution (like the American Revolution,
after which the revolutionaries generated a constitution as much like
the Royal British political system as they could do under the circumstances,
and wrote it down so as to make it difficult to change).
I think PCT says not which references at the principles level should be
considered moral, but which sets of references constitute possible systems
of ethics or morality. We may not be able at present to model the complex
interactions involved with different proposed ethical systems, but it should
be possible some day. PCT says that when that day comes, some proposals
will be shown to represent possible systems of ethics, whereas other proposals
would lead to societies that change rapidly or die out. Such transitional
societies could not be said to have any solid morality.
Once one has decided on a set of high level systems concepts the PCT can
be used to see if the concepts themselves or the rules and standards
established to support the concepts ARE or ARE NOT consistant.
Is the foregoing a reasonable elaboration of what you are saying?
Martin
